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Spiral Jetty in 2003 
1- Motivations 
This thesis grew out of a number of questions which I wanted to see 
resolved. 
Firstly: I had encountered several passing references made to systems- 
theory, cybernetics, the systems-thinking approach and so forth; but was 
unable to determine exactly on what terms these vocabularies were being 
evoked. These references appeared in texts connected to both of my 
research interests: art after Modernism and Historiography. For example 
conceptual artists working with systems and seriality, such as Burnham, 
Haacke, Bochner and Sol-Lewitt, have made reference to `systems' in their 
work; and Robert Smithson, who peppered his writings with allusions to 
`systems, ' included von Bertlanffy's General System's Theory and Weiner's 
Cybernetics amongst his library of scientific texts! Some critical writing had 
picked up on this tendency (for example Lawrence Alloway's short paper, 
`Network: the Artwork Described as a System, '2 (1972) and in particular 
Burnham's writings) But this can be observed as a now passed historical 
moment, interconnected with the prevalence of conceptual art and the 
`Dematerialisation of the Art Object' in the late 1960's and early 
I See Ann Reynolds, Robert Smithson: Learning from New Jersey and Elsewhere, (MIT 
Press, 2003) for the appendix: a catalogue of Smithson's entire library. 
2 Alloway, `Network: the Artwork Described as a System, ' Ar forum (1972) 
Reprinted in Alloway, Network. Art and the Complex Present, (UMI Research 
Publishing, 1984) 
3 For example Burnham wrote, "[The] cultural obsession with the art object is 
slowly disappearing and being replaced by what might be called `systems 
consciousness. ' Actually, this shifts from the direct shaping of matter to a concern 
for organizing quantities of energy and information. " In Burnham, Beyond Modern 
Sculpture: The Effects of Science and Technology on the Sculpture of This Century (George 
Braziller, 1968) See also by Burnham: `Systems Esthetics' Arforum, Vol. 7, No. 1, 
(September 1968) pg. 30-35 - also online at. - 
http: //cadre. sjsu. edu/artl03/spring98/readings/system. html (consulted 
Dec. 2003); `Real Time Systems, ' Artforum, Vol. 8, No. 1, (September 1969) pg. 49- 
55; 'The Aesthetics of Intelligent Systems, ' in On the Future ofArt (Viking Press, 
1970), pg 95-122 
Seventies. 4 In addition, in 1984 Michael Ann Holly had made a passing 
reference to von Bertalanffy's General System's Theory in her comparison of 
Riegl and Panofsky. s She was later to remark to me that she had done so 
because at a certain time Systems Theory was very fashionable and was being 
vigorously discussed across a wide variety of disciplines; and the 
implications seemed very exciting. ' 
However, if it seems that this appetite for the application of even a 
very general systems-thinking approach within artistic, cultural or historical 
analyses has abated somewhat then this is only within the English-speaking 
world of Art and Art History. In German speaking academia, for example, 
Systems-Theory is well-established in its application within sociology; 
centred particularly around the work of Niklas Luhmann. To the contrary 
in English academia, and Art History in particular, he has provoked little 
interest; and there has still been no systematic attempt in English to apply 
his systems-theoretical approach to Art Historical issues. This is 
undoubtedly a reflection of the fact that he was, until very recently, not 
translated in English (Social Systems translated in 1997 and Art as a Social 
System in 2000) and his death in 1998. Independently of Luhmann, and 
outside the humanities, however the discourse of Systems-Thinking itself is 
a burgeoning discipline with applications as diverse as economics, 
evolutionary biology, management, and so forth. The area of application 
4 Key exhibitions which exemplify the theme of conceptualism as it can be applied 
to `systems' and Lucy Lippard's historical conception of the dematerialised art object 
are: Information (July, 1970, MOMA) and Software: Information Technology - Its New 
Meaning forArts, (1970, Jewish Museum, NY) See too: Lippard, Six Years: the 
Dematerialization of theArt Object, (University of California Press, 1997 [1974]) 
5 Michael Ann Holly, Panofsky and the Foundations ofArt History, (Cornell University 
Press, 1984) pg. 70,76,79 
6 Michael Ann Holly in conversation with the author at the colloquium: Framing 
Art History: Reflections on the discipline, (A European Science Foundation Exploratory 
Workshop, ) Edinburgh College of Art, March 13-15,2003 
that has proved particularly exciting is the ongoing dialogue between 
cognitive science and philosophy when framed by the discursive strategies 
of systems, complexity, emergence and so forth'. 
Secondly: As I discuss in the introduction, where I outline the central 
problem which this thesis seeks to address, I feel that it is often the case 
that the radical implications of post-modern art practice are lost because 
they are observed through the critical lens of a historical and critical model 
which is, at heart, modernist. By saying this I mean to expand upon Craig 
Owens' claim that: 
The poststructuralist critique could not possibly be absorbed by art 
history without a significant reduction in its polemical force, or 
without a total transformation of art history itself' 
beyond the linguistic application he proposed for it; that is, to include art 
practice as part of that critique. In other words I work from the 
assumption that art after Modernism challenges us to find new critical 
paradigms by which to account for it. This thesis is an attempt to 
investigate Systems Theory as such a paradigm. 
2- Implications 
There are two further points that I wish to make about the adoption of the 
systems-theoretical approach as an art historian. These points also reflect 
7 For an recent survey of these debates see: Petitot, Varela, Pachoud & Roy (eds., ) 
Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, 
(Stanford University Press, 2000). I discuss the systems-theoretical approach to 
cognitive models in more detail in chapter 4. 
8 Owens, `Representation, Appropriation and Power, ' in Owens, Beyond Recognition, 
(University of California Press, 1992) 
my joint research concerns in late 20`h Century artistic practice and 
historiography. They are: 
Firstly: I argue that it is particularly effective in dealing with art after 
Modernism which is characterised by, amongst other things: non-visual 
qualities; unstable, or de-materialised physicality and an engagement (often 
politicised) with the institutional systems of support. By prioritising the 
systems of support over the individual work of art, such an approach is not 
tied by an umbilical cord of vision to an analysis based on what individual 
works of art look like. 
Secondly: I have identified a tradition within art historical writing, what 
Podro called the Critical Historians ofAn, that is known in the German 
tradition as Kunstwissenschaft (the systematic, or rigorous study of art. ) I 
have done so both as a means of clarifying what I mean when I say Art 
History; but also as a means of identifying a tradition within art history of 
self-reflexivity and systematic investigation of methods and limits. And 
this is something found in non-German scholarship too, as Podro said: 
This German tradition is not altogether isolated; it is not without 
relation to the writing of Ruskin, Pater and Fry in England, or to 
Viollet-le Duc, Taine and later Focillon and Francastel in France, or 
to that of Croce, Leonello Venturi and others in Italy. " 
From a systems-theoretical perspective it is an interesting question in its 
own right to ask why the Critical Historians ofArt have become the 
dominant mode of historiography (since the 1980s at least). As a discourse 
it has become, in systems-theoretical terms, `locked-in' (via positive 
feedback) which certainly makes it a valid one to engage with. 
9 Podro, The Critical Historians ofArt, (Yale University Press, 1982) pg. xxi 
It is my argument that the Systems-Theoretical approach to art 
history ultimately belongs to this tradition and is not in opposition to it. In 
summary, it is not my intention to either attack or defend a straw-man, or 
flimsy stereotype of what art history is. I am rather, throughout this thesis, 
seeking a body of work, a canon, or discursive system, with which to 
engage. In what follows I argue that the systems-theoretical approach to art 
history is a continuation of this rich and worthy heritage - that is of finding 
an historical model to match the art of scrutiny - not a break from it. 
SECTION ONE 
Conceptual Issues 
Introduction: 
The Problem of Observing Spiral Jetty 
1- Introduction 
In its most radical form Post-modern art presents a significant problem to 
traditional Art Historical method; that of how best to account for its 
paradox and complexity. In the following chapter I use Robert Smithson's 
Spiral Jetty (1970; Utah) to investigate this theme more fully. My motivation 
in doing this is to introduce the central challenge which my thesis as a 
whole seeks to address; that of finding a vocabulary by which to discuss 
artistic practice and discourse produced in the 2"d half of the 20th Century. 
And to do so in a manner which recognises that practice's distinction from 
modernism by distancing its own discursive observations from the Modern 
paradigms of traditional art historical vocabularies. In the chapters 
following this one I introduce my thesis that the systems-theoretical 
approach to Art History provides such vocabularies and thus new, and 
effective heuristic strategies. 
An implicit suggestion in this opening chapter (and in fact the 
thesis as a whole) is that these problems are not unique to Spiral Jetty but 
can instead be seen as an allegory for the problems which Art Historians 
must constantly negotiate in order to practice. This is because whilst an 
account of Spiral Jetty must grapple with the problems with the tried and 
tested methods the art historian have at their disposal these are problems 
which any study based on the analysis of objects and the way they look will 
have to confront. 
A first hand experience of Spiral Jetty is difficult to achieve. Having 
negotiated the relative remoteness of Spiral Jetty, one encounters first hand 
the physical volatility of the sculpture which makes it so hard to observe. 
Smithson: Spiral Jetty, (1970; Utah) in 2003 
Picture - New York Times Magazine 
This means that if you are prepared to make the hour long drive on dusty 
tracks to the edge of the Salt Lake there is no guarantee that you'll be able 
to see the sculpture itself. In 1972 the brackish waters of the salt lake rose 
to submerge it and it has emerged at various points since then with no 
regularity. 
This provides a specific example of a problem which most art 
historians will have to face at one point or another in their career - the loss 
of their object. 
In his edited companion to the work of Robert Smithson Robert 
Hobbs gives the following physical description of the location and 
composition of Spiral Jetty - 
Spiral Jetty, Rozel Point, Great Salt Lake, Utah, April 
1970; Mud, precipitated salt crystals, rocks, water; coil 
1500 ft long and 15 ft wide. '0 
But this is not the whole story. Spiral jetty is a complex work; we might 
even call it a system. Different aspects of this system include: the Sculpture 
in the Salt Lake, which Smithson completed in 1970; the 35 minute 16mm 
film which Smithson made; the essay Smithson wrote about the work; the 
photographs taken by Smithson and Gianfranco Gorgoni of the work and 
its creation; the sketches Smithson made in preparation; the performance 
of the work's creation, and so on, and so on. And this extends beyond the 
work itself to the whole system of essays, photographs, films projects and 
so forth which have been produced in response to the work. 
Given these multiple sites (and, to use Smithson's own term `non- 
sites') which offer themselves up in competition for one's critical attention 
the problematic of how to prioritise which aspect to focus on becomes the 
1O Hobbs, Robert Smithson; Scupture, (Smithmark, 1981) pg. 191 
central feature of the way in which the work is approached. As Owens has 
observed: 
Like the nonsite the jetty is not a discreet work, but 
one link in a chain of signifiers which summon and 
refer to one another in a dizzying spiral. For where else 
does the jetty exist except in the film which Smithson 
made, the narrative he published, the photographs 
which accompany that narrative, and the various maps, 
diagrams, drawings, etc. , 
he made about it? 
Unintelligible at close range, the spiral form of the jetty 
is completely intuitable only from a distance, and that 
distance is most often achieved by imposing a text 
between viewer and work... That Smithson thus 
transformed the visual field into a textual one 
represents one of the most significant aesthetic 
"events" of our decade; and the publication of his 
collected writings constitutes a challenge to criticism to 
come to terms with the textual nature of his work, and 
of postmodernism in general. That challenge is 
formidable, since it requires the jettisoning of most of 
our received notions about art; it can only be 
acknowledged here. " 
This reading of Spiral Jetty follows Owens' own political agenda and 
his prioritisation of the textual forms part a polemic application of the 
literary form of Post-Structural critique within the visual field of art history. 
It may be observed that Owens' politicised application of the strategies of 
deconstruction took place at a particular historical moment. It may also be 
claimed that the wake of the waves of deconstruction which crashed upon 
the island shores of Art History have abated somewhat. Nevertheless the 
central challenge which Owens identifies that Spiral Jetty presents to Art 
History remains. This is a challenge which goes to the very heart of Art 
Historical method and calls its very reliance upon visuality and iconography 
into question. For if, as Owens states, Spiral Jetty is but one link in a chain 
ti Craig Owens, `Earthwords', Beyond Recognition, (University of California Press, 
1992), pg. 47 
of signifiers which are not only visual but textual, aural, oral and even 
olfactory, then how is it that we as Art Historians should approach it? It 
would seem that the Art Historian's trusty apparatus of formal analysis and 
visual iconography - of doughty detective work and sleuthing in the 
archives to find things that look like other things (like spirals, circles and 
shoes) will not work in the face of a work which will, by its very complex 
nature, resist such easy simplification. This is because with work such as 
this it is the very visuality, upon which the method of iconography, relies is 
itself radically destabilised. Central to this destabilisation is the questioning 
of the structural form of iconography itself. This challenge involves an 
interrogation of the positing of a discreet, direct and logical symbolic 
correspondence within the visual icon (or sign) to that which it signifies 
and the system which mediates this representation. 
2- Sensism 
Any mode of analysis which limits itself to one sense alone will be a flawed 
account of experience. This is because it does not recognise the multi- 
sensory nature of that experience and as a result will not be a satisfactory 
basis for a thorough historical account. For the majority of us we will not 
have a visual impression without attendant experiences received from the 
other senses; hearing, touch, taste and smell. Because this is something 
which forms an integral part of experiential life it requires little proof in 
order to be accepted. However - what has also been suggested is that the 
senses can effect one another in an interconnected interaction. This is to 
say that individual senses can both intensify, diminish and alter the role and 
input of other senses depending on how experience is framed by 
understanding at a particular time. 
That our experience is multi-sensory can be demonstrated by the 
ways in which the senses can influence one another. Chef Heston 
Blumenthal gives the following example of how perception is influenced 
across the senses: 
It is possible to alter the perception of the texture of and, by 
association, the freshness of a potato crisp by using sound. 
Listening, (through headphones) to the crunching sound made 
while eating crisps has a dramatic effect on the level of crispness of 
the crisp itself. Increase the frequency and or volume and the crisp 
becomes crunchier and perceptively fresher. Turn the sound or 
frequency down however and it becomes less crunchy and stale. So 
here... we have used sound to create an illusion. " 
At his restaurant The Fat Duck, Blumenthal uses this type of cross- 
sensory illusion in his own cookery to trick the taster into new and 
unexpected tastes and sensations by giving them, for example, something 
that tastes different from what is expected from the way that it looks. An 
example of this is an orange and beetroot jelly which is presented as a slice 
of two coloured jellies; orange and deep purple. The diner is fooled by their 
sight because one expects, due to the visual prompts of the jelly's colours 
that a mouthful taken from the left will tastes of orange while the purple 
gel, on the right will taste of beetroot. "In fact", Blumenthal explains, "it is 
the other way round! The expected orange gel is made from yellow 
beetroot juice and the beetroot [coloured gel] from blood orange juice. So 
here, the sense of sight is fooling the taster's expectation. " He gives a 
further example of a pate des fruits which is served as a petit four: 
12 Heston Blumenthal, Fat Duck News, Pour La Science', Emailed newsletter, (April, 
2003) 
It is made from pumpkin juice. If this is eaten blindfolded, it has 
a slightly earthy character and a subtle taste of pumpkin. When 
the blindfold is removed and the pate tasted again it tastes of 
apricot. Here, the taster focuses purely on the flavour. When the 
blindfold is removed however, the sense of sight comes into play 
once more and begins to fool. It seems that the presence of 
acidity produced by the tartaric acid (required to set the gel) along 
with the colour helps to steer the taster into thinking that it has a 
fruity taste. " 
This view can also be supported by various experiments into the workings 
of perception, from both a physiological and psychological perspective, 
which identify its cross-modal nature. 
In the examples of ventriloquism, the relationships between audio 
and visual perception have been investigated with a view to seeking how to 
describe the two modes of perception can become conflated. Ventriloquism 
occurs when we attribute the source of a sound to a source based upon a 
visual prompt. This is like when we are `fooled' into attributing the sound 
of the ventriloquist's dummy to the dummy itself, or when we `forget' that 
voices of actors on the cinema screen are not emanating from the moving 
image itself but instead from loudspeakers. As Bertelson noted from his 
own experiments: 
The example of the ventriloquist is interesting to psychologists 
because it illustrates the perceptual integration of data from 
different modalities, here vision and audition. Just as speakers 
produce streams of changes available to both ear and eye, most 
real life events produce correlated inputs to several of our senses. 
Yet, most research on perception considers one modality at a 
time. In comparison, the problems of how simultaneous inputs to 
several modalities are combined has received relatively little 
attention. 
14 
13 Heston Blumenthal, Fat Duck News, Tour La Science, Emailed newsletter, (April, 
2003) 
14 Bertleson, `Starting From the Ventriloquist; The Perception of Multimodal 
Events, ' in Sabourin, Fergus et al (Eds. ) Advances in Prychological Science, voL 2: 
Biological and Cognitive Aspects, (Psychology Press, 1998) pg. 419-439. 
Ventriloquism occurs because experience is constructed from the 
manifold of perception (in the Kantian sense) which is then synthesised 
into a conceptual unity by understanding. It is in this synthesis where 
ambiguities can arise as Bertelson has identified: 
In real life, the stimulation of different senses occurs all the time. 
Some stimuli originate in the same external events, others in 
separate ones. How does the system know which data belong 
together? This is the problem of pairing, in the terms of Wallach 
(1968) and Epstein (1975), or of the unity assumption, following 
Welch and Warren (1980). 15 
In one particular experiment subjects were played sounds to either their left 
or their right synchronously with a flashing LED light source again to the 
right and left. As Bertleson surmised: "the results so far supported the 
notion of an automatic attraction of the apparent locations of the sounds 
by the flashing light, s16 which is to say that given the visual prompt of the 
light simultaneously with the sound the subject was more likely to attribute 
the sound as coming from the same side as the light regardless of the actual 
sound source. Further examples of ventriloquism include those by Saldana 
and Rosenblum in which the decision of a subject in identifying the sounds 
of a cello being either plucked or bowed were strongly influenced by the 
visual prompt of a cello being plucked or bowed. 17 In the McGurk and 
15 Bertleson, `Starting From the Ventriloquist; The Perception of Multimodal 
Events, ' in Sabourin, Fergus et al (Eds) Advances in Prychological Science, vol 2: 
Biological and Cognitive Aspects, (Psychology Press, 1998) pg. 419-439. The references 
referred to are: Wallach, `Informational Discrepancy as a Basis of Perceptual 
Adaptation. ' in Freeman (Ed. ), The Neuropsychology of Spatially Orientated Behaviour, 
(Dorsey Press, 1968); Epstein, `Recalibration by Pairing a Process of Perceptual 
Learning, ' Perception, 4, (1975), pg. 59-74; Welch & Warren, `Immediate Perceptual 
Response to Intersensory Discrepancy, ' Prychological Bulletin, 88, (1980) pg. 638-667 
16 Bertleson, `Starting From the Ventriloquist; The Perception of Multimodal 
Events, ' in Sabourin, Fergus et al (Eds. ) Advances in Psychological Science, voL 2: 
Biological and Cognitive Aspects, (Psychology Press, 1998) pg. 428 
17 Saldana & Rosenblum, `Visual Influences on Auditory Pluck and Bow 
Judgements, ' Perception and Psychophysics, 54, (1993), pg. 406-416 
Macdonald experiment short speech sounds were dubbed over video 
recordings of mouths uttering different sounds which lead to the visual 
prompts influencing the sounds that were heard. It was found that when 
the sound baba was played simultaneously with the video of a mouth 
uttering gaga then a `large proportion' of the subjects heard the sound 
DADA. 18 
Additional studies which investigate the phenomenon of 
ventriloquism across different sensory modalities all suggest that our sensory 
experiences are not discreet but interconnected to such an extent so as to 
be influential to one another. This is demonstrated by the study of moving 
visual prompts such as that of, `The Ventriloquist in Motion: Illusory 
Capture of Dynamic Information Across Sensory Modalities' in which it 
was observed that when viewing a shift of lights from left to right 
synchronously with a sound source shifting in the opposite direction the 
results achieved demonstrated the apparent direction of a sound, as 
opposed to just the source, could also be influenced by visual prompts. 19 
What the above examples demonstrate is that the nature of our 
experience is such that we will have many sensory impressions at once that 
can both influence and conflict with one another. This leads us to 
18 And likewise the soundgaga superimposed on the visual prompt baba lead to the 
sound BABGA being reported. In McGurk & MacDonald, `Hearing Lips and 
Seeing Voices, ' Nature, 264, (1976), pg. 746-48 
19 The results of the present study demonstrate a strong crossmodal interaction in 
the domain of motion perception. In particular our findings suggest the obligatory 
perceptual integration of dynamic information across sensory modalities, often 
producing an illusory reversal if the true direction of the auditory apparent motion 
(originally unambiguous if presented in isolation). Further, support for the 
uniqueness of this phenomenon comes from the fact that dynamic capture was 
shown to depend on apparent motion being captured. ' Soto-Faraco, Lyons, 
Gazzaniga, Spence, Kingstone, `The Ventriloquist in Motion: Illusory Capture of 
Dynamic Information Across Sensory Modalities, ' Cognitive Brain Research, 14, 
(2002) pg. 139-146 
experience discontinuous but simultaneous events (such as those which we 
see at hear at the same time) as causally related. Further it has also been 
shown that the occurrence of cross-modality across the senses is not 
limited to sight and sound alone and can extend to smell, taste and touch. 
Given the specific example of smell it has been demonstrated that relative 
intensity of smell can be influenced by both visual and auditory sources to 
such an extent that by focusing ones attention upon the experience of one 
sense one can diminish the role of the other senses. This is because in 
certain situations we might focus attention onto a particular sensory mode 
to the detriment of the other senses, as Spence et al explain: 
Taken together with previous results from studies attending to 
audition, vision and touch, our results support the view that 
there is a common pool of attentional resources for the 
processing of auditory, visual, tactile and olfactory stimuli. It 
appears that people can selectively direct this pool of 
attentional resources to a particular modality (or modalities), 
resulting in the preferential processing of stimuli in that (or 
those) modalities compared with the processing of stimuli in 
the other "unattended" modalities20 
In support of his various experiments (of which the above experiments are 
exemplary) into the diverse and interconnected nature of sensory 
experience experimental Psychologist Charles Spence has called this 
multisensory aspect of experience Sensi W'. 
Spence has called for a `regaining of sensory balance. ' He claims 
that the contemporary world is one in which we are subject to a `sensory 
20 Spence, McGlone, Kettenmann, Kobal, `Attention to Olfaction; A 
Psychophysical Investigation, ' Experimental Brain Research, [Published online] (10th 
April, 2001). The results of this experiment were reported as follows; `symbolic 
auditory clues which predict the likely target modality on a trial-by-trial basis can 
influence discrimination latencies and/or accuracy for olfactory and visual targets 
presented in the expected versus unexpected modality, with better performance in 
the former case. ' 
21 Spence, The ICI Report on The Secrets of the Senses, (ICI, 2003) 
assault' whereby our perceptual system runs the risk of becoming 
overloaded and jaded. Further, he argues, this assault on our senses is 
predominantly a visual one: "Sensory deprivation is an ailment of modern 
society. While our visual senses overdose on information, the emotional 
sense of touch and smell are neglected. "22 
3- Modernity, Technology and Visuality 
Spence's claim, that we live in a world that is somehow too visual is a 
familiar one. The move to a visual culture as a definition of the sociological 
conditions of Modernity is one that has been well documented. Such an 
example might be McLuhan's arguments in Understanding Media; The 
Extensions ofMan that the modern separation of the senses, as explained by 
Spence in psychophysical terms, is technologically determined: 
Each form of transport [of information] not only carries, but 
translates and transforms, the sender, receiver, and the message. 
The use of any kind of medium or extension of man alters the 
patterns of interdependence among people, as it alters the ratios 
among our senses? ' 
For Mcluhan Modernity and rationality were orientated around the same 
axis, that of visuality. This is because it was this optical turn which ensured 
the primacy of objectivity and rationality: 
It is this uniform, connected and visual order that we still use as 
the norm of "rational" living. In our electric age of instant and 
non-visual forms of interrelation, therefore, we find ourselves 
at a loss to define the "rational", if only because we never 
noticed whence it came in the first place 24 
22Spence, The ICI Report on The Secrets of the Senses, (ICI, 2003) pg. 7 
23McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions ofMan, (Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1964) pg. 99 
24 ibid. pg. 129. Emphasis added. 
That said, overall Mcluhan was an optimist, rather like Spence, and 
suggests that the hegemony of the visual might be broken by the potentials 
of new technologies. He was positive in his outlook in so far as he felt 
confident in predicting a return, within the Global Village to the oral and 
aural cultures of some pre-modern, pre-lapsarian state of integrated sensory 
life facilitated by new technologies 25 
Benjamin on the other hand, provided a considerably more 
pessimistic prognosis of humanity in the visual world of Modernity. Susan 
Buck-Morss has convincingly argued that Benjamin advanced the thesis in 
`The Artwork in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' that Modernity is 
defined by, "the crisis in cognitive experience caused by the alienation of 
the senses that make it possible for humanity to view its own destruction 
with enjoyment. "M This enjoyment was enabled in the form of Fascism 
which, Benjamin argued, functioned through the bringing of aesthetics into 
the arena of politics. For Benjamin, like Marx before him and Debord and 
Baudrillard in his wake, modernity was defined as being phantasmagoric; as 
an image of reality, a spectacle or simulacra that somehow masked and 
perverted the basic and material order of things. As Buck-Morss explained 
of the word phantasmagoria (in relation to the visual turn within 
modernity): 
It describes an appearance of reality that tricks the senses 
through technological manipulation. And as new technologies 
multiplied in the nineteenth century, so did the potential for 
phantasmagoric effects. [In footnote] Technology thus 
develops with a double function. On the one hand, it extends 
the human senses, increasing the acuity of perception, and 
forces the universe to open itself up to penetration by the 
u See McLuhan & Fiore, War and Peace in the Global Village, (1968), (Hardwired, 
1997) 
26 Susan Buck-Morss, `Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin's Artwork 
Essay Reconsidered, ' October, 62, (Fall, 1992) pg. 3-43 
human sensory apparatus. On the other hand, precisely because 
this technological extension leaves the senses open to exposure, 
technology doubles back on the senses as protection in the 
form of illusion, taking over the role of the ego in order to 
provide defensive insulation. 27 
4- Art History and Modernity 
This is the point at which the spiral of this discussion loops back upon 
itself to the starting point of Art History. What has been argued up to this 
point is that our experience is not explicable in terms of separate senses but 
rather it needs to be acknowledged that all sensory experience forms part 
of an interconnected experiential continuum. It has been suggested that 
even within the field of Perceptual Psychology, as Bertleson has observed 
that "most research on perception considers one modality at a time, " to the 
detriment of a more holistic understanding of the continuum of 
experience. It has also been demonstrated that we are capable of 
cognitively and conceptually separating our senses but that in doing so we 
run the risk of over-prioritising one sense at the expense of others or a 
more full account of experience. 
It was then suggested that Modernity might be defined as the over- 
prioritisation of sight. The prioritisation of the visual therefore provides a 
set of common criteria seen to be shared between Art History and 
Modernity2ß which would benefit from further elucidation with specific 
reference paid to Art History's History in relation to visuality. With this in 
mind what follows in the discussion below is the investigation of the 
suggestion that when we, as art historians, focus our attentions upon the 
27 Ibid. pg. 22 
28 For other ways of defining this intersection see Mansfield (ed. ), Art History and 
its Institutions: Foundations of a Discipline, (Routledge, 2002) especially Mansfield, `Art 
History and Modernism. ' 
sense of sight alone then other senses, which also constitute the totality of 
experience, fade into the background of our understanding. 
Riegl made an explicit connection between modernity and visuality 
in terms of the balance between optic and tactile (haptic) conceptions of 
space. In The Late Roman Art Industry he identified the history of art as a 
slow shift toward a modern perceptual and conceptual sensibility. And 
such a sensibility was one in which there was an optical understanding of 
space as a rational and abstract concept. This was seen in contrast to a 
tactile conception of space and objects within that space as discreet and 
touchable, almost to be experienced emotionally rather than rationally, as 
was demonstrated in his examples of Egyptian and Early Roman art. Thus 
it was that the art of the Late Romans served, for Riegl, as a transition 
period on the way to this modem, optic sensibility: 
The third period of antiquity deserves our special interest. Not 
only was the classic attempt to erect a mechanistic system of 
causality between individual phenomena no longer valued, but 
one went so far as to bring externally, individual shapes in 
reciprocal isolation from each other. In no way did this mean a 
return to primitive disconnectedness. Instead, a mechanistic 
theory of connection between individual shapes no longer 
seemed satisfactory ... A correspondence of this process with 
the isolation of individual shapes on the visual plane is obvious 
in contemporary art... the change in the late antique 
conception of the world was a necessary transition made by the 
human mind in order to take it from the concept of a purely 
mechanistic and sequential relationship of things (as if they 
were projected on a plane) to one of a general chemical 
connection, including, as it were, space in all directions 29 
Note here the self-conscious reference connection to artistic practice 
contemporary to his own historical practice which therefore invites the 
comparison between Modernism in Art and Art History. Hauser also drew 
29 Riegl, Late Roman Art Industry, trans. Winkes, (Bretschneider, 1985), pg. 232-33 
a connection between the act of the historian of art and contemporary art 
practice in terms of a modern sense of a visual turn when he argued that 
Wölfflin's method would have been inconceivable without Impressionism. 
So, just as Impressionism attempted to reduce the act of painting to the 
replication of the visual sense so too, it was argued, Wolfflin's method 
attempt at historical objectivity was to ground an art history in the 5 pairs 
of formal, visual analysis30 
After Riegl Bahktin and Medvedev, in 1928, drew a parallel 
between the claims for autonomy by and on behalf of Modernist art and 
the genesis of Art History. But they went further by suggesting that the 
structural form of Formalist Art History itself was related to a broader 
definition of Modernism. They argued that Art History, as a separate and 
self-contained academic discipline, should be understood in terms 
congruous with a formalist analysis of the work of art based on the 
separate and self-contained visual qualities of the work. They thus argued 
that a common ground could be attributed to the emergence and 
development of formalism as a guiding principle in both the artistic 
production of contemporary art and attempts to produce systematic 
accounts of the history of art which arose around the turn of the century. 
Bahktin and Medvedev argue that this emergence could itself be 
understood in terms of `Modernity'. And more specifically that this 
30 `Wölfflin's categories of the baroque are, in fact, nothing but the application of 
the concepts of Impressionism to the art of seventeenth century - that is to say, to 
a part of this art, for the clarity of the concept of the baroque is obtained even by 
him at the price of mostly neglecting to consider the classicism of the seventeenth 
century. ' Hauser notes that Wölfflin's conception of the Baroque is the move 
from a `tactile' to a 'visual' sense of pictorial order (which he refers to as the 
`subjectivisation of the artistic world view') which not only identifies Wölfflin's 
own position as pre-empted by Impressionism in the 19th century but also 
neglects the pre-emption of the Baroque by the Renaissance and Mannerism. 
Hauser, The Social History ofArt, voL 2, (Routledge, 1999), pg. 160 
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modernity involved a turn to the visual in terms of a formalist 
understanding of vision and visuality: "It was not what was seen that was 
new, but the forms of seeing themselves, "" they observed. 
In a move that paid acknowledgement to both Wölfflin's Art 
History Without Names (which was identified as a slogan behind `The 
completely proper demand for an objective history of the arts and the 
history of artistic worksi32) and Reigl's attempts to recover `artistic volition' 
[Kunstwollen] through the formal structure of a work, this Modernist 
mode of vision, as articulated in the systems of Modern Art History was 
identified as being characterised by: 
Increased interest in and sharpening of sensitivity to all 
concrete expressions of world view, whether expressed in 
paints, spatial forms, or sounds. In short, interest was focused 
on the forms of concrete seeing and apprehending the things of 
the world, not on the forms of thinking about them. 33 
What was termed as "the general ideological horizon of West European 
Formalism, " was seen to be one delineated by, in broader cultural terms, as 
a particular sensory balance in favour of vision. Thus, within the context of 
my argument, Modernism in both Art and Art History was identified by 
Bahktin and Medvedev in terms of formalism, and further, this formalism 
lead to a bias toward the visual over and above other ways of 
conceptualising experience. The act of seeing was thus made central to the 
European Formal Art Historical method from its conceptual foundations. 
In this making central of the act of seeing it was believed that an historical 
31 Bakhtin & Medvedev, The Formal Method in European Art Scholarship, ' in 
The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship, trans. Wehrle, (John Hopkins University 
Press, 1978) pg. 43 
32 Bakhtin & Medvedev, The Formal Method in European Art Scholarship, ' in 
The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship, trans. Wehrle, (John Hopkins University 
Press, 1978)pg. 50 
33 ibid., pg. 43 
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critique could receive a grounding in objective reality. This was because it 
was based upon the `constructive aspect' of the artwork, which is to say the 
formal structure of the work as expressed in visual terms (and which could 
be accessed via an interpretation of the phenomenological encounter with 
those formal qualities. )" This was part of a serious minded attempt to 
replace connoisseur-ship with the study of art as rigorous and systematic 
[Kuntswirschenschaf 
, with attention shifted to the 
`objective' visual away 
from judgements based on taste: 
The problem of seeing occupies a very important place in 
European formalism. The work does not exist for thought, or 
for feelings or emotions, but for the . right. The concept of seeing 
itself underwent extensive differentiation. The perception of 
form, the perception of the quality of the form, became one of 
the most important problems of not only art scholarship, but of 
theoretical aesthetics and psychology. Here too the basic 
tendency was to assert the inseparability of significance and 
meaning from the sensually perceptible quality. 's 
5- Panofsky's Visual Perspective 
Much has been made of the textual nature of iconography, perhaps as a 
way of distancing it, as Panofksy had himself tried to do, from the visual 
formalism of his predecessors. However it could also be argued, as I do 
here, that Iconography itself is implicated in the critique of the visual which 
34 Yet to access a work of art via its visual qualities means that we are tied (by an 
umbilical cord of vision) to the materiality of that work. However this does mean 
that we are required to experience the material object not as `fresh' and newly 
created but rather in a physically degenerated state as refracted through the patina 
of its own history. This could well be an unavoidable condition of historical 
reconstruction and not one that we could ever hope to avoid without an unhelpful 
retreat into speculative metaphysics. However what it also means is that if our 
only access to the work of art is through the formal, visual qualities of that work 
then we will always be working at a position at which were are alienated from the 
material conditions of the work's physical creation. Again, this is not necessarily a 
problem that can ever be reconciled, yet it is one which means that the act of 
interpretation will never be fully requited. 
35 Bakhtin & Medvedev, The Formal Method in European Art Scholarship, ' in 
The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship, trans. Wehrle, (John Hopkins University 
Press, 1978) pg. 49 
forms the central argument of this paper. This is because it shares the 
heritage of Kantian epistemology as a basis for a systematic art history. 
Cheetham has argued that 
when in the1920 essay [`The Concept of Artistic Volition] 
Panofsky calls for `serious scholarship' as the hallmark of a new 
and rigorous art history he argues that this foundation can only be 
built on Kant's philosophical method. 36 
This grounding in Kantian vocabulary and method takes two forms and 
has one implication. Firstly the invocation of A Priori principles which 
feature as the building blocks of the interpretative systems of Art Historical 
reconstruction; and secondly the recognition of the role of the perceiving 
(and thus seeing) subject at the heart of this system both illustrate the 
influence of Kant. The implication of this is that Art Historical method 
shares with Kant a distrust of the purely phenomenological experience of 
the unity of senses; placing an emphasis instead on the role of the 
understanding in shaping the manifold in perception. The separation of the 
senses, with an emphasis subsequently placed by Art History upon sight, 
can be seen as the legacy of Kant within Art History in so far as Kant 
prioritised the rationality of human understanding over the irrationality of 
sensibility. This is a tendency which can be seen to be shared between 
Panofsky and his formalist predecessors. With the sense of sight singled 
out for attention by the understanding as the basis for a systematic Art 
Historical method Panofsky seeks to establish his rigorous method, as 
Wölfflin and Riegl had done before him, on the visual qualities of the work 
of art: 
36 Cheetham, Kant, Art and Art History, (Cambridge University Press, 2001), pg. 72 
The work of art whose immanent meaning is to be perceived must 
also be understood, first of all, in the concrete and formal sense of 
its phenomenal appearance which contains this meaning. 37 
This is a common ground inhabited by Panofsky Wölfflin and Riegl, a 
Kantian legacy which, I argue, ties them all to a limited foundation for their 
studies - that of sight. 
A second argument which can only be alluded to here concerns 
that put forward by both Michael Ann Holly and Keith Moxey (amongst 
others)" that Panofsky's model of Art History as a Humanistic discipline 
takes its cues from a visual model, namely perspective. In other words, to 
paraphrase Panofsky himself, that perspective is the Symbolic Form of his 
own art historical method. This is to say that Panofsky's method has as the 
diagram for its modus operandi the model of single-point linear 
perspective, which has at its centre the sovereign subject who, as a king of 
infinite space expanding beyond them, nevertheless masters that space by 
rationalising it. Further, this system of rationalisation is a transparent 
system. A visual system (perspective) is taken, therefore as a metaphor for 
knowledge. 
6- Seeing After Modernism 
What has been presented above is the argument that if Art History is to 
be defined as a Modernist practice then a significant feature of this 
37 Panofsky, "The Concept of Artistic Volition' (1920), trans. Northcott & Snyder, 
Critical Inquiry 8,1, (1981), pg. 31 
38 See Holly, Past Looking, (esp. Ch. 1), (Cornell University Press, 1996); Moxey, 
`Perspective, Panofsky and the Philosophy of History, ' The Practice of Persuasion, 
(Cornell University Press, 2001). See also Elkin's arguments on the potential of 
various forms of perspective to be used as allegories for knowledge in Elkins, The 
Poetics of Perspective, (Cornell University Press, 1994) especially chapter 1, `Into the 
Maelstrom of Metaphor. ' 
Modernism lies in Art History being founded upon a specifically visual 
mode of analysis. Further this over-determination on visuality takes 
three forms. Firstly in the form of Formalist Art History we see critical 
attention diverted toward the visual qualities of the work of art; then, in 
the iconographic method we see critical attention diverted toward the 
structure of interpretative vision; and thirdly we see that Art History as a 
Humanistic Discipline has an allegorical model in a diagram of vision - 
perspective. 
If it seems like a commonplace to note the connection between 
art, history and vision and that we need to rely on sight to provide 
accounts of visual art then let the following be noted. Pictures, or the 
visual stimulus for art historical studies, and the words that describe 
them are different. As Michael Baxandall has described: 
We do not explain pictures: we explain remarks about pictures - or 
rather we explain pictures only in so far as we have considered 
them under some verbal description or specification... 
Every evolved explanation of a picture includes or implies an 
elaborate description of that picture. The explanation of the picture 
then in turn becomes part of the larger description of the picture, a 
way of describing things about it that would be difficult to describe 
in another way. But though "description" and "explanation" 
interpenetrate each other, this should not distract us from the fact 
that description is the mediating object of explanation. The 
description consists of words and concepts in a relation with the 
picture, and this relation is complex and sometimes problematic... 
In fact, language is not very well equipped to offer a notation of a 
particular picture. It is a generalising tool. 39 
One of the things Baxandall draws attention to is something that can often 
be forgotten in our day to day practice. This is that art history, as the study 
of the visual, often takes as a given condition of its practice the 
39 Baxandall, `Introduction, Language and Explanation, ' Patterns of Intention, (Yale 
University Press, 1985) 
transparency of its operations. By doing so what can often be ignored is the 
fundamental paradox which lies at the very heart of art historical method - 
namely the incommensurability between works of art and, in the words of 
James Elkins, "the words that fail them. s40 There seems no clear way to 
navigate this rubicon which separates art and its historical account. 
However what might be suggested is that an Art History that limits itself 
within the Modernist parameters of vision alone works within a 
unnecessarily blinkered perspective. And yet this is precisely how Art 
History continues to operate. According to the rules of one modality, that 
of sight. It is for this reason that it is argued that an account of art based 
purely on its visual qualities alone represents an especially reductive and 
unrealistic project and that these words in particular can provide only part 
of the experiential and historical explanation of an artwork. 
7- Art and Art History After Modernism 
In spiralling back again to Art History for a moment the question is posed - 
but what about Art History after Modernism? For that is surely where we 
are now. 
It was almost as soon as Art History had found its prototype model 
in Panofsky that it began to implode. We stand now on shifting sand. 
There is an incredulity toward the universal systems of Modernism which 
Art History becomes implicated in. To demonstrate this one only needs to 
pose the question - has art history changed over the forty years or so since 
the loss of faith in the modernist project? In doing so a number of answers 
40 Elkins, On Pictures and the Words That Fail Them, (Cambridge University Press, 
1998) 
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present themselves which involve the many and varied methodological 
twists and turns that the discipline had responded to in the latter half of the 
20th Century. 
The list of how Art History may have changed in response to 
influence from without its borders is, I am sure, familiar to all academics, 
regardless of what discipline within the humanities or social sciences which 
they study. These include amongst the usual suspects of chapter headings 
for anthology compilers: Psychoanalysis; Marxist and Critical Theory (post 
or late - take your pick); Anthropology; Post-structuralism and the 
Linguistic Turn; Feminism; Queer Theory; Museology; and so on. 
But Art History, as a self-contained, autonomous and Modernist 
discourse, has also faced a specific threat to its method that came not from 
without; but from within its own borders. 
This internal conflict concerns the means and methods of artistic 
production which have also taken place in the last 40 years. This is to say 
that Art after Modernism, by which is meant art that calls the autonomy of 
the monadic modernist art work into question, also calls the operations and 
limits of Modernist Art History into question. 
The reason for this lies in the structure of the system of Art History 
itself. In order to function as a recognisable discipline Art History must be 
a history of those particular and peculiar objects that are identified (for 
whatever reason) as Art. And it may be that these particular objects, the art, 
in turn require that particular critical positions are adopted in relation to 
them. The implication of this line of thinking is then that Art and Art 
History are inextricably linked. This is what was argued in the above 
examples of Wölfflin and Riegl in relation to Modernist Art. If this is the 
case (as is argued here) then any transformation of one will have 
implications in the other. 
One way in which this has been interpreted is the various `End of 
Art/ Art History' arguments such as those of Danto and Belting4'. It is 
argued here that because Art and Art History are linked by necessity 
through their following of parallel evolutionary paths then it is no 
coincidence that just as there was (and still is) an ambiguity, confusion, 
scepticism, or whatever, over the possibility of Art at the end of the 20th 
century, so too there was an ambiguity, confusion and scepticism over the 
possibility of Art History at the end of the century. The charge therefore is 
presented that Art History in its Modernist form has run out of steam and 
this exhaustion has an historical explanation. This explanation lies in the 
observation that the object of its analysis, artistic practice, has itself also 
undergone a dramatic shift in that there has been a move in emphasis away 
from the single object into more complex engagements with the artistic 
institutions which surround and support the practice of artistic production 
and reception. When faced with post-modern artistic systems Art History 
just doesn't have the vocabularies to deal with their complexity. More 
specifically it is argued that with Art after Modernism a feature of this 
complexity is the turnfrom the visual. This is another way of saying that 
with artworks of which the single example being used here is Spiral Jetty, 
what it looks like is the very least interesting thing to say about it. However it is 
the visual aspects which a certain type of Art History continues to stare at. 
41 See especially Belting, The End ofArt History, (trans. Wood), (University of 
Chicago Press, 1987); Belting, The Invisible Masterpiece, (trans. Atkins), (Reaktion 
Books, 2001); Danto, After the End ofArt, (Princeton University Press, 1997) 
8- The Bad Medicine of Visual Culture Studies 
In drawing this introduction to a conclusion I argue that the `cure' for the 
symptoms of Art History's blindness often ends up treating the wrong 
organ. We should be opening up the senses rather than focusing on our 
eyes alone. And this brings us on to another usual suspect which did not 
appear in the above list alongside the other pretenders to the throne of Art 
History. This is Visual Culture Studies. 
In `who's afraid of visual culture' Johanna Drucker levelled the 
following criticism at Art History - in relation to the study of Visual 
Culture: 
Art history has not only not expanded to include it's [the history of 
graphic design] products in its scope of inquiry, in my experience it 
has locked down the borders ever more stringently under the threat 
that expanding research in this field seems to raise 42 
Drucker's position is a good example of those who seek to use Visual 
Culture Studies to cure Art History of its melancholic modernist malaise 
which is manifested in a futile and atavistic searching for lost time and lost 
origins 43 In an approach common to Visual Culture Studies Drucker 
argues that there should be a focus on objects other than art in a broader 
study of culture with a specific emphasis placed upon the visuality of those 
objects; that is the way that certain objects look. 
She continued: 
Graphic design, like fine art, but perhaps more conspicuously, is as 
much the result of historical, economic and social forces as it is of 
42 Drucker, `Who's Afraid of Visual Culture, ' ArtJournal, 4, vol. 58, (Winter, 1999), 
pg. 37-47 
43 This futile (almost Proustian) search for lost origins in these times after 
modernism has been mused over most eloquently by Keith Moxey in `Panofsky's 
Melancholia, ' in The Practice of Theory, (Cornell University Press, 1994) and Michael 
Ann Holly, `Mourning and Method, ' The Art Bulletin, 4, vol. 84, (Dec. 2002), pg. 
660-669. 
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aesthetic choice. In so far as the visual forms of graphic design 
inscribe ideological values and cultural attitudes in the very specific 
modes of their constitution, finish, treatment and other features of 
visual rhetoric, they are potent indices of the social conditions in 
which they are produced. " 
Taken to its logical conclusion this study of cultural objects and 
cultural practices in terms of them being seen spells the end for Modernist 
Art History. Art become those objects which have a particular symbolic 
function within visual systems of signification of which art is just a part. 
This thereby negates the need for a history of just art. The implication of 
this is that these visual systems become the focus for an expanded 
discursive field with a broader scope encapsulating all the visual. Thus 
there may be other objects (those which are distinct from art) which may 
also have a significatory function and which may thus be also looked at and 
read as cultural symptoms. 
As Susan Buck-Morss prophesied: 
The production of a discourse of visual culture entails the 
liquidation of art as we have know it. There is no way within such 
as discourse for art to sustain a separate existence, not as a practice, 
not as a phenomenon, not as an experience, not as a discipline as 
By arguing that their own methodological shift reflects the more general 
epistemological shift to visuality in society the advocates of the study of the 
visual aspects of culture have an initially convincing case. 
It is often noted that we are surrounded by images in society. As 
Stuart Hall and Jessica Evans observed in their introduction to Visual 
Culture: The Reader, "the mechanically determined or electronically 
as Drucker, `Who's Afraid of Visual Culture, ' Art Journal, 4, vol. 58, (Winter, 1999), 
pg. 37-47 
as Susan Buck-Morss, response to, `Visual Culture Questionnaire, ' October, 77, 
(Summer, 1996) 
reproduced image is the semantic and technical unit of the modern mass 
media and at the heart of post-war popular culture.. "' And it is therefore a 
persuasive argument that suggests that we need to reflect this in our 
academic praxis. 
WJT Mitchell put it slightly differently and said that in critical 
practices there has been a `pictorial turn' as well as a linguistic turn. He has 
written of the: 
Realisation that spectatorship (the look, the gaze, the practices of 
observation, surveillance, visual pleasure) may be as deep a problem 
as various forms of reading (decipherment, decoding, 
interpretation, etc. ) and that visual experience may not be fully 
explicable on the model of textuality [and hence]... One way of 
thinking of visual culture, then, is in terms of particular and 
historically specific combinations of meanings and subjects - scopic 
regimes - whose histories remain to be written. 
' 
Visual Culture Studies is therefore often presented as a cure to Art 
History's limited vision by providing one way in which the study of art can 
accurately reflect the pictorial turn to which Mitchell refers. This is not by 
moving attention away from seeing alone, but as a way of expanding the 
scope of that vision. It thus expands the Modernist discourse of Art 
History to draw the objects of its analysis from a broader study of culture. 
In doing so the study of visual culture deprives art of its privileged status as 
focus for critical attention hence making it seem attractive to those who 
had raised complaints about what Art History did and how it did it (the 
name of Boudieu springs immediately to mind. ) 
By flattening the field Visual Culture Studies suggests that we can 
use the same vocabularies to talk about a Pokemon card as a Picasso 
46 Evans & Hall, `What is Visual Culture?, ' Evans & Hall (eds. ), Visual Culture: The 
Reader, (Sage, 1999) pg. 1-7 
47 Mitchell, The Pictorial Turn, ' in Picture Theory, (University of Chicago Press, 
1994) 
painting; in other that the history of Art is replaced with a history of 
images, a history of things seen, or in the words of Christopher Wood : 
Visual studies has become shorthand for the idea that images, 
buildings, and design ought to be handled by the same discipline, 
and the idea that the distinction between high and low art is 
specious. "Visuality", meanwhile is shorthand for the idea that 
vision is an active, interpretative process strongly governed by 
communities and institutions, rather than an innocent openness to 
natural stimuli. " 
Further, just as Visual Culture Studies has no object of study as such (in so 
far as it's not looking at art per se, but potentially anything) it is an 
ambiguous discipline. Given this ambiguity it is perfectly suited to the 
current academic climate namely one in which the concern for truth in 
relation to a knowable human subject is rejected with fashionable 
incredulity. In the absence of a specific object of study Visual Culture 
Studies has some claim to interdisciplinarity. It does so by working between 
the gaps between subject matters (such as television studies, film studies, 
design history, history of the decorative arts and so forth) and also over 
these gaps too. 
However in concerning itself with the way things are looked at, by 
being a history of images/ or a history of things seen one charge which 
may be made against Visual Culture Studies. This is that it has no object 
upon which to critically reflect. As Crow says; `But they perpetuate the... 
narrowness entailed by Modernism's fetish of Visuality. s49 
This is problematic in that it restricts the analysis of the ideology 
implicit when things are set apart and defined as being art and are 
48 Wood response to, `Visual Culture Questionnaire, ' October, 77, (Summer, 1996) 
49 Crow response to, `Visual Culture Questionnaire, ' October, 77, (Summer, 1996) 
subsequently studied in those terms. The study of the purely visual skips 
the problems inherent in calling some things art, and other things not and 
in doing so avoids a discussion of the power dynamics implicit in such 
differentiation. 
But more importantly to the arguments of both this introductory 
chapter but also the thesis as a whole is something which as been 
mentioned already. This is that when it comes to providing historical and 
critical accounts of art after Modernism the way that things look is often 
the very least interesting thing to say about it. In this respect any study 
which limits itself to the visual alone doesn't provide any panacea for Art 
History. And herein lies a certain irony. Visual Culture Studies takes the 
fundamental problem which has lain at the very heart of Art History since 
its Modernist foundations - the over-prioritisation of the visual - and, in an 
attempt to cure its symptoms merely extends the scope of this problem 
more widely than Art History ever did. 
Yet the major problem facing Art History isn't that it didn't look 
hard enough but that it saw too much. This is another way of saying that 
the most fundamental problem facing Art History today might be not that 
it limits itself to sight alone, but that it doesn't `see' enough. In doing so it 
runs the risk of being left behind forms of art which have moved beyond 
such Modernist preoccupations with the merely visual into institutional 
critiques, critiques of originality, critiques of the monadic artwork and so 
on. 
We may be in an age that gives more emphasis to the visual but do 
we live in a more visual age after all? In `Showing Seeing: a Critique of 
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Visual Culturei50 WTJ Mitchell discusses the well rehearsed question of 
whether we've moved into a more `visual' age or not. In such discussions 
often it seems that the fundamental point is missed. It is not a question of 
whether we are more or less visual now, and as Mitchell points out there 
are many historical examples of the invocation of the `pictorial turn' as an 
epistemological strategy (Mitchell cites the historically diverse examples of 
Pliny, Plato, Lessing and Wittgenstein who all discussed the 
interconnection between thought and sight demonstrating that `The 
pictorial or visual turn, then, is not unique to our time. i51) It is rather that if 
we choose to engage in a critique of culture which takes visuality as its 
prime modus-operandi then we will place certain limits on our discursive 
practice and hence what we can and can't say. Of course many may argue 
that this is a trade-off worth taking. However I would still like to leave 
open the question as to whilst we may gain certain insights, what are we 
loosing? As Foster has suggested it may be more than we gain from this 
expanded field of research: 
The Image is to visual studies what the text was to post-structuralist 
criticism: an analytical tool that has revealed the cultural artefact in 
new ways, especially regarding the psychological positionings of 
different viewers, but sometimes to the neglect of historical 
formation. For often in visual studies that develops out of film 
theory and media studies, the image is treated as a projection - in 
the psychological register of the imaginary, in the technical register 
of the simulacral, or both - as a doubly immaterial fantasm. 
Moreover, where once critics were slow to concede the importance 
of the image in our political economy, perhaps today they are too 
quick to grant it a dominance that it does not possess. 52 
50 in eds. Holly & Moxey, Art History, Aesthetics, Visual Studies, (Yale University 
Press, 2002) 
51 WTJ Mitchell, `Showing Seeing: a Critique of Visual Culture, in eds. Holly & 
Moxey, Art History, Aesthetics, Visual Studies, (Yale University Press, 2002) 
52 Foster, 'Antinoniies in Art History, ' Design and Crime and Other Diatribes, (Verso, 
2002), pg. 93 
Mati Klarwein: Bitches Brew (cover art), (1970) 
In this attempt to construct more effective and convincing `historical 
formations' let us instead seek to avoid the `unconscious optics' that scared 
Benjamin so much by re-integrating sight into a more complete cognitive 
and phenomenological encounter with the art object. What does it smell, 
taste, sound and feel like; and is this different from when it was created? If 
so why; and how? But also what does it do, how does it do it and most 
importantly why? Asking these questions is important because in doing so 
a more complete and satisfactory account of how artworks function within 
social systems can be approached in empirical, historical and political 
terms. In the following thesis I hope to suggest that the systems-theoretical 
approach to Art History is an interpretive strategy which allows for the 
questioning and answering of works of art and their social and discursive 
supports in such an expanded heuristic field. 
9- Seeing Bitches Brew 
I have in my hands a copy of another work of art from 1970; the same year 
that Spiral Jetty was completed. It's the record Bitches Btw by Miles Davis - 
an often terrifying collision of loose jams in which funk rhythms, rock 
aesthetics, jazz experimentation and the potentials of electronic recording 
equipment are all somehow stitched together through the multiple 
personalities of Miles Davis (directions in music) and Teo Macero (the 
producer). I'm looking at it thinking of the best way to describe it. 
One can feel the smoothness and gently yielding stiffness of the 
glossy cardboard cover and feel the rustle of the paper sleeves inside. 
Inside there is the records themselves and by running your fingers over the 
grooves you can feel the contours of the sound contained within. It makes 
me think that if my fingers were sensitive enough I might be able to `feel' 
for the sounds; like musical Braille. It smells too - the slightly fusty smell 
you get in old record shops and second hand books shops. This object is 
older than me. 
How would we describe this record from the point of view of 
Visual Culture Studies? 
As a visual object it's actually quite an impressive object. The cover, 
by Mad Klarwein, is a histrionic blend of afro-eroticism and pseudo- 
spiritualism. An Art Historian might scoff at the naff-ness of such images: 
a flaming flower, a lightning storm, a dark masked magus with a large `afro' 
hairstyle, an intertwined black and white hand. Yet the image might reveal 
something of its historical context, of contemporary social attitudes to 
ethnicity (in 1970 Davis was arrested again for his colour) social change 
and spirituality. But is that all there is to say? 
There are two records inside the sleeve with a spiral scratch on 
each side - four sessions of music edited from the days of jamming laid 
down by Davis and the group and edited by Teo Macero. You can see the 
grooves spiralling to the centres. You can actually see the fossilised music. I 
wonder if there's any way of re-constructing the music from the 
appearance alone. Is there a possibility that, given sufficiently sensitive 
equipment, one could `read' the grooves and map this into sound just as 
one would a musical score? Even if one could it is clear that just looking at 
Bitches Brew isn't enough. You're going to need to play the records and hear 
them. And even then this isn't the whole story. 
And from one spiral let us move back finally to the origin of the 
twist and turns of this chapter; the Spiral Scratch on the landscape of 
Northern Utah. With Spiral Jetty like Bitches Brew and every other work of art 
the way that they look is not necessarily the most significant thing to say 
about them. In order to fully engage in the complexity of such systems we 
need to engage all our senses in order to provide more complete historical, 
political and ethical accounts of Art and its Histories. Mere vision alone 
will not allow this. 
10 - Art Historical Synaesthesia 
It may be that Art History must rely primarily upon vision as a starting 
point. And this is not necessarily a bad thing as Art History was founded 
upon a Modernist balance of the senses in favour of vision and will retain 
its rhetorical force by not deviating too much from its conceptual 
foundations as a rigorous and serious discipline. But in preserving this 
heritage let us also not limit ourselves unnecessarily by instead expanding 
the field of interpretive possibilities. 
In conclusion I would like to suggest that what we need now is an 
art historical synaesthesia. Such a synaesthesia could extend the 
phenomenological experience of art beyond the boundaries of the vision of 
Art History's limited perspective. This is not a call to give up thought in 
place of aesthetics but is instead an attempt to emphasise that the historical 
conditions of art after modernism will not be recognised by an historical 
method which remains limited by its own specifically Modernist 
perspectives. For when it comes to fording the `sense' of works of art, 
especially complex ones like Spiral Jetty, one sense, it seems, is never 
enough. Systems-Theory, I argue, can allow Art History to observe this. 
CHAPTER ONE: 
WHAT IS SYSTEMS THEORY? 
Introduction 
In the chapters following this one I will apply the concept of system and 
the methodology of the systems-thinking approach to Art History. 
However, before this application, in this chapter I introduce the reader to 
two central definitions. These are: 
(i) What is a system? 
(ii) What is Systems Theory? 
The term System is very common in contemporary society; and even 
someone who has no familiarity with the specific debates of the systems- 
theoretical approach will have encountered some of the popular usage of 
the definitions and vocabularies that I outline below. This is because 
systems proliferate in all aspects of contemporary society. Systems are all 
around us. We use them every day in the form of, for example: air 
conditioning systems; computer operating systems; health care systems and 
so forth. The term `system' is widely applied and might also be used to 
describe social phenomena as diverse as: housing systems; clothing 
systems; bedding systems; driving systems and so on. The growth of the 
phenomena of systems has had noticeable implications for the employment 
market. For example, The Bureau of Labor Statistics (U. S. Department of 
Labor) gives the following statistical analysis of workers considered to be 
Systems Analysts: 
As computer applications expand, systems analysts, computer 
scientists, and database administrators are projected to be among 
the fastest growing occupations. Systems analysts, computers 
scientists, and database administrators are expected to be among 
the fastest growing occupations [corresponding to an increase of 36 
percent or more] through 2010. Systems analysts, computer 
scientists, and database administrators held about 887,000 jobs in 
2000, including about 71,000 who were self-employed... 
Employment was distributed among the following detailed 
occupations: 
Computer system analysts: 431,000 
Network systems and data communications analysts: 119,000 
Database administrators: 106,000 
Computer and information scientists, research: 28,000 
All other computer specialists: 203,0053 
1- What is a System? 
1.1 Defining a System 
Systems can be defined in various ways depending upon how they are 
being used and who is using them. For example within the discourse of 
Communications Theory a system is defined in terms of the flows of 
information. 54 Systems can be analysed in terms of their structural 
organisation, as a biologist studying organic systems might. 55 Systems have 
been identified by those working within disciplines as diverse as: physics, 
biology, chemistry, engineering, economics, sociology and so forth. It has 
also been used within theories and strategies of management56. As will be 
discussed in further detail below, it is a strength of Systems Theory that it 
can accommodate such wide-ranging interests within the vocabularies of a 
53 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor, Occupational Outlook 
Handbook, 2002-03 Edition, Systems Analysts, Computer Scientists, and Database 
Administrators, on the Internet at http: //www. bls. gov/oco/ocos042. htm 
(consulted November 25,2003). 
54 The classic formulation of Information Theory was presented by Claude 
Shannon in 1948 at Bell Labs.. The text of his original paper is expanded upon in: 
Shannon & Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication, (Univ of Illinois, 
1963 [1998]) 
55 The classic work on the application of a systems-theoretical approach to 
Biology is by Gregory Bateson, most notably in Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, 
(Ballantine, 1972) 
56 This is exemplified by the work of the Complexity Research Programme at the 
London School of Economics which is a interdisciplinary research and teaching 
initiative. Further details are found at the Complexity Research Programme Website. 
http: //www. psych. Ise. ac. uk: 16080/complexity/index. html (consulted 
29,11,2003). The application of the systems-theoretical approach to town planning 
and social management received a thorough articulation in Chadwick, A Systems 
View of Planning, (Pergamon, 197 1) 
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unified discourse. This is because it looks for systems in a diversity of 
observed phenomena. 
Broadly speaking a system is a set of elements integrated with one 
another to such an extent that they form a recognisable and coherent 
whole. In addition, this recognisable and coherent whole performs some 
type of recognisable function. Thus, in general a system is a collection of 
components that by virtue of its organisation and function, becomes 
meaningful57 in its own right. 
As Boulding observed: "The broadest possible definition of a 
system is that it is anything that is not chaos. We could turn the pattern 
around and define a system as any structure that exhibits order and 
pattern. "" 
However, a mere aggregation of arbitrary elements on its own does 
not constitute a system. It needs to be a collection of the right type of parts 
in the right type of order. For example a drawer full of socks is not a 
system. It is, instead, merely an aggregate of its parts and will not display 
the requisite systemic behaviour. In order for a collection of components 
to be considered a system the following three criteria need to be present: 
1- There must be some kind of meaningful order to their arrangement. In 
other words they need to be organised in a meaningful way. 
2- The order of this organisation must enable the performance of an 
identifiable function. 
3- The individual components of the system need to be able to perform 
functions which contribute to the systemic operations of the whole system. 
57 A system is identified as meaningful in so far as it has a recognisable structure 
and that structure contributes to the functioning of the whole. 
58 Boulding, K. E., The World as a Total System., (Sage, 1985), pg. 9 
For example a collection of neurons meaningfully ordered in a system of a 
neural network is able to perform functions that none of the single neurons 
can perform; (on the contrary there is nothing that a drawer of socks can 
do - no matter how sophisticated the ordering of the socks - that a single 
pair of socks cannot do. This is because the socks on their own, and as part 
of a collection of socks, cannot perform autonomous functions; and the 
drawer on its own cannot function autonomously either. ) 
For a collection of components to be called a system (either simple, 
complicated or complex) the elements must be organised in a systemic way. 
This is to say that not only the system's function be considered but also 
that the organisation of its elements plays an equally significant role in 
identifying and defining whether a collection can be called a system. The 
identification of systemic organisation requires that the elements are 
interconnected in such a way that the functions of the individual parts will 
have an effect on the functioning of the whole system. Likewise the 
functioning of the system will affect the functions of elements within the 
system. Within the sock drawer the socks do not function in a manner 
related to the drawer of socks; instead their `sock-ness' is autonomous from 
their location in either the drawer or on the foot of the owner. Likewise the 
drawer does not function according to the socks contained within it and 
would function no differently if it contained other items of clothing such as 
tee-shirts. 59 
59 von Bertalanffy has defined this in the following terms: "In dealing with 
complexes of `elements, ' three different kinds of distinction may be made - i. e., 1. 
according to their number, 2. according to their , species, 3. according to the relations 
of elements. " von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory, (Braziller, 1968) whereby in 
the example of the sock-drawer: number corresponds to the amount of socks; 
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Ludwig von Bertalanffy, who is widely seen as the originator of the 
systems-thinking approach60 gave the following, more technical, definition 
of how a system can be defined: 
A system can be defined as a complex of interacting elements. 
Interaction means that elements, p, stand in relations, R, so that the 
behaviour of an element p in R is different from its behaviour in 
another relation R'. If the behaviours in R and R' are not different, 
there is no interaction, and the elements behave independently with 
respect to the relations R and R'61 
Further, von Bertalanffy stated that a system might also be defined 
mathematically as a series of simultaneous differential equations. In doing 
so a set of mathematical criteria is provided for modelling the system. The 
set of conditions of the system's operation and how this will change over 
time can therefore be qualified as is demonstrated, by von Bertalanffy in 
the following sequence of differential equations62: 
species refers to the items of clothing (in this case socks); and relations refers to the 
organisation of the socks in the drawer. 
60 Often called the `founding father, ' of Systems Theory von Bertalanffy established 
the systems-theoretical approach in 1968 with the publication of General Systems 
Theory, (Braziller, 1968); as a developmental biologist he argued that the systems- 
theoretical approach could use the biological metaphors of adaptation and 
evolution to explain a wide variety of `isomorphic' systems and their behaviour. 
61 von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory, (Braziller, 1968) pg. 55 
62 "For illustration, we choose a system of simultaneous differential equations. 
Denoting some measure of elements, P; (i = 1,2,... n), byQ,, these, for a finite 
number of elements and in the simplest form will be of the form [of the equation 
given above]. Change to any measure Q; therefore is a function of all. Qs fromQ 
toQ,,; conversely, change of any Q, entails change of all other measures and of 
the system as a whole. " Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory, (George Braziller, 
1968) pg. 56 
'01 =J1 cQi, Q2, " " ""Qnl 
dt 
402 
-J2(QiI 
Q2) 
""". 
Qn/ 
dt 
=n -Jn lQi9Q2ý" "" "Qnl 
di 
Another definition of System has been provided by Angyal. Like 
von Bertalanffy he is another figure of historical significance for the birth 
of systems-thinking as a separate discipline 63 From within a sociological 
perspective Angyal applied the concept of systems to the behaviour of 
humans in their environments. He claimed that the: 
Structure of wholes is perhaps amenable to logical treatment after 
all, that, though it may not be described in terms of relations, it may 
be described in terms of some more adequate logical unit, 
representing an entirely different logical genus. Here the attempt 
will be made to demonstrate that there is a logical genus suitable to 
the treatment of wholes. We propose to call it a system. 64 
Angyal's conception of `system' as an entity of structural 
organisation which is conceptually distinct from its component parts raises 
another key aspect of systems in general, of central importance to my 
arguments in the thesis, that that they are understood not only as 
combination of component parts but also as a combination of component 
parts that can only, be understood in terms of its entirety. In other words the system 
63Angyal was another key figure in providing clear definitions of `system' for the 
nascent discipline. His scientific definitions of `system' are outlined in: Angyal, 
Logic of Systems, (1969, Penguin). As a psychologist and psychotherapist Angyal 
discussed the epistemological implications of Systems-Thinking with particular 
reference to the human subject as an extension of his earlier work which focused 
on the relationship between the psychic system (Luhmann) and its environment. 
See Angyal, Foundations fora Science of Personality, (Harvard University Press, 1941). 
64 Angyal, Foundations for a Science of Personality, (Harvard University Press, 1941), 
pg. 243 ff. 
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cannot be accounted for by considering merely the sum of the individual 
elements. Instead, because the organisation and function in the system as a 
whole is crucial for their operation, a holistic approach is required. 
1.2 Identifying a System 
A system, in order to be identified as such, must have coherence and must 
be recognisable in its own right. This sense of the individual identity of a 
system is related to its function in so far as the system's identity is 
constituted by its performing a recognisable function (or variety of 
functions) over time. It is by virtue of its function (or functions) that the 
system acquires and maintains both a clear identity and distinguishable 
boundaries. It can thus be differentiated both from its environment and 
other systems. Further, through the use of function(s) as the criteria for 
identity rather than structure, the system can retain its recognisable and 
distinct identity over time even though its structure may have adapted and 
evolved. For example a synapse within a neural network cannot be 
identified as a system because it cannot be functionally differentiated from 
its environment of the network within which it functions. The neural 
network itself, on the other hand, can be identified as a system because it 
has its own coherent and differentiated identity in so far as it will be seen 
to perform the same recognisable function over time even as its structure 
evolves. It can also be differentiated from other neural networks that 
function in different spatio-temporal conditions. 
Further a system (or sub-system) might be identifiable in its own 
right but still be functionally subordinate to a larger systems. This would 
happen in the case of sub-systems which operate within larger systems. 
Such subordination need not compromise the identity of the sub-system 
which could still be identified as a system in its own right. This would be 
possible providing that the system meets the criteria given above of 
demonstrating a recognisable function over time. An example of this would 
be the human subject - itself a complex system yet one which circulates 
within and is hence subordinate to larger social systems. 
1.3 Linear and non-linear systems 
Providing a set of qualifying mathematical criteria, as von Bertalanffy does, 
is necessary if the system is to be modelled conceptually rather than 
physically. This is of particular significance when the system is to be 
modelled by computer a virtual system (and given the complexity of many 
systems this is the only way of modelling them. ) By using such a conceptual 
of model the nature of the system can articulated in terms of the types of 
differential equations which are required for its modelling. For example a 
simple system such as an environment whose temperature is regulated 
using a thermostat (which uses negative feedback to regulate temperature 
of a system within set parameters) can be mathematically modelled using 
several linear differential equations which give the following graph. 
Image of the operations of a thermostat from the American Appliance 
websitebs 
The differential equations will be linear because such as system will 
behave in a predictable way. In other words it can be plotted on a graph 
using a straight line. This means that given an input into the system a 
predictable output will be generated and that this output will be of the 
same value every time that input is used. Further, given the predictability of 
the system a specific output can be predicted for any possible input 
introduced into this simple, linear system. 
65 http: //www. american 
appliance. com/service_pages/general_tips/range_adjustment. htm (visited 
29/11/03) 
A complex, or non-linear system, on the other hand, behaves 
differently, and it is these complex or non-linear systems that form the 
basis of the examples used throughout this thesis. Systems this type are 
unlike linear systems because there are unpredictability aspects to their 
behaviour and they do not display the quality of simple predictability that 
we find in linear systems. Complexity refers to the fact that systems will not 
always behave in the same way given the same input. Stated simply this 
non-linearity means that the behaviour (or output) of the system cannot be 
plotted on a graph by using a straight line. If such a system is to be 
modelled (and often the complexity of the system means that it cannot be 
modelled in its entirety) then the differential equations used in the 
modelling will also be non-linear. Coveney and Highfield have given some 
examples of what complex and non-linear systems are like: 
In general, non-linearity produces complex and frequently 
unexpected results. Irreversibility and nonlinearity characterise 
phenomena in every field of science: the complexity of the 
markings on a butterfly's wings, a leopard's spots, the shape of a 
spleenwort fern, the whorls of a little green alga called the 
Mermaid's cap, and the rhythms in living systems such as the 
palpitations of a heart, the firing of nerve cells within the brain, and 
so on. Related but more subtle, chaotic forms of complexity also 
arise from non-linearity, including apparently random weather 
patterns, the outbreak of flu epidemics, and the spread of 
information and ideas 66 
2- What is Systems Theory? 
Generally speaking Systems-Theory is the study of systems. It is an 
umbrella term that includes a wide variety of studies. However the 
arguments in my thesis are concerned primarily with study and theory of 
complex systems. The closest historical precedent for the study of complex, 
66 Coveney & Highfield, Frontiers of Complexity, (Faber and Faber, 1995), pg. 9- 
10 
non-linear systems as it is understood today is found in the study of 
Cybernetics. The term `Cybernetics' was coined in 1948 when Norbert 
Weiner, a professor of mathematics at MIT, published his book called 
Cybernetics Weiner defined his term in the following manner: 
"We have decided to call the entire field of control and 
communication theory, whether in the machine or in the animal, by 
the name Cybernetics, which we form from the Greek [kybernos] 
or steersman. , 67 
In inventing Cybernetics Weiner was a pioneer of the systems-theoretical 
approach. However he did not consider himself to be on originator of a 
new way of thinking but instead traced his thought back to the Industrial 
Revolution. The emergence of the industrial world in the 19`h century 
brought with it, he argued, systemic modes of thought. He identified the 
analysis of systems emerging from the creation of systems of industrial 
production and the subsequent need for ways of accounting for them. 
According to Weiner the first paper of note to be published on feedback 
mechanisms within industrial systems was published by Clerk Maxwell in 
186868. Further, Weiner argued, the modern world as the product of the 
industrial revolution was comprised not only of industrial systems but also 
of other social systems that emerged at the same. Such social systems 
included class systems marked by the emergence of the bourgeoisie as the 
dominant political force in the western world; national systems marked by 
the emergence of the nation state; political systems created to reflect these 
new class and national systems; transport systems marked by the 
emergence of railway networks; communication systems evidenced by the 
67 Norbert Weiner, `Cybernetics [or control and communication in the animal or 
machine]', (John Wiley & Sons, 1948) 
68 Weiner, Cybernetics, (The Technology Press, 1948), Pg. 19 
appearance of newspapers and the telegraph and other forms of mass 
media; and so forth. 
Weiner's project in the establishment of Cybernetics was to identify 
a vocabulary through which a general theory of scientific, social and ystemic 
phenomena could be articulated. He therefore sought a language by which 
to describe the: 
Essential unity of the set of problems centring about 
communication, control and statistical mechanics, whether in the 
machine or in living tissue 69 
2.1 Systems-Thinking and Interdisciplinarity 
The `essential unity' to which Weiner referred demonstrates his intention to 
identify a shared vocabulary by which to talk about different systems and 
thus provide common conceptual and mathematical models to be applied 
across disciplines. This call for interdisciplinarity represents another key 
feature of a systems-theoretical approach. It was later taken by Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy, the father of modem systems theory, as the defining feature of 
what he was to name in 1968 -a General Systems Theory. As is discussed in 
further detail below in his `General Systems Theory' von Bertalanffy 
attempted a project similar to that of Weiner; namely the identification of 
what he called isomorphisms, or structural similarities, shared by different 
systems. 
Like the study of Cybernetics the General Systems Theory of von 
Bertalanffy is interested in different organisations of systems as well as 
questions about their functions and outputs. Equally it is also concerned 
with identifying systems; that is in distinguishing systems both from their 
69 ibid 
environment and from other structures that are not systems. This process 
of differentiation entails the observation of phenomena in terms of 
systemic input, output and behaviour, and then the subsequent evaluation 
as to whether systems are present. Areas of research where the Systems- 
Thinking approach has been meaningfully applied and systemic behaviour 
identified include - meteorology, economics, neuro-science, biology, 
chemistry, physics, sociology and anthropology. It is my intention in the 
following chapters to add Art History to this ever growing list of 
applications 
2.2 How Does General Systems Theory work? - The Operations of 
Systems Theory 
Regardless of its application in the various areas of study there is a unifying 
feature of the systems-theoretical approach. This is that clearly there can be 
no systems-theory without a concept of system. In 1968, in General Systems 
Theory Ludwig von Bertalannfy recognised the need for such a plural 
concept in the systems-theoretical approach and stated that it should 
operate according to the central concept of `System. ' He wrote: 
Thus, there exist models, principles, and laws that apply to 
generalized systems or their subclasses, Irrespective of their 
particular kind, the nature of their component elements, and the 
relations or "forces" between them. It seems legitimate to ask for a 
theory, not of systems of a more or less special kind, but of a 
universal principles applying to systems in general... In this way we 
postulate a new discipline called General System Theory. Its subject 
matter is the formulation and derivation of those principles which 
are valid for systems in general.. .A consequence of the existence of 
general system properties is the appearance of structural similarities 
or isomorphism in different fields. There are correspondences in 
the principles that govern the behaviour of entities that are, 
intrinsically different. 70 
70 von Bertalannfy, General System Theory, (Braziller, 1968) pg. 32 
Broadly speaking General Systems Theory operates through the 
analyses of three types of systems. These are: 
1 -Natural Systems. Those systems said to occur naturally. These include 
such systems as an ant colony, a weather system or a cognitive system such 
as the brain. 
2 -Artificial Systems. These are non-natural systems such as economic 
markets, or models of artificial intelligence which are, in the broadest sense 
the product of human activity. 
3 -Epistemological systems. These are systems of knowledge by which the 
world is represented. Whilst these are closely related to artificial systems (in 
so far as epistemological systems are not naturally occurring) they are 
included here as a separate order of systems because they are discursive 
systems of conceptual self-reflection. Systems theory itself is such an 
epistemological system. And as I argue in the following chapters, so too is 
Art History. 
Von Bertalanffy developed General Systems Theory as a way to order 
the many apparently differing yet what he identified as `isomorphic' 
(structurally similar) practices that he had observed in diverse scientific 
fields. In reflecting back on his own historical legacy just four years later (in 
1972) he again asserted the centrality of the principle of `System' in a 
General System Theory as a way of organizing what he had observed. Von 
Bertalannfy wrote: 
This trend [of organization in complex systems] arising in biology 
and other disciplines led me to conceive the idea of a general 
Systems Theory, that is, an interdisciplinary doctrine "elaborating 
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principles and models that apply to systems in general, irrespective 
of their particular kind, elements and forces involved. "" 
Evidence of Dynamical Systems Theory `locking in' around the concept of 
system proliferates the discourse. As Ackoff observed in 1960: 
The term `system' is used to cover a wide range of phenomena. We 
speak, for example, of philosophical systems, number systems, 
communication systems, control systems, educational systems and 
weapon systems. Some of these are conceptual constructs and 
others are physical entities. Initially we can define a system broadly 
and crudely as any entity, conceptual or physical, which consists of 
interdependent parts. 72 
Lazlo, another pioneer of the systems-theoretical approach wrote in 1972 
that: 
I only suggest that such general systems theories grasp some forms 
of order in the world which elude other types of theories. Thus 
general systems theories are one species of "world hypothesis"; 
they find their use and justification in the elucidation of otherwise 
chaotic patterns of events in the natural world. That currently 
general systems theories represent the most intensely worked field 
of general theory is not accidental: the systems concepts used in 
this theory permit a more adequate interpretation of a greater range 
of phenomena in a more consistent and unitary manner than any 
other73 
More recently Kevin Kelly argued in Out of Control, (1994) (his survey of 
complex systems and what he subtitles `the new biology of machines, social 
systems and the Economic world') for a wider application of the systems 
-theoretical approach to a variety of analyses: 
The overlap of the mechanical and the lifelike increases year by 
year... I call these examples [of complex and auto-catalytic systems 
from ant colonies, to economies to robot intelligence], both made 
and born, "vivisystems" for the lifelikeness each kind of system 
holds.... The vivisystems I examine in this book are nearly 
71 von Bertalannfy, foreword to, Lazlo, Introduction to Systems Philosophy, (Gordon 
and Breach, 1972) pg. xvii 
72 Ackoff, `Systems, organizations and interdisciplinary research', General Systems 
Yearbook, vol. 5,1960 (Society for General Systems Research) pg. 3 
73 Lazlo, Introduction to Systems Philosophy, (Gordon and Breach, 1972) pg. 15 
bottomless complications, vast in range, and gigantic in nuance. 
From these particular big systems I have appropriated unifying 
principles for all large vivisystems; I call them the laws of god, and 
they are the fundamentals shared by all self-sustaining, self- 
improving systems. 74 
What follows below is a general introduction to some more specific 
vocabularies of systems theory which will be subsequently applied to Art 
History within the course of the thesis - in particular in the second part of 
my thesis. 
3 Some key vocabularies of the Systems-Theoretical Approach 
3.1 - Dynamical Systems Theory75 
Systems come in all shapes and sizes; in different types and multiple forms. 
And likewise the studies of systems also comes in different forms. For 
example the broad term `Systems-Thinking' includes Cybernetics, General 
Systems Theory, Chaos Theory, Complexity Theory and so forth. Given 
the diversity of concerns, disciplines and practitioners involved there is 
often a lack of clarity in the application and use of specific vocabularies. 
This lack of clarity is demonstrated by the example of Chaos Theory which 
whilst very fashionable during the 1980s consequently fell out of favour in 
the 1990s and was replaced by the discourse of Complexity Theory. The 
74 Kelly, Out of Control, (Perseus Books, 1994) 
75 The term Dynamical Systems comes from the group, The Dynamical Systems 
Collective which was established in the 1970's at the University of California, 
Santa Cruz to study the nascent discipline of Chaos Theory. The group was 
formed by Norman Packard and Doyne Farmer who famously tried to discover a 
system by which to beat the casino tables in Las Vegas. Further anecdotal 
evidence of this can be found in Bass, The Preddctorr. " How a Band of Maverick 
Phyricirtr Set Out to Beat Wall Street, (Penguin, 2001). The key paper by the members 
of the collective is Crutchfield, Farmer, Packard, Shaw, `Chaos', ScientifrcAmerican, 
255 (December, 1986), pg. 46-57 in which they discuss chaotic dynamics in the 
operation of both computers and in intervals between drops of water dripping 
unpredictably from a tap. 
terms `chaos' and `complexity' often carry an ambiguity with regards to 
what theories exactly they are meant to invoke. As Chris Langton (a central 
figure in `Chaos Theory') has observed: "Chaos and Complexity are 
chasing each other around in a circle trying to find out if they are the same 
or different. , 16 These ambiguities are exacerbated because systems-thinking 
is still a relatively young discipline that constantly makes new 
advancements. For this reason it has not yet had time to clarify its terms 
and methods or effect a consensus amongst practitioners. So, for example, 
in the discussions on emergent properties reference is made to 
Emergentism77 Emergence, Emergent Properties and Synergetic s7' in 
reference to the same observations about the emergence of phenomena 
from collective patterns of systemic behaviour. 
In my own discussion in this thesis I am concerned with those 
particular types of systems known as Dynamic Systems. Dynamic systems 
are those systems which demonstrate dynamic patterns of behaviour which 
is to say that they are systems that change over time. Such dynamic patterns 
include behaviour such as self-organisation, emergence, complexity and 
unpredictability (as outlined below. ) For this reason I will use the term 
Dynamical Systems Theory, that is the study of dynamical systems, to refer 
collectively to the various theories which I draw from in my arguments 
concerning the application of the systems-theoretical approach to Art 
History. 
76 Chris Langton in conversation quoted in Lewin, Complexity: life on the Edge of 
Chaos, (Phoenix, 1993) pg. 10 
77 See Roy, Petitot, Pachoud, Varela, Beyond the Gap: An introduction to 
Naturalizing Phenomenology, ' in Roy, Petitot, Pachoud, Varela, Naturalizing 
Phenomenology, (Stanford University Press, 1999), pg. 1-82 
78 Haken, Synergetics: An Introduction: Nonequilibrium Phase Transitions and Self- 
Organization in Physics, Chemistry, and Biology (Springer, 1978) 
Open And Closed Systems 
- exchanges material with surroundings. 
- no exchange: can reach equilibrium; 
#molecules/s returning to liquid= # escaping to vapour 
liquid vapour 
a 
ýý. l Open system Closed system 
Lecm 9.1 
Image of Closed and Open systems from: 
http: //www. chem. usyd. edu. au/- mjtj/CHEM1101/CHEM1101. lectures/1101. Ject 
ure9/sldOOl. htm (Consulted Dec. 2003) 
3.2 - Closed and Open Systems 
A key characteristic of Dynamic systems is that they are Open systems. 
Open systems are dynamic and change over time because they are open to 
influence from their immediate environment. Open systems are 
differentiated from Closed Systems which are, conversely, operationally 
separate from their surroundings. 79 
One can imagine a closed system by imagining two glass jars; on 
top of one another and separated by a card divider. In the top jar is black 
smoke (which is heavier than air), and in the bottom jar is fresh air. The 
contents of the two jars are separated from one another by the divider and 
from the external environment by the walls of the jars; it is thus a closed 
system. If the separating divider is removed the smoke will diffuse into the 
air of the lower glass. After a period of time both jars will be full of an even 
mixture of smoke and air. At this point the system will have reached a 
point of equilibrium, which is to say that at this point the air and smoke 
cannot mix any further and thus the closed system ceases to evolve. In 
contrast an open system will continue to receive information from its 
immediate environment and in doing so it will adapt its operations and 
form accordingly. 
The difference between closed and open systems is a central focus 
of attention for two of the most important studies of Systems-Theory: von 
79 The significance of open systems to a systems-theoretical approach was 
identified as early as 1950 in von Bertalanffy's paper, 'The Theory of Open 
Systems in Physics and Biology. ' In this paper von Bertalanffy identified that 
organisms could be discussed in terms of being open systems in so far as they 
interacted with their immediate environments by, maintaining themselves 
inexchange of materials with environment, and in contiuous building up and 
breaking down of their components. ' Von Bertalanffy, 'The Theory of Open 
Systems in Physics and Biology, ' Science, vol. 111, (1950), pg. 23-29 
Bertanlanffy's General System Theory and Prigogine and Stengers' study of 
complexity, Order out of Chao?? In Order out of Chaos it is argued that when 
dynamical systems reach a certain level of complexity they display self- 
organising (autopoietic. S1) behaviour. This principle of self-organisation is a 
key characteristic of complex systems. It expresses how complexity 
emerges from systems which are open to influence from their 
environment(s). 
Open systems interact with their environment in two ways. They 
can receive information from outside their boundaries which subsequently 
has an effect upon the internal organisation of the system. And they can 
transmit information to their environment too. Neither process of input or 
output occurs in the smoke filled jars of the above example. 
The distinction between closed and open systems is often invoked 
by the system-theoretical approach as a means to demonstrate the limits of 
classical physics, as exemplified by the Second Law of Thermodynamics, 82 
in dealing with the emergent dynamics of complex systems. As von 
Bertalannfy noted, classic physics looks at closed systems which do not 
interact with their environment. These include models as small as an atom 
80 Prigogine & Stengers, Order Out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature, 
(Bantam, 1984) 
81Autopoiesis is "the process whereby an organization produces itself. An 
autopoietic organization is an autonomous and self-maintaining unity which 
contains component-producing processes. The components, through their 
interaction, generate recursively the same network of processes which produced 
them. An autopoietic system is operationally closed and structurally state 
determined with no apparent inputs and outputs. A cell, an organism, and perhaps 
a corporation are examples of autopoietic systems. " From the Web Dictionary of 
Cybernetics and Systems, (ed. Heylighten), on the website of the Principia Cybernetica 
Project (PCP): see http: //pespmcl. vub. ac. be/Default. html, (visited 29,11,2003) 
82 The Second Law of Thermodynamics is part of the study of Dynamics. 
Dynamics is a branch of mechanics which concerns itself with the study (and 
mathematical modelling) of the behaviour and action of physical bodies when 
acted upon by physical forces. It also studies the changes in motion produced 
thereof by such forces. 
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or as large as a solar system. The benefit of dealing with these entities as 
closed systems is that their behaviour can be successfully predicted. This is 
because if the all the conditions of the system and the way in which that 
system will perform are known it can be modelled as if it were isolated 
from its environment. 
Prigogine has provided the following mathematical definition of 
the Second Law of Thermodynamics as formulated by Rudolf Clausius 
with Lord Kelvin some time around 182083: 
as >o 
Simply speaking it states that within a closed physical system the disorder 
or entropy of that system will increase over time until an equilibrium is 
reached and the systems is in the state of maximum entropy. 84 
As a further development of this theme Von Bertalanffy, 
extrapolated by providing a conceptual congruence between the concept of 
entropy and the concept of information. In these terms information is 
defined accordingly, as (in Sayre's terms): "decrease in uncertainty, or more 
directly as an increase in probability. "85 
In his use of the concept of information Von Bertalanffy appeals to the 
concepts of order and the lack of order (or disorder) as a means of 
describing the state of a system at any one time. A disordered system is one 
83 Prigogine, Thermodynamics of Evolution. ' Physics Today, (November, 1972) pg. 
23-28; & (December, 1972) pg. 34-44 
84 To clarify; the equation states that within a closed system the ['instantaneous] 
rate of change [the differential or d] of entropy [or S] with respect to time is 
positive. In other words over a period of time a closed system will move towards 
a state of increased entropy and this will continue without change until a state of 
thermodynamic equilibrium [or maximum value of S] is reached. 
85 Sayre, Cybernetics and the Philosophy of Mind, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), pg. 
which demonstrates minimal organisational information; and likewise an 
ordered system manifests the information of the systems structural 
organisation. 
Thus the Second Law of thermodynamics can be restated using the 
concept of information. In doing so it will be stated thus: that within a 
closed system the quantity of entropy (or disorder) will increase until a state 
of equilibrium is reached; and at this stage the system will contain minimal 
information. In this formulation a closed system will lose organizational 
information over time and become increasingly entropic. 
An order of entropy can be expressed mathematically as a 
logarithm of probability because, it is argued, the entropic state is the most 
probable state for a closed system to be in. In the example of a closed 
system given above it is highly unlikely that the smoke and air will remain 
separated of the dividers are removed and the system is left to its own 
devices. In this case The system `wants' (if you will) to become entropic. 
This `will to disorder' means that the system is predisposed to distribute the 
elements (in this case the smoke) equally. This means that the eventual 
mixture of black and white smoke is the most probable state for the system 
to be in. Likewise when the system which is highly structured according to 
organisational information, by being separated into smoke and air, it is in a 
less probable state. On probability and structural organisation Bertalanffy 
has stated: 
But entropy, as we have already heard, is a measure of disorder; 
hence negative entropy or information is a measure of order or of 
organization since the latter, compared to the distribution at 
random, is an improbable state. 86 
86 Von Bertalanffy, General System Theory, (George Braziller, 1968) pg. 30-53 
The Second Law of Thermodynamics has proved highly effective 
in describing how closed systems behave. However not all systems are 
closed systems. The limitations the law become evident when one uses it to 
model observable events which occur within open and dynamic systems. 
Von Bertalanffy has stated: 
Conventional Physics deals only with closed systems, i. e., systems 
which are considered to be isolated from their environment. Thus 
physical chemistry tells us about the reactions, their rates, and the 
chemical equilibria eventually established in a closed vessel where a 
number of reactants are brought together. Thermodynamics 
expressly declares that its laws apply only to closed systems. In 
particular, the second principle of thermodynamics states that in a 
closed system, a certain quantity called entropy must increase to a 
maximum and eventually the process comes to stop at a state of 
equilibrium. [The second principle can be formulated in different 
ways, one being that entropy is a measure of probability, and so a 
closed system tends to a state of most probable distribution... So 
the tendency towards maximum entropy or the most probable 
distribution is the tendency to maximum disorder. ] However, we 
find systems which by their very nature and definition are not 
closed systems. Every living organism is essentially an open system. 
It maintains itself in a continuous inflow and outflow, a building up 
and breaking down of components, never being, so long as it is 
alive, in a state of chemical and thermodynamic equilibrium but 
maintained in a so-called steady state which is distinct from the 
latter. This is the very essence of that fundamental phenomenon of 
life which is called metabolism, the chemical process within living 
cells. What now? Obviously, the conventional formulations of 
physics are, in principle, inapplicable to the living organism qua 
open system and steady state, and may well suspect that many 
characteristics of living systems which are paradoxical in view of 
the laws of physics are a consequence of this fact. "87 
A theory of dynamic systems as is practiced by the systems- 
theoretical approach concerns itself with open systems. In doing so it can 
be used to identify a limit to the vocabulary of so-called `classic' physics 
which fails to accommodate the behaviour of open systems. This failure 
lies in an inability to account for that fact that open systems receive neg- 
87 Von Bertalanffy, General System Theory, (George Braziller, 1968) pg. 30-53 
entropy (negative entropy or information) from outside their internal 
functions. Since neg-entropy effects the internal functioning of these 
systems they cannot be sufficiently explained according to internal effects 
alone. The input of external information affects the degree of internal 
organisation. The system therefore displays less entropy and becomes more 
ordered and thus it appears that the process towards increasingly probable 
entropic states suggested by the second law is reversed. Such systems 
display, for example, evolutionary behaviour (by which a system adapts to 
its environment), which can be empirically observed but which contradict 
the world-view of the second Law of Thermodynamics. 
In anticipation of the arguments advanced below a similarity is 
identified between the methods and limits of `classic' physics described 
above (and exemplified by the Second Law of Thermodynamics) and an 
account of art which deals with it as a closed system. Such a view is 
exemplified by Formalist art criticism. Thus when Greenberg famously 
insisted that; "The purely plastic or abstract qualities of the art are the only 
ones that counts88 he was not only ignoring the institutional systems that 
served to support the modernist art at the centre of his analysis but was 
also effectively undermining his own project by failing to acknowledge the 
function of his own writing in providing regulatory feedback on the growth 
of American abstract art. Thus for the same reason that the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics is flawed (namely that it deals with closed systems) so too 
a formalist analysis of a work of art is limited because it treats the object as 
a closed system of representation that is not engaged in processes of 
88 Greenberg, Towards a Newer Laocoon' in Art in Theory 1900-1990, ed. 
Harrison and Wood (Blackwell, 1992) 
feedback with the supporting institutional and critical systems by which it is 
supported and within which it exists. In this thesis I propose to overcome 
these limitations by means of a systems-theoretical approach that sees the 
work of art as an open system of representation that itself constitutes a 
subsystem of the art world which in turn interacts with larger historical, 
social, philosophical, political and economic systems. 
3.3 The whole is greater than the sum of the parts 
It was argued above that Complexity within systems means that the 
behaviour of dynamic systems cannot be understood in terms of either the 
functioning of the elements of the system on their own or the system as 
isolated from its environment. Further it was argued that a complex system 
is an organisation of functioning elements with an identity that is 
recognisable in relation to both those functions and that organisation. This 
means that in the act of both identifying a complex system and the 
subsequent analysis of the behaviour of that system the system needs to be 
considered in its entirety In other words the whole of the system is a more 
significant object of critical analysis than its individual components. 
Further the whole of the system is a different entity than the mere sum of 
the parts of the system. And the system as a distinct entity can be 
distinguished from its environment. 
Von Bertalanffy locates this move to a holistic approach within the 
systems-theoretical method in relation to a broader epistemological shift 
away from a method based upon atomism. Von Bertalanffy associates such 
an atomistic approach with positivism within science and more specifically 
the approach of his own academic heritage. He wrote: 
Having been educated in the philosophical tradition later called the 
Vienna Circle, I may perhaps hint at the change that has taken place 
[with regards to the methodolgical shift of a systems approach]. 
The epistemology (and metaphysics) of logical positivism was 
determined by the ideas of physicalism and reductionism, and the 
`camera theory' of knowledge. These in the view of present day 
knowledge, are quite simply obsolete... Compared to the analytical 
procedure of classical science, with linear causality connecting two 
variables as a basic category, the investigation of organised wholes 
of many variables requires new categories of interaction, 
transaction, teleology, etc. with many problems arising in 
epistemology, mathematical models and techniques. 89 
Two of the most significant implications of the holist approach are: 
1- that the system needs to be understood in terms of both its parts and 
the structure of those parts because everything in a complex system is 
interconnected 90 
2- complex systems operate as a whole; this means that the behaviour, 
inputs and outputs of such systems are distributed over those systems. 
Kevin Kelly has described the concept of holism in the systems- 
theoretical approach in terms similar to that of von Bertalanffy whilst also 
describing its interdisciplinary application: 
The spirit of a beehive, the behaviour of an economy, the thinking 
of a supercomputer, and the life in me are distributed over a 
multitude of smaller units (which themselves may be distributed). 
When the sum of the parts can add up to more than the parts, then 
that extra being (that something from nothing) is distributed 
among the parts. Whenever we find something from nothing, we 
find it arising from a field of many interacting smaller pieces. All 
the mysteries we find most interesting - life, intelligence, evolution 
- are found in the soil of large distributed systems9' 
89 von Bertalanffy, , 
foreword', in Laszlo, Introduction to Systems Philosophy, (Gordon 
and Breach, 1972), pg. Xix. A parallel can arguably be drawn between the Vienna 
Circle to which von Bertalanffy alludes and a particular configuration of scientific 
art history (also connected with Vienna in the early 20th Century) which, I argue, 
requires a reconsideration of its aims and methods. 
90 The form of this interconnection takes the form of processes of feedback and 
distribution as a discussed in more detail throughout the thesis. 
91 Kelly, Out of Control, (Perseus Books, 1994) pg. 469 
The ramifications of the above are discussed in greater length throughout 
the thesis. In anticipation of these discussions, however, I propose that a 
holistic critical approach (as opposed to the atomistic viewpoint) which is a 
key characteristic of systems-thinking approach has two significant 
implications when applied to the discipline of Art History. These reflect the 
two implications of the holist approach in general (as given above). They 
are: 
1- In its application within social sciences the holism of the systems- 
theoretical approach necessitates a move from a sociology based on the 
individual human subject to one based upon the systemic structures from 
out of which those human subjects emerge as was most famously practiced 
i92 in Luhmann's sociology based upon his analysis of `Social Systems. 
2- In a study of art in terms of systems this attention to the whole system 
means a shift in attention away from individual works of art onto the 
structures and systems within which those incidents of art occur. In my 
thesis I identify these as the systems of (amongst others): the art gallery; the 
art market; art discourse; and the artwork itself as a complex (non- 
monadic) system. 
3.4 Emergence 
The concept of the whole of the system being a more significant 
conceptual entity than can also be understood in terms of emergence. 
92 Luhmann's method forms the basis of my own discussions concerning the 
function of art, the artist and art history within such social systems. See especially, 
Luhmann, Social Systems, (trans. Bednarz, ), (Stanford University Press, 1995) 
although I do not take up his specific concept of the work of art understood in 
terms of intersubjective communication as is specifically discussed in: Luhmann, 
Art as a Social Systems, (trans. Knodt), (Stanford University Press, 2000) 
Emergence occurs when there is sufficient complexity in a system for 
additional properties or behaviours to emerge from the system. These are 
often called `global' properties of the system as Heylighten has observed: 
Emergence is a classical concept in systems theory, where it denotes 
the principle that the global properties defining higher order 
systems or `wholes' (e. g. boundaries, organisation, control, ... ) can 
in general not be reduced to the properties of the lower order 
subsystems or `parts'. Such irreducible properties are called 
emergent. Until now there is no satisfactory theory explaining what 
characterizes emergent properties or what are the conditions for 
their existence 93 
The concept of Emergence in complex systems has been applied to 
the self-organisation which is observable in many complex systems (such 
as, for example the system of an ant colony as is discussed in a following 
chapter. ) Such self-organisation, which I argue is also observable in the 
systems of Art, is an emergent property of complex systems. Emergence 
has thus been used to explain a wide variety of behaviour observable in 
complex systems. One of its most significant applications can be found 
within neuroscience and the discourse of Artificial Intelligence/Life. Here 
consciousness is understood as an emergent property of a complex 
cognitive system. 94 As Coveney and Highfield have observed: 
93 Heylighen, `Self-Organization, Emergence and the Architecture of Complexity', 
Proceedings of the 1st European Conference on System Science, (AFCET, 1989) pg. 23-32. 
94 The literature on this area is both huge and rapidly expanding. An early 
philosophical study concerning a systems-thinking application to the mind/body 
debate in materialist terms is found in Sayre, Cybernetics and the Philosophy ofMind, 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976) however arguably Sayre's arguments were not 
testable without the sophisticated computer technology which has emerged from 
the late 1980s onwards. More recent and excellent overviews of the major current 
philosophical debates are found in: Horgan & Tienson (eds. ), Connectionism and the 
Philosophy ofMind, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991); Ramsey, Stich, & 
Rumelhart (eds., ), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory, (Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, 1991); Boden (ed. ), The Philosophy ofArtificiallife, (Oxford University 
Press, 1996); Boden (ed. ), The Philosophy ofArt ifi dallntelligence, (Oxford University 
Press, 1990) 
Life is also an emergent property, one that arises when 
physiochemical systems are organized and interact in certain ways. 
Similarly a human being is an emergent property of huge numbers 
of cells, a company is more than the sum of its pens, papers, real 
estate, and personnel, while a city is an emergent property of 
thousands pr millions of human beings. And no one should doubt 
that out innermost thoughts, our emotions of love and hate, are 
more than a rush of individual hormones, or the firing of individual 
neurons in the brain. The study of complexity, through its 
emphasis on emergent properties, goes some way to restoring a 
balance between the spiritual and materialistic sides of our nature. 95 
In the arguments of this thesis I argue that the very concept of Art 
is itself an emergent property of the complex systems to which it is 
associated. These include the systems of the art gallery, the art market, art 
discourse and the complex networks of artworks themselves. 
3.5 Complexity 
Complexity is the most important concept of the types of systems which I 
discuss in this thesis. It is also, however, the most difficult to define 
precisely. As Cilliers has noted: "The concept remains elusive at both the 
qualitative and quantitative levels. s96 Likewise Coveney and Highfield have 
also written about the difficulty in defining the concept: 
"This word is often used in an infuriatingly vague sense by scientists, who 
may mean different things by it. i97 Likewise Heylighten has given the 
following commentary on the difficulty in providing a specific definition of 
Complexity. 
Still, I believe there is a common, `objective' core in the different 
concepts of complexity. Let us go back to the original Latin word 
complexus, which signifies `entwined', `twisted together'. This may 
be interpreted in the following way: in order to have a complex you 
95 Coveney & Highfield, Frontiers of Complexity, (Ballantine Books, 1995) pg. 330-31 
96 Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernity, (Roudedge, 1998), pg. 2 
97 Coveney & Highfield, Frontiers of Complexity, (Faber & Faber, 1995) pg. 14 
need two or more components, which are joined in such a way that 
it is difficult to separate them. Similarly, the Oxford Dictionary 
defines something as `complex' if it is `made of (usually several) 
closely connected parts'. Here we find the basic duality between 
parts which are at the same time distinct and connected. Intuitively 
then, a system would be more complex if more parts could be 
distinguished, and if more connections between them existed. More 
parts to be represented means more extensive models, which 
require more time to be searched or computed. Since the 
components of a complex cannot be separated without destroying 
it, the method of analysis or decomposition into independent 
modules cannot be used to develop or simplify such models. This 
implies that complex entities will be difficult to model, that 
eventual models will be difficult to use for prediction or control, 
and that problems will be difficult to solve. This accounts for the 
connotation of difficult, which the word `complex' has received in 
later periods. 98 
From within a Systems-Thinking perspective when it is said that systems 
are complex something quite specific is being said. 
Firstly it means that the systems are more often than not. This means that 
they receive organising information from outside their boundaries which 
increases the order within the system. 
Secondly Complexity does not just mean that a system is very big, nor even 
does it mean that it is complicated. Instead complexity refers to the way in 
which the system functions in a dynamic manner. Complexity emerges 
from dynamic as opposed to simple systems. This means that the way in 
which a complex system functions is not explained through an explanation 
of how every bit of the system works; instead something of the system as a 
functioning whole is required. As Cilliers observed: "there is neither 
something at the level below (a source) nor at a level above (a meta- 
98 Heylighten, `What is complexity?, ' (Dec 9,1996, ) published on the Principia 
Cybernetica Web, website: http: //pespmcl. vub. ac. be/COMPLEXI. html, 
(consulted 29/11/03) 
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description), capable of capturing the essence of complexity. "" Further a 
complete description of a complex system must be as complex as the 
system that it is describing. This is because if the description is more simple 
than what it is describing then the complexity will have been mis- 
represented. 
Nonetheless the following characteristics of complex systems can 
be identified in relation to the following concepts: 
1- Complex (as opposed to complicated); 2 -Dynamic; 3- 
Interconnected; 4-A whole (as opposed to a aggregate of its parts); 5- 
Non-linear; 6- The balance between connection and differentiation. 
I will now discuss each of these concepts in turn. 
3.5.1 - Complex not Complicated 
In identifying a system as complex it is differentiated from a system which 
is merely complicated. To call something complicated means that it can be 
recognised as being composed of many different parts. These parts could 
be organised in simple manner but be complicated by virtue of the sheer 
number of parts involved. An example of this would be an imaginary 
jigsaw puzzle of 100,000 pieces. The puzzle is complicated because of all 
its many parts. And it would require this complication to be negotiated in 
order for the puzzle to be completed. However despite this numerical 
complication the way in which a jigsaw works is, in actuality, very simple. It 
is not complex. Likewise an organisation could be made of many parts and 
be structured in a complicated way but still not be complex because it does 
not function in a complex way. As Cilliers has observed: 
99Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernity, (Roudedge, 1998), pg. 3 
"I have heard it said (by someone from France, of course) that a jumbo jet 
is complicated, but that a mayonnaise is complex. "" 
3.5.2 - Dynamic 
Complexity emerges from dynamic systems. There are three aspects of a 
system which allow it to function dynamically; and hence in a complex 
manner. These are: 
1- the type of elements within a system. They must be those which will 
interact with one another in different ways. This means that each element is 
capable of behaving in different ways depending upon the other elements 
that it is interacting with and the mode of that interaction. In short each 
part of a dynamic system must be flexible enough to work with other parts 
of the system in creating the dynamic whole that is a complex system. 
2- the way in which those elements are organised. The elements of a 
complex system must be organised in such a way so as to allow for a 
dynamic interaction between the (adaptable) elements. 
3- the manner in which the elements interact with one another. Self- 
evidently, in order to be complex a system must actualise its potential for 
dynamic interaction. That is it must display complex behaviour. 
3.5.3 Interconnected 
One of the reasons that certain systems are dynamic and complex is 
because of the high level of interaction amongst the component parts. For 
example a complex system such as a neural network operates dynamically 
by virtue of a high level of interconnection between the component parts. 
100 Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernity, (Routledge, 1998), pg. 3 
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This serves to illustrate that what makes an arrangement dynamic (and 
hence complex) is the different ways in which the components of a system 
can interact. Within a jumbo jet there is a specific way in which the parts 
can interact. This interaction is set within the parameters of the jumbo jet's 
function and there is little potential allowed for deviation from this 
function. For example the tyres of the plane have a specific function and 
cannot interact with the air-conditioning system. And if the parts were 
arranged in a different order then the object wouldn't be a jumbo jet.. 
There are clearly a great many parts to the jet and they perform a great 
many functions -I couldn't build one in my garage - but this is just an 
expression of the complication of the jet's design rather than its 
complexity. A mayonnaise on the other hand is complex because whilst 
each element of the emulsion (egg yolk, oil, acid and salt) contributes to the 
overall system the mayonnaise as a whole and they are in a symbiotic (and 
non-linear) relationship with one another. 
3.5.4 -A Complex system must be taken as whole 
An understanding of a complex system must operate at the level of the 
system as a whole and not on an atomistic level which reduces the system 
to its component parts. 
To be complex a system must be both numerous and diverse. As 
Coveney and Highfield have stated: 
"The complexity of a problem is defined [in mathematical terms as] the 
number if mathematical operations needed to solve it. s101 Thus complex 
systems are similar to complicated systems in so far as both are composed 
101 Coveney & Highfield, Frontiers of Complexity, (Faber & Faber, 1995) pg. 14 
of a large number of component parts. However, in complex systems this 
numerousness creates a diverse and complex interaction between those 
elements. For example a collection of five ants is not complex yet an ant 
colony is. This is because the potential for dynamic interaction between the 
five ants is limited (by the number of ants) whereas the potential for 
dynamic and complex interaction between the ants in the colony is 
enormous. A small system is easy to describe by describing the individual 
elements and their behaviours (through differential equations for example). 
However in a large and complex system this description of the elements 
alone is not sufficient to describe and understand the way in which the 
system works. Thus, in order to account for a complex system, the level of 
description needs to be at the system as a whole. 
3.5.5 - Non-linearity 
If interactions between elements within a dynamic system are both diverse 
and non-linear then they will produce complex behaviour; and further they 
will contribute to the complexity of the system. By diverse interactions it is 
meant that elements within the system will interact with many other 
elements of the system; and do so in varied ways. For example ants in a 
colony can interact with one another in a variety of ways that would not be 
possible for the elements in a jumbo-jet to do. By non-linear it is meant 
that interactions need not happen in the same order for subsequent 
interactions. Non-linearity is a defining feature of complex systems and 
also allows for another key characteristic of complex systems namely 
positive feedback within complex systems (as is discussed in more detail 
below) where small causes can have large effects102 
The non-linearity of dynamic/complex systems has two other 
implications. These are: 
1- That dynamic systems are not in a state of equilibrium. They are 
constantly changing their state and do not remain the same over time (that 
is that their structure, rather than just their physical constitution, and 
operations adapt and evolve); hence their dynamism. As Cilliers has 
observed: "Complex systems operate under conditions far from 
equilibrium. There has to be a constant flow of energy to maintain the 
organisation of the system and to ensure its survival. Equilibrium is another 
word for death. ""' 
2-A dynamic system develops in a non-linear fashion because it has a 
memory. This is to say that previous operations within the system are 
`remembered' by the system. The weather system `remembers' the 
butterflies wings flapping when the tidal wave breaks. This argument is 
discussed in greater length (ref) in my discussion below on `lock-in' and 
systemic memory. 
3.5.6 - The balance between connection and differentiation 
The emergence of Complexity depends upon two aspects of a system. 
These are: 
1- connection and 2- differentiation. These two elements need to be 
balanced in order for complexity to emerge. Connection means that parts 
102 The role of Positive Feedback, as discussed by W. Brian Arthur, forms the basis 
of my arguments in Chapter 8 on the Gallery and Dynamical Systems Theory. 
103 Cilliers, Complexity and Poxtmodernity, (Routledge, 1998), pg. 4 
of the system need to be interconnected. The greater the level of 
interconnection the greater the level of order within the system. This is 
because more information will be required to describe the system; in other 
words a connected system will require more data to model what goes on 
within the system. The connected system will thus display less entropy (or 
disorder) and more neg-entropy than a unconnected one. Complete 
connection within a system (in which every element is connected with every 
other element) leads to a completely ordered system. An example of a 
completely order system would be a perfect crystal in which the position of 
each molecule within the crystal is related to every other molecule in a 
completely interconnected structure. Differentiation in a system, on the 
other hand, means that the components of the system are distinct from one 
another. This means that there will be variety in the system and that 
different parts of the system will behave differently. Increased 
differentiation within a system contributes not only to the complexity of a 
system but also, contrary to connection, to its disorder. Complete 
differentiation within a system leads to complete disorder. An example of 
such disorder would be a gas in which the movement of the molecules 
within the gas in its environment are independent of one another. A system 
can only be complex if a balance between connection and differentiation is 
present. This means that a complex system is both ordered and disordered. 
It has a structure but also variety and capacity for change and dynamic 
behaviour. An increase in both connection and differentiation within a 
system can contribute to that system's complexity this is because with more 
structural variety more dynamic behaviour, for different types of 
operations and thus change is possible. This is not the case in a totally 
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connected system (such as a crystal) which is too ordered to allow the 
possibility of dynamic change or a totally differentiated system which will 
also not change because it has reached a state of maximum entropy. A 
complex system is therefore one balanced between order and disorder. 
This balance allows to system to be creative and to change over time under 
its own impetus (what Varela calls auto-poiesis)104 but to do so in a way 
that means that it retains its own recognisable identity. This complex 
balance between chaos and order has lead to complexity being called The 
Edge of Chaos. Such systems on the `Edge of Chaos' can adapt and evolve as 
Goodwin has argued: 
[The edge of chaos] is almost a theorem about life, the universe and 
everything that is complex and non-linear (which is nearly 
everything) Speaking anthropomorphically the edge of chaos is a 
good place to be in a constantly changing world because from their 
you can always explore the patterns of order that are available and 
try them out for their appropriateness to the current situation... 
Complex systems that can evolve will always be near the edge of 
chaos, poised for the creative step into emergent novelty that is the 
essence of the evolutionary process. i105 
3.6 Isomorphism 
Isomorphism the final key concept of a systems-theoretical approach I 
explain here is, arguably, the most important for method; that is my own 
application of Dynamcial Systems Theory to an analysis of art and art history. 
This is due to that fact that because Dynamical Systems Theory proposes that 
isomorphisms (or structural similarities) are identifiable amongst diverse 
systems it can be legitimately applied to other discourses including the 
104 Varela, Autopoiesis: A Theory of Living Organisation, (North Holland, 1981) 
105 Goodwin, How the Leopard Changed its Spots, (Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1994), 
pg. 175. Kaufman has also argued that the edge of chaos is a: "powerful new 
framework to understand evolutionary biology, " which can be used to explain the 
evolution of biological systems. See Kauffman, The Origins of Order, (Oxford 
University Press, 1993), pg. 261 
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systems of art and art history. When General Systems Theory was originally 
formulated by von Bertalanffy it was as a solution to what he recognised as 
the failure of the increasingly isolated and specialized sciences106 to 
accommodate certain phenomena. Hence the failed application of the 
second law of thermodynamics to open systems as outlined above. Thus 
the aim of his method was to identify structural similarities or isomorphic 
tendencies having currency in the gaps between isolated scientific disciplines 
such as biology, chemistry and physics. The goal was to find these more 
general principles and thus save the language of the specialist from 
unintelligibility, metaphysics and isolation from the world which I 
discussed at the beginning of the chapter. 
Dynamical Systems Theory is thus characterised by an interdisciplinary 
method. It attempts to discuss isomorphisms between different systems 
and works on the basic principle that there are universal principles 
according to which all dynamic systems, no matter what form they take, are 
organised. As von Bertalanffy observed: 
Speaking in `material' language, it means that the world, i. e. the total 
of observable events, shows structural uniformities, manifesting 
themselves by isomorphic traces of order in the different levels or 
realms. 107 
Thus the universal concept of the `system' serves as the overarching 
conceptual framework by which a multitude of phenomena from diverse 
fields of study can be explained. 
106 This can be compared with both Husserl's arguments on the `crisis' of the 
sciences in the modem age (see Husserl, The Crisis of European Science; and 
Transcendental Phenomenology, (1954), (Northwestern University Press, 1970)) and 
Lyotard's arguments in The Postmodern Condition. Both argue that the crisis in the 
condition of knowledge in Modernity is defined by an increasing specialisation of 
disciplines which facilitates their increasing autonomy and isolation. 
107 von Bertalanffy (1968) pg. 49 
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In the spirit of such an interdisciplinary method I attempt, in this 
thesis, to find and discuss further general and `isomorphic' systems 
principles in the systems of Art and Art History. 
4 Applications 
Given the suggestiveness of the Systems-Theoretical approach it has been 
taken up in the name of a number of practices. Management studies for 
example has found the concept of `system' as a highly useful concept in 
understanding corporate and management structures and the literature on 
`Management Systems' and so forth is vast. Arguably the most productive 
recent application has been the application of systems-thinking and 
complexity to the questions and philosophy of Artificial Intelligence and 
Artificial Life108. In artistic practice there has been some application of 
`systems' to inform artistic practice. This is most notable in the work of 
Jack Burnham who first invoked systems-thinking in the 1960s109; and 
Hans Haacke who has also made numerous artistic engagements with 
artistic `systems. ' More recently the Biotica project at the RCA (1999) 
attempted a (not entirely successful) artistic synthesis of modelling of 
Artificial Life and installation art110. To my knowledge there has been no 
attempt to systematically apply the systems-theoretical approach to art 
history in the English language (m book length form at least)'1' However I 
identify two precedents for my arguments and method below. 
108 I discuss some of the implications of this in chapter 7 
109 see - http: //www. volweb. cz/horvitz/burnham/homepage. htm - for a 
full online bibliography of Burnham's work - work in reference here. 
110 See Brown, Biotica: Art Emergence and Artificall life, (RCA, 2001) 
111 Notable exceptions include the ever growing English translations of Luhmann, 
Sevänen, E., `Art as an Autopoietic Sub-System of Modern Society, ' Theory, Culture 
and Society, vol. 18 (1)(SAGE, 2001) and the recent work of Matthew Rampley 
4.1 Luhmann - Social Systems and Art as a Social System 
The work of the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann is exemplary of the 
usefulness of the systems-theoretical approach when applied to the 
humanities; and it has thus been an inspiration for my own use of systems- 
theory within Art History12 
Luhmann proposed to radicalise his own sociological praxis 
through application of systems thinking. In doing so he proposed an 
analysis of various social systems (which include legal systems; art systems; 
economic systems and so forth) in terms of them being understood in the 
following key terms: 
1- Systems of observation. That is systems which have function according 
to the phenomena which they observe. For example the economic system 
is a system which observes economic value. 
2- Systems of differentiation. That is systems which by virtue of their 
representative function perform the function of differentiation (from one 
another and, crucially from their environment). 
(Edinburgh College of Art), WJT Mitchell, (Art Institute of Chicago) and 
Rakuschan, whose work, `Art and Repugnance: Form as Anti-Form, Art as Anti- 
Art, Market as Anti-Market, ' was published on the website of the European Institute 
for Progressive Cultural Policies, 
http: //www. eipcp. net/diskurs/d05/text/rakuschan_kunst_en. html 
(consulted Dec. 2003). Kitty Zijlmans has made a valuable contribution to the 
field. See for example her `Kunstgeschichte als Systemtheorie, ' Gesichtspunkte. 
Kunstgeschichte heute (Berlin: D. Reimer Verlag, 1995) pg. 251-277. 
112 However it is also noted that I do not attempt an evaluation of Luhmann's 
specific approach to Art (as it is discussed in Art as a Social System) within my 
thesis. This is because, I argue, that this would only be possible after I have 
established my own theoretical position with regards to the application of 
systems-thinking to Art Historical method (something which Luhmann does not 
himself do) Luhmann is therefore discussed here as one example of the 
application of systems-thinking to questions of cultural analysis. However a more 
thorough investigation of Luhmann's thought in particular (and ultimately his 
application to commentaries on Art and Art History) forms a significant part of 
my ongoing and future research. 
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3- Systems of Communication. That is systems which function according 
to the process of communication (transfer of information as it is 
understood by Shannon's conception of information theory13) 
Luhmann claimed that his project should be understood as a 
`rewriting [of] the theory of society' through the systems-theoretical 
approach. This, he argued, had the implication of a paradigm shift: 
At the structural level, from stratification to functional 
differentiation. The unity of society is not to be sought in ethico- 
political demands, but rather in the emergence of comparable 
conditions in systems as diverse as religion or the monetary 
economy, science or art, intimate relationships or politics - despite 
extreme differences between the functional and operational modes 
of these systems. Our theoretical proposition offers the following: a 
clear demarcation of external system boundaries of different 
domains and comparability between different systems. 114 
What Luhmann thus proposed was nothing less than a move, in 
sociological practice, away from an analysis of the structural `stratification' 
of society in terms of critiques of societal organisations and hierarchies and 
social relationships"s to a sociological analysis in terms continuous with the 
strategies of Dynamical Systems Theory. One of Luhmann's translators - Eva 
M Knodt - has elaborated on this paradigm shift in the following manner: 
'13 Luhmann's adaptation of Shannon's Information Theory to the specific issue 
of communication within social systems is introduced in the collection of essays: 
Luhmann (ed. Rasch), Theories of Distinction, (Stanford University Press, 2002) - see 
especially part III, `What is Communication? ' For Shannon's own definition of 
Information Theory see Shannon & Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of 
Communication, (University of Illinois Press, 1949) 
1t4 Luhmann, Art as a Social System, Trans. Knodt, (Stanford University Press, 
2000) pg. 2 
115 Such a method was exemplified by the earlier approach to `systematising' 
Sociology practiced by Talcott Parsons, (see Parsons, The Social System, (Free Press, 
1951) for an outline of his largely structuralist approach) which has its roots in the 
social structuralism of Weber and Levi-Strauss. This mode of Sociology requires 
the notion of society understood in terms of social structure in order to function. 
Luhmann's contribution was that he acknowledged that such structure was a 
function of, and thus relative to, his own discursive system rather than understood 
as an extra-discursive `other. ' 
General systems theory is the result of two subsequent paradigm 
shifts, which moved the problem of order from the fringes of 
metaphysical speculation to the centre of scientific research. In the 
first of these shifts, initiated by the German biophysiologist Ludwig 
von Bertalanffy in the mid - 1950's, the metaphysical distinction 
between part and whole was replaced by the distinction between 
system and environment... In a second shift, the 
system/environment distinction was redefined within a general 
theory of self-referential systems. "' 
Hence in Luhmann's work there is a move away from an analysis of 
social structures in themselves, which in structuralist sociology are pre- 
empted before they are deconstructed, to analyses of the ways in which 
these structures emerge from the complex matrices of communication 
which occur at the level of the social system. "' 
For Luhmann, the Social Systems of his analyses are not composed 
as rigid macro-structures which dictate behaviour from the top down by 
organising it and systematising it. In other words they are not a scaffolding 
which supports social activity or bureaucratically orders social relationships 
and communications. Instead Luhmann suggests that social systems are 
formed from the bottom up; that is that they are emergent properties of 
the functioning of social relations on the micro (not macro) level. Social 
116 Knodt, `Foreword' [to Luhmann, Social Systems], in Luhmann, Social Systems, 
Trans. Bednarz, Jr. with Baecker, (Stanford University Press, 1995) pg. xxi 
117 This move away from an analysis of the structure of social systems toward 
examinations of the functional patterns of social behaviours in terms of the 
dynamics of complex systems is characteristic of a more general skepticism 
toward structural analytical strategies demonstrated by a rejection of Modernism. 
This rejection of Modernism forms part of the larger debate in which Luhmann's 
reception is placed; not least I terms of the debate between himself and 
Habermas. For more on this see Rasch, Niklas Luhmann'. r Modernity, (Stanford 
University Press, 2000) which is especially good on the Habermas/Luhmann 
debate. See also Rasch & Wolfe (eds), Observing Complexity: Systems Theory and 
Postmodernity, (University of Minnesota Press, 2000) which contains Luhmann's 
own paper, `Why Does Society Describe Itself as Postmodern? alongside 
commentaries on the debate. A good English introduction to Habermas' position 
is found in: Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse ofModernity: 12 Lectures, (MIT 
Press, 1987); Habermas, `Modernity versus Postmodernity, ' (trans. Benhabib), 
New German Critique, 22, (1981) pg. 3-14 and Habermas, `Modernity - An 
Incomplete Project, ' in Foster (ed. ), The Anti- aesthetic, (Bay Press, 1983) pg. 3-15 
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systems are, therefore, a collection of functions, or to use Luhmann's terms 
a collection of `operations'. He argued: 
Operations (conscious perceptions as well as communications) are 
nothing more than events. They cannot persist, nor can they be 
altered. They emerge and vanish in the same instant, taking no 
more time than is needed to fulfil the function of an element that 
cannot be decomposed any further. 18 
4.1.1 Psychic Systems: Luhmann and the Human Subject 
Luhmann conceives of individual humans within social systems in terms of 
what he defined as Prychic Systems. It is this identification of the individual in 
the same terms as society (i. e. as systems) that allows him to discuss 
operational isomorphisms shared between them. His discussions on Physic 
Systems identify the following key points: 
1- that consciousness is a (closed) psychic system (differentiated from its 
environment and other psychic systems. ) 
2- that psychic systems are characterised by the operations of perceptions 
particular to individual psychic systems. That is that self-consciousness is a 
particular type of perception; that this perception is one of self- 
recognition/apperception and hence can be identified, in systems- 
theoretical terms as self-reflexive or cybernetic. 
3- psychic systems operate within larger (Social) systems 
4- the operations of social systems have an influential effect on the 
operations of psychic systems (and vice versa) 
and therefore that: 
18 Luhmann, Art as a Social System, Trans. Knodt, (Stanford University Press, 
2000) pg. 49 
5- perceptions within psychic systems (the operations of psychic systems) 
are involved in relations of feedback, exchange and control with social 
systems. 
Hence Luhmann argued that conditions of social systems will effect 
the operative conditions of the psychic systems which operate within 
them. '" 
Luhmann further argued that within social systems interactions take 
place between psychic systems. However Luhmann argues that this 
interaction between psychic systems does not occur at the level of 
`communication' within social systems but rather that it takes place in a 
manner different to the discreet transfer of information between minds. 
This is because, Luhmann argues, psychic systems are closed to both 
themselves and one another; they have `operative closure' which means 
that they have clearly delineated boundaries within which they operate. 
Luhmann argues that because of this operative closure perception itself 
19 A particular aspect of this inter-relationship, between psychic and social 
systems is the ways in which the perceptions and output of psychic systems are 
interdependent upon the technological state of that social system. Luhmann 
articulated this interdependence in terms of the `meaning' produced by the 
organisational information and the output of both psychic and social systems. He 
wrote: "Psychic and Social Systems have evolved together. At any time the one 
kind of system is the necessary environment of the other. This necessity is 
grounded in the evolution that makes these kinds of systems possible. Persons 
cannot emerge and continue to exist without social systems, nor can social 
systems without persons. This co-evolution has led to a common achievement, 
employed by psychic as well as social systems. Both kinds of systems are ordered 
according to it, and for both it is binding as the indispensable, undeniable for of 
their complexity and self-reference. We call this evolutionary achievement 
`meaning"' Luhmann, Social Systems, pg. 59 And that: `Both kinds of systems 
emerge by the path of co-evolution. One is impossible without the other, and 
vice-versa. They must, so to speak, differentiate themselves in respect to meaning. 
Meaning is the true `substance' of this emergent evolutionary level. It is therefore 
false (or, more gently, it is a falsely chosen anthropocentrism) to assign the 
psychic, that is, the conscious, anchorage a sort of ontological priority over the 
social. It is impossible to find a `supporting substance' for meaning. Meaning 
supports itself in that it enables its own self-referential reproduction. And only the 
forms of this reproduction differentiate psychic and social structures. " Luhmann, 
Social Systems, pg. 97-8 
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(which is the operations of a closed psychic system in terms of that 
system's self-recognition, or self awareness) cannot be directly 
communicated to another psychic system. In Art as a Social System 
Luhmann stated: 
"One thing is certain; if it is generally true that psychic operations, 
not to speak of those of the living system, can never be executed in 
another consciousness, which because of its complexity and 
historically self-referential mode of operation remains opaque, then 
this holds also for the artist distanced by his work and for his 
admirers as well - no more and no less, for inaccessibility does not 
allow for augmentation. s120 
In Art as a Social System Luhmann argues that art has a special function 
within social systems because it allows for the replication and hence 
communication of the perceptions and operations of these closed psychic 
systems between one another. However the arguments outlined a greater 
length in this thesis as a whole will not investigate the problematic issue of 
intersubjectivity between psychic systems and the nature that art may play 
in this, but will instead use Luhmann's arguments concerning the discursive 
self-reflexivity of systems-theory as a means for art history to reflect upon 
its operations through the adoption of a systems-theoretical approach. 
4.1.2 Luhmann and Complexity 
Another key aspect of Luhmann's contribution to Sociology was his use of 
the principle of complexity (and complex systems) as a descriptive 
organising principle of social systems. Thus both complexity and complex 
systems are used as a heuristic device in the analysis of social systems. 
120 Luhmann, Art as a Social System, [trans. Knodt], (Stanford University Press, 
2000) pg. 13 
Luhmann engages with Complexity in two fundamental ways. 
These are: 
1- The particular behavioural patterns of the social systems which he 
described are specific to complex systems; that is they are dynamic, 
unpredictable, self-organising (auto-catalytic) and display emergence. 
2- As a consequence of ensuring that his own discursive system (such as 
that presented in the 600 pages of Social Systems) satisfactorily accounts for 
the complexity in the social systems he observed, his own textual and 
theoretical system is mimetic of the complexity discusses. This means that 
texts such as Social Systems are themselves complex. This is something 
Luhmann himself recognised at different stages in the reception of Social 
Systems. Firstly in the original preface to Social Systems he wrote: 
A Sociological theory that wants to consolidate the conditions of 
the discipline must not only be more complex, it must be much 
more complex that the classical authors and their interpreters - 
even Parsons - had thought. This requires different theoretical 
precautions in regard to validity and connectivity, internally as well 
as externally, and it requires, not least, building the reflection of 
complexity (and the concept of complexity ) into the theory 
itself. 121 
And then again in 1991 in the preface to the English edition of Social 
Systems he wrote: 
This is not an easy book. It does not accommodate those who 
prefer a quick and easy read, yet do not want to die without a taste 
of systems theory. This holds for the German text, too. If one 
seriously undertakes to work out a comprehensive theory of the 
social and strives for sufficient conceptual precision, abstraction 
and complexity in the conceptual architecture are unavoidable. ""2 
121 Luhmann, `Instead of a Preface to the English Edition [of `Social Systems]: On 
the Concepts "Subject" and "Action"', Social Systems, Trans. Bednarz, Jr. with 
Baecker, (Stanford University Press, 1995) pg. xlix 
122 Luhmann, `Instead of a Preface to the English Edition [of `Social Systems]: On 
the Concepts "Subject" and "Action"', Social Systems, Trans. Bednarz, Jr. with 
Baecker, (Stanford University Press, 1995) pg. xxxvii 
4.1.3 Luhmann and Self-Reflexivity 
Luhmann claimed that the synthesis of a systems-theoretical approach and 
Sociology radicalises the methods of Sociology by allowing for a 
methodological self-reflexivity which he identifies as lacking. In short, 
Luhmann used systems-theory as a means by which to achieve a theory 
which could include within its own theoretical framework a reflection upon 
itself on its own terms. Thus through the use of systems-theory as a strategy 
of theoretical self-recognition Luhmann was able to claim a generality for 
his theoretical position. This was because, he claimed, the systems- 
theoretical approach: 
deals with everything social and not just sections (as, for example, 
strata and mobility, particularities of modem society and patterns of 
interaction, etc. ) 
Theories that claim universality are easily recognized by the fact 
that they appear as their own object. (if they wanted to exclude 
themselves, they would have to surrender the claim to universality. ) 
Thus it is - and this holds for all `global theories' (including e. g., 
quantum physics) - that specific areas of the classical theory of 
science are suspended, in particular, everything having to do with 
independent confirmation of the theory's claim to truth.... 
Therefore, theories that make a claim to universality are self- 
referential. At the same time, they always learn something about 
themselves from their objects. Therefore they are forced, as if by 
their own logic, to accept a limitation of their meaning. 1 
It is my intention throughout this thesis to use a similar synthesis of Art 
History and the systems-theoretical approach as a means for Art History to 
reflect upon its aims, methods and outcomes. 
4.2 Cilliers - Postmodernity & Dynamical Systems Theory 
123 Luhmann, `Instead of a Preface to the English Edition [of `Social Systems]: On 
the Concepts "Subject" and "Action"', Social Systems, Trans. Bednarz, Jr. with 
Baecker, (Stanford University Press, 1995) pg. xlix 
Paul Cilliers has provided an excellent commentary on the observable 
connections between, what he identifies as, Complexity and Postmodernism 
(1998). In the following (concluding) chapter section on post-modernity 
and the systems-theoretical approach I argue, following Cilliers, that a 
shared critical impetus can be identified between the critique of the 
metaphysical systems of structuralism (be these social, political, moral or 
philosophical structuralism) which informs post-modernity and the 
multiple and relative perspectives of Dynamical Systems Theory. 
In his discussion Cilliers argued that the studies of Complexity and 
Postmodernity (understood as Deconstructionism) operate according to a 
shared set of values. He stated: 
Saussure's `structural' model of language remains a landmark in the 
study of complex systems. His primary insight - that meaning is 
generated through a system of differences - remains an excellent 
way of conceptualising the relationships in a complex system. His 
model is somewhat `rigid', but Derrida's transformation of the 
system of the system by means of a sophisticated description of 
how the relationships interact in time (using the notion of d jerance) 
provides us with an excellent way of conceptualising the dynamics 
of complex systems from a philosophical perspective. 
And, 
Since it is based on a system of relationships, the post-structural 
inquiry into the nature of language helps us to therorise about the 
dynamics of the interaction in complex systems. In other words, 
the dynamics that generates meaning in language can be used to 
describe the dynamics of complex systems in general. 124 
From within a systems-theoretical approach Cilliers identifies 
language, as Saussurre and Barthest et al. do, as a (normative) system of 
124 Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernism, (Routledge, 1998), pg. 37; a central theme 
of Cilliers arguments concern connectionism and representation within complex 
systems in relation to a conception of postmodernity. 
125 "semiology aims to take in any system of signs, whatever their substance and 
limits; images and gestures, musical sounds, objects and the complex association 
differentiation in which the sign is a `node in a network of relationships. ' 
Language is hence seen as a ystem of representation. He concludes that: 
"in the language of systems theory, Sausurre still understands language as a 
closed system, whereas Derrida wants to argue for language as an open 
system, s126 and in which, "meaning is determined by the dynamic 
relationships between components of the system. s127 
Through his example of linguistic analysis Cilliers provides one case 
of the possible interconnections between the contemporary 
epistemological technologies of post-structuralism and the systems- 
theoretical approach. He does this through identifying a correspondence 
between the post-structural critique of language, in which meaning is 
understood as an unstable, complex, chaotic, non-linear system and the 
systems-thinking view of unstable, complex, chaotic, non-linear systems in 
general. ' 
I argue further that the correspondence between theories of 
Complexity and Postmodernity can be understood in terms of a definition 
of Modernity. This is to say that a common ethos is shared between the 
two can be couched in terms of the project of (social and philosophical) 
of all of these, which form the content of ritual, convention or public 
entertainment: These constitute if not languages, at least systems of signification. " 
Roland Barthes, Elements of Semiology, (trans. Annette Lavers & Colin Smith), (1967, 
Jonathan Cape) pg. 9 
126 Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernism, (Routledge, 1998) pg. 42 
127 Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernism, (Routledge, 1998) pg. 46 
128 This is discussed further in the following. Hayles (ed. ), Chaos and Order, 
(University of Chicago Press, 1991) which contains several discussions on the 
application of complex dynamics to a study of literature. Hayles, How We Became 
Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics, (University of 
Chicago Press, 1999) in which Hayles further applies systems-thinking and in 
particular Artificial Intelligence (connectionism) to a study of literature. This was a 
theme she had already visited in Hayles, Chaos Bound Orderly Disorder in 
Contemporary Literature and Science, (Cornell University Press, 1993). Also Aarseth, 
C bertext. " Perspectives on Ergodic Literature, (John Hopkins University Press, 1997) is a 
thorough and thought provoking study of hypertext and its history as a literary 
form in relation to a systems-thinking approach (broadly conceived). 
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Modernity; and more specifically Modernity as understood as the 
proliferation of the establishment of ystems (of meaning, differentiation and 
control. ) As Rasch has observed; modernity, postmodernity and systems- 
thinking can be conceived of as conterminous. He wrote: 
If the initial, eighteenth-century differentiation of reason associated 
with the name of Kant came to be seen as the problem of 
modernity that supposedly needed overcoming, then the 
subsequent uncontrolled proliferation of languages, system 
rationalities, and observer positions would seem to signal 
unsurpassable modernity's irreversible triumph. ... Thus, 
if the 
critique itself is legitimate, then it must be located within the heart 
of modernity itself. Postmodernism's skeptical, ironic, and 
unrelenting critique of modernity's more ambitious projects must, 
in fact, be the quintessential modern gesture, a type of immune 
system attacking the anxieties that have produced the fevered 
delusions of foundation and future reconciliation ... Postmodernity, 
were one to retain the word, would then be seen not as the result of 
the exhaustion or of the disillusionment with modernity but rather 
as a new realization of modernity's self-imposed limits. '29 
Rasch's observations were being used specifically to identify Luhmann's 
systems-theoretical approach as a continuation of, rather than a break 
from, Modernity's project of self-criticism and self-determination10. I argue 
that Dynamical Systems Theory as a whole can be similarly characterised. In 
doing so Dynamical Systems Thinking can be re-configured as a post- 
metaphyrical modernism; one in which the `deep-structure' of systems is 
identified but with two further implications which demonstrate its affinity 
with postmodernity. These are that from within the systems-theoretical 
approach: 
129 Rasch, Niklas L ihmann's Modernity, (Stanford University Press, 2000) pg. 9. 
130 For Luhmann's own commentary on this see: Luhmann, `Deconstruction as 
second-order observing. ' In, New Literary History, 24, (4; 1993), pg. 763-782. 
1- systems are identified in order that their structures and processes by 
which `meaning' is produced can be deconstructed; hence identifying 
Dynamical Systems Theory with Deconstructionism in general 
2- systems are identified as being relative to the discursive systems by 
which they are identified and represented; hence identifying Dynamical 
Systems Theory with the postmodern `incredulity toward metanarratives. ' 
This isomorphism shared between Modernity, Postmodernity and 
Dynamical Systems Theory can also be compared to what Rasch identified 
in Luhmann's praxis as: 
The ability to perceive this deep structure [which] becomes the 
ability to read surface complexities symptomatically as 
manifestations of a rationally comprehensible totality... [And] For 
theory to have social import - which is to say for theory to live up 
to its purported imperative to change and not just understand the 
world - it must be able to articulate the connection between deep 
and surface structure in such a way as to make the deep structure 
eminently alterable. It must grasp the deep structure, in other 
words, from some perspective that is itself not determined by that structure. To 
fail to do so would be to fail in one's duty as either a Marxian 
historical materialist or a Straussian political Philosopher. "' 
It is proposed that the `deep structure' of which Rasch talks can be 
articulated in terms of the differential system of contingencies, but which is 
nonetheless a function of its own discursive system and is not an extra- 
discursive structure. This allows us to represent (Marxian) base and 
superstructure (of communicative technology and the social system) as 
inextricably linked and not as a dichotomy of conflicting forces but rather 
as an organic and systemic unity which displays the behavioural patterns of 
a complex system such as internal self-organization, auto-catalytic 
behaviour and emergent properties. 
131 Rasch, Niklas Luhmann °r Modernity, (Stanford University Press, 2000) pg. 6 
Rasch continued: 
If the conflict of perspectives is not to be reconciled from a higher- 
order metaperspective; if, in other words, a universal perspective of 
the morally Good or ontologically True cannot be occupied; if, 
rather, such perspective must compete on the same level as all 
others, with no hope of logical or divine resolution; then, ironically, 
the statement that describes this state of affairs must `pose' as a 
metastatement and `occupy' this impossible metaperspective. To 
describes adequately the ineluctable necessity of the contingency of 
modernity, the perspective of the metaperspective has to be filled 
with the assertion that there is no metaperspective, and, thus, the 
description of modernity as contingent has to serve as modernity's 
1 `transcendental' ground. 2 
It is from a new, multiple and contingent meta-perspective of which Rasch 
talks that Dynamical Systems Theory emerges as an epistemological, heuristic 
system of observation which is isomorphic to postmodernism. And 
moreover as it is being used in my thesis as a strategy to be applied to Art 
History it is also seen as being a continuation of, rather than a radical break 
from, Modernist Art History (as it is expressed in the project of 
Kunstwissenschaft. ) 
132 Rasch, Niklas Luhmann's Modernity, (Stanford University Press, 2000) pg. 24 ff. 
One of Rasch's arguments is that Luhmann tackles the problem of the meta- 
perspective of discourse from within the contingencies of the Modem perspective 
through application of the paradigms of systems-thinking. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
PUTTING SYSTEMS-THEORY INTO 
PERSPECTIVE 
The essence of technology is by no means anything technological. Thus 
we shall never experience our relationship to the essence of technology 
so long as we merely conceive and push forward the technological, put 
up with it or evade it. Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to 
technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it. 
Martin Heidegger133 
The status of knowledge is altered as societies enter what is known as 
the postindustrial age and cultures enter what is known as the 
postmodern age. This transition has been under way since at least the 
end of the 1950's 
Lyotard134 
Introduction 
In this chapter I advance the following claims: 
1- That Art History is a discourse which is inherently Typographical; that 
is that it is configured according to a particular communicative technology. 
2- That we now live in a post-typographical age; and more specifically that 
art after modernism takes place in a post-typographical social system. 
3- That therefore Art History in its Typographical form is an 
unsatisfactory discursive model for accounting for the artistic practice of 
the 2"d half of the 20`'' Century. 
4- That Dynamical Systems Theory is a post-typographical form of 
knowledge which is therefore highly appropriate as a strategy by which to 
observe art and art history from the second half of the 20`h Century. 
To demonstrate this relationship between systems of 
communication and structures of knowledge in the arguments that follow, 
133 Heidegger, TheQuertion Concerning Technology, (Harper Colophon, ) pg. 5 
134 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Trans. 
Bennington/Massumi, (Manchester University Press, 1984) pg. 3 
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I will use the particular example of single point linear perspective (as 
rediscovered in the Western Renaissance) to illustrate the connections 
between visual representation and epistemological structures in the 
modern, or (what I identify as) the Typographical age. More specifically my 
argument focuses on the centrality of the universal and sovereign human 
subject in Modern, typographic, systems of knowledge. Thus, what will be 
investigated in this chapter is Panofsky's thesis that linear perspective is the 
`symbolic formi135 of Renaissance epistemology. However Panofsky's 
argument will be adapted by demonstrating how this broadly `modern' type 
of knowledge is linked to other technologies of communication. In doing 
so the invention of the printing press will be linked to not only a visual 
mode of analysis but also the emergence of modes of thought which will 
be called typographical. 
Extending this line of thought further it will also be argued that the 
tradition of Art History (of the type introduced and critiqued in the 
arguments of the Introduction) is also hardwired with the same 
epistemological structure of typographical thought. In doing so an 
interrelationship is posited between Art History and technology; and more 
specifically the technology of the printed word. 136 What follows below is a 
critique of the same canon but from a widened perspective. Hence it will 
be argued that Art History in its form as Kunstwi senscbaft or the canon of 
135 Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, trans. Wood, (Zone, 1991) 
136 In Chapter 1 it was argued that Art History was limited by its own perspective 
of Modernity by being bound to visuality. From within the perspective of Visual 
Modernity this can be linked to the technology of photographic reproduction 
which makes it possible to study of works of art regardless of their actual physical 
location. Examples of the reliance of the photograph on the functioning of Art 
History from its Modern foundations include Wölfflin's Art History Without Names 
performed via the technology of the dual slide lantern; Warburg's juxtaposition of 
images in the picture atlas Mnemosyne and Mairaux's conception of a Museum 
Without Walls made possible through an archive of photographic reproductions. 
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The Critical Historians of Art, is not only a visual mode of analysis but also 
a typographical form of knowledge. And to develop this argument an 
interconnection will be observed between perspective and Art History in 
relation to typography. 
It is noted, however, that my intention is not to provide another 
account of the History of Art History restated from within a technological 
determinist point of view. Instead the specific example of a particular type 
of Art History in relation to typography will be used to cast a juxtaposition 
between typographically configured systems of knowledge and our 
contemporary situation; a situation which is identified as post- 
typographical. In doing so a discontinuity between typographical thought 
and the post-typographical strategies of the Systems-Theoretical approach 
is identified. Implicated in this paradigm shift are the systems of Art 
History. Dynamical Systems Theory, on the other hand, is a contemporary 
epistemological technology and thus inseparable from the communications 
revolution, of the closing forty years of the Twentieth Century. 
The history of technology"' is, by necessity, as old as the history 
of humanity. Given the enormity of the subject matter regarding the 
nodes and interconnections between technology, society and culture in 
terms (not least the Marxian model of the base - superstructure system of 
social organisation and teleology) I will concentrate below upon one 
pertinent aspect of this broad topic. This is the area of communications 
technologies in their connection to epistemological systems. I argue that 
137 Technology is identified as the: "practical application of scientific method and 
scientific conclusions whether in peace or war. Technology is the science of 
means, and as science advances so does technology. " From Scruton (ed. ), A 
Dictionary of Political Thought, (1982, Macmillan Press, ) Pg. 458 
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these two systems are inter-related in terms of the meaning18 produced 
by and within them. This is to say that different modes of 
communication, which are grounded upon representations, 139 (for 
example the visual communication of an artwork, ) can be regarded as 
the manifestations of a specific epistemic structure. 
To achieve this juxtaposition I will formulate my position using 
the vocabularies of the systems-theoretical approach. Thereby I will be 
able to observe the key systems theoretical concepts of feedback and 
communication in operation in two different but co-existent social 
systems. The central issue in relation to this is that there is a common set 
of issues can be seen to be shared between systems. In the arguments 
below I identify these systems as: 
1- Systems of communication These are social systems such as the printed 
word, and the visual system of linear perspective both of which are used as 
examples in the arguments below. 
and 
138 Luhmann dedicates a entire chapter (2) in Social Systems to discussing the 
concept of meaning in terms of self-reference within social and psychic systems. 
He has written: "structures and processes that employ meaning can include 
system boundaries and environments, which take on meaning within the 
processes of a self-referential system (not in themselvesr), so that such systems 
can operate internally with the difference between system and environment. For 
all internal operations, meaning enables an ongoing reference to the system itself 
and to a more or less elaborated environment; the choice of the main focus of 
orientation can thereby be held open and left to the connecting operations that 
reproduce meaning through internal and external references. " In Luhmann, Social 
Systems (trans. Bednarz jr. & Baecker), (Stanford University Press, 1995) pg. 37 
139 NB -I discuss my specific use of the term representation in much more detail 
in chapter 6. It is my contention that whilst representation takes place within 
complex systems that this is a distributed representation. Following Smolensky and 
Cilliers I argue that this is different form of representation to traditional or 
`iconographic' representation where there a direct correspondence is posited 
between referent and reference. Instead the distributed representation of complex 
systems is a representation which is `distributed' over the entire system. 
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2- Sjstems of knowing. These are epistemological systems by which 
knowledge is produced. Because discourse is such a system both 
Dynamical Systems Theory and Art History are also observed in systemic 
terms. 
This in turn raises issues related particularly to two points of the 
following discussion, they are: 
1- Meaning produced by ystems; and what is identified here is a schema of 
systems which comprises: 
(i) social systems (systems of social organisation) 
(ii) epistemological systems (systems of knowledge) 
(iii) communicative systems (systems of communication) 
(iv) psychic (systems of cognition and self-awareness14) 
2- Communication between and amongst these systems. 
In advancing these augments this chapter follows the following 
structure: 
1- Elective Affinity 
In this section I outline the concept of elective affinity in order to 
demonstrate the inter-relationship between technology; epistemological, 
communicative and artistic systems and social systems in terms distinct 
from technological determinism. 
2- Technology and the Psychic System 
In which I look at the relationship between the individual and the 
technological development of social systems. 
140 Luhmann refers to the concept of the human subject as a psychic system which 
circulates within larger social systems - see Social Syrtemr, chapter 7. 
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3- The typology of typography 
In which I outline the type of knowledge configured by typography as a 
communicative technology. 
4- Art History as Typographic Knowledge 
In which I outline the thesis that Art History is also a typographic form of 
knowledge. 
5- Contemporary Issues 
In which I allude to the argument that the Systems-Theoretical approach 
(as I apply it within Art History) is a post-typographical form of 
knowledge; and functions differently as a result. 
1- Elective Affinity 
In this section I address the relationship between technology, the social 
system and the psychic system in terms of Weber's concept of `Elective 
Affinity. '"' 
As I discuss in further detail below; in an argument specific to the 
effects of typography, Mcluhan juxtaposed the preliterate, non-Western 
tribal human with both Western `scribal man' (a product of `manuscript 
culture) and `typographic man' (a product of `print-culture'). However in 
my view it is not sufficient to merely identify a simple cause and effect 
between technology and a teleology of social systems as might be done in 
an argument informed by technological determinism in the case of Marxist 
sociological accounts. To avoid the tautological position of technological 
determinism it is asserted that it is not simply sufficient to argue that the 
141 Although the term was first used by Goethe in his novel Die 
lVahlvenvandtrchaften (1809) it receives its application in discourse through Weber's 
adoption of the term. 
-107- 
empirically verifiable consequence of development of social systems (in this 
case technological change) is the cause of that social development. As 
Damisch has observed: 
Without doubt, any thesis according to which culture informs 
perception in a way that allows us to say that culture is perceived is 
circular, though it is advocated by any analyst pretending to 
acknowledge in a period's artistic production the expression of a 
vision of the world whose very concepts it would determine. "' 
Again in relation to the technology of the printed word, in a 
position similar to that advocated by Goldstein (with reference to an 
extended discussion on Engels in relation to Marxist `Reflection Theory' 
and the possible connections between society and the individual) 143 Jay has 
also noted the problem of how technology and epistemology might be 
related with reference to both typography and perspectival models in a way 
so as not to second-guess the conclusion. 
"Making a strong case for a causal relationship between the invention of 
perspective and the rise of capitalism may be problematic, "'" he argued. 
Instead Jay suggests that the term Elective Affinity should be used instead. 
142 Damisch, The Origin of Perspective, trans. Goodman, (MIT Press, 2000) pg. 31 
143 `It is not that the economic position is the cause and the alone active, while every 
thing else has a passive effect. There is, rather, interaction on the basis of the 
economic necessity, which ultimately, always asserts itself' from Engels' letter to W. 
Borgius January 15th 1894, in Marx and Engels, The Correspondence of Karl Marx 
and Friedrich Engels, 1846-1895, Trans. Dona Torr, (International, 1936 [1934]); 
quoted in Goldstein, The Social and Cultural Roots of L nearPerspective, (MEP 
Publications, 1988) pg. 137 
144 Jay, Downcast Eyes, (University of California Press, 1993) pg. pg. 57-8. Jay's 
statement here is in part a direct response to Goldstein's own invocation of 
Weber's methodology in The Social and Cultural Roots of Linear Perspective. Jay 
however does not credit Goldstein fully with his own position and dismisses him 
somewhat as an `orthodox Marxist' saying. The most orthodox Marxist of these 
commentators, Goldstein goes so far as to claim that although changes in musical 
and poetic form antedate any evidence for the capitalist division of labor by 
several centuries, since the causal relationship works for painting, it must also 
explain these earlier phenomena! ' - Jay, Downcast Eyes, (University of California 
Press, 1993) pg. pg. 58 fn. 121. 
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The term Elective Afnity is taken from Weber's observations that 
there is both an "elective affinity of Calvinism... for capitalism" and an 
"elective affinity of the bourgeoisie for certain life styles" in connection 
with the `Protestant work ethic. i145 Elsewhere Weber also argued that: 
We can generalize about the degree of elective affinity between 
concrete structures of social action and concrete forms of 
organization; that means, we can state in general terms whether 
they further or impede or exclude one another whether they are 
adequate or inadequate in relation to one another" 
Both Goldstein and Jay147 invoke Weber's employment of this term 
`elective affinity' in relation to their own commentaries on the relationships 
between social and psychic systems. Weber used this term elective affinity 
(Wahlverwandtschaft) to explain the systematic relationships between 
epistemological systems and social systems with reference to the human 
subject; and his analysis of Protestantism as having an elective affinity 
towards capitalism in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism provides 
an example for the position that I develop in the subsequent arguments of 
this chapter. 148 Taking this as a working method, the next section of this 
chapter will look at the elective affinities between various technological, 
social and epistemological systems. 
145 Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, [trans. Talcott Parsons, ] 
(Unwin Paperbacks, 1985) 
146 Weber, Economy and Society, eds. Roth & Wittich, (Bedminster Press 1968) pg. 
341 
147 Goldstein, The Social and Cultural Roots of Linear Perspective, (MEP Publications, 
1988); Jay, Downcast Eyes, (University of California Press, 1993) pg. pg. 57-8 
148 It should, however, also be noted that Weber's concept of elective affinities is not 
without difficulty given confusion arising from his ambiguous use of the term. 
This has been discussed by several commentators; see especially: Gerth &C 
Wright Mills., (eds), Max Weber. Essays in Sociology, (Oxford Univ. Press, 1946); 
Thomas, "Ideology and Elective Affinity", Sociology, (Vol. 19, Issue 1,1978) pg. 
39-54; Howe, "Max Weber's Elective Affinities: Sociology Within the Bounds of 
Pure Reason", American Journal of Sociology, (Vol. 84, Issue 2,1978) 
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In their use of the term Elective Affinity both Jay and Goldstein, 
whilst arguably working from within what may be loosely defined as a 
Marxist sociological model, eschew the crude Marxist interpretation of the 
top-down influence in social systems from the material base to the social 
superstructure. Instead they both favour a model of the interrelationship 
between the material, process and structures of social systems which sees 
the cause and effect relationships between them as reciprocal. This position 
is consistent with a cybernetic model of social systems in terms of 
processes of feedback and is also integral to the position of Dynamical 
Systems Thinking (as is seen in Luhmann's analysis of Social Systems and 
Weiner's systems-thinking model of society in Cybernetics and Society. ) 
In a cybernetic conception of social systems the observation of 
connections between various elements within the social system is 
conceived in terms dissimilar to the simple and one-way cause and effect 
relationship of technological determinism. From a systems-theoretical 
perspective such relationships might be seen instead as the diverse, 
cybernetic, non-linear, patterns of positive feedback and distributed 
representation that characterise complex systems. 
Thus it is argued that there is a matrix of influential forces which 
shape both the social systems of communication and control, the psychic 
systems of subjects who circulate within those social systems and the 
discursive systems of knowledge production. This supports the argument 
that the emergence of Dynamical Systems Theory, as a discursive system, is 
inextricably bound up with the revolution in communications media of the 
last forty years such as the microprocessor. In the same way the 
epistemology of the modern age, which is illustrated through the Cartesian 
understanding of infinite space that is rationalised and, in turn, represented 
through single point linear perspective, is bound up with the revolution in 
communications media of the mid-fifteenth century and the simultaneous 
emergence of the printing press and typographical orders of knowledge. It 
is to this that I will now turn. 
2- Technology and the Psychic System 
In this section I outline the connections between the technology and the 
human subject. I do this in order to advance the overall argument of this 
chapter that there are observable interconnections (elective affinities) 
between the technological state of social systems and the discursive 
systems produced by those social systems. More specifically I argue that 
Dynamical Systems Theory is a post-typographical form of discourse; that 
as such it should be differentiated from previous, typographical, discursive 
systems; and that this has implications for knowledge as it is produced and 
used by human subjects who are also configured by such systems. 
If you were to believe the dejected postings in webboards all 
over the world, the second of March 2001 was the day the music died. 
On this day it seemed that the free trading of music on the Internet had 
effectively come to an end when Napster, the Internet software company 
which allows users to share music files with another and download them 
to their personal computer's hard-drive, bowed to increasingly intense 
legal pressure from the music industry and began the filtering over one 
million copyrighted song titles from its system. This was implemented to 
prevent the files being traded, free of charge, over the Internet in what 
WiredNews described as a: "last-gasp effort - partly endorsed by the 
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recording industry - to stay in business. """ This marked the endgame of 
a battle which had begun in a U. S. District Court, in Northern District of 
California in December 1999 when the RIAA (Recording Industry 
Association of America), a consortium of the five major music 
companies in the world, launched a legal case against Napster to sue 
them for contributory copyright infringement. What had panicked the 
music industry so much was the implication that a communications 
technology (in this case Mp3 file compression which allowed for high 
quality music files to be traded efficiently over the Internet, coupled 
with CD burning capabilities which allowed for the production and 
copying of compact discs on a home computer) would dramatically alter 
social patterns of consumption. The record companies responded to the 
suggestion that as a result the sales of tapes, compact discs and records 
would evaporate if music could be shared for free over the Internet 
between personal computers. 
The example of Napster is used here to provide just one example, 
contemporary to my writing of the thesis, of the inextricability between 
the technology of communications and the social systems by which 
human interrelationships are constituted, mediated and controlled. In this 
case technology changed peoples patterns of consumption and hence the 
ways in which they lived their lives. 
The life of the human subject is framed and shaped by such 
technologies. And, as Foucault identified in his discussion on technologies of 
149 `Napster to Start Filtering Songs', WiredNews - (March 2nd, 2001), 
(Newshttp: //www. wited. com/news/politics/0,1283,42140,00. html) 
[Consulted March 2nd, 2001. ] 
the self, they can extend to include all technologies by which the self is 
regulated and are historically determined in so far as they can be different 
at different times and places: 
Everything propitious to the development of a technology of the 
self can very well be analysed, I think, and situated as a historical 
phenomenon - which does not constitute the bifurcation of reason. 
In this abundance if branchings, ramifications, breaks and ruptures, 
it was an important event, or episode; it had considerable 
consequences but it was not a unique phenomenon. '5° 
2.1 - McLuhan 
The relationship between technologies of communication and the effect 
they have on the people who use those technologies is one that has been 
investigated by length by Marshall Mcluhan. Mcluhan suggested that 
because: "societies have always been shaped more by the nature of the 
media by which men communicate than by the content of the 
communication, s1S1 then we might understand that the introduction of new 
technologies of communication at different historical moments will have 
various social consequences. Examples of this include technologies of 
communication such as the phonetic alphabet and the printing press 
causing shock-waves within the power dynamics of social systems and also 
the discourses on Modernity which relate it to the invention of the 
photograph. '52 
150 In `Structuralism and Post Structuralism', Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology, ed. 
Faubion, (Penguin, 1998) pg. 442; see also Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 
(Penguin, 1981) 
151 Mcluhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962) 
152 These include those discussions by Benjamin, Lyotard, Barthes who exemplify 
the arguments linking the photograph to Modernity. See: Walter Benjamin, The 
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, ' in Illuminations, (Trans. 
Harry Zohn), (Schocken Books, 1968) pg. 217-251; Lyotard, `Presenting the 
Unpresentable, ' in Artforum, 3, (April, 1982) and Barthes, Camera L idda: Reflections 
on Photography, (Fontana, 1982) 
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Mcluhan argued that systems of communication (such as the 
printed word, or the television) are the means by which the psychic system 
extends into the world via the feedback of the human nervous system. 
These media therefore provide the means by which to experience the world 
and communicate that experience. Thus: 
The effects of technology do not occur at the level of opinions or 
concepts, but alter sense ratios or patterns of perception steadily 
and without any resistance. '53 
A major implication of Mcluhan's argument is that the way in 
which the world is represented within the psychic system of the individual 
(according to the patterns of perception dictated by the sense impressions) 
is affected by the various systems of communication, information transfer, 
representation and knowledge within which that individual psychic system 
is located. He argues that the configuration(organisation) of the psychic 
system which circulates within the social system organised according to 
pre-typographic principles generates a human subject which, in the words 
of McLuhan, "lives in the implicit magical world of the resonant oral 
word" in which space and time are conceived as an organic unity; and in 
which there is: "an acoustic, horizonless, boundless, olfactory space. ""' 
This is differentiated from the linear, objective and transparent `visual 
space' configured by the Western, literate world-view. 
Ong has expanded on the suggestions of Mcluhan with reference to 
the balance of human sensory experience within print cultures and has 
argued, most notably in Orality and Literacy (1982), that it is a predominately 
153 Mcluhan, Underrtanding Media: The Extensions of Man, (Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1964) pg. 27 
154 Mcluhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy, (Roudedge and Kegan Paul, 1962) 
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visually experience in such cultures. This argument has also been 
formulated by Steiner (in Language and Silence (1967)) and Lowe (History of 
Bourgeois Perception (1982)). The significance of such questioning upon my 
own arguments here lies in their gravitating around the impact upon the 
impact of technology upon the human subject; and more specifically the 
sovereignty of the individual `modern' subject which is at centre of both 
typographic epistemology, and single point linear perspective toward which 
my discussion turns below. 
Mcluhan equates the move within print culture to the primacy of 
visual experience, catalyzed by the act of reading texts linearly15' with a new 
form of logical, objective and `linear' thought. He says: 
"Rational", of course, has for the West long meant "uniform and 
continuous and sequential. " In other words, we have confused 
reason with literacy, and rationalism with a single technology. Thus 
in the Electric age mans seems to the conventional West to become 
irrational. '56 
And elsewhere in conversation: 
McLuhan - Well, I think people who are subjected to the 
arrangement of language visually in lines, highly sequential and 
precise rigid, develop habits of arranging their lives, arranging their 
whole social existence, which are very closely geared to these 
forms. They're not specially aware of this. Linearity, though, is not 
characteristic of radio or television or movies. And so we have 
been subjected to tremendous new forces, new influences which 
have broken up the older habits acquired from the print world. 
Seldes - Would you say we tend to think in straight lines? 
155 This does not necessarily mean that we must read a book from beginning to 
end in only one order in order for them to make sense; however as Aspen 
Aastheth has argued in, Cybertext, (1997, John Hopkins Press, ) textual narrative is 
inherently linear as opposed to the non-linearity of hyper-text which he identifies 
in both the I-Ching and the non-linear fiction of Michael Joyce - both of which 
are used as examples of texts which do not dictate the order in which they should 
be read. 
156 Mcluhan, Understanding Media. The Extensions of Man, (Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1964) pg. 245 
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McLuhan - We still like to speak of following a person, or drawing 
conclusions in lines. And I don't follow you, and I do follow you, 
sort of thing, it does suggest, yes, that we think of thought itself. 's' 
3- The typology of typography 
Thus far it has been argued that by adopting a systems-theoretical approach 
elective affinities can be observed between different social systems of 
communication and systems of knowledge. It was further argued that such 
an approach is illustrative of a systems-theoretical analysis of the cybernetic 
operations within social systems. Implicit in these arguments is the 
assertion that such `elective affinities' as shared between communicative 
and epistemological systems are understood as systems of representation; 
hence the elective affinity identified between a visual model (artistic 
perspective), mechanical systems of typography and a `world-view' which 
all operate according to a particular representative model which stands in 
direct contrast to the model of distributed representation of the post- 
typographical systems of which Dynamical Systems Theory is exemplary. 
I will now look to some issues regarding the nature of 
typographical knowledge. In doing so the type of knowledge which I'm 
referring to here as typographical can be investigated more specifically with 
regards to the concepts of communication and representation. I do this by 
looking at some historical issues regarding the development and 
dissemination of the printed word. This not only provides a useful 
analogue from history for the current historical situation of the emergence 
of new communicative technologies (as witnessed over the last 40 years) 
but also has two other implications. These are: 
157 Ohio State University Interview by Gilbert 
Seldes, Edgar Dale, Keith Tyler, 
1958, [from http: //www. netsoc. tcd. ie/-steo/mcl/interl. htmq 
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(i) The establishment of the conditions of the epistemological and social 
systems from which the post-typographical situation of a systems approach 
is discontinuous. 
(ii) Returning the discussion to Art History. This is in so far as it has been 
argued (in the Introductory chapter) that Art History is a modernist 
discourse; and is further demonstrated by its elective affinity with not only 
a model of visual representation (single-point linear perspective) but also 
with the technological correlate of this representative model namely 
mechanical typographic reproduction. 
3.1 A brief history of Type 
The Typographical Age began five hundred years ago. As Steinberg has 
noted; the `first century of printing' of 1450-1550 (the incunabula period") 
emerges at the very beginning of the sixteenth century with the appearance 
of the printed book facilitated by Gutenberg's development of movable 
type at some time between 1440 and 1460.159 Much has been written about 
the various implications of such a development and, as already mentioned 
158 'The word incunabula was first used in connexion with printing by Bernard von 
Mallinckrodt, dean of Münster cathedral, in a tract, De ortu et pmgressu artis 
typographicae (Cologne, 1693), in which he contributed to the celebration of the 
second century of Gutenberg's invention. Here he describes the period from 
Gutenberg to 1500 as `prima typographiae incunabuld', the time when typography 
was in its swaddling clothes. The French Jesuit, Philippe Labbe, in his Nova 
bibliotheca liborum manuscriptorum (1653), already equated the word incunabula with 
"period of printing up to 1500". In the course of the eighteenth century men 
whose Latin was considerably shakier applied the term to the books printed 
during this period, and nineteenth century writers with ni Latin at all eventually 
coined the singular 'Inkunabel"incurable"incunabulum', to denote the individual 
item that emanated from the printing presses of the fifteenth century. ' From 
Steinberg, Five Hundred Years of Printing, (Penguin, 1955) pp. 16 
159 See Steinberg, Five Hundred Years of Printing, (Penguin, 1955) in which he 
identifies that by 1450 Gutenberg, in Mainz, `had perfected his invention far 
enough to exploit it commercially', and that between 1452-56 he produced a 42 
line bible. Pg. 18. A similar sentiment is found in Febvre and Martin, The Coming of 
the Book, trans. Gerard, (NLB, 1976) 
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the parameters of the multiplicity of discussions can be narrowed to 
manageable dimensions. There are, however three issues to note before 
continuing. They reflect the eschewing of a crude one-way causal 
relationship between elements within the social systems in favour of 
identifying elective affinities between various observed events and entities. 
(i) The period between 1450 to around the middle of the 20th century will 
be taken as the period of the printed word. This thus precedes and includes 
the birth of photography in the 19`h Century which is often seen as the 
beginning of Artistic Modernism. To avoid a confusion of terms the five 
hundred years of the printed word will be called The TypographicAge. 
(ii) As Febvre and Martin have argued; printing itself did not lead to 
massive leaps in scientific knowledge but rather facilitated the 
dissemination of information - both useful and specious - to a larger audience 
of scientists and non-scientists alike. 160 It is thus an emblem rather than the 
sole mechanism of more general social shifts away from medieval systems 
of social organization and stratification which were taking place at this time 
- identified here as the beginning of the Typographic Age. They wrote: 
So printing does not seem to have played much part in developing 
scientific theory at the start, though it seems to have helped draw 
public attention to technical matters... [provided are] so many 
clues to a new outlook which was already apparent in the numerous 
technical advances made in as many fields in the first half of the 
15th century. And printing after all was simply the most 
spectacular... It is fairly evident at the outset that printing brought 
about no sudden or radical transformation, and contemporary 
culture hardly seems at first to have changed, at least as regards its 
general characteristics. 16' 
160 Febvre and Martin, The Coming of the Book, trans. Gerard, (NIB, 1976) 
161 Febvre and Martin, The Coming of the Book, trans. Gerard, (NLB, 1976) pg. 259- 
60 
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(iii) The significance of Gutenberg, as the figure where the Typographic 
Age begins, should not be misconstrued. He did not, for example, invent 
the book, or even the printing press. However Gutenberg's innovations 
were indicative of more general social change and the emergence of 
typographical modes of thought. As Steinberg has noted: 
To nine out of every ten readers the sentence that "Gutenberg 
invented printing" is a shortened form of "Gutenberg invented the 
printing of book". The inevitable association of Gutenberg's name 
with the 42-line Bible tends to strengthen this fallacy. For it is not - 
certainly not primarily - the mechanical production of books which 
has made Gutenberg's invention a turning point in the history of 
civilization. Books were printed before Gutenberg and there is no 
reason why printing from wood-blocks, engraved metal plates, 
drawings or photographs on stone, and other media should not 
have gone on with greater refinement - as it has actually done. The 
books `printed' by William Blake and, now, filmsetting come readily 
to mind as examples of printing without movable type. What was 
epoch-making in Gutenberg's process was the possibility of editing, 
sub-editing, and correcting a text which was (at least in theory) 
identical in every copy: in other words, the uniform edition 
preceded by critical proof reading. The identity of each copy of 
each edition extends even to the misprints which, in turn, can be 
atoned for by identical "errata" slips. 162 
Knowledge as a social phenomenon in the typographic age was not 
born from the big bang of the typographical revolution of the Renaissance. 
The way people knew about the world did not change as if over-night. This 
is demonstrated by the distribution of the written word before the 
invention of moveable type, via the chirographic traditions of manuscript 
writing and printing using non-moveable type (such as wood-cut blocks. ) 
Also of note is the subsequent non-standardisation (in terms of 
information) and disparities within the texts produced in the typographical 
age. The technology of print, and increase in the literal capabilities of 
populations did not, in itself, lead to a universal knowledge, but was instead 
162 Steinberg, Five Hundred Yearr of Printing, (Penguin, 1955) pg. 20 
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related, via processes of feedback, to general changes within the social 
system. Thus, whilst knowledge itself did not arrive with the invention of 
the printing press, it is instead claimed that from such technologies 
emerges a new type of knowledge. This is to say that with the arrival in 
western society of different methods of organising, systematising 
communicating and distributing information we see the emergence of a 
different type of knowledge - typographical knowledge. 
The numerous and varied shifts within the structure of social 
systems from the Renaissance onwards has been attributed to the 
proliferation of literature produced by the new technology of the printing 
press in various ways. Since Steinberg's history of Five Hundred Years of 
Printing (1955)163, in which he introduced some of the history of 
interrelations between culture and communications technology, there has 
been a proliferation of studies looking at the different type of typographical 
knowledge which was produced and relating this to a broadly Modem 
sensibility. Examples already cited include Febvre and Martin's The Coming 
of the Book (1958, English translation 1976) and Eisenstein's investigations 
into The Printing Pass as an Agent of Change (1979)164 both of which include 
discussions on the role of the printed word in the Protestant reformation 
for example in the spread of Lutheranism and Calvinism via the production 
165 of propaganda literature and pamphlets. 
163 Steinberg, 500 Years of Printing, (Penguin, 1955) 
164 Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change, (Cambridge University Press, 
1979). This is a two volume work which appears in an abridged form as The 
Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe 
165 Febvre and Martin, The Coming of the Book, pg. 287-319 
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The distribution of printed texts has also been cited as a major 
factor in the birth of the nation state, and subsequent rise of nationalism in 
the modern historical era. For example Febvre and Martin discuss the role 
that the distribution of printed works played in the establishment first of 
literacy then national identity. This identity could then be expressed in 
terms of a shared language and customs and was identified and defined 
through that common language and distributed via multiple texts. This 
became crystallized through the production of texts printed in the 
vernacular of particular regions and the waning of Latin as the universal 
language of academia. The implication of this was, they argued, that: 
"The unified culture of Europe was finally dissolved by the rise of the 
vernacular languages which was consolidated by the printing press. "166 Such 
an argument had been rehearsed by Mcluhan who argued `the Printed 
Word: Architect of Nationalism. "" Anderson (in Imagined Communities) 
further explored the area of the birth of nationalism in relation to a Marxist 
analysis of social relationships and in doing so implicated the genesis of 
typography with spread of democracy and the expansion of the political 
franchise to larger sections of populations that were increasingly literate 
and thus self-aware (in terms of being given, and thus identifying with 
characteristics of identity and group coherence): 
These print languages laid the bases for national consciousness in 
three distinct ways. First and foremost, they created unified fields 
of exchange and communications below Latin and above the 
spoken vernaculars. Speakers of the huge variety of Frenches, 
Englishes, or Spanishes, who might find it difficult or even 
impossible to understand one another in conversation, became 
capable of comprehending one another via print and paper. In the 
process, they gradually became aware of the hundreds of 
166 Febvre and Martin, pg. 332 
167 Chapter 18, Understanding Media; The Extensions of Man 
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thousands, even millions, of people in their own particular 
language-field, and at the same time that only, those hundreds of 
thousands, or millions, so belonged... 
Second, print capitalism gave a new fixity to language, which in the 
long run helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the 
subjective idea of the nation... 
Third, print capitalism created languages-of-power of a kind 
different from the older administrative vernaculars. 168 
This presents the question: what `type' of knowledge was typographical 
knowledge? 
Eisenstein defined the (initial) features of systems of knowledge 
within print culture according to the following criteria169: 
(i) Dissemination; (ii) Standardization; (iii) Reorganization; (iv) Data 
Collection; (v) Preservation; (vi) Amplification; (vii) (shift from) hearing to 
reading; (viii) (the establishment of) The republic of letters, which I will 
now discuss in further detail. 
Regarding dissemination and distribution of texts, the arrival of the 
press had an enormous impact. One of the straightforward reasons for this 
is that after the initial manual work (of typesetting, editing10) and so forth 
required to produce the first copy of a text subsequent copies of a 
theoretically almost infinite number could be produced with relative ease. 
As observed by Febvre and Martin: "there were no technical difficulties 
about producing `large' editions even with the earliest, or almost the earliest 
presses. ""' Further, this actually encouraged printers to produce more 
copies in order to recoup the initial and unavoidable outlay required for the 
168 Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, 
(??? ) pg. 47-8 
169 Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change, (Cambridge University Press, 
1979) Chapter 2 
170 For a full description of the processes involved in the production of early 
printing see Eisenstein (1979) and Steinberg (1955) 
171 Febvre and Martin, The Coming of the Book, pg. 217 
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first edition. it was in the interests of printers and booksellers alike to 
produce and sell as many copies as the market could handle, because in 
doing so they minimized the relative cost of each copy and thus maximized 
the profit margin relative to their production costs. 
However it would be an overstatement to claim that proliferation, 
amplification and re-enforcement within textual and epistemological 
systems was the only implication of this new technology. It did not 
necessarily lead on its own, to the Copernican revolution within scientific 
knowledge in the Renaissance and the emergence of a typographic 
sensibility. It has rather claimed that: 
the contrary seems true in the case of the so-called scientific 
revolution. Exploitation of the mass medium was more common 
among pseudo-scientists and quacks than among Latin-writing 
professional scientists, who often withheld their work from the 
press. When important treatises did appear in print, they rarely 
achieved the status of bestsellers. Given the limited circulation of 
works such as De revolutionibus [by Copernicus, published 1543] and 
the small number of readers able to understand them, it seems 
plausible to play down the importance of printing. 12 
A consequence of this was that knowledge quickly became 
collaborative and accumulative as textual systems served as memory banks 
from which new discoveries were made. Textual systems have a memory 
by virtue of their physical permanence and reproducibility and this changes 
the nature of the knowledge that is retained and distributed via them. 
An example from history is provided by Eisenstein who wrote: 
As sixteenth-century astronomers, [Tycho and Copernicus] may be 
distinguished from their predecessors not so much because they 
were influenced by one or another Renaissance current of thought 
but rather because they were freed from copying or memorizing 
and could make use of new paper tools and printed texts. 13 
172 Eisenstein, The Printing Revolution in Modern Europe, (Canto, 1983) Pg. 187 
173 Eisenstein, The Printing Revolution in Modern Europe, (Canto, 1983) Pg. 215 
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Foucault has also noted that another aspect of social systems within a print 
culture is the prioritisation of textual systems in the creation and 
dissemination of knowledge: 
The use of the alphabet in as an arbitrary but efficacious 
encyclopaedic order... such an interweaving of language and 
things, in a space common to both, presupposes an absolute 
privilege on the part of writing. This privilege dominated the entire 
Renaissance, and was no doubt one of the great events of Western 
culture. Printing, the arrival in Europe of Oriental manuscripts, the 
appearance of a literature no longer created for the voice or 
performance and therefore not governed by them, the precedence 
given to the interpretation of religious texts over the tradition and 
magisterium of the Church - all these things bear witness, without 
its being possible to indicate causes and effects, to the fundamental 
place accorder in the West to Writing. "' 
Of specific relevance to my arguments here is Foucault's use of Writing as 
a proper noun and how this is related to a `modern' experience. This is 
thereby distinguished from the process of scribing which is linked to the. 
pre-Renaissance chirographic tradition. This is a phenomenon that Siskin 
has also observed. He argued that this effect magnifies in the following 
century as the Work of Writing as a practice emerges with the emergence of 
discourse about Writing and the birth of Literature as a discreet area of 
academic study. He noted: 
Writing proliferated [in the eighteenth Century] as something new 
through, in a large part, writing about writing - that is, writers 
throughout the eighteenth century were so astonished by the sheer 
volume of writing they began to encounter that they wrote about it 
- and thereby astonished themselves. The engine here was not the 
oft-cited growth of the reading public or rise in the literacy rate. To 
use writing as shorthand for the entire configuration of writing, print 
and silent reading, is to cast its proliferation as not simply a matter 
of when and how many learned a skill, but of skills interacting in 
practice. '75 
174 Foucault, The Order of Things, (Routledge, 1974) pg. 38. 
175 Siskin, The Work of Writing, (John Hopkins University Press, 1998) pg. 2 
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This position acknowledges a causal relationship between the technology 
of textual production and something of the nature of the texts produced. 
Changes in the nature of knowledge means other changes in the 
configuration of social systems which I will outline below. 
The move from a pre-typographic and oral culture (in which social 
communication is primarily via the spoken word there being a relatively 
small amount of hand-written manuscripts) to a typographic culture (in 
which, due to the proliferation of the written word, as already mentioned, 
the dominant mode of social communication becomes the printed word) 
means an increase in the amount of reading taking place within the social 
system. This shift also translates into a social shift onto the process of 
reading texts (which is rooted in the visual-conceptual re-cognition of 
visual symbols, invariably from left to right - in the western European 
tradition), in that one is encouraged to read, linearly, in one direction, from 
beginning to end (be this word, sentence, paragraph, chapter or book. ) This 
shift alters the organisation of the social system and its internal 
relationships and functioning. An example of this as discussed by Lowe, 
Goldstein and Eisenstein is the emergence of capitalism synchronously 
with the linear standardisation of typographical thought. Thus it is 
observed that the proliferation and development of capitalism as a system 
of social organisation and the reordering of social relations along the axes 
of the system of capitalism has an elective affinity with both the rise of 
modern science in the age of the printed book and the emergence of the 
printed word as the dominant means of social communication. The 
rationality of the typographical age is illustrated in increasing 
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standardisation and the reduction of words to their quantifiable component 
parts as letters on the page. This compartmentalisation and reification of 
words into parts serves as an allegory for the nascent capitalist system of 
social organisation. 
In summary of the above, an argument shared amongst the various 
commentaries regarding what Eisenstein called, The Printing Press as an Agent 
of Change is that the type of knowledge produced within those 
epistemological systems shaped and mediated by the technology of 
typography has its own unique character. The transformation of systems of 
knowledge in the Typographical Age was not just an increase in quantity of 
data produced. Instead it brought with it a qualitative social change which 
defined the 500 years of the TypographicAge. Its character was distinct from 
the systems of epistemological representation in the pre-typographical 
(medieval) epoch and the time of post-typographical (identified here as 
related to the question of post-modernity) knowledge. Emerging from this 
is the argument that the post-typographical knowledge which is 
characteristic of a systems-thinking approach is discontinuous from the 
technological and epistemological paradigm that preceded it. 
3.2 - Objectivity, Linearity, Transparency 
In this section I further discuss the structures of systems of typographic 
knowledge. More specifically I do so in terms of those concepts which 
allow them to be related to single-point linear perspective - namely 
objectivity, linearity and transparency. 
As discussed above the techniques of mechanical printing were not 
invented by Gutenberg alone; and, quite obviously, people read and wrote 
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before 1450. However the significant difference engendered by the advent 
of the typographical printing and typographical knowledge came in the 
form of a disassociate separation of sentence and words into the similar 
and interchangeable component units of the letter. This was both an 
analogous and literal separation. It was an analogous separation which was 
catalysed by the production of a literate society familiar with texts as a 
major apparatus of knowledge production and consumption - hence as 
people became familiarized with the textual form (as opposed to the 
spoken word) a shift was made to a typographical understanding of the 
disassociation between the letters on the page and the concepts to which 
they referred. It was also a literal separation which occurred in the physical 
process of the typesetter sorting and combining their metal letters into 
meaningful strings of words and sentences within the frame of the 
mechanical printing press. Following this separation these letters were 
subsequently constituted into the significant units of words, sentences and 
paragraphs which then acquire meaning by virtue of their situation within a 
system of representation and a system of meaning -a linguistic system. It is 
this division analogously, conceptually and literally, of the organic unity of 
the text into the component parts of the representative textual system 
which is illustrative of the dissociate nature of both typographical 
knowledge and the typographical subject. It is argued here that this model 
is also replicated in the visual model of single point, linear perspective. 
Typographical systems of knowledge can be related to perspective 
because they are 
(i) Objective 
(ii) Linear 
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(iii) Transparent (not literally but conceptually). 
(i) Typographical systems of knowledge are objective because of the 
particular understanding which they formulate. This is a disassociate 
understanding of words and sentences. It is an understanding that 
understands the words as comprised of discreet semantic and typographical 
units. The order of these units requires a conceptual constitution by the 
sovereign perceiving subject in order to be meaningful. This is a visual and 
conceptual knowledge system rather than an oral one; hence its claims to 
objectivity. The word or sentence isn't heard whole but rather seen and 
constructed; the meaning therefore is not grasped wholesale as it might be 
when transmitted orally. Instead meaning is objectively established from 
the singularly meaningless component parts which make up the text and 
given its meaning by virtue of the system of communication within which 
they are represented. Implicit in this transfer of meaning is a universal 
Humanist subject. Thus the `meaning' of the words is assumed to be 
objective. 
(ii) Typographical systems of knowledge are linear because having 
separated and logically disassociated the component letters; the re- 
constitution into meaningful units occurs in a linear fashion. Typographical 
knowledge is linear in the way in which meaning is subsequently generated 
by the typesetter who places letters sequentially, from left to right and from 
A to Z, within the matrix of the textual system. This textual system is then 
mechanically reproduced by the printer, distributed by the publisher and 
then read by the reader in a causal chain (normally understood as leading 
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from left to right and from top to bottom; although this is by no means 
always the case. 
(iii) Typographical knowledge is transparent in so far as it is transmitted by 
systems which do not overtly co-transmit their own structural organisation 
as part of the message being transmitted. Thus the media of the message, 
whilst serving as the support for what is being represented, do not 
represent themselves in the representation. In typographical representation 
(and included in this broader use of the term is single point perspective) 
the representative media are transparent, they do not obscure or overlay 
representation. The `transparency' of such systems is a quality which 
Foucault famously discusses in his introduction of The Order of Things. He 
uses the opening example of Las Meninas, in order to demonstrate how the 
perspectival system of artistic representation is illustrative of the type of 
conceptual transparency16 which is characteristic of typographical 
knowledge in general. '" 
It is because of the alleged objectivity, linearity and transparency of 
Typographical Knowledge that means it is pre-disposed to the generation 
of `objective' teleological and ontological systems of knowledge of the 
`modern' age. In its apparent (conceptual) transparency, it is a denotative, 
significatory and classificatory type of knowledge. This is reflected in 
176 In terms of communication theory the `transparency' of the media of support 
can also be conceived of in terms of the `noise' of the materiality of support not 
interfering with the message transmitted via that support. This contributes to the 
alleged `objectivity' of the representative system in so far as the transparency of 
the media of support is contingent upon a logical disassociation between the 
visual units of the text and the `meaning' to which they are referring. The 
`meaning', therefore, is not dependent upon the physical attributes of the material 
support of the code which is conceptually transparent; but is instead related to the 
ordering of the code itself. 
In This is what Foucault refers to as the Classical schema of representation. See 
Foucault, The Order of Things, (Routledge, 1970) 
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typographical and systematic epistemology (such as that of Descartes) and 
the various attempts within the five hundred years of the typographical age 
to establish objective ry lemr of knowledge. As Mcluhan has stated: 
System means something to look at. You must have a very high 
visual gradient to have systemization. In philosophy, before 
Descartes, there was no system. Plato had no system. Aristotle had no 
ystem. My own interest in studying media is a systems development 
approach. Systems development is a structural analysis of pressures 
and strains, the exact opposite of everything that has been meant 
by systems in the past few centuries. Systems development is the 
opposite of systems in the philosophical sense. It is concerned with 
the inner dynamics of the form. 178 
In contrast Cybernetic knowledge (conceived in terms of processes of 
communication and control) which is included within the broader remit of 
Dynamical Systems Thinking is a conceptual shift away from the hegemony 
of the linearity of typographical knowledge to a knowledge that is both 
self-reflexive and non-linear. It is thus a non-transparent and 
deconstructive type of knowledge that questions its own limits, nature and 
relativity in matters regarding ontology and teleology in a manner that 
typographical knowledge did not. 
3.3 Perspective as the Symbolic Form of Typographic Knowledge 
It is argued that the visual model for typographical-type systems of 
knowledge (around which the ongoing discussion has been `locked-in') is 
single-point linear perspective, identified by Panofsky as the `Symbolic 
Formi19 of Western Renaissance epistemology. For as a system of 
178 Marshall Mcluhan & G. E. Steam, `A Dialogue', in Steam ed., Mcluhan Hot and 
Cool, (Penguin Books, 1967), pg. 333 
19 In addition; Goldstein's position in The Social and Cultural Roots of Linear 
Perspective takes a Marxist perspective (on arguments investigated by Lowe, 
Eisenstein, Febvre and Martin, Jay et al. ) that single point linear perspective is the 
`symbolic form' of the new social ordering of capitalist configured social relations; 
-130- 
representation Linear Perspective is, like Typographical Knowledge: 
objective, linear and transparent. 
In Perspective as Symbolic Form Panofsky draws a specific 
interconnection between two systems of representation; Art and 
Epistemology. He does this by establishing a specific link between the 
representative systems of art and images and the psychic systems of human 
rationality. Thereby Panofsky can argue that art (in this case focusing on 
the representative system of linear perspective in particular) is the symbolic 
form of knowledge and hence that both can be read in terms of human knowledge 
and rationality. 180 Thus, for Panofsky, the fact that Renaissance pictures look 
a certain way (and are organised according to the representative system of 
single-point linear perspective) can be explained by the way Renaissance 
painters looked at the world, or (from a systems-theoretical perspective) the 
way in which the world was observed by the Renaissance psychic ystem. 
In The Origin of Perspective Damisch calls for a rigorous 
understanding of perspective to be achieved through a thorough 
application of the structure of Symbolic Forn>181 If, Damisch argued, 
that "the relationship between linear perspective and the new cosmology of the 
Renaissance is one of parallelity since both are different representations of an 
emerging social structure, namely, modem capitalism, " and that "the whole 
process involves the breakdown of the organicist thinking of feudal society 
through the development of bourgeois production relations in which man and 
nature become the objects of active exploitation, so that man in commodity 
production is no longer a part of nature but its active and aggressive exploiter. " 
See Goldstein, The Social and Cultural Roots of Linear Perspective, (MEP Publications, 
1988); pg. 18 
180 Hence Panofsky's faith in Humanism upon which his whole system rests and 
this is that there is a shared human rationality between the past and the present 
which allows for the successful reconstruction of the past in the present through 
the tri-partite scheme of the iconological method. There is a whole academic 
industry providing discussion on the limits (and strengths) of Humanist Art 
History. 
181 Damisch took this reading of the of a system of representation, like Panofsky, 
from Cassirer's conception of the Symbolic Form. Holly has also provided a full 
discussion of Panofsky's indebtedness to Cassirer's conception of Symbolic Form 
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perspective is a symbolic form then we can't understand its meaning 
through the trivial task of semiologically decoding the pattern and 
organisation of its representational schema in order to discover the 
semiotic code (and thus decode it). Instead he proposed that symbolic 
form expresses a more profound observation regarding the configuration 
of the social and psychic systems which allow for its possibility. Thus it 
should: 
Not be reduced to a history, specifically to a history of those 
particular forms that are language, myth, art and science [and 
therefore] the question of their unity, tendentious at the very least, 
must be raised continually as a fundamental preoccupation of 
182 reason, in [an] expansive sense. 
Therefore the symbolic form of a system of representation (and the 
network of relations of which it is constituted) can be identified at the level 
of structure and configuration of that system which, in turn can be re- 
translated (not literally) as an identifiable coherence (or `mutual 
articulation) of the system itself. This statement comes with the caveat that 
this coherence at the level of the system does not function as part of a 
structuralist analysis of a pre-discursive order but instead expresses 
conditions of internal coherence and correspondence of the discursive 
in; `Panofsky and Cassirer', Panof ky and the Foundations ofArt History, (Cornell 
University Press, 1984), pg. 114 ff. 
182 Damisch, The Origin of Perspective, trans. Goodman, (MIT Press, 2000). "As 
Cassirer asserts, the operation of the sign is indistinguishable from the very 
principle of consciousness, which implies that nothing can be posited by it that 
does not refer to something else, that does not need supplementary mediation. 
`Only in and through this representation does what we call the presence of the 
content become possible. ' [Cassirer, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, vol. 1] It is 
still necessary, if one is to speak of symbolism as it is currently understood, for 
this representation, operating as it does like a kind of mis-en-scene or natural 
scenography - its signifying power being antecedent to the position of any specific 
sign - to be caught up in a network of relations that conforms to the principle of 
constitution, which in turn makes its mark on all its productions. In this last 
analysis the sole purpose of `symbolic forms', their sole product, is just this: the 
conquest of the world as representation. " Pg. 9 
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system by which it has been identified. Thereby, in eschewing the 
structuralist, and semiotic model of the structure of symbolic form, the 
system is revealed not to be structured upon a foundationalist relation of 
discreet cause and effect between the base and superstructure of either a 
social system or a language system to be decoded. Instead it consists of a 
non-linear network of interrelated factors with elective affinities. 
Panofsky argued that the system of Renaissance perspective, as it 
was systematised by Alberti in 1435183 is conceived in such a way as to 
guarantee that it is an objective system of representation. It is an: 
Infinite, unchanging and homogenous - space, this central perspective 
makes two tacit but essential assumptions: first, that we see with a 
single and immobile eye, and second, that the planar cross sections 
of the visual pyramid can pass for an adequate reproduction of our 
optical image. "' 
This makes it congruent with typographic qualities of objectivity, linearity 
and transparency. '85 
As is demonstrated by the image from Perspective as Symbolic Form 
Renaissance perspective is conceived on the plane of artistic representation 
according to a system of straight lines. Panofsky argued that this is 
unfaithful to perception because it straightens the natural curve of the eye 
and thus the naturally curved image which is projected onto the back of the 
183 Alberti, On Painting (1435), trans. Grayson, intro. Kemp, (Penguin Books, 
1991). 
184 Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, trans. Wood, (Zone Books, 1991) pg. 29. 
185 Bryson has described the epistemological significance of the model of 
perspective in similar terms. 
"[the renaissance viewer takes up the position] in relation to the scene that is 
identical to the position originally occupied by the painter, as though both painter 
and viewer looked through the same viewfinder on to a world unified spatially 
around the centric ray, the line running from viewpoint to vanishing point... At 
the picture plane, the two cones intersect; which is to say that the single vanishing 
point marks the installation within the painting of a principle of radical alterity, 
since its gaze returns that of the viewer as its own object; something is looking at 
my looking. " Bryson, Vision and Painting, (Yale University Press, 1983) pg. 104 ff.. 
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retina (and hence the form of the data which is presented to the psychic 
system): "exact perspectival construction is a systematic abstraction from 
the structure of this psychophysiological space. ""' To illustrate this 
Panofsky compared Renaissance with Greco-Roman perspective which is 
curvilinear and thus, he argues, more true to the conditions of actual 
perception. 1S7 Renaissance perspective, on the contrary, in being unfaithful 
to perception provides a rational and systematic order to subjective 
experience which allows for its representation according to a particular, 
rational system and thus for its reproduction and subsequent re-translation 
by the viewer using that same, shared rationality. In turn this rationality is 
intended to ensure the objectivity of the system. 
For Panofsky Renaissance perspective is the most effective and 
rational way of achieving this intelligible and thus communicable system of 
representation in the sphere of artistic representation. This is because in its 
balance between a subjective and objective viewpoint it provides a 
consistent and transferable system which can be recognised and hence 
translated universally. "' Thus, he argued, it is the rationality of linear 
perspective which allows for representation according to rational rules in 
186Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, trans. Wood, (Zone Books, 1991) pg. 30. 
187 'Because it conceived of the field of vision as a sphere [and here Panofsky 
makes a footnote reference to Riegl's Late Roman Art industry], antique optics 
maintained, always and without exception, that apparent magnitudes (that is, 
projections of objects onto that spherical field of vision) are determined not by 
the distances of the objects from the eye, but rather exclusively by the width of 
angles of vision. ' From Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, (trans. Wood, ) (Zone 
Books, 1991) pg. 35. 
188 "In a sense, perspective transforms psychophysiological space into 
mathematical space, " which Panofsky contrasts with antique perspective which is 
defined as subjective and "curved". "Antique perspective is thus the expression of 
a specific and fundamentally unmodern view of space... [and] furthermore the 
expression of an equally specific and unmodern conception of the world. " 
Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, (Zone, 1991) 
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which things may be read by others in the same way by virtue of a shared 
rationality between humans. 
For Panofsky, linear perspective is a normative system of 
representation because it systematises perception according to the 
conception of geometric and infinite space orientated around the dual 
poles of the perceiving subject and the vanishing point at infinity, in order 
to make it publicly communicable according to universally recognized 
rational laws (as opposed to subjective feelings). As an emblem of the 
systems of typographical knowledge Renaissance, straight line, linear 
perspective locates the psychic system at the centre of a system which 
represents the world according to a systematic and rational system; it thus 
illustrates the iconography of objectivity. 
Perspective is related to transparency because it requires the 
negation (in the phenomenological sense) of the material of production. 
Thus stylistic or artistic choices made in the application of methods of 
perspective space construction, in much the same way that Alberti's 
conception of the perspectival painting, in on Painting of 1435, was a 
mimetic `window on the world' negate and make transparent the picture 
plane in the act of looking-through (per-spect/spicere) it. '89 In this sense it is 
emblematic of the transparency of typographically configured systems of 
representation identified above. 190It is transparent in that the canvas, which 
189 For a discussion on this see Holly, Past Looking, (Cornell University Press, 
1996) chapter 1 
190 See Damisch, The Origin of Perspective, trans. Goodman, (MIT Press, 2000) pg. 
For Damisch the implications of this negation are that the implications of a 
significant (Cassirer-ian) reading of the symbolic form of the art are glossed over 
(and are themselves, like the `transparency' of the picture plane negated) by the 
tendency to assign a superficial meaning to images which fails to contribute to the 
"philosophy of symbolic forms as well as to history, or better, to cultural 
anthropology, in the strongest and most radical meanings of these terms. " 
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as the transparent window by which to view the picture space beyond, is 
phenomenologically negated. Foucault observes this transparency in 
relation to `Classical Representation' in his celebrated mediation on Las 
Meninas which begins The Order of Things. 
It may be that, in this picture, as in all the representations of which it is, as 
it were, the manifest essence, the profound invisibility of what one sees 
is inseparable from the invisibility of the person seeing - despite all 
mirrors, reflections, imitations and portraits. Around the scene are 
arranged all the signs and successive forms of forms of 
representation; but the double relation of the representation to its 
model and to its sovereign, to its author as well as to the person to 
whom it is being offered, this relation is necessarily interrupted. It 
can never be present without some residuum, even in a 
representation that offers itself as a spectacle. In the depth that 
traverses the picture, hollowing it into a fictitious recess and 
projecting it forward in front of itself, it is not possible for the pure 
felicity of the image ever to present in a full light both the master 
who is representing and the sovereign who is being represented. 191 
From this connection to objectivity, linearity and transparency it allows for 
the possibility that linear perspective be used as the visual model, or 
`manifest essence', of typographical systems of representation and vice- 
versa, be these epistemological, social or psychic systems. 
Thus from within the system of this thesis (and relative to that 
system) there exists a constellation of multiple vanishing points which 
include single-point linear perspective as the symbolic form of 
typographical knowledge. Single-point linear perspective can be restated as 
the representation of typographical knowledge and likewise that typographical 
knowledge can be observed as the representation, or symbolic form, of 
single-point linear perspective. This is significant, because as Damisch 
observes the perspectives of rational, typographic knowledge pervade all 
191 Foucault, The Order of Things, (Routledge, 1970) Pg. 16. Emphasis added. 
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aspects of the social system and thus dictate the ways in which perspective 
itself has been dealt with by Art History: 
To say that our culture has been and continues to be shaped, 
informed, and programmed at bedrock by the perspective paradigm 
is more than mere wordplay - though language requires that 
perspective not be an object like any other, because, metaphorically 
speaking, it has a bearing on the conditions determinant of all 
objectivity, of the perception of objects, from whatever angle or 
point view they might be considered, in relation to a horizon line 
and a set distance. Perspective has become so completely integrated 
into our knowledge, at the most implicit or unconscious level, that 
today we must turn to another kind of knowledge, erudite 
knowledge, and embark on an anamnestic project designed to 
recover it from the technological oblivion into which it has been 
plunged by ideology. 192 
It is the contention here that a systems-thinking approach breaks from the 
hegemony of typographical perspectives and in doing so provides the 
systems of art history with different epistemological technologies and 
representational systems and thus altered perspectives - or strategies of 
observation. 
4- Art History as Typographic Knowledge 
In this section I argue that Art History as a Humanistic Discipline is also a 
manifestation of the typographical form of knowledge. Several 
commentators193 have identified the profound structural connection 
between Panofsky's method of Humanist Art Historical reconstruction and 
192 Damisch, The Origin of Perspective, trans. Goodman, (MIT Press, 2000) pg. 52. 
193 See, amongst others: Jay, `Scopic Regimes of Modernity, ' in Force Fields: Between 
Intellectual History and Cultural Critique, (Routledge, 1993); Holly, Past Looking, 
(Cornell University Press, 1996); Summers, `Meaning in the Visual Arts as a 
Humanistic Discipline, ' in Lavin (ed), Meaning in the VisualArts: Views from the 
Outside, (Institute for Advanced Study, 1995); Crowther, The TranshistoricalImage, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001); Damisch, The Origin of Perspective, trans. 
Goodman, (MIT Press, 2000); Elkins, The Poetics of Perspective, (Cornell University 
Press, 1996); Moxey, The Practice of Persuasion, (Cornell University Press, 2001) 
especially chapter 4. 
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the artworks it takes as its primary object of research. These arguments 
share the view that this Art Historical model has the model of visual, linear 
perspective as the visual diagram for its mode of operation. The argument 
below follows on from this observation. Having drawn a connection 
between perspective an typography another step will be taken. This step 
involves the extending the observation of a structural similarity between 
Typographic Knowledge and perspective to identifying the same structural 
similarity between Typographic Knowledge and Humanist Art History 
itself. To do this it will be necessary to argue that the attributes of 
Typographical Knowledge shared by single-point, linear perspective are 
also manifested in Humanist Art History. These attributes are Objectivity, 
Linearity and Transparency. I will now discuss these characteristics in 
order. 
(i) Objectivity 
Art History in its form as `Art History as a Humanistic Discipline' 
and Kunstwissenschaft is concerned with the objectivity of its claims. In 
Panofsky's later (English-language) work the tri-partite interpretive schema 
of Pre-Iconography, Iconography and Iconology was established as a 
means of ensuring Art Historical objectivity. And the Art Historical 
methods of the Vienna School and its heritage were informed by the 
attempts to provide systematic and objective accounts of art and its 
history. 194 
Panofsky's methodological schema is illustrative of his own 
Humanism; a Humanism he saw as being paralleled in Renaissance values 
194 For an overview of the Vienna School see Wood, Vienna School Reader. Politics 
and Art Historical Method in the 1930s, (MIT Press, 2003) 
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and worldview (Weltanschauung). 195 This is also manifested in his 
investigation into Perspective as Symbolic Form. 196 Panofsky specifically links 
acts of representation (and observation) to rationality and epistemology. It 
is this interrelationship between the products of a culture and the 
structures, systems and strategies of knowing peculiar to that culture which 
once expressed in terms of modes of knowledge provides, for Panofsky, 
his art historical method with the historical objectivity he requires of it. 
This point of historical objectivity is his celebrated `Archimedean point. i197 
Thus, for Panofsky198 historical reconstruction of the past is made 
possible through the particular representative objects (and these might 
include texts, sculpture, paintings etc. ) by which historically specific acts of 
representation have occurred; and the possibility for this occurs because 
these acts and objects symbolise the particular epistemological 
configurations of the psychic and social systems which mediated their 
genesis and existence. In other words, as Podro has observed: "the concern 
195 There has been innumerable accounts and discussion of Panofsky's method. 
Notable discussions include: Belting, The End of the History ofArt, trans. Wood, 
(University of Chicago Press, 1987); Cassidy (ed. ), Iconography at the Crossroads, 
(Princeton University, 1993); Fernie (ed. ), Art History and its Methode A Critical 
Anthology, (Phaidon, 1995) chapter 15; Holly, Panofsky and the Foundations ofArt 
History, (Cornell University Press, 1984); Mitchell, Iconology, (University of Chicago 
Press, 1986) chapter 3; Moxey, The Practice of Theory, (Cornell University Press, 
1994) esp. ch. 4; Pacht, The Practice ofArt History, trans. Wood, (Harvey Miller, 
1999); Panofsky, Studies in Iconology, (Harper Torchbooks, 1939); Podro, The Critical 
Historians ofArt, (Yale University Press, 1982); Preziosi (ed. ), The Art ofArtHistory: 
A CriticalAnthology, (Oxford University Press, 1998) Chapter 3; Steiner (ed. ), Image 
and Code, (University of Michigan Press, 1981) 
196 Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, (1927), trans. Wood, (Zone Books, 1997) 
197 Discussions of Panofsky's concept of the `Archimedean Point' can be found in 
Holly, (1984) and Podro, (1980) 
198 Holly identifies Panofsky's attitude as one shared with Cassirer who states that 
philosophy must locate a `standpoint situated above all these forms and yet not 
merely outside them: a standpoint which would make it possible to encompass the 
whole of them in one view, which would seek to penetrate nothing other than the 
purely immanent relation. ' Cassirer, Language and Myth, (New York, 1946) cited in 
Holly, Panofsky and the Foundations ofArt History, (Cornell University Press, 1984), 
pg. 127 
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with rationality as such, and this makes the art of the past available in so far 
as it can be see in participating in this rationality. "'99 The structuring and 
organisation of the systems of representation of past art in some way 
reflects the structuring, organisation and nature of the systems of 
epistemological representation which mediated their existence; hence the 
link between typographical knowledge and perspective. 
(ii) Linear 
Art History is Linear in so far as it attempts to construct historically 
linear teleologies. Even the cyclical models of bud, bloom and decay, 
observed in both Riegl's and Wölfflin's systematic studies of changes in 
style, follow a linear development in terms of developments in style being 
directly related to preceding incidents. Thus although, as Podro has argued, 
although for Wölfflin and Riegl (in comparison with, say, Schnasse): 
"teleology no longer offers a final vantage point from which to look back at 
the past, " however it does offer a framework for analysis. In other words I 
argue that the (as opposed to a synchronic model) diachronic model of 
historical reconstruction is inherently linear. 200 
(iii) Transparent 
Art History is transparent in so far as it attempts to be objective 
and therefore transhistorical. It thus attempts to be transparent as a system 
of historical representation. As Moxey has argued; 
199 Podro, The Critical Historians ofArt, (Yale University Press, 1980) pg.?? 
200 Another way of conceiving this linear historical model is one that is inherently 
Hegelian. In `In search of Cultural History, ' (In Fernie (ed), Art History and its 
Methods, (Phaidon. 1995) Gombrich observed the `dogma' of Hegelianism as 
inherent in most Art Historical models including Wölfflin's, Riegl's and 
Panofsky's. 
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Used metaphorically [as a means by which to visualise art historical 
method] perspective can suggest that our access to history is as 
direct and unmediated as our view through a window. 201 
Damisch has convincingly identified such a tendency toward 
transparency within the Humanist model of art historical method which 
operates according to the semiotic paradigm as something to be resisted. In 
this model everything in an image is a significant detail within a `code' and 
all portrays some kind of meaning which may be read by the suitably 
informed historian. There is thus no account of the extraneous material of 
support: 
The image is always seen, whatever its constitution as an image, as 
the prop, the vehicle for any and every signified injected into it 
from outside, and research still obeys a model of signification, of 
communication, which leads to a radical distinction between that 
aspect of the image which belongs to the order of perception, and 
that which has properly semiotic dimensions. Iconography has its 
roots deeply entrenched in the metaphysics of the sign 202 
In summary of the above section I hope to have demonstrated 
above that Art History (albeit a certain type) is tied by the dual umbilical 
cords of Humanist rationality and visuality to both Perspective and 
Typography. In other words that it configured congruently with both 
artistic and technological systems of communication and representation. 
What follows below is an argument that discusses further this connection 
between particular systems of Art History and Typographic Knowledge in 
order to demonstrate the limits to that type of Art History particularly in 
dealing with artistic practice after modernism. 
201 Moxey, `Perspective, Panofsky and the Philosophy of History, ' in The Practice of 
Persuasion, (Cornell University Press, 2001) pg. 96 
202 Damisch, `Semiotics and Iconography', in Preziosi ed., The All ofArt History, 
(Oxford University Press, 1998), pg. 240 
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4.1 Typography and Discursive Memory 
Before the discussion moves on to the specific case of Art History 
some general points should be noted regarding memory within typographic 
systems in relation to technology. 
The technology of the printing press allows for the creation of 
systems of knowledge which rapidly become, what is called in system- 
theoretical terms, "locked-in. " The self-similarity of subsequent editions of 
a single text allows for a standardisation of the material produced. In 
contrast the older technology of the copying of manuscripts by hand can 
lead to the degeneration of the information between copies as ambiguities 
in the material were extenuated or misinterpreted as Eisenstein has 
explained: 
When one places a reconstruction of a Ptolemaic world map 
derived from the second century A. D. beside a mappae mundi 
designed later on it becomes clear that the statement [by Boulding, 
in relation to maps that `early images can always be seen as partial 
unclear expressions of later more exact images] needs qualification. 
Instead of demonstrating `orderly development, ' a sequence of 
hand copied images will usually reveal degradation and decay. A 
survey of maps issued during a millennium or more shows how the 
`course of recorded history' produced spatial images that cannot be 
ordered even by taking full advantage of hindsight and present 
techniques of placing and dating past records... The `disassociated 
transcript' that Boulding describes could emerge only after the shift 
from script to print. 203 
In contrast, the numerous copies of a text produced by a printing 
press could, theoretically, demonstrate no significant degradation of 
content between one another. Thus the potential for standard copies of 
texts to appear was created. The proliferation of self-similar texts had an 
obvious impact on the production and regulation of knowledge in that 
203 Eisenstein, The Printing Revolution in Modern Europe, (Canto, 1983) Pg. 199 
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there were more books produced and available thus hastening the "spread 
of new ideas" (Eisenstein). Again, this provides an example of systems of 
textual knowledge displaying the behavioural qualities of complex systems 
such as positive feedback (as further discussed in other chapters of the 
thesis. ) Eisenstein argued that because of the `fixity' of print (or in the 
terms of complex systems its irreversibility; or that such systems have 
memory) the printed word allows for the accumulation of knowledge of a 
different order to the duplication of pre-typographical knowledge. She 
observed that when copied there is the potential for manuscripts to mutate 
over time due to discrepancies arising in the duplication process such as 
human error (which becomes amplified over successive copies. ) 
If one accepts the criteria of `totality and permanence' to 
distinguish prior revivals from the Renaissance, then probably the 
advent of the scholar-printer should be heralded instead. He arrived 
to cast his Greek types and turn out grammars, translations, and 
standard editions in the nick of time - almost on the eve of the 
Valois invasions. Once Greek type fonts had been cut, neither the 
disruption of civil order in Italy, the conquest of Greek lands by 
Islam, nor even the translation into Latin of all major Greek texts 
saw knowledge of Greek' wither again in the West. Instead it was 
the familiar scribal phrase Greaca . runt eto non 
legenda that 
disappeared from Western texts. Constantinople fell, Rome was 
sacked. Yet a cumulative process of textual purification and 
continuous recovery had been launched. The implications of 
typographical fixity are scarcely exhausted by thinking about early 
landmarks in classical scholarship and its auxiliary sciences: 
paleography, philology, archaeology, numismatics, etc. Nor are they 
exhausted by reckoning the number of languages that have been 
retrieved after being lost to all men for thousands of years. They 
involve the whole modern "knowledge industry" itself, with its 
mushrooming bibliographies and overflowing card files. ' 
This I argue, has specific implications for Art History. 
204 Eisenstein, `Some Conjectures About The Impact of Printing on Western 
Society and Thought', journal ofModern History, 40: 1(March 1968), pg. 40 ff. 
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The emergence of typographically configured systems of 
knowledge meant that these knowledge systems demonstrated the 
behavioural patterns (such as memory/irreversibility and positive feedback 
etc. ) of systems. With the proliferation of texts references within them 
become accumulative allowing for a process within knowledge production 
and consumption which Eisenstein called: "amplification and 
reinforcement. " Such positive feedback and `locking-in' with regard to a 
system of knowledge can also be observed in the system of Art History (as 
a system of knowledge production); and this is discussed at greater length 
in my concluding chapter where I argue that discourse on art is `locked-in' 
around particular paradigms and cultural forms which include a concept of 
Art itself. 
Typographical Knowledge is characterised by systems of 
knowledge which are taxonomical and accumulative. Such representative 
structures can be observed to behave like complex ryrtemr, that is to say that 
the terms by Foucault discussed them are consistent with the observations 
of the systems-theoretical definition of complex systems. Foucault wrote: 
In any case the Classical episteme can be defined in its most general 
arrangement in terms of the articulated system of a mathesis, a 
taxinomia, and a genetic analysis. The sciences always carry within 
themselves the project, however remote it may be, of an exhaustive 
ordering of the world; they are always directed, too, towards the 
discovery of simple elements and their progressive combination; 
and at their centre they form a table on which knowledge is displayed in a 
system contemporary with itself. 205 
One reason for the occurrence of the systemic processes of 
memory and positive feedback is that once liberated from the laborious 
(and as mentioned above, often inaccurate) tasks of copying manuscripts 
205 Foucault, The Order of Things, (Routledge, 1974) pg. 74 
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the processes of the production of knowledge became much more 
predicated upon principles of accumulation rather than replication (which 
could now take place mechanically and hence on a faster and more 
extensive scale). An example to illustrate this would be that Copernicus' 
observations in De revolutionibus (placing the sun at the centre of the 
universe) were made possible by this accumulation of knowledge culled 
from a variety of sources. As Eisenstein observed: 
One need not wait until `a half century after Copernicus' death' to 
observe the effect of this change [in scientific procedure], for it had 
begun to affect the study of astronomy shortly before Copernicus 
was born. Copernicus was not supplied, as Tycho's successors 
would be, with precisely recorded fresh data. But he was supplied, 
as Regiomontanus's successor and Aldus Manutius's contemporary, 
with guidance to technical literature culled from the best 
Renaissance Greek manuscript collections and, for the first time, 
made available outside library walls. 06 
This is an example of knowledge behaving like a system by becoming 
`locked-in' around particular paradigms. And it is also an example of an 
observable `elective affinity' to be observed between technology and 
epistemology. 
Within systems of Typographic Knowledge the role of the scholar 
changes from one of duplication to one of contribution. The task of the 
scholar is to contribute to the ever growing information of the system of 
knowledge which, via processes of positive feedback, accumulates 
exponentially. It becomes `locked-in'. Scholars were now afforded more 
leisure time to pursue investigation linking knowledge production with 
bourgeois patterns of behaviour as something to be consumed and as 
sob Eisenstein, The Printing Revolution in Modern Europe, (Canto, 1983) Pg. 209 
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something allowed those who could afford the leisure time to pursue 
independent study. 207 
As is discussed elsewhere in this thesis this principle of 
accumulation is illustrative of the principle of irreversibility isomorphic to 
complex systems. According to this principle the memory of a system is 
articulated in terms of its irreversibility; or in other words, a temporal 
aspect is added to the analysis, whereby having reached a particular state 
the system cannot regress to a previous state (such as the VHS/Betamx 
example outlined in section 2). The argument here is thus; that via systems 
of typographical memory (books) knowledge became standardised through 
being reified in print, which in turn facilitated and catalysed and 
accumulation of information within systems of knowledge, which, in turn, 
became defined in terms of the accumulation of that knowledge. It is thus 
argued that when observed from within a systems-theoretical approach the 
history of systems of western knowledge from about 1450 onwards is a 
history of a series of irreversible bifurcation points of no-return which are 
reached and superseded. This reading of history is investigated in more 
detail with particular reference to the history of the discipline of the history 
of art in the concluding chapter where it is argued at length that the 
discipline of art history be observed as a complex system and is thus 
defined by systems predicates such as irreversibility, positive feedback, 
systemic memory and so forth. 
5- Contemporary Issues 
207 Eisenstein, The Printing Revolution in Modern Europe, (Canto, 1983) Pg. 240-2 
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Contemporary technologies bring with them new conceptions of 
representation; new forms of communication; different ways of thinking; 
and new perspectives. As Mcluhan has said of the contemporary world: 
We are today as far into the electric age as the Elizabethans had 
advanced into typographical and mechanical age. And we are 
experiencing the same confusions and indecisions which they had 
felt when living simultaneously in two contrasted forms of society 
and experience 208 
The perspective provided by the representative and epistemological 
systems characteristic of the social systems of print culture are configured 
typographically according to principles of linearity, objectivity and 
transparency (which presupposes the universal and sovereign human 
subject of the Cartesian Cogito) 
And thus the shift to post-typographical epistemological systems is 
another paradigm shift to new systems with different representative 
capacities and functions. Therefore, in our cybernetic age, with the arrival 
of new systems of reproduction and dissemination of knowledge the nature 
of academic research will undergo similar mutations and modifications, to 
those of the move into the typographic age. 
With the emergence of new epistemological systems, with which to 
order and preserve structures of knowing, different behavioural patterns 
regarding the way in which that knowing operates also emerge. 
In other words new technologies engender different types of 
knowledge. But what types of knowledge are these? 
There is not the time or resources to discuss here more extensively 
the connections between (post) Modernity/(post) structuralism and 
208 Mcluhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962) pg. 1 
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technology; this has been covered by many and various commentaries 2°9 
Instead what is suggested (and demonstrated above) is an attempt to 
practically apply our technologically configured systems-thinking to a 
problem central to systems of art history. Thus in an investigation to find 
the limits and nature of Dynamical Systems Theory we may see how it 
represents the multiple perspectives of technology, epistemology, 
typography and perspective. And like a `magic eye' image, which doesn't 
represent using single-point perspective but, in which we stare at the `noise' 
until we throw our eyes out of focus and stare beyond the image, upon 
which a three dimensional emerges before our eyes so too will the multiple 
perspectives of a systems approach emerge from the discussions of this 
discursive system. Hence, as Foucault observed of his Archaeology of 
Knowledge, both this chapter and the thesis as a whole is my own attempt 
to: 
Define this blank space from which I speak, and which is slowly 
taking shape in a discourse that I still feel to be so precarious and 
so unsure... 
What, do you imagine that I would take so much trouble and so 
much pleasure in writing, do you think that I would keep so 
persistently to my task, if I were not preparing - with a rather shaky 
hand -a labyrinth into which I can venture, in which I can move 
my discourse, opening up underground passages, forcing it to go 
far from itself, finding overhangs that reduce and deform its 
itinerary, in which I can lose myself and appear at last to eyes that I 
will never have to meet again. "' 
209 Notable discussions are included within - Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernism, 
(Routledge, 1998); Rasch & Wolfe eds., Observing Complexity Systems Theory and 
Postmodernsmy, (University of Minnesota Press, 2000); Levinson, Digital Mcluhan a 
Guide to 'the Information Millennium, (Routledge, 1999); ed. Hayles, Chaos and Order - 
Complex Dynamics in Literature and Science, (University of Chicago Press, 1991); 
Kroker A. & Kroker M. eds., Digital Delirium, (New World Perspectives, 1997); 
Aronwitz et al eds., Techno Science and Cyber Culture, (Routledge, 1996); Poster, The 
Second Media Age, (Polity Press, 1995); Aarseth, Cybertext, Perspectives on E, godic 
Literature, John Hopkins University Press, 1997); Ramsey et al eds., Philosophy and 
Connectionist Theory, (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc., 1991) 
210 Foucault, The Archaeology ofKnonledge, Trans. Sheridan Smith, (Tavistock, 1972) 
pg. 17 
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Stereogram, `Magic Eye', image from 
http: //yosemite-sam. net/Sam/Books/Sam-Magic-Eye. jpg [consulted 29, May, 2004] 
Thus it is that by putting perspective into Dynamical Systems 
Theory, by situating a particular historical situation within its particular 
circuits and representative networks, the operational functions and 
idiosyncrasies of that system can be identified and delineated. And it is 
therefore the putting of perspective into Dynamical Systems Theory that 
allows us to put Dynamical Systems Theory into perspective, and the 
emergent structures of its critical perspectives are subsequently thrown into 
focus. In what follows I hope to achieve this with the different objects of 
observations. 
CHAPTER 3: 
THE SYSTEMS-THEORETICAL 
APPROACH AND DISCURSIVE VALIDITY 
We may have to relinquish the notion, explicit or implicit, that changes of paradigm 
cart' scientists and those who learn fmm them closer and closer to the truth. ' 
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (1962) 
The displacement of the idea that facts and evidence matter by the idea that everything 
boils down to subjective interests and perspectives is, second only to American political 
campaigns, the most prominent and pernicious manifestation of anti-intellectualism in 
our time. ' 
Larry Laudan, Science and Relativism (1990) 
There is no need for these hypotheses to be true, or even to be at all like the truth; rather 
one thing is sufcient for them... that they should yield calculations which agree with the 
observations' 
Osiander Preface to Copemicus'De Revolutionbus 
Introduction 
The primary function of any system, be it ecological, biological, economic 
or discursive, is to survive. 
In order to survive within a competitive environment all systems 
must adapt and evolve. 
This has specific implications for the systems of Art History. 
Themselves discursive systems, they must also adapt and evolve in order to 
survive within the competitive environment of the contemporary 
epistemological and academic climate. For they face the dual threat of both 
the challenge from outside their borders of the post-structural critique of 
authority and the internal challenge of the post-modern artistic practice. 
The key to the survival of discursive systems, including those of art 
history, lies in their legitimacy. It is ensured by their plausibility and by their 
authority. They must become `locked-in' and thus accepted within 
academic and social systems. 
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In what follows I will discuss how the discursive system of Art History is 
implicated in this systemic `will to survive. ' The argument of this chapter 
runs as follows: 
1- Since its conceptual foundation as an autonomous academic discipline, 
Art History has sought to ensure its legitimacy and validity. 
2- Dynamical Systems Theory is a discursive system that can account for 
its own legitimacy and validity. 
2.1 - The truth claims of Dynamical Systems Theory are relative to the 
discursive system of Dynamical Systems Theory; that is they are not 
transcendent or metaphysical truths. However the truth claims of 
Dynamical Systems Theory do have a validity relative in so far as the claims 
are plausible and consistent. 
2.2 Dynamical Systems Theory produces a `truth' which is consistent with 
the terms and operations of its own system. In other words Dynamical 
Systems Theory can provide the conditions for its own validity and an 
account of these conditions on its own terms. 
3- The discursive systems of Art History can adapt, evolve and hence 
survive by adopting a systems-thinking approach. This enables Art History 
to ensure its legitimacy and validity, and thus to re-invigorate its Modernist 
project 21 
This chapter is, then, about what claims to `truth' a systems- 
thinking approach has with regards to how this effects its application to 
Art Historical problems. This discussion is further informed by the debate 
regarding the (dis)continuity between Modernism and Postmodernism. I 
211 As is discussed at length in other parts of the thesis the adoption of new 
vocabularies is essential if the discursive systems of Art History are to successfully 
account for the complex issues engaged by art after Modernism. 
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argue that a Systems-Theoretical approach is discontinuous from 
Modernist discursive approaches to knowledge production which include 
the claims and methods of `Art History as a Humanistic Discipline. ' 
1- Art History and The problem of Scientific Validity 
There has never been one homogenous art historical method. 
Instead, since their conceptual foundation in the 19th Century, the systems 
of art history have employed an adaptive strategy by means of which they 
can be and remain able to confront the persisting issue of how to write 
about past events with any legitimacy or authority. Panofsky addresses 
precisely this adaptive strategy when he says: 
"Finally the results have to be classified and coordinated into a coherent 
system that makes sense... " and a process by "which the historian may 
grasp reality by detach [ing] ourselves from the present. "212 
Panofsky's method exemplifies the quest for objectivity within the 
Germanic tradition of art history understood as a systematic or scientific 
strategy, (or Kunstwissenschaft as opposed to the narrative approach of 
Kunstgerchichte. 21) According to Panofsky Kunstwissenschaft. 
Demands that the objects of its study must be grasped with 
necessity and not merely historically. A purely historical 
examination whether it goes first to content or to the history of 
form, elucidates the phenomenal work of art only by reference to 
other phenomena, it does not have any higher order knowledge on 
which to ground itself: to trace back to the particular iconographic 
representation, derive a particular formal combination from a 
typological history, ... is not to fix it in its absolute place outside its 
own sphere of being, it is to remain inside the total complex of 
interconnected appearances. Even the longest `development series' 
212 Panofsky, `Art History as a Humanistic Discipline', In Fernie (ed., ) Art History 
and its Methods, (Phaidon, 1995) 
213 see Sedlmayr's manifesto on the theoretical method of Art History, Towards a 
Rigorous Study of Art, ' (1931), in Wood (ed. ), The Vienna School Reader; Politics and 
Art Historical Method in the 1930s, (Zone, 1999) 
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necessarily place the line within ' the limits of the purely historical 
complex 214 
The establishment of a systematic strategy is to guarantee the 
necessity that Panofsky conceives in terms of his notion of the Archimedean 
Point. 215 It refers to the point of critical and historical objectivity from 
which to view the past in order to be able to avoid projecting ones own 
culturally and historically specific values back onto it. The aim and purpose 
of art history is thus to investigate art works in order to: "determine their 
absolute situation and significance from a fixed Archimedean point outside 
the art work's own sphere of becoming. "216 And it is by avoiding the 
falsifying projection of ones own subjective values that a critical stance can 
be established within the descriptive system of art history and its historical 
`truth' can be ensured. 
The same desire for veracity and validity in the systematic study of 
art (Kunstwissenschafl) can be also be observed in Wölfflin's `Art History 
without Namesi217 in which the formal, and thus empirical, qualities of the 
work of art are used as the transhistorica1218 criteria for differentiation and 
214 Panofsky, 'he Concept of Artistic Volition', Trans. Northcott & Snyder, 
Criticallnquiry, 8, (Autumn 1981), Pg. 17-33 
215 Holly (1984) further notes that, "how the term `Archimedean Viewpoint' 
became a phrase at issue in art historical theory is not known, but we can find 
Worringer using it as early as 1907 in Abstraction and Empathy: A Contribution to the 
Pychology of Style, trans. M. Bullock New York, 1953), 4, " pg. 211, fn. 36. 
216 Panofsky, 'The Concept of Artistic Volition', Trans. Northcott & Snyder, 
Critical Inquiry, 8, (Autumn 1981), Pg. 17-33 [emphasis added] 
217 or `kunstgeschichte ohne namen' see, Wölfflin, Renaissance and Baroque, (...? ) 
218 Holly observes, in relation to Wölfflin's method, that this demonstrates a: 
`concern with validity in interpretation [which] was itself an offshoot of the 
positivist theory of scientific validity, which contended that truth is independent 
of the observer or researcher who discovers it, ' (Holly, Panofsky and the 
Foundations of Art History, Cornell University Press, 1984) pg. 51). ) But it can 
also be seen to be equally a result of the post-Kantian climate of philosophical 
modernism and a systematic and self-reflexive approach to epistemology in order 
to establish a veracity and validity to knowledge. This two tendencies were 
combined in Wölfflin's adoption of a Systematic Strategy and the `box of 
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evaluation. This proved an attractive adaptive strategy because, in the 
words of David Summers: 
The technique of formal analysis which grew up with the discipline 
of art history seemed to provide a sturdy bridge between what we 
see and what we say, a secure metalanguage to any art whatever. 219 
Gombrich attempted yet another strategy to establish the objectivity of his 
art historical method, namely that of adopting scientific methods and 
vocabularies. His courting of certain scientific methods, in particular 
biology and psychology, as a means of verifying his observations is best 
understood as his attempt to establish an Archimedean point. Gombrich thus 
models his art historical style after the principles of scientific discourse, a 
strategy which is also adopted by the project of this thesis. Through the use 
of scientific discourse Gombrich therefore provides a precedent for my 
own application of systems-thinking (which initially emerged from 
scientific and mathematical discourse) to certain art historical issues. 
Throughout Gombrich's work we find various examples of his 
engagements with the limits of the objectivity of the practices and methods 
of art history. Bakos has observed that, as the `Vienna School's 168th 
Graduate, ' Gombrich identified720 with their art historical approach because 
tools'(Fernie) of the 5 pairs of stylistic analysis as an attempt to provide a neutral 
and thus `objective' language of formal style. 
219 Summers, "'Form", Nineteenth Century Metaphysics, and the Problem of Art 
Historical Description', Criticalingkiy 15, (Winter 1989), pg. 372-93 
zz° It should however be noted that whilst alive Gombrich himself remained 
skeptical of such a teleological (indeed Panofskian) reading of his own intellectual 
development and having been identified by Bakös as an inheritor of the 
intellectual tradition of the Vienna School replied; "I am all the more struck by the 
fact how rarely it may be possible to reconstruct a sequence of historical events 
from a few scattered sources. For inevitably I know more about my intellectual 
development than you could possibly find out from my writings... But frankly, I 
don't think it matters to what extent I belong to the Vienna school or any other 
school, of course we all absorbed views and problems from our teachers, but my 
present interests he on a very different plane, as any reader of my writings (and 
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there was a "common denominator as the belief in art history as a 
science. "22' Wood described the ethos of the Vienna School as follows: 
The most successful and at the same time most disastrous 
extensions of Riegl's Weltanschauungrßhilosophie [which was] indeed 
carried out by his own immediate successors and students, 
including Max Dvorak, and above all Hans Sedlmayr, Guido von 
Kaschnitz-Weinberg, and Otto Pächt, the core of the so-called 
Second Vienna School. They sought to drive Riegl's structural 
analysis farther along its synchronic axis by refining and elaborating 
the categories of the initial pictorial analysis. Their ambitions were 
superbly ascetic. The latent structural principles of the work would 
alone yield the insight into the world that produced that work. ' 
The attribution of Gombrich's position to the Vienna School is, to a 
certain extent, informed by his own enthusiastic embrace of the Positivism 
of Popper with whom he had a particular social and intellectual affinity via 
the Vienna Circle. Gombrich said of one of his more celebrated works; "I 
should be proud if Professor Popper's influence were to be felt everywhere 
in [Art and 111urion]"u' 
It was specifically Popper's synthesis between the processes of historical 
and scientific verificationism (and falsification) and his scepticism toward 
Marxist and Psychoanalytical `Pseudo-sciences'22' that Gombrich found so 
attractive. 
Thus, like Popper, Gombrich too attempts to provide an 
objectivity for discourse, (in his case art history) by affecting a synthesis 
possibly of my future writings, if I live so long) will be able to judge. I am sorry I 
have had to be so outspoken, but while I happen still to be alive, I must `put the 
record straight"' in Gombrich on Art and Pycholoy, cd. Woodfield, (1996) 
221 Bakos, The Vienna School's 168th graduate', Gombrich on Art and Psychology, ed 
Woodfield, (1996) 
222 Wood, `Introduction', Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, trans. Wood, 
(Zone, 1991) pg. 10. 
zzs From the introduction to Gombrich, Art and Illusion, (ref, req. ) 
224 See especially The Logic of Scientjc Discovery, 1959; The Open Society and its Enemies, 
1945 [in which he equates Plato and Marx's philosophical systems with 
totalitarianism and thus tacitly with the rise of Nazi-ism] and The Poverty of 
Historicism, 1957 [ which was an attack on legacy of Hegel] 
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between art history and science. According to Gombrich, cultural history 
requires the invocation of the world of physics (verifiable in the Popperian 
sense) rather than of the speculative world of cultural metaphysics: 
As Historians we have learned to use the word `explanation' with 
caution. The scientist can test his explanations by a systematic 
variation of conditions in experiment, the historian obviously 
cannot. But this need not prevent him from rejecting spurious 
explanations such as "the evolution of mankind" or the "spirit of 
the Greeks" and searching instead for conditions that would make 
the adoption of one or the other way of rendering nature 
intelligible. It is precisely because mankind can hardly have changed 
in the period which separates us from the archaic Greeks that we 
are entitled to expect these conditions still to be intelligible if we 
ask the simple question of how the function of an image will 
influence its form. ' 
The example of Gombrich's `scientific method' has been used here 
to provide a precedent for my own application of the scientific method and 
vocabularies of systems-thinking as an interpretive method for Art History. 
However, as is argued below, this account needs to be balanced with the 
recognition that within the current social, academic and epistemological 
climate the appeal to truth by scientific discourse has been called into 
question. As a result of this they might not necessarily be able to provide us 
with a fixed critical point with credibility. The problem of verification 
remains. Thus it is proposed that the Arrbimedean Point of objectivity 
desired by Panofsky, (who expected the problem to be solved through a 
shared Human rationality, in a neo-Kantian sense) and Gombrich (who 
attempted to address the problem through the applied rational objectivity 
of science) needs to be revisited by art history. This thesis revisits this issue 
through a systems-theoretical approach. 
=5 Gombrich, 'Reflections on the Greek Revolution', Art and Illusion, (Phaidon, 
1960) 
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In the next section, on Systems Thinking and relativity, the truth claims of 
Dynamical Systems Theory will be discussed in further detail. 
2- Systems-Thinking and Relativity 
'God has put a secret art into the forces of Nature so as to enable it to fashion itself out 
of chaos into a perfect world system. ' - Immanuel Kant 
`11: 15, estate my assumptions: 1. Mathematics is the language of nature. 2. Everything 
around us can be represented and understood through numbers. 3. Ifyougraph these 
numbers, patterns emerge. Therefore: There are patterns everywhere in nature. ' - 
Maximillian Cohen 
The plot of Darren Arrononfsky's 1997 film Pi (tagline -faith in chaos) is 
driven by New York mathematician Max Cohen's obsession with a formula 
hidden in the chaos of the universe. When he stumbles across the `System' 
behind nature he finds himself subject to the dangerous attentions of 
people, such as stock-market traders and scholars of the kabala, who want 
to find out what he knows about the `truth. ' 
This fictional plot illustrates nicely the quasi-mystical quality of 
some claims that have been made in the name of Systems-Thinking. It has 
been suggested that, like Max Cohen, we are on the edge of discovering 
what was formerly considered the unknowable and transcendent order of 
zza Kant, Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heaven, [trans. Jakii, (Scottish 
Academic Press, 1981) 
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the world in itself- the `perfect world system. ' According to this line of 
thought there are systems and structures which are divine forces of nature 
controlling all natural processes according to simple rules, lying in wait in 
the world to be disclosed. The hopeful assumption is that as soon as these 
rules are uncovered, the true nature of Kant's `perfect world system' will 
also be revealed. In the light of such hopes, Coveney and Highfield, make 
the following somewhat overstated claim for the systems-thinking 
approach to knowledge: 
Today, those who pursue the study of complexity are followers of a 
secret art in which the colour, form and motions of the universe are 
painted in atoms of logic. And, like their post-Impressionist fore 
bears, these logical pointillists expect that a greater whole - the 
essence of the world - will emerge from the discreet elements of 
their mathematical code. '' 
Examples of such kind show how systems-thinking is often 
perceived to harbour a faith in discovering a "greater whole - the essence 
of the world", the faith that a systems approach can provide a unified 
`theory of everything'and that thereby it is theoretically possible to find 
the mathematical patterns and algorithms which dictate the complex 
systems which underlie the world. " In Chaos Theory for example we find 
the belief in an order behind chaos, and in Complexity Theory the 
assumption that complex systems are self-organising and thus may be self- 
conscious. Emerging from this is a new spirituality based on what may be 
227 Coveney, P., and Highfield, R., Frontiers of Complexity, (Faber and Faber, 1995) 
pg. 19 
228 see Barrow, J., Theories of Everything: The Quest for Ultimate Explanation, (Oxford 
University Press, 1991) and Pi in the Sky, (Oxford Unveristy Press, 1992) 
229 Such tendencies are exemplified by the quasi-religious Gaia Theory which argues 
that there is a ghost in the machine of the world. For a demonstration of Gaia 
theory by one of its proponents see Lovelock, The Ages of Gaia, (Bantam, 1990). 
There is also a varied commentary on aspects of the theory (taken from 
proceedings of a conference, organized by the American Geophysical Union in 
San Diego, 1988) in Schneider, S., (cd), Scientists on Gaia, (MIT press, 1991) 
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loosely called a Systems approach. This is exemplified in the following 
quote from Paul Davies: 
The very fact that the universe is creative, and that the laws have 
permitted complex structures to emerge and develop to the point 
of consciousness - in other words that the universe has organised 
its own self-awareness - is for me powerful evidence that there is 
something going on behind it all. The impression of design is 
overwhelining. 20 
This `spiritual turn' has proved attractive to both scientists and non- 
scientists alike as Erik Davis has noted with specific reference to Systems- 
Thinking in Techgno. ris his discussion of `myth, magic and mysticism in the 
age of information'. He says: 
The systems paradigm argues that similar patterns of behaviour 
underlie widely different dimensions of the real, from gadgets to 
galaxy clusters to games people play. In seeking to pin down this 
`pattern that connects, ' systems thinking has also seduced many 
non-scientists restlessly seeking a new frame for the big picture... 
the flowers of West Coast "holistic thought" in many ways 
sprouted from this cybernetic matrix. " 
Systems theory is, therefore, often seen as the inheritor of a Metaphysical 
search for absolutes sought after by science, philosophy and theism alike. 
However it is argued here principles of a Systems Thinking approach need 
not be understood as part of a higher `truth. ' Instead they should be 
understood as extremely useful heuristic devices. This thesis uses the 
principles of systems-thinking to this purpose only and brings them to bear 
upon certain art historical debates. 
2.1 Systems-thinking and the threat of relativism 
0 Paul Davies, The Cosmic Blueprint, (Heinemann, 1987), pg. 203. Paul Davis has in 
other books such as God and the New Physics explored the relationship between 
science and religion. 
231 Davis, E., Techgno. rir, (Serpents Tail, 1998) pg. 90 
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The acknowledgment of the relativity of the truth claims of both 
Dynamical Systems Theory and Art History can itself be placed in a 
historical context. Dynamic Systems Theory is a contemporary theory 
which has developed over the last forty years. Its emergence is thus 
synchronous with a more generally observed restructuring of social 
systems. Such restructuring has involved the questioning and the 
reconfiguration of the following systems (amongst others): linguistic 
systems (post-structuralism, ) the systems of knowledge (deconstruction, ) 
economic systems (the cultural logic of late capitalism) technological 
systems (the communications revolution, ) contextual systems (theories on 
the end of history, ) and finally political systems. Due to this synchronicity 
Dynamical Systems Theory must reflect such social, political and 
epistemological paradigm shifts in order to be able to ensure and 
demonstrate the validity of the claims it makes about the world in which 
this shifts have taken place; in other words so as not to appear 
anachronistic. 
The post-modern relativist attitude now pervades many aspects of 
academic and intellectual life and has specific implication for both 
Dynamical Systems Theory and art historical discourse. It has been 
identified (for example by Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition) as a 
contemporary attitude characteristic of the organisation of social 
relationships in late-capitalist society. In terms of systems-thinking it can be 
understood as operating via processes of positive feedback within the 
academic systems of late capitalism (which have had a cumulative effect for 
the last forty years) in which academics have become `locked-in' around the 
principle of post-modern skepticism. As Sokal and Bricmont observe, this 
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had a `knock-on' effect to all disciplines (not least scientific disciplines 
where Systems-Theory is mostly practised) that used to have a well- 
deserved reputation for being hermetically sealed away from the vagaries of 
fashionable conceits. Sokal and Bricmont critically dismiss such skeptical 
tendencies of relativism in what they regard as: 
A potpourri of ideas, often poorly formulated, that go under the 
generic name of `relativism' and are nowadays rather influential in 
some areas of the academic humanities and social sciences. This 
relativist Zeitgeist originates partly from contemporary works in the 
philosophy of science such as Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions and Paul Fayerabend's Against Method, and partly 
extrapolations of these philosophers' work by their successors. 
(There are of course many other sources of the relativist Zeitgeist, 
from Romanticism to Heidegger, but we shall not deal with them 
here. )72 
Sokal and Bricmont warn against the degenerate potential of what they 
diagnose as the pernicious `relativism' of `contemporary works' on truth 
claims in scientific discourse in particular (such as those by Kuhn and 
Feyerabend). They thus identify epistemological relativism with particular 
orders of knowledge specific to late capitalism. In opposition to Sokal and 
Bricmont I maintain that acknowledgment of discursive relativity need not 
mean the erosion of validity. 
What has been argued so far is that Dynamical Systems Theory is a 
contemporary discourse; and must remain so in order to retain the 
relevance and credence required of it. This is especially necessary if is to 
function as a viable meta-critique, which is how it is used in this thesis. It is 
meant to provide art history with a viable method by which to reflect both 
upon the functions of art and upon its own operation and validity. 
232 Sokal and Bricmont, Intellectual Impostures, (Profile Books, 1998) pg. 50 
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However as contemporary discursive systems both Dynamical 
Systems Theory and art history are always already situated within the 
contemporary skepticism toward metaphysics as outlined above. Lyotard 
gave this scepticism a description that is immediately relevant to the 
narrative discourse of art history. At the beginning of his `report on 
knowledge' in the post-modern era he states: 
Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward 
meta-narrative. This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of 
progress in the sciences; but that progress in turn presupposes it. 
To the obsolescence of the meta-narrative apparatus of legitimation 
corresponds, most notably, the crisis of metaphysical philosophy 
and of the university institution which in the past relied upon it. 
The narrative function is losing its functors, its great hero, its great 
danger, its great voyages, its great goal. ' 
Whilst not writing specifically about either the history of art or Dynamical 
Systems Theory the question which Lyotard presents to the arguments of 
my thesis is that: given that the authority of the meta-narrative has allegedly 
lost its credibility, how can Dynamical Systems Theory meaningfully and 
legitimately serve as a meta-critique for art history. 
This question becomes especially pertinent one if the concept of 
system is seen as part of a pre-discursive meta-narrative within what 
Lyotard calls: "a Newtonian anthropology (such as structuralism or ystems 
theory)? "214 In other words: if Dynamical Systems Theory is merely a 
technologically sophisticated version of Modernist structuralism, does this 
short circuit its relevance within the post-structural economies and systems 
of knowledge within which art history now operates? 
233 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: a Report on Knowledge, [trans. Bennington, 
MassumiJ, (Manchester University Press, 1984) pg. xxiv 
234 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: a Report on Knowledge, [trans. Bennington, 
Massumij, (Manchester University Press, 1984) pg. Xxiv [Emphasis added] 
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2.1.1 - Lyotard's Challenge to the Validity of Scientific Discourse 
A central theme of Lyotard's argument, in the Postmodern Condition, is the 
problem of legitimacy15 with regards to knowledge production, regulation 
and consumption in the post-industrial age. To do this Lyotard here 
introduces a distinction between (1) narrative knowledge and (2) scientific 
knowledge. 
Narrative knowledge, Lyotard argued, is connected to forms within 
narrative systems: "Narration [and narrative] is the quintessential form of 
customary knowledge in more ways than one, s236 and according to him 
there is a sociality to language systems and the meanings which emerge 
from them. At this level, such social `language-games' have a normative 
function in that the meaning and legitimacy of such games relies upon 
communicator and those participating in the same system to whom the 
message is communicated. A feature of Postmodernity, Lyotard argues, is a 
disintegration of the distinctive legitimacy of such social systems of 
meaning and hence, ultimately of narrative knowledge. He says, "lamenting 
the `loss of meaning' in postmodernity boils down to mourning the fact 
that knowledge is no longer principally narrative. ""' 
Scientific knowledge, on the other hand, requires `denotationi238 for 
its legitimacy. This is because it requires an empirically verifiable 
correspondence to a world of facts which remains outside of the systems 
of scientific knowledge but which, nevertheless, may be successfully 
235 See section 2, The Problem: Legitimation', pgs. 6-9, The Postmodern Condition: A 
Report on Knowledge, Trans. Bennington/Massunmi, (Manchester University Press, 
1984) 
236 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Trans. 
Bennington/Massumi, (Manchester University Press, 1984) pg. 19 
237 ibid. - pg. 86 
238 ibid. - pg. 25 
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represented within those systems. As Lyotard stated: "In this context, then, 
one is `learned' if one can produce a true statement about a referent and 
one is a scientist if one can produce verifiable or falsifiable statements 
about referents accessible to the experts. "" 
In this respect, Lyotard argues, scientific knowledge is distinct from 
narrative knowledge in that it relies upon the authority of `experts' for its 
legitimacy; and not just upon its repetition and self-similarity within a 
socially mediated and hence normative language game (as narrative 
knowledge does): "It is impossible to judge the existence or validity of 
narrative knowledge on the basis of scientific knowledge and vice-versa: 
the relevant criteria are different. s24° 
Thus, Lyotard claims, whilst scientific knowledge is concerned with 
legitimacy, with regards to the retention of the `language game' of 
denotation alone, narrative knowledge is not concerned with legitimisation 
via denotation (and empirical correspondence) per se but with self- 
similarity; that is with retaining an internal coherence within its own 
language games and systems. When explained in Systems-Theoretical terms 
this argument proposes that meaning is understood as an emergent 
property of social systems and is as such represented from within those 
systems. 
It is this tension, between two types of knowledge which, for 
Lyotard, creates the epistemological crisis of The Postmodern Condition. This 
corrosive skepticism toward knowledge places scientific knowledge, and its 
denotative activities, in a precarious position. Science, it would seem, 
239 ibid. - pg. 25 
240 ibid. - pg. 86 
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cannot legitimise itself. According to Lyotard science can't denote its own 
truth. This is because `truth' is not something which can in itself be 
denoted. In other words, because `truth' is not a biological system or a 
physical law or a molecular structure `science', in its denotative capacity, 
cannot establish any correspondence with it. Therefore not only does 
science fail to legitimise itself and its own truth claims without recourse to 
structures of legitimation which are external to it, but it also negates the 
non-denotative knowledge production of narrative knowledge upon which 
it must rely in order to appear legitimate within social systems. Lyotard 
thus suggests that scientific positivism, in attempting to establish a basis for 
its own truth (denotation) thus negates the truth of those language games 
and social systems which could provide it with the external legitimacy for 
its claims. 
Scientific knowledge cannot know and make known that it is the 
true knowledge without resorting to the other, narrative kind of 
knowledge, which from its point of view is no knowledge at all. 
Without such recourse it would be in the position or presupposing 
its own validity and would be stooping to what it condemns: 
begging the question, proceeding on prejudice. But does it not fall 
into the same trap by using narrative as its authority? 241 
If Lyotard's critique of scientific validity is a serious challenge to 
the legitimacy of scientific discourse in general then this presents a 
situation regarding the central premise of a systems-theoretical approach 
which needs to be negotiated in order to ensure its plausibility. This is 
because the systems-thinking approach is supported by: 
(1) the organising principle of the `system' 
and 
241 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, (Trans. 
Bennington/Massumi, ] (Manchester University Press, 1984) pg. 29 
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(2) the presumed validity of scientific epistemology. 
The virus of incredulity of which Lyotard spoke appears to threaten 
the present discussion. For it casts doubt over whether the application of 
the scientific discourse of Dynamical Systems Theory can be meaningfully 
and legitimately applied to the narratives of art history (in the spirit of von 
Betalannfy's search for `isomorphic principles. ') 
However, as is argued below, unlike scientific discourse as 
conceived by Lyotard, Dynamical Systems Theory can establish its own 
truth. What's more in doing so it is able to provide an account of its own 
validity on its own terms. 
2.1.2 Language, Meaning and Truth 
A systems-theoretical account of the conditions of validity displays telling 
parallels to Foucault's notion of `truth games' and to Wittgenstein's 
`language games. ' Wittgenstein playfully undermines a transcendent 
conception of language and truth claims and proposed, instead, the 
following: 
We can also think of the whole process of using words in (2) as one 
of those games by means of which children learn their native 
language. I will call these games "language games" and will some- 
times speak of a primitive language as a language-game. 
And the processes of naming the stones and of repeating 
words after someone might also be called language games. Think of 
much of the use of words in games like ring-a-ring-a-roses. 
I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the 
actions into which it is woven, the "language game. , 2V2 
Similarly Foucault's notion of Truth-Games' maintains that truth is 
not an absolute or transcendent entity with pre-discursive existence. 
242 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigation, [trans. Anscombe], (Blackwell, 1963) pg. 
5 [emphasis added] 
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Instead, truth is relative to the conditions of its existence in discourse. 
Foucault outlined this specifically in The Archaeology of Knowledge (with 
reference to the `Enunciative Function'): 
The referential of the statement forms the place, the condition, the 
field of emergence, the authority to differentiate between individuals or 
objects, states of things and relations that are bought into play by 
the statement itself; it defines the possibilities of appearance and 
delimitation of that which gives meaning to the sentence, a value as 
truth to the proposition. 243 
Applying Foucault's arguments2' to the problem of legitimacy raised by 
Lyotard, I propose to conceive `truth' and (hence the validity) of different 
discursive systems as an expression not of a direct and unmediated 
correspondence with a world in-itself, a world of unadulterated and pure 
facts, but instead as a function of the system of knowledge (in terms of its 
production, regulation, communication and consumption). Truth is 
therefore an internal feature of particular closed (in the sense that they have 
coherent boundaries) discursive systems and their coherence. 45 
243 Emphasis has been added to allude to the emergent properties of systems of 
communication. 
244Foucault identifies discourse as that which is written, said, practiced, taught and 
learnt within the parameters of a discipline such as medicine or law; it is the 
matrix of functions which take place within a particular system of representation 
(a discursive system): 
"Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of 
dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic 
choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and 
functioning, transformations), we will say, for the sake of convenience, that we are 
dealing with a discursive formation. " Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, (tr ans. 
Sheridan-Smith), (Routledge, 1972) pg. 91. Like the orders of discourse which 
Foucault analyses and historicizes in his books (such as psychiatry and the 
mentally ill (Madness and Civilization, medicine (The Birth of the Clinic) legal and 
punitive practice (Discipline and Punish), science, economics and classification (The 
Order of Things) Sexuality (The History of Sexuality vol. 1-3) and his own practice (The 
Archaeology of Knowledge))both Dynamical Systems Theory and Art History are also 
discursive systems. 
245 Further coherence can be understood as self-similarity within those systems; 
thus introducing the form of the fractal into the shape of the argument as an 
allegory for its structure. 
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It is precisely because there is not one `truth' about the world 
understood in terms of a mind and discourse independent reality that 
truths should be understood as localised concepts; that is as relative and 
specific to the systems by which they are represented and expressed. It is in 
this sense that truths and meaning are relative. As Foucault wrote: 
Knowledge is not an epistemological site that disappears in the 
science that supersedes it. Science (or what is offered as such) is 
localized in a field of knowledge and plays a role in it. A role that 
varies according to different discursive formations, and is modified 
with their mutations... 
In any discursive formation, one finds a specific relation 
between science and knowledge; and instead of defining them in a 
relation of exclusion and subtraction (by trying to discover what in 
knowledge is still comprised by its proximity to and the influence 
of knowledge), archaeological analysis must show positively how 
science functions in the element of knowledge say 
Foucualt's position in relation to discursive practice has a parallel in the 
position of W. V. Quine the American philosopher and logician who is 
contemporary247 to both Foucault and the emerging tendencies of systems 
approaches/systems thinking. 248 
246 Foucault, TheArchaeology ofKnowledge, [trans. Sheridan-Smith], (Routledge, 1972) 
pg. 185 
247 Note that Quine's Ontological Relativity appears in 1969 thus sandwiched 
between the English edition of Foucault's The Order of Things which appeared a 
year after in 1970; and a year after von Bertalannfy's epochal General Systems Theory 
of 1968. 
248 This is a significant historical observation because a central argument to this 
chapter is that strategies of deconstruction, ontological questioning on analytical 
grounds and the cybernetic self-reflexivity of systems-thinking all share a common 
ground of historical context. Some have attempted, (Luhmann and Cillers 
amongst others) to categorize these numerous contemporaneous tendencies in 
disparate fields such as sociology, literary theory or meteorology as functioning 
within the shared space of a general systems approach which unifies aspects of the 
humanities and the sciences according to certain `isomorphic principles'. In 
particular Quine's writings coincide with Foucualt's regarding the metaphysical 
indeterminacy of meaning and Quine's position can be seen to share a common 
ground with Foucualt's own skeptical archaeologies of the ontology and validity 
of particular epistemological and classificatory systems. However, unlike Foucault, 
Quine worked outwards from a tradition of analytical philosophy exemplified by 
the Logical Positivism of Rudolph Camap (and to a lesser extent the English 
-169- 
The key aspect of Quine's thought, as it relates to ontology (and 
thus its specific application concerning an ontology of systems as I use it 
here), is outlined in detail in Word and Object and Ontological Kelativit49. 
Quine's argument is that any ontology is relative to the system by which it 
is categorised and defined. Thus, in particular, meaning is best understood 
as a property of language rather than as a matter of metaphysics because 
language is a system by which meaning is categorised and defined. Quine 
observed: 
Both ontology and satisfaction are matters of reference. In their 
elusiveness, at any rate in their emptiness now and again except 
relative to a broader background - both truth and ontology may in a 
suddenly rather clear and even tolerant sense be said to belong to 
transcendental metaphysics 1% 
Quine argued that meaning, truth and ultimately ontology are relative to 
the systems of language; that is they are not dependent upon transcendent 
or metaphysical structures. A key point of note here is that Quine occupies 
a position very close to that of the post-structural critique of structuralism. 
For him the language acts as an agent of legitimisation but is not a structure 
or a system in so far as it is not a pre-discursive given. Rather, language is a 
pattern of behaviour: 
Semantics is vitiated by a pernicious mentalism as long as we regard 
a man's semantics as somehow determinate in his mind beyond 
what might be implicit in his dispositions to overt behaviour. It is 
the very facts about meaning, not the entities meant, that must be 
construed in terms of behaviour. "" 
Language analytical tradition of analytical philosophy as demonstrated by the 
Logical Positivism of A J. Ayer). 
249 Quine, Word and Object, (MIT press, 1960); Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, 
(Columbia University Press, 1969) and The Ways of Paradox, (??????? ) 
250 Quine, Word and Object, (MIT press, 1960) pg. 68 
251 Quine, Word and Object, (MIT press, 1960) pg. 27 
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Such a `behavioural' notion of language rejects structural accounts that 
understand language as if it were a solid, physical or structural fact which 
can be identified and analysed in itself using particular strategies of 
structuralist analysis 252 The behavioural patterns of language, which 
function within particular social systems, give rise to the emergent property 
of meaning, in turn expressed as internal coherency amongst 
communications within those particular systems. Meaning, and in particular 
the meaning of truth, is thus revealed as having a nominal existence as a 
specific function of behavioural patterns relative to particular social 
systems of communication. 
Quine has further argued that in order to ultimately legitimate the 
meaning of statements a `background theory' is required. This `background 
theory' provides epistemological and ontological support to the assertion 
of the statement. It is also subject to relativism and thus also can't be 
proved outright via recourse to a congruency with an absolute, instead it is 
relatively congruent to parts of itself. Quine stated: 
We need the background language to regress into. The background 
language gives [a] query sense, if only relative sense; sense relative 
in turn to it, this background language. 
In these terms [of the potential for this to cause an infinite regress 
of meaning] the situation sounds desperate, but it is in fact little 
different from questions of position and velocity. When we are 
given position and velocity relative to a coordinate system, we can 
always ask in turn about the placing and the orientation of axes of 
252 This is exemplified in the structuralist approach of Saussure and those 
influenced by him. He wrote: "°The sum total of word relations that the mind 
associates with any word that is present gives a virtual series, a series formed by 
the memory (a mnemonic series), as opposed to a chain, a syntagma formed by 
two units present together. This is an actual series, as opposed to a virtual series, 
and gives rise to other relations. The conclusion I should like to draw from this is 
as follows: in whichever order of relations a words functions (it is required to 
function in both), a word is always, first and foremost, a member ofa rystem, 
interconnected with other words, sometimes in one order of relations, sometimes 
in another. " Ferdinand de Saussure, Third Course of Lecturer on General Linguistics 
(1910-1911) (Pergamon Press, 1993) [Emphasis added. ] 
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that system of coordinates; and there is no end to the succession of 
further coordinate systems that could be adduced in answering the 
successive questions thus generated. "' 
In summary of the above, and in advance of the next chapter 
section I conclude that from within the perspective of a Systems- 
Theoretical approach discourse is able to reflect back upon its own 
operations. This reflection is made possible by a notion of meaning as a 
function an internal consistency amongst patterns of language; or, in other 
words as an emergent property of certain self-similarities which occur 
within linguistic systems. The relationship, between validation and meaning 
and the internal consistency of a linguistic system can then, in turn, be 
applied to Dynamic Systems Theory and its application to Art History in 
two ways: 
(1) Externally. The adoption of Dynamic Systems Theory as a discursive 
method allows for the identification of language and meaning in the 
systems-thinking vocabularies of: behavioural patterns, internal consistency 
and self-similarity. 
(2) Internally. Dynamic Systems Theory, as an interdisciplinary strategy, can 
utilise a hybrid of terms. In doing so it is seen through a combination of 
Foucault's terms as relative `Unity' of a `Discursive Formation' within what 
Quine has called a relative `co-ordinate system'. Further, according to its 
own terms it is itself a dynamic and complex system (with all this entails). 
Dynamic System; Theory can thus recognise and cla s jy itrelf. And once classified as 
a system of discourse it can be seen to have its own behavioural patterns of 
253 Quine, Word and Object, (MIT press, 1960) pg. 49 
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internal consistency and self-similarity and as such have a claim to meaning 
(at least on its own terms). 
In this respect, unlike the scientific knowledge which Lyotard 
observed cannot demonstrate its own validity (and this is because it 
functions via denotation), Dynamic Systems Theory can observe and represent 
itself. It is by virtue of this self-representation that it contains both a 
description of itself and its own self-reflection within its own theorising; 
there is no critical blind spot and it is fully self-reflexive. This is something 
Luhmann observes with regards the universality he proposes a systems 
approach can bring to his discipline of Sociology: 
A universal theory observes its objects, and itself as one of those 
objects, as self-referential relations. It does not presuppose any 
transcendental epistemological criteria. 54 
Systems research is itself a system; it cannot formulate its basic 
concept so that it would not itself come under that basic concept 255 
It is by virtue of this self-representation that Dynamical Systems Theory 
ensures its claim to `truth' and validity. 
2.2 A Systems Theoretical Account of Validity 
As Kuhn has observed the acceptance of the relativity of scientific 
statements need not diminish the validity of those statements. This means 
that ascertaining the plausibility of the statements produced by a discursive 
system is still both possible and important. Therefore although `truth' is 
identified as a function relative to the system within which it is represented 
it does not lose its validity. 
254 Luhmann, Social Systems, Trans. Bednarz, Jr. with Baecker, (Stanford University 
Press, 1995) pg. xlviii 
ass Luhmann, Social Systems, Trans. Bednarz, Jr. with Baecker, (Stanford University 
Press, 1995) pg. 482 
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As Kuhn has said: 
I agree entirely with the traditional view that [objective factors, 
including empirical veracity, coherence and correspondence] play a 
vital role when sociologists must chose between an established 
theory and an upstart competitor... they provide the shared basis 
for theory choice 6 
In other words even after the waning of the credibility of Scientific 
Realism" the concept of `truth' can still function as a regulatory principle 
within discursive systems. In Leplin's words; even informed by an 
incredulity toward the belief that there can be a direct, epistemologically 
256 Kuhn, The Essential Tension, (1977) pg. 322 
257 For the classic defence of Scientific Realism as it was presented by Tarski in 
The Concept of Truth in Formalized Language (1956 ?) see Boyd, Realism and Scientific 
Epistemology, (Cambridge University Press, 1985? ). A useful introduction to the 
vast amount of literature can be found in Leplin ed., Scientific Realism, (University 
of California Press, 1984); see also Field, 'Tarski's Theory of Truth', Journal of 
Philosophy 69,13 (1972) pg. 347-375. The position of scientific realism (which accepts 
and tries to demonstrate the correspondence of statements with the world as it 
actually is) and the position of scientific anti-realism (which seeks to show a 
discontinuity between discursive statements and the actually state of the world) 
operates according to the same dichotomy. This is between on the one hand 
discourse, and on the other extra-discursive entities. So essentially both positions 
play the same game, with both sides agreeing on ground rules of a binary of 
opposing entities (the discursive and the extra discursive) but disagreeing upon 
whether there can be a demonstrable correspondence between the two. The 
position of scientific realism proposes that there can be a correspondence 
between statements about the world and the world and that: `a good model gives 
an insight into real structure and that the long term success of a theory, in most 
cases, gives reason to believe that something like the theoretical entities of that 
theory actually exist. ' [McMullin, `A Case for Scientific Realism', in Leplin ed., 
Scientific Realism, (University of California Press, 1984) pg. 9-36. ] The position of 
anti-realism, on the other hand, identifies the relativity of the claims of scientific 
discourse, as van Frassen observes, the systems of science will always be weighted 
and thus not wholly objective: `Science itself distinguishes the observable that it 
postulates from the whole it postulates. The distinction, being in part a function 
of the limits science discloses on human observation, is anthropocentric. But, 
since science places human observers among the physical systems it means to 
describe, it also gives itself the task of describing anthropocentric distinctions. It is 
in this way that even the scientific realist must observe a distinction between the 
phenomena and the transphenomenal in the world picture. ' Van Frassen, To Save 
the Phenomena', Journal of Philosophy, (vol. 73, no. 18, Oct. 21,1976) (A more 
thorough statement of the case of anti-realism is provided by van Frassen in The 
Scientific Image, (Oxford Univeristy Press, 1980); a commentary on this key text is 
included among the arguments in: Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of 
Mind, (Cambridge University Press, 1979) 
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sound and empirically verifiable correspondence between systems of 
discourse and the extra-discursive world, there are still: 
Important uses for concepts possessing the formal properties truth 
and reference, such as are captured by Tarski's theory of truth; only 
the concepts we would use would be theory relative - such as warranted 
assertability or probability within a system rather than classical ideas 
based on correspondence to theory independent of fact. u8 
In the remaining argument of the chapter I will address the ways in which 
the discursive systems of Dynamical Systems Theory (and its application within 
Art History) adhere to this regulatory function of plausibility. To do this I 
demonstrate the ways in which the discursive systems of both Dynamical 
Systems Theory and Art History display the iconography of truth in terms of 
internal and external259 coherence within the psychic and social system. 
This will be demonstrated below by showing that `truth' can be understood 
as a function of a hierarchy of value systems. 
A belief can be held which can be meaningfully said to be justified 
and therefore `true' without being validated by metaphysics. When belief is 
explained in systems-thinking terms (as I do below) it is understood to be 
validated by a state of coherence within the psychic system. This coherence 
satisfies the conditions required to produce the state of belief within that 
psychic system; which is to say that evidentially, empirically and intuitively 
it satisfies a probability calculus. In turn, this internal state within the 
psychic system (or, the belief of that psychic system) is validated in terms 
258 Leplin, `Introduction', in Leplin ed., Scientific Realism, (University of California 
Press, 1984) pg. 5 
259 Note here the use of `internal' and external'; `internal' refers to an internal 
consistency within a system and `external' does not refer to an extra-systemic state 
but rather a state represented in another system. In this case a belief is a function 
of an internal state in the psychic system which is in turn validated in terms 
external to the psychic system by an corresponding to an internal consistency 
within the, larger, social system. And this suggests a normative basis for `truth' 
within the social and psychic system. 
- 175 - 
external to the psychic system, namely through the circuits of authority and 
norms within the social systems 
2.2.1 Truth as Plausibility: The Rejection of Exactness 
In order to create the conditions for a statement to be represented as true 
within the psychic system2C0 that statement must appear to be to be true `in 
all likelihood. ' Thus conditions of probability are introduced. In this 
respect, with regards to the subjective plausibility of statements, there is the 
sense that a belief can be held to be true if there is plausible evidence to 
suggest that the probability of the statement's validity is more likely than 
not. Stated in its simplest sense, as Pollock and Cruz do, this proposes the 
seemingly commonsense suggestion that: "A person is justified in believing 
P if and only if the probability of P is sufficiently high. "26' 
At first glance this seems sensible. Just as it is intuitively viable to 
accept as true what we believe to be in all probability to be the case, so too 
it seems counter-intuitive to believe what seems improbable. The 
controversy regarding the application of this simple regulatory principle 
(that we believe to be true is most probably true) arises from its 
zoo "Even after the observation of the frequent conjunction of objects, we have no 
reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we 
have had experience. " David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, part 3, 
Section 12, (Clarendon Press, 1975) pg. 139. Popper also argued that 1000 
confirmations of a theory still do not ensure that its 1001st occurrence it will be 
confirmed; and used the example of Newton's Law of Gravitation which whilst 
accepted as `true' for over 200 years was superseded by Einstein's psychics. 
Popper argued for the fallibility of science which is constructed of hypotheses 
(rather than absolute truths) which may therefore be falsified at some point in the 
future. Thus, for Popper it is the falsification, of theories rather than the 
confirmation of them which is the significant epistemological technology and the 
scientist should not seek confirmation of hypothesis by experimental activity. On 
the contrary, he should look for ways in which to disprove them. See Popper, The 
Logic of Scientjc Discovery, (Routledge, 1992) 
261 Pollock & Cruz, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, (Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers Inc., 1999) pg. 101 
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formalisation. For the quantification of belief and of relative probabilities 
forces one to misrepresent states as exact probabilities which are by their 
very nature un-quantifiable, or in systems-thinking terms `fuzzy'. This 
conundrum can be approached in systems-thinking terms. 
The most celebrated example of this approach (and the example 
toward which criticisms regarding the limitations of ascertaining a 
probability calculus for states of belief are usually directed) is the so-called 
Bayer Theorrrr? 2. Bayes' theorem is a formalisation of the conditions for the 
belief in the probability of the hypothesis h, in light of both evidence e, and 
context a. This is formulated thus: 
p(h I e, a) = p(h I a)*p(e I h, a)/p(e I a) 
It states the proportional correlation between the degree of belief in a 
hypothesis and the probability of the evidence given for it. Thus given 
increasing evidence in support of a statement we are more likely to believe 
in its truth (and vice versa) 2G3 
262 Bayes, Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances, ref. 
required 
263 "[the theorem gives an] expression for the probability of a hypothesis h, if 
some evidence e, is added to antecedent knowledge a. The theorem states that the 
probability of b relative to e and a is equal to the probability of b relative to a 
multiplied by the probability of e relative to b and a, and divided by the probability 
of e relative to a. This means that evidence improbable antecedently, but likely to 
obtain if a hypothesis is true raises the probability of a hypothesis most. " From 
Flew ed., A Dictionary of Philosophy, (Pan Books, 1979) pg. 38. An example of this is 
the statement `pigs can't fly so you need wings to fly' representing a strong belief. 
Therefore in the highly unlikely case that a flying pig is found then the belief in 
needing wings to fly is overthrown. This corresponds to Popper's argument that 
value of a hypothesis surviving a test of validity is proportional to the severity of 
the test applied to it. 
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Bayes' theorem is thereby an attempt to formalise rules for our acceptance 
of statements by reference to their probability. As Worral has explained: 
"The Principles of Personalist Bayesianism are essentially natural 
extensions of logical principles. The requirement of coherence (that 
is, the requirement that one's degrees of belief satisfy the 
probability calculus) is a natural extension of the requirement of 
deductive consistency. " 264 
A major flaw in the Bayesian formulation of the pmbabilisnf65 lies in the 
requirement of a specific mathematical value being calculated for the 
following: 
(i) our initial belief in a hypothesis (b) given 
(ii) our system of background beliefs (a - being the context or antecedent 
knowledge of the hypothesis) and 
(iii) any new evidence presented to the psychic system (e). 
These three values are required for the Bayesian equation. This inherent 
difficulties of such an approach become obvious as soon as one tries to 
calculate a precise value (between 1 and 0) for any new evidence given to 
the psychic system. Despite the merit it promises by offering a simple 
formulation of the correlation between belief and probable evidence, this 
approach is clearly unrealistic not least because of the skeptical doubts, 
which form the very foundations of modern philosophy, regarding the 
validity of sense data in a total epistemological system. 266 
264 John Worrall, `Philosophy and the Natural Sciences', in Grayling ed., Philosophy 
2, (Oxford University Press, 1998) pg. 229 
265 The term `Probabilism' is used by Pollock and Cruz (1999) 
266 Further expositions on the strengths and weaknesses of Bayesian epistemology 
are discussed in - Earman, Bayer or Bust/ A Critical Examination ofBayesian 
Confirmation Theory, (1992 ref. ); Chisholm, Perceiving, (Cornell University Press, 
1957); Howson & Urbach, Scientific Reasoning The Bayesian Approach, (1993 ref. ); 
Kyburg, Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief, (Wesleyan University Press, 1961); 
Kyburg, The Logical Foundations of Statistic Inference (D. Rreidel, 1974); Levi, The 
Enterprise of Knowledge, (MIT Press, 1980). They are expounded upon at length by 
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Thus, the problems with Bayesianism as a strategy for providing a formal 
expression of a principle of belief arise because of its unrealistic 
expectation that there can be a refinement or elaboration of the 
mathematical foundations of the theory which will enable the precise 
calculation of various degrees of belief and probability. Further, this 
expectation will, it seems, always be a futile project that requires one to 
ascertain exact values (probabilities) for natural states and systems states 
(such as beliefs) which given their dynamic, fuzzy, distributed and thus un- 
quantifiable nature will always be misrepresented by such a strategy. 
The foundational rule of common-sense rationality in Bayesian 
Epistemology is undermined by its rigid application and reliance upon a 
binary systems of values (true vs. false. ) A further problem arises with 
regards to a fundamental incongruity between systems of validation and 
that which they are seeking to validate. This is represented by the 
incommensurability between: 
(i) the formal system of propositional logic in which statements such as: 
`All busses are red; a is a bus; therefore a is red' 
are by necessity represented within that system as being either completely 
true or completely false. 
And 
(ii) the system of empirical validation within which factual statements are 
made about the world'' 
Carnap, see especially, The Logical Structure of the World, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1967) 
267 This distinction does not include the Kantian SyntheticA Priori (such as 
mathematical statements). 
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However, while the demand for exactness has to be rejected, the 
correlation expressed by the Bayesian formula still holds. Thus the 
Bayesian equation should be taken not as an axiom to be applied exactly 
and literally, but instead as an expression of the following general 
regulatory principle within systems of knowledge: 
A belief is a function of a representation within a particular system 
which represents that belief as more or less true, or true to a certain 
but not necessarily quantifiable degree. 
2.2.2 Systems-Thinking and Fuzzy Truth 
In the following I will outline the notion of `Fuzzy Truth' as employed 
by Dynamical Systems Theory. Truth is here understood as a `fuzzy' 
distributed representation within a particular representational system. It 
can thus account for its own truth or validity. 
The `fuzzy' truth of systems-thinking acknowledges the 
distributed nature of truth in both psychic and the social systems. It is 
thus congruent with the model of distributed representation 
characteristic of a systems-thinking approach. In other words, given the 
distributed nature of what is represented, a `truth' does not require a 
simple correspondence between the representation and what it 
represents. Instead, this `fuzzy' correspondence is distributed over a 
matrix of representation and meaning production. The relevant systems 
of distribution include both psychic systems of internal beliefs and social 
systems of normatively validated 'truths. "' These are networks within 
acs One of the criticisms leveled at the Bayesian model of personalist plausibility is 
that by concentrating upon, and quantifying, states of belief within the individual 
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which particular connections can be altered or expire without damaging 
the capacity of the system to represent. Thus the accepted `truth' of a 
statement need not correspond to one particular component and its 
probability calculus. It is instead distributed throughout the 
representative network. 
This distributed or fuzzy nature of belief can be demonstrated 
through its application to Tarski's classic statement of Scientific Realism 
it is over determined by a reliance upon subjectivity of the believing subject and is 
thus an epistemologically benign form of solipsism which ignores the public 
nature of knowledge production and regulation. Fisher provided a well 
commentated upon dismissal of Bayesian subjectivism in R. A. Fisher Statistical 
Methods and Scientific Inference, Oxford Univ. Press (1925) The concept that the 
scientific worker can regard himself as an inert item in a vast co-operative concern 
working according to accepted rules, is encouraged by directing attention away 
from his duty to form correct scientific conclusions, to summarize them and to 
communicate them to his scientific colleagues, and by stressing his supposed duty 
mechanically to make a succession of automatic decisions... The idea that this 
responsibility can be delegated to a giant computer programmed with Decision 
Functions belongs to a phantasy of circles rather remote from scientific research. 
The view has, however, really been advanced (Neyman, 1938) that Inductive 
Reasoning does not exist, but only Inductive Behaviourl' pp. 104-5. However 
Fisher's methods have also received well documented criticism such as that from 
Robert Matthews; The key stumbling-block to the application of Bayesian 
inference [is that] to work out the value of Prob(theory I data), we must first 
establish Prob(theory); that is, we must be able to put some "prior probability" on 
the theory we are testing. As I shall show later, setting this prior probability is 
often far less problematic than some critics [such as Fisher] claim: it is rare that 
there are absolutely no previous findings or plausibility arguments available to 
constrain our estimate. It remains true, nevertheless, that in those cases where 
there is a complete absence of any previous results or insight, the prior probability 
of the correctness of the hypothesis will be based largely on opinion. In short, it 
will be subjective. It is this unequivocal use of subjectivity that has made Bayesian 
inference so controversial, and has led to such determined attempts to find 
alternatives. As we have seen, working scientists may routinely use subjectivity 
when it suits them, but the idea of explicitly incorporating it into the very heart of 
data analysis remains anathema. But this attitude overlooks a striking fact about 
the scientific process: that all attempts to rid it of subjectivity have failed. By the 
usual standards of scientific research, the repeated failure of these attempts would 
be taken to imply that the basic thesis was flawed... The axioms of probability, via 
Bayes's theorem, show that subjectivity cannot be wrung out of the scientific 
process for the simple reason that it is mathematically ineluctable. Much as we 
might want to, it is impossible to obtain the value of Prob(theory data) without 
having some value for the prior probability Prob(theory)', Matthews, Facts versus 
Factions. - the use and abuse of subjectivity in scientific research, based on a monograph for 
the European Science and Environment Forum, Cambridge, UK, September 
1998. 
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whereby the statement `Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is 
white. " This statement can be made `fuzzy'; and in doing so it can be 
equally valid to say that snow is both white and not white at the same 
time. The binary between true and false can often prove to be 
unsatisfactory, and given the distributed nature of representations of 
truth we can see that often statements may be more or less true in the 
strict sense yet no less valid, or plausible as a result. To demonstrate the 
limits of a non-distributed concept of plausibility let us say, for the sake 
of argument, that we are flying in a hot air balloon and see a pattern of 
snow from above and decide that it is white, in which case our statement 
would have a truth value of 1. Upon landing the balloon and getting out 
we see that the snow still looks white, thus the statement `the snow is 
white' still has a truth value of 1. Then we squat down and look at a 
small patch of snow which is mostly white but some of which has 
melted and the brown earth below can be seen, things are becoming 
harder to quantify now but we decide to accept that the snow is mostly 
white and thus according to a non-distributed concept of truth we must 
say that the statement `the snow is white' is true (i. e. that this statement 
has a truth value of 1). Then we get up really close to the snow, looking 
at just one bit of it which we see is a mottled colour, therefore at this 
point the statement `the snow is white' has a truth value of 0 and at this 
point in time it has switched to being an untrue statement. Then we get 
out our magnifying glass and see that the mottled colour of the snow is 
comprised of many colours.. And so we could continue the microscopic 
269 See Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, (Clarendon, 1956) 
-182- 
level and beyond this to the level of observation of the atomic 
microscope with each degree of magnification suggesting a different 
response to the statement that the snow observed in our ever decreasing 
sample is white. However if we approach this problem with the fuzzy 
logic of distributed systems rather than the binary logic of truth and 
falsehood then we could state that the snow is more or less white and 
without having to assert the definitive truth of the statement it still 
remains a normatively plausible statement. 
As Kosko has observed: 
The problem with [Tarski's position] lies in tacking on the 100% 
certainty factors... the positivist can make a meta-round off and 
say that this means that this just means that the higher-order 
statement "grass is green is 85% true" is true 100% if and only if 
85% of grass is green. This admits the existence of fuzzy-truth 
value, here the 85% truth score. And we can come back and again 
fuzzify the whole formula. We can fuzzify any attempt to meta- 
round off our higher-order versions of the formula. Rounding off 
lies at the heart of working with symbols and speech. Rounding off 
compresses information. It simplifies matters and reduces the many 
to the few, reduces the complex to the manageable. We round off 
to get by and to get a quick handle on idea and the pieces of our 
changing world view. We have to simplify to get things going, at 
least at first. No harm in that. But actions have costs. Bivalence or 
rounding off trades accuracy for simplicity. When you round off, 
you pay in truth and accuracy and honesty for what you gain in 
simplicity and precision and conformity. 270 
As I discuss with regards to a number of systems throughout my thesis 
(including ant colonies, models of consciousness, the art gallery, the art 
market and art discourse); in a complex system, which operates according 
to the structure of connectionism, representation is distributed over that 
system. It is therefore not centred around any particular part or element of 
that system. For example memories are not stored as engrammes (actual or 
270 Kosko, Fuzy Logic, (Flamingo, 1994) pg. 90 ff. 
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virtual), but are instead distributed throughout the cognitive system. 
Therefore a distributed system, unlike a linear system, can still function in 
the event of localised damage. Representations do not have exact and 
specific values which are fixed (in terms of weights of nodes within a 
neural net), a specific location within a system or follow specific 
algorithms. 
It is thus argued that strict Bayesianism be replaced with what will 
be called here `Fuzzy Bayesianism. ' I thereby follow Pollock and Cruz who 
argue that the Bayesian epistemological algorithm can be rejected without 
dismissing its overall ethos. What is adopted in its place is a type of 
reasoning that is inspired by Bayes, yet has no need for strict mathematical 
quantification. What remains is the simple rule of plausibility and 
probability upon which Bayes' calculus was founded. In Pollock and Cruz's 
words: 
The simple rule might be combined with a more sophisticated 
account of perception and memory without robbing it of the power 
inherent in its use of probability. And the simple rule would still 
retain its intuitive appeal in capturing the idea that what we should 
be doing in the epistemological evaluation of beliefs is choosing 
beliefs that are probable. 271 
However, this is not to say that the notion of truth employed by 
systems thinking is restricted to a merely descriptive account and has no 
potential for predication. Despite an already noted fundamental 
unpredictability of complex systems, it can still be maintained that the 
plausibility of a discursive system can involve a capacity for predication is 
271 Pollock & Cruz, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, (Bowman and Littlefield 
Publishers Inc., 1999) pg. 102 
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used in an expanded sense. In this expanded sense predication is 
understood as being possible after events. Worral has referred to this as a 
non-temporal sense that allows for the prediction of old facts. This 
may seem like a strange usage - but it is in fact one often adopted 
both in science and studies of science. 'z 
This `strange usage' is based on a non-linear notion of prediction. 
This means that patterns of behaviour can be identified as conforming to 
behaviour of complex systems without requiring the determination of how 
those systems will behave in the future. The Logical Positivist Moritz 
Schlick explained this as follows: 
The confirmation of a prediction means nothing else but the 
corroboration of a formula for those data which were not used in 
setting up the formula. Whether these data had already been 
observed or whether they were subsequently ascertained makes no 
difference at all Z" 274 
Consequently `truth' cannot be satisfactorily explained by any 
verifiable correspondences but is instead a state mediated by, and thus 
272 John Worrall, `Philosophy and the Natural Sciences', in Grayling ed., Philosophy 
2, (Oxford University Press, 1998) pg. 231 
273 quoted in John Worrall, `Philosophy and the Natural Sciences', in Grayling ed., 
Philosophy 2, (Oxford University Press, 1998) pg. 231 
274 Thus a case for pragmatic scientific realism with regards the claims of 
Dynamical Systems Theory (and its application within Art History) is presented in 
the terms and vocabularies of the systems-thinking approach. This is a 
performative type of scientific realism based on conditions of plausibility such as 
that identified by McMullin: "The realist would not use the term `true' to describe 
a good theory. He would suppose that the structures of the theory would give 
some insight into the structures of the world. But he could not, in general, say 
how good the insight is. He has no independent access to the world, as the 
antirealist constantly reminds him. His assurance that there is a fit, however 
rough, between the structures of theory and the structures of the world comes not 
from a comparison between them but from the sort of argument I sketched 
above, which concludes that only this sort of reasoning would explain certain 
contingent features of the history of recent science. The term `approximate truth', 
which has sometimes been used in this debate is risky because it immediately 
invites questions such as how approximate?, and how is the degree of 
approximation to be measured? If I am right in my presentation of realism, these 
questions are unanswerable because they are inappropriate. " See McMullin, 'The 
Case for Scientific Realism', in Leplin ed., Scientific Realism, (University of 
California Press, 1984) pg. 9-40. 
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relative to, both the psychic and social systems within which that `truth' is 
represented. To claim the `truth' of a statement is then not to make a claim 
about an homology between a system-state and any extra-systemic state, 
but is rather a statement about the internal conditions of the system which 
supports that `truth' at the time of the 'truth. 27' 
In summary; representations of belief within either discursive or 
psychic systems are distributed across these systems and do not follow a 
binary principle of correspondence. Therefore, the issue of plausibility can 
be accounted for by isomorphic processes of representation within the 
following three systems. They are: 
1- The Psychic System - within which the `truth' of a belief, and its relative 
plausibility is distributed and therefore cannot be given an exact value; 
instead it is represented as `fuzzy' i. e. as more or less true (or more or less 
false. ) 
2- The Discursive System - within which the `truth' of a belief, and its 
relative plausibility is distributed over the system and cannot be therefore 
given an exact value but is represented in a `fuzzy' sense as more or less 
true (or more or less false. ) 
275By demanding nothing more from our epistemological technologies except 
efficiency in producing maximum output this flourishing of instrumentalism could 
be identified as the bringing of the industry of truth production within the sphere 
of influence of the system of the logic of (late) capitalism. Thus we can apply to 
truth production the rule of maximum productivity with maximum efficiency 
which is as Marx observed in The Grundrisse; `the self preservation of capital is 
its self realization... Surplus value in general is value in excess of the equivalent. 
The equivalent, by definition, is only the identity of value with itself. Hence 
surplus value can never sprout out of the equivalent; nor can it do so originally 
out of circulation; it has to arise from the production process of capital itself... 
The great historic quality of capital is create this surplus labour, superfluous 
labour from the standpoint of mere use value, mere subsistence; and its historic 
destiny is fulfilled as soon as, on one side, there has been such a development of 
needs that surplus. ' Marx, The Grundrisse', The Marx-Engels Reade42nd ed. ], ed. 
Tucker, (W. W. Norton & Company, 1978) pp. 248-9 
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3- The Social System - within which the `truth' of a belief, and its relative 
plausibility is distributed over the system and cannot be therefore given an 
exact value but is represented in a `fuzzy' sense as being more or less true 
(or more or less false. ) This is discussed below. 
2.2.3 Truth and Normativity 
The application of a `distributed' understanding of `truth' across different 
systems means that the concept of `fuzzy' truth is not limited to the 
personal belief of an individual psychic system. To the contrary, as will 
become clear in the following, we can observe an isomorphic structure across 
a variety of systems. The micro-system of the human subject is reflected in 
the macro-system of discourse and society and vice-versa. 
The same distributed model at work in the psychic systems is thus 
replicated in discursive and social systems. At the level of the social system 
this effects a normative function with regards to the representation of 
truth, as Wittgenstein suggested when he identified the public nature of 
language. Language is identified as a system of communication in which 
publicly accepted rules to the various `language games'276 prescribe the 
norms of communication. Plausibility the requires a normative dimension. 
As Wittgenstein put it: 
276 `I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it 
is woven, the "language game"', section 1,7; and for Wittenstein this requires 
public involvement, `And hence also "obeying a rule" is a practice. And to think 
one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 
"privately": otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as 
obeying it' section 1,202. Both quotations from Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations, (Blackwell, 1963) 
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So you are . raying that 
human agreement decider what is true and what it false? 
- It is what humans say that is true and false; and they agree in the 
language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of 
life 27 
For example a theory that proposes the clearly ridiculous claim that the 
moon is made of cheese will immediately be rejected as false by most 
people despite the fact that by the year 2003 only twelve people have set 
foot on the moon. This is because the plausibly of that claim is not 
evaluated directly by every single individual but is instead distributed over 
the social system as a whole. 
Representations of `truth' are therefore not only dependent upon 
the credulity of individuals but are also distributed throughout the 
connections of the social system. They are not located in any particular area 
of that social system but are instead relative to the state of that social 
system. This has several implications; 
(i) The distributed explanation of truth takes into account the normative 
function of truth within social systems (as illustrated by the cheese-moon 
example. ) Obviously the absence of personal verification of beliefs by 
direct experience does not damage their normative validity. 278 
(ii) Socially mediated truths have permanence, which can be explained in 
systems-thinking terms as a function of memory (irreversibility) within 
277 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, section 1,241, (Blackwell, 1963) 
278 Likewise this argument can also be extended into the arena of socially mediated 
ethics whereby the statement murder is wrong is validated by the social 
acceptance of the statement. Ethics is a complex and problematic topic about 
which there is not the resources to enter into a more full discussion; and for 
many, like aesthetics, there can be no talk of ethics without metaphysics. This 
creates significant problems for any ethical discussion in the environment of an 
incredulity toward metaphysics. However normative views of ethics with regards 
to being necessary for the survival of the social (and psychic) system have been 
explored by writers such as Dawkins, who argues in The Selfish Gene, (Oxford 
University Press, 1976), that both genes and memes (ideas) replicate and adapt 
purely to ensure the survival of the system of which they are components. 
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complex systems. Complex systems `lock-in' around certain patterns of 
behaviour (known as attractors) within those systems. Therefore the belief 
that the moon is not made of cheese is a belief around which the social 
system is firmly locked-in. Given this systemic social lock-in, this belief will 
require a significant change in the state of the social system to reject the 
accepted truth of this matter. Likewise a claim that the moon is made of 
cheese does not correspond to an internal representative state within the 
social system at the moment and will not be verified by that system in its 
current state. 
As will be discussed at greater length in the second part of this 
thesis the phenomenon of lock-in within complex systems not only explains 
inertia in the social system with regards the popular acceptance of new 
scientific theories (such as the Copernican view of universe which was not 
immediately accepted because social system had memory of an 
anthropocentric universe) but can also be used to explain in other aspects 
of cultural life such as the history of art 
(iii) By identifying the relativity of representations of truth with regards to 
the state of the social system within which they are represented, these 
`truths' can be historicized, namely in relation to a given historical state of 
the social system. In short truth has a history. 279 
(iv) Dynamical Systems Theory is verifiable and plausible. It replaces a 
simple correspondence theory of truth with a distributive theory of truth 
that can account for the conditions of the emergence and validity of its 
claims. As such a valid and plausible branch of scientific research it should 
279 "Truth, and its original reign, has had a history within history from which we 
are barely emerging" Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in Rabinow, (ed., ) The 
Foucault Reader, (Pantheon Books, 1984) pg. 76-100 
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prove a suitable tool for Art History to adopt in its guise as 
Kunstwisschenshaft- albeit in a adapted form. 
Conclusion: Dynamical Systems Theory and the Survival of Art 
History 
In conclusion I'd like to turn back, again, to the `will to survive' of systems. 
For discursive systems survival is ensured by plausibility, demonstrability 
and predictive success, for without these they will lose their social 
authority. It is argued here that the systems of Art History might adopt a 
systems theoretical strategy as a means of facilitating their evolution. In 
doing so they might negotiate their potential loss of authority and hence 
ensure their survival in the face of the threats posed to them by both the 
post-modem critique of discourse and post-modern artistic practice. 
As a heuristic and explanatory tool Dynamical Systems Theory gets 
results. And it works in many and varied ways. They range from general 
examples (the VHS/Betamax market (discussed at length in a following 
chapter) to connectionist models of consciousness) to the particular 
application put forward in this thesis - as a contemporary discursive 
technology to be applied within the borders of Art History. And in doing 
so, through my adoption of a systematic strategy as a means of historical 
observation and representation, it can be seen as a continuation of, rather 
than part of a significant schism with, what Preziozi calls the erudite 
machine? 80 within which Art is circulated. These are erudite machines such as 
the Art History of the Critical Historians of Art where: 
280 Which are: "places whose organization confers meaning and sense to the 
arrangement of things, and within which each object becomes the locus of an 
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Objects speak in the third person (the historical mode) of what 
they are in relationship to other objects. That relationship is 
presented, furthermore, as an expression or reflection of the meaning of a 
whole historical or evolutionary system, which itself stands as a figure or 
emblem of the totality of a society (or the life of an individual) in its 
genesis. 2" 
It is thus argued that the arguments of this thesis represent a 
continuation of the project and ethos of the systematic strategies of Art 
History (Kunstwisschenshaft) rather than a radical break from their history 
and traditions. Dynamical Systems Theory functions by using one principle 
(system) to identify both similarities and differences between different 
observed phenomena. Thus the concept of `System' functions in the same 
way in which the concept of `style' did for Wölfflin; the concept of 
'kunstwollen' did for Riegl and the concept of human rationality did for 
Panofsky and Gombrich; namely as an Archimedean point from which to 
anchor ones critical activities. In doing so `system' provides the criteria by 
which to find similarities and differences in what is observed. 
Thus the application of the principle of system allows for a type of 
trans-historicism; albeit a trans-historicism which is performative and 
crucially (unlike that of the Critical Historians of Art) ultimately recognises 
its relativity as part of its working method and observations. 
analytical metamorphosis or transformation - the passage of things from being 
opaque and resistant to reading, to a state of transparency or legibility. " 
281 Preziosi, `History as an Art', intro. to chapter 4, The Art ofArt History, ed. 
Preziosi, (Oxford University Press, 1998), Pg. 165 ff., emphasis added. 
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SECTION TWO 
APPLICATIONS TO ART AND ART 
HISTORY 
CHAPTER 4 
Systems of Art 
The Complex and Distributed 
Representational systems of the Art 
World 
There's a machine which is called History ofArt, which is a structure. And artist [sic] 
fits in this only because be or she is needed for this structure. If, for example, the History 
ofArt needs some parallel lines, there is an individual who makes parallel lines. And 
this individual fits into this machine, which works by itself, " it doesn't care about people 
or anything else, itjustgoes by itself. 
Alexander Melamid282 
Introduction 
In this chapter I outline two central observations of the Systems- 
Theoretical approach as it is applied within the second half of the thesis. 
These observations are related to two key characteristics of complex 
systems namely: 
(i) Positive Feedback and `Lock-in' in complex systems 
(ii) Distributed Representation283 in complex systems. 
In doing so, in this chapter I tackle three issues. These are: 
1-A reformulation of the Institutional Theory ofArt from a systems- 
theoretical perspective. In doing so I argue that Danto's concept of the 
Artworld be observed as comprising of (amongst others) the following 
complex systems of distributed representation (and from which works of 
art `emerge. '): (i) the work of art as a complex system; (ii) the art gallery and 
market as a complex system; (iii) art discourse as a complex system. 
282 JoAnn Wypijewski, Tainting by Numbers -Komar and Melamid's Scrent ifl cguide to 
Art; (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997) 
283 Luhmann argued (throughout Social Systems) that the systems-theoretical 
approach necessitates a paradigm shift in which the traditional conception of 
Representation is replaced with the concept of Observation which is contingent 
upon the system within which that observation occurs. However following 
Smolensky and Cilliers (et al) I argue that the concept of distributed 
representation is sufficiently distinct from traditional (iconographic or classical) 
representation to emphasise what is at stake. Further, the concepts of distributed 
representation and observation are not mutually exclusive; in other words both 
can be employed simultaneously without contradiction. Distributed 
representations are those which are distributed over the entire complex system 
and emerge from them rather than being located in particular areas of the system. 
And Observation is the process by which that behaviour is observed. 
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2- An outline of Positive Feedback and `Lock-in' as a key characteristic of 
complex systems as it is applied to the reformulation of the Institutional 
Theory ofArt from a systems-theoretical perspective. 
3- An outline of Distributed Representation in complex systems as it is 
applied to the reformulation of the Institutional Theory ofArt from a systems- 
theoretical perspective. 
1- The Ontology of Art: the Institutional Theory ofArt from a 
systems-theoretical perspective 
It is a central argument of my thesis as a whole that a response to the issue 
of the questionable ontology of the work of art (in particular the post- 
modern work of art) be formulated in Systems-Theoretical terms. This 
means the uncontroversial step of defining Art not in material terms but 
rather in terms of a function of certain social systems. In other words 
rather than being an inherently differentiated set of objects and practices a 
systems-theoretical approach, when applied to the question of art, argues 
that Art gains its definition from the systems within which it circulates. 
Hence art is not defined by any material particularity but is rather taken to 
be relative to these systems of differentiation and distributed 
representation. 
There is a cluster of philosophical discussions based around the 
definition and ontological status of the work of art which has been loosely 
defined as Institutional Theories ofArt. These positions can be distinguished 
from the project of The Critical Historians of Art in so far as they are not 
attempts to provide histories of art based on style (and attempts to explain 
changes of style over time), iconography, or representation. The Institutional 
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Theories ofArt are rather philosophical attempts to account for definitions 
of art rather than place art in a historical teleology. It is for this reason that 
we can seek a common ground between such approaches and a systems- 
theoretical approach. 
Arthur Danto calls the systems around which art circulates the 
Artworld which he identifies (in The Artworld) as a `style matrix' of various 
influences and institutions 284 Danto's Artworld system is a network of 
interrelated systems including not only the museum/gallery system but also 
the art market, art schools, art history, and all the protocols and 
conventions which form part of broader systems of which Art is part. 
The celebrated example of Danto's argument concerns his 
encounter with Warhol's Brillo Boxes which he discussed first in the essay 
The Artworld and later at length in The Transfiguration of the Commonplace. 285 
Whilst Danto's meditation of the institutional system of Artworld 
was conceived as a response to Pop Art it raises a question which is 
transferable to the discussion on art in relation to complex systems of 
distributed representation. This transferable theme is the role context plays 
in the observation and representations of art; that is the processes by which 
certain objects and events are differentiated, observed and represented as 
art. Central to the argument of the Institutional Theories of Art is the claim 
that works of art are mere things that have no physical or metaphysical 
differentiation from other objects or their environment other than by 
virtue of the way in which those objects are represented and the systems 
where that observation and representation occurs. 
284 Danto, The Artworld, ' (1964) in Madoff (ed), Pop Art a Critical Anthology, 
(University of California Press, 1997) pg. 269-78 
285 Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, (Harvard University Press, 1983) 
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Warhol: Brillo Box, (1964) 
I argue that Danto's position be reformulated from within a 
systems-theoretical perspective with regards to the role the system of 
support plays in the differentiation of works of art from their 
environment 286 Danto argued that commonplace objects were 
`transfigured' whilst within the gallery space and were thus, in a process 
analogous to alchemy, transformed from objects into Art. This ontological 
transformation was not absolute and the representation of the objects as 
art remained relative to the system of observation. 
Danto's argument was an immediate response based on a personal 
encounter with the Brillo boxes which Warhol exhibited at The Stables 
Gallery, New York in 1964. Danto's anxiety arose when trying to work out 
how these objects could possibly be seen as Art when they are, at first 
glance no different from packages in the storerooms of a supermarket 28' 
As Danto was to later recall of the moment when he encountered the 
boxes: 
It was a most exciting moment, not least of all because the entire 
structure of debate which had defined the New York art scene up 
to that point had ceased having application. A whole new theory was 
called for other than the theories of realism, abstraction and 
286 In the case of Minimalism (for example) this environment is the `white-cube' of 
the gallery space. 
2a7 Nearly forty years on Danto's shock seems anachronistic especially given that 
Warhol's boxes are noticeably different from their mass-produced model. Made of 
plywood they clearly betray the process of their crafting in the obvious material 
grain of the wood and the perceptible in-exactness of some of the painted design. 
It would be hard to imagine anyone mistaking these works of craftsmanship for 
the hygiene and exactness of a mass-produced original. Perhaps this can be 
therefore seen as evidence of Danto working from within and yet against quite a 
traditional view of art; and trying to over turn his own prejudices. Thus Danto's 
observation can be seen to betray its own historical moment in so far as Danto 
needs to adapt his own, historically determined, idea of what art should be. 
Nevertheless the accuracy of Warhol's copies of the Brillo Boxes need not alter 
the efficacy of Danto's argument which concerns the role of the gallery system in 
the differentiation and representation of works of art. 
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modernism which had defined the argument for Hopper and his 
allies and his opponents 288 
The Institutional Theory ofArt finds a further expression in Dickie's 
commentaries on the ontology of art289 as being defined as an `institutional 
concept' (his terms) rather than a physical class of objects. 
In Dickie's view Art is thus about the way objects are classified 
rather their physical qualities. And their existence is relative to that system 
of classification rather than any physical, or metaphysical, qualities. The 
significance lies in the way artworks are represented or performed by their 
system of support. By arguing in such a way Dickie states that he has 
rejected definitions of art in terms of it being about and expression of 
either Imitation or Emotion. In systems-theoretical terms Dickie's process 
of institutional `classification' is stated as the function of two systemic 
processes. These are: 
(i) Differentiation; by which art is differentiated from its environment and 
(ii) Observation; by which that differentiation is observed by the relevant 
systems. 
Firstly Dickie argues that theories of art up to the end of the 
eighteenth century were variations of what he calls the `imitation theory of 
art'. He referenced such an impulse to Plato who argued that Art is a 
deception in that it imitates the form of beauty in nature 290 Such an 
imitation theory of art finds an Art Historical expression in Gombrich's 
288 Danto `Pop Art and Past Futures' in After The End ofArt, (Princeton University 
Press, 1997), pg. 123-24 
289 Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis, (Cornell University Press, 
1974). Dickie's arguments have most recently been summarised in: Dickie, Art and 
Value: Themes in the Philosophy ofArt, (Blackwell 2001) 
290 In book 10 of The Republic Plato uses the example of a bed to describes three 
modes of reality; the ideal form, the approximation of this which is fashioned by 
the carpenter and finally the imitation of the imitation which the artist conceives. 
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concept of `Making and Matchingi291 in relation to artistic and art-historical 
practice in which he argued that art is about mimesis of the world 
according to the limits imposed by certain artistic conventions. In the 
imitation theory, which Dickie rejects, it is accepted that there is some 
property of the art work (in this case its ability to mimic and/or recreate a 
visual experience) which differentiates it from other objects. 
Secondly Dickie identifies what he calls the `expression theory of 
are. The `expression theory of art' is seen by Dickie as arising with 
Romanticism in the nineteenth century. He argues that in this conception 
of art the empiricism and rationalism of the Enlightenment was called into 
question. Dickie calls Romanticism, to which the `expression theory of art' 
is linked: 
An attempt to reach behind the sensuous screen of ordinary 
knowledge to something thought to be vital and important. A 
strong aura of religion and mysticism hovers around 
Romanticism. "292 
According to the expression theory of the definition of art, Art is about the 
expression through the signs and symbols of Art in which the artist 
communicates their feelings emotions or intentions. Such a conception of 
art states that there is some property of the art work (in this case its ability 
to mediate and communicate an emotional experience) which differentiates 
it from other objects. 
Dickie thus establishes a binary of theories of art which he rejects. 
On the one hand there is the materialism of the imitation theory in which 
art is special class of imitative objects and on the other there is the 
291 Gombrich's theory of `Making and Matching' receives it fullest expression in: 
Gombrich, Art and Illusion, (Phaidon, 1960) 
292 Dickie, Art and theAesthetic. An InstitutionalAnalysis, (Cornell University Press, 
1974) pg. 39 
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metaphysics of the expressionist theory in which art is a special class of 
psychic objects. In contrast to both approaches Dickie proposes an 
argument which can be related to Danto's arguments in both TheArtworld 
and The Transfiguration of the Common Place with regards to the way in which 
the artwork is represented and received and defined. 
Dickie acknowledges that there may be different strategies for 
approaching the question of defining the work of art which are relative to 
the manner in which the work is to be defined. For example the work may 
be identified by evaluative criteria and the use of judgment to ascertain 
whether something is good enough to be a work of art. Secondly the work 
of art may be defined by classificatory criteria. Such judgments are related 
to how the relevant systems of classification observe and differentiate 
certain Art objects from other objects based upon certain qualities of the 
objects. 
In summary of the above; with reference to the ambiguous 
ontology of art, it is these senses of distinction and classification, which 
Dickie uses as the crux for his definition of art as an `Institutional 
Concept, ' which can be reformulated by the systems-theoretical approach. 
This is in so far as the Institutional Theories ofArt posit the definition of art as 
an act which operates according to the normative function of the systems 
which are used to observe, differentiate and describe it. 
Danto had also argued from a similar perspective when he had 
suggested that it is through the act of classification that objects are 
differentiated and thus transfigured into Art. Hence the definition of art can 
be seen to be relative to the systems by which it is observed; and, as I 
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outline in the following chapters, those systems may behave in certain 
complex ways. 
1.1 Semiotics, Narrative and Complex, Distributed Representation 
As with all other art historical and critical tendencies the Institutional 
Theory of Art itself is an historically specific argument. Danto's essay `The 
Artworld' first appeared in 1964 and was followed by Dickie's essay 
`Defining Art' in 1969293. There are two points to note about this historical 
placing. These are: 
(i) As Danto subsequently noted, it was a response to contemporary art 
movements, such as Minimalism and Pop Art, which made aesthetic capital 
out of a questioning of the environments within which they were being 
exhibited 294 
(ii) It can be paralleled with other tendencies within the humanities to turn 
towards linguistics and semiotics as a mode of enquiry and structural 
analysis. 
Both of these points draw attention to the point that their heart the 
institutional theories are stoutly materialist; they argue that art works are 
mere things and their aesthetic and social significance is relative to the ways 
in which they are ordered, classified and curated. One way of reading this 
ordering or re-presentation is that the argument be conceived of in 
semiotic terms and the concept of transfiguration be substituted for 
signification. The `re-signification of the commonplace' doesn't have quite 
293 Dickie, `Defining Art' in American PhilosophicalQuarterly, (July 1969, ) pg. 253-56. 
294 See Danto, After the End ofArt, (Princeton University Press, 1995) especially 
chapter 1, `Introduction: Modem, Postmodem and Contemporary' in which he 
provides a historical account of his own arguments in relation to various `End of 
Art theories, ' (most notably his own and Belting's. ) 
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the rhetorical punch of Danto's original but it brings the arguments back 
within the orbit of systems of representation. In short the Artworld might 
be conceived of as a representative system (in terms of a linguistic model 
of signification) and objects within it are thus `transfigured' into art by 
being made to signify art. An example of this would be within the gallery 
system whereby Urinals and (ersatz) Brillo Boxes (and suchlike) become 
signs for art. Thus the objects are seen to have particular signifying 
functions relative to the system of representation, or narrative, within 
which they are re-presented. 
However I argue that such a semiotic interpretation of the 
Institutional Theory of Art is limited in so far as it operates according to 
the representative model of signification (mediated by the 
signifier/signified correlation regulated by the logic of the sign) Further, I 
argue that such an approach (likened to a structural or semiotic analysis of 
the representation of objects as art) can be expanded upon by applying the 
systems-theoretical approach to such representations. The complex model 
of distributed representation identifies both the contingency of the act of 
representation (as being relative to the system of that representation) and 
further identifies representation as being distributed over the entire system. 
In the case of the systems of the Art-world this means that instead of 
conceiving of particular objects as being represented as art from within 
particular narratives that `art' emerges from the functioning of the entire 
systems of art (and its relative sub-systems) 
This observation regarding the concept of distributed representation 
being used to develop the representative model of signification is a 
particularly important claim within regards to other arguments advanced in 
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this thesis (and it receives a further explanation in the third section of this 
chapter. ) These arguments concern the challenge to the structuralist basis 
for traditional notions of representation which the systems-theoretical 
approach advances. In others words it is not the case that by likening 
Institutional Theories of Art to linguistics or semiotics I am seeking to find 
a structuralist base for an analysis of the systems of the artworld. I am not 
using semiotics as the primary model for my systems-theoretical approach; 
and I am not seeking to subsequently embark upon a rigidly semiotic 
decoding of the signs and symbols of the artworld. Rather, by identifying 
similarities between different interpretive strategies which are founded 
upon the foregrounding of the significance of the representative act it is 
demonstrated that language, museums and art-history and other complex 
systems are all complex systems of distributed representation which display 
isomorphic patterns of behaviour. Such complex systemic behaviour 
includes: that all systems become `locked-in' around specific examples and 
that they are self-organising and auto-catalytic and so forth. In other words 
it is not claimed that because both the artworld and language are systems 
that we can apply a linguistic analysis to the artworld, but rather that we 
can apply a similar systems approach to both linguistic systems and the 
artworld system as well as other complex systems. 
2- `Lock-In': Positive Feedback and Irreversibility 
In the following section I outline the concept of `lock-in' in complex 
systems in terms of positive feedback and irreversibility. `Lock-in, ' is a key 
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concept of complex systems and I use it in the chapters following this one 
to explain how the social systems discussed become dominated by 
particular cultural forms (including definitions of art and art historical 
methods. ) 
W. Brian Arthur has analysed this particular aspect of the 
behavioural patterns of complex systems in the following terms: 
Dynamical systems of the self-reinforcing or auto catalytic type - 
systems with local positive feedbacks - in physics, chemical 
kinetics, and theoretical biology tend to possess a multiplicity of 
asymptotic states or possible `emergent structures. ' The initial 
starting state combined with early random events or fluctuations 
acts to push the dynamics into the domain of one of these 
asymptotic states and thus to select the structure that the system 
eventually `locks into. 295 
By means of what he refers to as a "simple example of positive feedback" 
Arthur uses the economic history of the domestic videocassette [VCR] 
market, and the evolutionary competition, during the period between 1975 
and the mid 80's, between the two leading formats - VHS and Betamax to 
show how systems become `locked-in' to certain behavioural patterns. 
To give some background in `Fast Forward: Hollywood, the 
Japanese and the VCR Wars' James Lardner briefly outlines the case study 
of the VCR consumer war. 296 In 1975 the Betamax format, which had been 
devised and was still controlled by Sony, held the monopoly on the sale of 
domestic VCRs. In America alone Sony sold 30,000 units during the year. 
However, the following year, JVC introduced the VHS format. By January 
of the year of the centre's completion (1977) JVC's hand was strengthened 
295 W. Brian Arthur, `Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics, ' in The Economy 
as an Evolving Complex System (The Proceedings of the Evolutionary Paths of the Global 
Economy Workshop, held September, 1987 in Santa Fe, New Mexico) - vol. V, Santa Fe 
Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, ed. Anderson, Arrow, Pines, 
(Addison-Wesley, 1988) 
296 Lardner, Fast Forward, (New American Library, 1997) 
- 204 - 
by the announcement that a further four Japanese electronics 
manufacturers (including RCA) had decided to construct and market VHS 
format VCRs. By 1978 Sony, who were still only marketing Betamax, held 
just 19.1% of the VCR market, compared to RCA's share of almost twice 
that at 36%. By 1979 VHS had become locked-in' as the system which lead 
the market and in 1981 only 25% of operating systems used the Betamax 
format. `The battle [was] over' by 1987, according to an article which 
appeared in Rolling Stone297 the same year. The following year, with VHS 
players now holding 95% of the VCR market, Sony finally conceded to 
manufacturing VHS formatted VCRs 298 
Using the economic system within which the sub-system of the 
VCR market operates Arthur adopted the VHS/Betamax example to 
demonstrate an isomorphic principle which applies to the paradigms of 
Dynamical System Theory in general- namely that through positive feedback 
systems may perform in a `self-reinforcing', `autocatalytic' and `locked-in' 
manner. By `Locked-in' what is meant is that in a situation where any 
number of states which it is possible for a system to achieve, regardless of 
the merits of the alternatives, the system becomes phased-locked into one 
developmental path; and that this occurs through a combination of random 
factors, the effects of which are accentuated by positive feedback. His 
conclusion runs contrary to conventional economic theory which suggests 
that economic systems are subject to the principle of diminishing returns. 
Arthur argues that some markets do in fact behave like complex systems 
and are subject to increasing returns. This suggestion that some 
297 `Format Wars', Rolling Stone, (Jan. 15th, 1987, pg. 43) 
298 `Sony Isn't Mourning the' Death" of Betamax', Business U'eek, (Jan 25th, 1988, 
pg. 37) and `Goodbye Beta', Time, (Jan 25th 1988, pg. 52) 
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observations on the complex dynamics of complex systems are creatively 
and meaningfully transferable (to economic systems for example) in turn 
opens up a Pandora's box of descriptive possibilities which allow for the 
discursive suggestions that other cultural systems, such as the art market, 
art galleries and art histories, may also be seen to behave according to 
complex dynamics. In other words that they also become `locked-in' 
around singular foci. 
Arthur stated: 
Positive feedback economics, on the other hand, finds its parallels 
in modem non-linear physics. Ferromagnetic materials, spin 
glasses, solid-state lasers and other physical systems that consist of 
mutually re-enforcing elements show the same properties of the 
economic examples I have given. They `Phase-lock' into one of 
many possible configurations; small perturbations at critical times 
influence which outcome is selected, and the chosen outcome may 
have a higher energy (that is, be less favourable) than other possible 
end states. 99 
In short, through a combination of factors the VHS format ended up 
gaining an upper hand in the VCR market and no-matter how slight this 
initial advantage was it became multiplied, through positive feedback, so 
that VHS ended up holding a virtual monopoly in the domestic market. 
This lock-in occurred because a number of factors were brought into play. 
For example, once a customer was enticed into buying one product it was 
unlikely that they would buy a similar product for economic as well as 
pragmatic reasons, as Arthur related: 
Each format could realize increasing returns as its market share 
increased: large numbers of VHS recorders would encourage video 
outlets to stock more pre-recorded tapes in VHS format, thereby 
enhancing the value of owning a VHS recorder and leading more 
people to buy one. In this way, a small gain in market share would 
299 W. Brian Arthur, `Positive Feedbacks in the Economy', ScientificAmerican, (Feb. 
1990) 
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improve the competitive position of one system and help it to 
further increase its lead. 300 
There is also evidence to suggest that VHS was technically inferior and that 
the factors leading to its dominance may have been arbitrary - indeed 
Betamax is still the industry standard for video recording in 
filmmaking/broadcasting (although Lardner notes that JVC were the first 
to produce a [VHS] machine which doubled Sony's initial Betamax 
recording time of one hour, it may have been this advantage which swung 
the balance) Whatever the reasons the general principle remains; namely 
that in the developmental life of a complex, and non-linear system, a point 
of no-return, or bifurcation point, may be reached beyond which there is 
no turning back. The system thus becomes `locked-in'. 
2.1 Phase-Lock and System Attractors 
The accumulative effects of positive feedback are also observable in 
another effect. This is that it may be that small causes can produce the 
large effects of phase-lock - this is the so-called butterfly effect whereby it 
is suggested that the flapping of a butterfly's wings in Paris could effect the 
weather in New York, or that small causes lead to the monopoly of VHS in 
the VCR market. When a complex (or otherwise) system has become 
`locked-in' as the VCR market had by the mid-eighties then it can be said to 
be settled in around an attractor, and the apparent order can be regarded as 
an emergent property of the system. Such emergent (or macro) properties 
are common to the behavioural patterns of complex systems as Lewin 
describes: 
300 W. Brian Arthur, ibid. 
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Most complex systems exhibit what mathematicians call attractors, 
states to which the system eventually settles, depending on the 
properties of the system. Imagine floating in a rough and dangerous 
sea, one swirling around rocks and inlets. Whirlpools become 
established, depending on the topography of the seabed and the 
flow of the water. Eventually you will be drawn into one of these 
vortexes. There you will stay until some major perturbation, or 
change in the flow of water, pushes you out, only to be sucked into 
another. This, crudely, is how one might view a dynamical system 
with multiple attractors: such as cultural evolution, with attractors 
equivalent to bands, tribes, chiefdoms and states. This mythical sea 
would have to be arranged so that the hapless floater would be first 
susceptible to whirlpool one first, from which the next available 
would be whirlpool two, and so on. There would be no necessary 
progression from one to two to three to four. History is full of 
examples of social groups achieving a higher level of organization 
and then falling back. 'o' 
There is a way that such emergent order of the so-called attractorr 
within complex systems can be visualised and this is through the use of 
Phase Space. Phase Space maps are the visual maps that can be used in the 
study of physical systems, such as chaotic systems, and their behaviour. On 
a two dimensional graphical map the X and Y co-ordinates of a graph are 
used to represent the horizontal and vertical position of a point in space. 
But in phase space one variable of the map represents a position, but the 
other variable of the map represents a different variable such as the speed 
associated with the position. Gleick has given the following concise 
explanation of Phase Space: 
Any state of the system at a moment frozen in time was 
represented as a point in phase space; all the information about its 
position or velocity was contained in the coordinates of that point. 
As the system changed in some way, the point would move to a 
new position in phase space. As the system changed continuously, 
the point would trace a trajectory. For a simple system like a 
pendulum, the phase space might be just a rectangle: the 
pendulum's angle at a given instant would determine the east-west 
301 Lewin, Complexity, (Phoenix, 1993) 
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position of a point and the pendulum's speed would determine the 
north-south position. For a pendulum swinging regularly back and 
forth, the trajectory through phase space would be a loop, around 
and around as the system lived through the same sequence of 
302 positions over and over again 
The descriptive utility of such a visual representation lies in that what is 
plotted is not what one would literally see since only one variable is a 
physical position. Instead, one is presented with a plot within the imagined 
phase space which depicts a general view of the behavioural patterns of the 
system, a view that whilst abstract, is both a suggestive and highly effective 
tool for studying the nature of complex systems as can be seen in the figure 
on the facing page which is taken from Gleick's book on Chaos. 
As seen, the attractors are the parameters around which the system 
oscillates, which when visualised in a representation of Phase Space appear 
as the area and orbit around which the system becomes attracted. One of 
the reasons that this made such a large impact upon the scientific 
community is that, as can be seen in the fourth of Gleick's images, when 
plotted in phase space what at first appeared to be chaotic systems - from 
dripping taps to global economies - may in fact demonstrate some kind of 
order when visualised using phase space. This order appears to be 
manifested in the characteristic butterfly shape of the fourth image, the so- 
called Lorenz Attractor (named after Edward Lorenz, a pioneering theorist 
of Chaos Theory. )303 This has caused many to ask the question - is there an 
emergent order in chaos? And if so at what stage does this order appear? 
From such questioning emerges the suggestion that order occurs within 
`chaos' due to self organisation within complex, adaptive systems. Order 
302 Gleick, Chaos, (Vintage, 1987) 
303 Lorenz, The Essence of Chaos, (UCL Press, 1995) 
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thus arises as an emergent property or a macro property of complex 
systems. In the chapters following this one I argue that isomorphic 
processes of irreversibility as can be seen in the complex systems of the 
artworld. 
As seen in the video markets and the competition between VHS 
and Betamx, the system reaches a point of no return beyond which it is 
very hard, if not impossible, for the system to return to its previous state. 
This point of no return, or the bifurcation point is used to illustrate the 
irreversibility of complex system. In the video market this was the point of 
no return was the point at which VHS became the dominant format; and, 
via positive feedback, from this point gained an exponentially increasing 
market share over Betamax. The effect of positive feedback occurs because 
complex systems have memory. And because they have memory each state 
of the system is subsequently related to the previous system state. Hence 
when a system becomes `locked-in' around an example it becomes very 
difficult to change the system's behaviour. I argue that when applied to the 
systems of the artworld that this can be used to explain patterns of cultural 
inertia and hegemony in systems-theoretical terms. 
3- Distributed Representation in complex systems 
In this third section I outline a definition of distributed representation in 
complex systems. In short distributed representations are those which are 
distributed over the entire complex system and emerge from them rather 
than being located in particular areas of the system. More specifically I 
illustrate this by looking at how distributed representation functions in 
relation to two complex and distributed systems. These are: 
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1- Cognitive Systems. By which thought is modelled 
2- Linguistic systems. By which language is modelled. 
Traditionally both cognitive and linguistic systems are conceived of 
as involved in the representation of the world. Systems of thought 
represent the world with regards to epistemological representation; and 
systems of language with regards to linguistic representation. Also in both 
cognitive and linguistic models both language and epistemology are taken 
to be profoundly interconnected. 3oa I argue that these processes of 
representation be conceived of in Systems-Theoretical terms as systems by 
which environments are observed; and likewise as systems which can be 
observed to be involved in processes of distributed representation. 
Further, both models provide demonstrable examples of how the 
application of complexity and a systems approach provides us with models 
which can account for the Dynamic ordering and chaotic complexity of 
both the biological system of the human brain and the social system of 
linguistic expression. These examples also provide examples of where the 
Systems-Theoretical perspective, or a strategy which acknowledges 
complexity and emergence, brings a new conceptual paradigm to 
proceedings: that of distributed representation. It is to a description of this in 
relation to cognitive models to which I now turn. 
3N One of the most complete defences of this position can be found in - Fodor, 
The Language of Thought, (Thomas Y. Crowell, 1975) - whereby the argument is 
advanced that thought is based on the symbolic logic of syntactic structures and 
semantic ordering. See also Chomsky's developed arguments concerning the inter- 
relationship between thought and language; most notably in, Syntactic Structures, 
(Mouton, 1957) 
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3.1 Two Models of Intelligence and complex systems: Distributed vs. 
Iconographic 
The application of observing complexity to the problem of models of 
intelligence (which grew in research profile during the 1980's) provoked an 
ongoing and increasingly fierce debate within the Artificial Intelligence 
(A. I. ) research community between two differing models of cognition. One 
is based on formal, symbolic logic as the basis for mental representation; I 
will argue that this approach can be seen as Iconographic in its outlook. 
The other side of the debate features a defence of cognitive models based 
upon complex, connected or what is called Distributed Representation. In 
short Distributed Representation (also called connectionism) provides a way of 
thinking about how the mind might work in a different way to a computer. 
In other words rather than representing via a system of formal symbolic 
logic - in an iconographic fashion, like a computer - it can be observed as a 
complex, dynamic and connected system which represents in a radically 
different manner. 305 
305 Cilliers has provided an excellent summary of the debate on representation and 
distributed representation in `Problems with Representation, ' (in Complexity and 
Postmodernism, (Routledge, 1998) Ch. 5) in which he argued that the very concept 
of representation itself is challenged by distributed representation. However it is 
also notable that he also retains the word representation in the concept of 
distributed representation demonstrating that whilst the concept of representation has 
been radically re-configured it has not been dismissed outright. See also S. Stich, 
D. Rumelhart, and W. Ramsey, Eds., Philosophy and Connectionist Theory, (Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 1991) and especially: van Gelder, `What is the "D" in 
"PDP"? An overview of the concept of distribution' & Haugeland, J. 
`Representational genera. ' Other discussions of distributed representation in 
cognitive systems include: French, `Semi-distributed representations and 
catastrophic forgetting in connectionist networks, ' in Connection Science 4, (1992) 
pg. 365-377; Haugeland, J. 'The nature and plausibility of cognitivism, ' in 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1, (1978) pg. 215-226; In W. Ramsey, S. P. Stich, and 
D. E. Rumelhart, (Eds. ), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. (Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, 1978) pp. 61-89; Hinton, G. E., J. L. McClelland, and D. E. 
Rumelhart, `Distributed representations' In D. E. Rumelhart and J. L. McClelland, 
(Eds. ) Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition. (MIT 
Press, 1986) pp. 77-109; Kanerva, Sparse Distributed Memory (MIT Press, 1988); 
- 212 - 
There are three ways to conceive of the debate regarding the 
impact of distribution/connectionism on cognitive modelling. These are: 
(i) That it can be used to replicate symbolic processing in a biologically 
plausible way; in this sense the `language of thought' idea is retained but is 
implemented upon a distributed/connectionist system. 
(ii) The distributed/connectionist system augments the symbolic language 
of thought model and fills in the gaps by providing, for example, a 
description of how systems might learn in a self-determining fashion but 
without the need to jettison the symbolic /iconographic `language of 
thought' notion altogether. 
(iii) The Connectionist models replace the symbolic/logical `language of 
thought' models of cognitive architecture and the concept of 
representation itself. This radical approach is what Cilliers (1998) argued in 
his attempts to provide a synthesis between connectionism and post- 
structuralism at the linguistic and epistemological levels. 
For me the question as to whether we can, at the moment, reach a 
final conclusion with regards to the implications of 
distributed/connectionist models on cognitive modelling is still unresolved. 
Nevertheless, what is clear is that the very existence of such models is 
Rumelhart, D. E., and J. L. McClelland. `On learning the past tenses of English 
verbs' In J. L. McClelland, D. E. Rumelhart, and The PDP Research Group, 
(Eds. ), Parallel Distributed Processing. Explorations in the Microstnrcturc of Cognition. vol. 
2: Psychological and Biological Models. (MIT Press, 1986) pg. 216-268; Smolensky, 
Connectionism, constituency, and the language of thought. In B. Lower and G. 
Rey, (Eds. ), Jerry Fodor and his Critics, (Blackwell, 1991); Thorpe, `Localized versus 
distributed representations' In M. A. Arbib, (Ed. ), Handbook of Brain Theory and 
Neural Networks. (MIT Press, 1995) pg. 549-552; van Gelder, `Compositionality: A 
connectionist variation on a classical theme' Cognitive Science 14, (1990), pg. 355- 
384; van Gelder, T. J. (1992). `Defining "distributed representation. "' In Connection 
Science, 4, (1992), pg. 175-191. 
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forcing the issue with regards to modelling the processes of the mind in a 
biologically plausible manner. Such plausible models suggested by 
connectionism and distributed representation will, it is argued, provide 
accounts which accommodate the clear structural dissimilarities between 
the von-Neumann computing machine of G. O. F. A. I. (the symbolic 
processing models of so-called Good Old Fashioned Artificial Intelligence) 
in which the mind is taken to be like a computer running the software of 
thought, and a biological system of interconnected and distributed 
elements from which intelligence may be seen to emerge out of increased 
systemic complexity. 
Regardless of the models used to achieve the ends the central aim 
of artificial intelligence is to provide a model of human cognition (this 
being the model with which we are most familiar). The aim of this is to 
provide both an explanation of human consciousness and the theoretical 
possibility of generating an `Artificial' (that is non-human) consciousness of 
some description. 
A fundamental question of Modern, western philosophy is, as 
Descartes famously conceived of at the beginning of the Modem Age, the 
attempt to explain how to bridge the epistemological gulf between the 
internal mental life of apperception and the material world of mind 
independent reality. 306 Such Cartesian dualism was ultimately 
epistemologically unsatisfactory and it is an uncontroversial philosophical 
claim to assert that the successful modelling of the mind must provide us 
with a physical account of mental life and that we should not rely upon 
306 Descartes' celebrated idealist intercession of the rationalist soul with the 
physical world was achieved through the Pineal Gland, which mediated between 
the two worlds of the mental and the physical. 
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positing a mind/body split with a physical body being seen as ontologically 
distinct from mental activity and the apperception of a metaphysical 
soul/sprit. 
The central task of artificial intelligence is, broadly conceived, to 
find the physical basis of mental activity and to model it using an non- 
human (or artificial) technology. Thus, if we can ever make a machine 
`think' then three questions are thrown up. These are 
(i) What is the physical support of `thought'? 
(ii) What is the nature of this `thought'? (is it, for example, what Roland 
Penrose has called `a very human prerogativei307 or can it be replicated in 
other systems? ) 
(iii) What form does this `thought' take? 
In addressing these three questions the act of cognition is 
conceived of as the act by which the world (whatever this may be) is 
observed by the psychic system (or the mind) of the subject. 
If it feels that there has been at this point a divergence from the 
central theme of the chapter (art and systems) then in response it is stated 
that this definition of complex systems, articulated via cognitive models of 
distributed representation (which will ultimately be applied to a systems- 
theoretical re-statement of the Institutional Theory of Art, ) finds another 
expression in models of how the mind works. By looking at the mind as a 
complex system it is proposed that an understanding of how cognitive 
observation and distributed representation takes place be formulated. 
Models of cognition which present the mind is a complex system suggest 
307 Penrose, The Empemr''s New Mind, (ref. ) pg. 3. Penrose argues that thought is 
peculiarly human and as a result will never be replicated artificially. 
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that it is a Distributed System of Representation and that mental activity is 
distributed over the whole cognitive system rather than being located in 
one particular area of the brain. 
3.1.1 Mapping the Mind 
Put very simply; the human cognitive system is a network of neurons. 
That's what the soft-machine (to use a William Burroughs term) of the brain 
is. These neurons are single cells which operate in conjunction with one 
another by transfer of electrical current and it is by this current that the 
biological system of our body is able to communicate with itself and, 
hence, think. Each one of these neurons is connected with up to 10,000 
other neurons within the system via axons which transmit information and 
dendrites which receive information. The meeting point between the 
transmitting axons and the dendrites are the synapses. And these synapses 
are mediated, chemically, by neurotransmitters. One neuron by itself is 
almost insignificant and cannot `think' by itself. Any significant form of 
mental activity requires the firing of millions of these neurons at once to 
generate thought. 
In other words there is a physical basis for `the mind' and this is a 
complex, biological system or interconnected cells. Here are two examples 
which demonstrate the grounding of consciousness in the complex 
biological physical system of the brain. 
(i) The way psycho-active drugs work is by interfering with the activity of 
these neurotransmitters and in doing so altering thought patterns and 
hence perception. This provides us with an example of the impact a 
physical process can have on mental life. 
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(ii) Here is a more particular example. 308 
In 1998 surgeons at the University of California Medical School, using a 16 
year old epileptic girl, applied a tiny electric current near to a part of her left 
hand side of the brain. This part was known to be related to humour. It 
was where Franz Gall, the founder of Phrenology, had located what he 
called the Organ of Mirthfulnesr. 309 The current caused the girl to laugh. When 
they asked her what was so funny she just said: "you guys are just so funny 
- standing around. " When the current was applied again the girl 
found the 
picture of a horse in the room hilarious, and again, a third time she was 
amused by something else. What this example demonstrates is that a 
genuine human emotion, humour, can be explained by a physical cause in 
the complex cognitive system of the brain. 
But, despite identifying a physical basis for thought as being 
grounded in this complex network of interconnected neurons there are 
various models for describing the ways in which that physical system thinks. 
As mentioned earlier representation provides us with ways of conceiving of 
this activity. 
3.1 .2 
`Classical' or Iconographic Representation 
When the discourse of artificial intelligence first began to emerge (in the 
early 1940's) the brain was taken to operate (and thus represent its 
environment) in the same way as a computer. This approach to cognitive 
modelling has been called both Classical Representation and Good Old 
Fashioned Artificial Intelligence - or G. O. F. A. L. This approach, which I 
308 From Nature, 1998, quoted in Carter, Mapping The Mind, (Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1998) Pg. 11 
309 Carter, Mapping the Mind, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998) pg. 11 
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will call the Iconographic Approach, can be critiqued from a Systems- 
Theoretical perspective. The term Iconographic Representation provides a 
means of distinguishing this approach with the Distributed model of 
cognition applied in Connectionist models (and also invokes a particular 
model of art historical reconstruction to which it will be ultimately applied. ) 
Early attempts to `map' the mind relied upon an understanding of 
computers based upon the von Neumann machine. This machine created 
by Hungarian mathematician John von Neumann (in the 1940s)'lo was a 
prototype digital computer and most computers today can be identified as 
conforming to the same van Neumann architecture. This architecture 
consists of a central processing unit which does the raw data processing of 
the machine according to principles of symbolic logic; that is bits of 
information have a symbolically representative function. This logical 
processing unit is the C. P. U. (central processing unit) of the computer. 
Secondly this C. P. U. works in parallel to an area of memory where 
information can be stored rather than symbolically interpreted. This area of 
memory can be accessed rapidly and at random and it does not need to be 
accessed sequentially (like information on a tape would have to be"'. ) This 
Random Access Memory (or R. A. M) thus uses information in a non- 
semantic sense and provides it for the C. P. U. to semantically order. 
The von Neumann machine works by storing instructions, or the 
software, as binary values (is or Os, or the states of connections being either 
on or off). These binary values (the Is or Os) are the raw data of the system 
and they are the instructions which are run, sequentially via the central 
310 For a history of the modern computer see: Ceruzzi, A History ofModern 
Computing : 1945-1995 (History of Computing), (MIT, 1998) 
311 hence difference between the von Neumann architecture and a Turing 
Machine which runs on a sequential tape. 
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processing unit. This data gains its symbolic, logical form relative to both 
its syntactic and its semantic ordering; the syntactic ordering corresponding 
to the order in which they're placed and the semantic ordering relating to 
the symbolic correspondence to their referents. 
To reiterate; computers which function according to the von 
Neumann architecture work through the operation of a sequence of 
symbols presented to the central processing unit and its subsequent 
operation according to its particular, logical, interpretation of the 
symbols. 312 In effect the von Neumann machine is an iconographic system. 
This GOFAI313 model of the sequential, logical symbolical 
processing machine, when applied to how the mind works leads to a 
conception of the mind as, in effect, a `wet' or `soft' von Neumann 
machine. A dualism is posited between hardware and software. This is the 
view that is opposed by the systems-theoretical model of distributed 
cognitive representation. On the one hand there is the physical hardware 
which provides the architectural support for the logical operations of the 
system. In the computer this would be the hardware of the computer 
system and in the human brain the hardware is the biological soft-machine 
of grey matter. On the other hand there is the software or the language of 
thought which is the set of logical rules to be run on that hardware. This 
language of thought operates at a distinct logical level from the hardware. 
312 Putnam argued for this application of cognitive modelling in, Putnam, 
Representation and Reality, (MIT, 1988) although subsequently modified his position 
away from a rigidly symbolic model of mental representation. 
313 In their connectionist models of cognitive architecture Rummelhart and 
McClelland have claimed that they are attempting to "replace the `computer 
metaphor' as a model of the mid with the `brain metaphor. "' Rumelhart & 
McClelland, `on learning the past tenses of English verbs. ' In Rumelhart, 
McClelland and the PDP Research Group (Eds), Parallel Distributed Processing, 
Volume I, (M. I. T Press, 1986), pg. 75. 
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In the classical view of cognitive representation thought emerges because a 
type of software is being run on the brain. 
Thus each `thought' that the system has is taken to correspond to a 
particular logical function operating upon a particular part of the system. 
Hence each `thought' is generated via the turning on of a bit of the system. 
GOFAI relies upon there being a symbolic correspondence between 
thoughts and the objects of those thoughts. And in contrast to the virtual 
engrammes of Classical Representation, Smolensky 314 has observed that in 
the connectionist model of distributed mental representation each `thought' 
generated by the system is not the result of the turning on of one bit of 
that system, or the implementation of a particular, discreet piece of data. 
Instead, in a distributed system of representation the whole system must be 
on and each thought is distributed over the whole of that system. 
I have argued so far that cognitive models of Classical 
Representation are based upon both a particular conception of mental 
representation and computation which are, essentially, iconographic in 
structure. The key issue here is that there is a direct correlation posited 
between the specific data processed by the cognitive system and mental 
representation. This symbolic correlation between thoughts and particular 
configurations of information means that classical mental representation is 
identified as an Iconographic model of thought. Classical representation is 
iconographic in so far as the model is based upon the positing of a rational 
correlation between signifier (in this case the semantic/syntactic ordered 
information) and the signified (the mental representation or thought). This 
314 Smolensky is one of the leading advocates of the model of distributed 
representation. See: Smolensky, `Connectionist A. I., Symbolic A. I. and the Brain, ' 
Al Review, 1, (1987), pg. 95-110 & Smolensky, `On the proper treatment of 
Connectionism, ' Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 11, (1988), pg. 1-74. 
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rational correlation is mediated by the symbol system, or the logic of the 
language of thought. 
In this model (opposed from the systems-theoretical perspective) 
cognitive systems are modelled as computational systems whereby 
thoughts are physical `states' of the system and are expressions of a 
particular semantic and syntactic ordering of information. These physical 
states are thus the symbolic representation of particular thoughts. This 
could be called computational in so far as Cummings has observed: "The 
system merits inferential characterization because it computes 
representations of conclusions from representations of the corresponding 
premises. ""' And, hence: "The basic assumption of orthodox 
representationalism is that under proper interpretation, formal symbol 
crunching is cognition. s316 In other words a thought is conceived of as a 
program, a set of instructions or an algorithm which is run on the hardware 
of the brain and is understood by virtue of the symbolic language of 
thought. 
Another way to look at this would be to invoke the idea of 
Engrammes and suggest that Classical Cognitive representation relies upon 
virtual engrammes. Engrammes are an anachronistic way of thinking about 
the mind as a library. (They formed the basis for Warburg's library as 
memory project in both his library and the Mnemosyne) Engrammes are 
the physical parts of the brain where particular memories would be stored. 
Thus if in the library if we bum down floor 11 then we'd have no Art 
315 Cummins, 'Tl1e Role of Representation in Connectionist Explanations of 
Cognitive Capacities, ' in: Ramsey, Stich, Rumelhart, (eds. ), Philosophy and 
Connectionist Theory, (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 1991) pg. 95 
316 Cummins, 'The Role of Representation in Connectionist Explanations of 
Cognitive Capacities, ' in: Ramsey, Stich, Rumelhart, (eds. ), Philosophy and 
Connectionist Theory, (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 1991) pg. 95 
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Historical memory (in that building in Glasgow at any rate. ) Similarly in the 
analogy of the engramme, if we lose the physical bit of the brain where we 
store our memory of horses then we will have no memory of horses. The 
classical approach is not an unsophisticated as to suggest that there is a 
particular physical location of every memory in the brain; it does not, for 
example, argue that we could point to the horse-representing part of the 
brain. However virtual engrammes form the basis of the Classical, 
Iconographic (G. O. F. A. I. ) approach to cognitive modelling. This is 
because specific semantic and syntactic orderings of information, or precise 
data-strings, correspond, iconographically, to particular thoughts. 
The major problem with classical models of classical representation 
lies in their basis upon the Engramme form. And until the Distributed 
models of Cognition based upon complex systems emerged in the 1980's 
models of the mind viewed the mind as a Physical Symbol System which 
was governed by rules of symbol manipulation"'. Such models are: brittle; 
non-dynamic; complicated; have no common-sense and they don't learn. 
As a result of these shortcomings such systems are characterised by 
their inability to deal with language as it is spoken and understood by 
humans. Language is not necessarily ordered and rational but is itself a 
complex, dynamic and fluid system full of redundancy and ambiguity. 
Language is not an expert system3' for describing the world in a discreet 
317 The phrase `physical symbol system' is attributed by Rumelhart to Alan Newel. 
See Ramsey, Stich, Rumelhart, (eds. ), `Preface', Philosophy and Connectionist Theory, 
(Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 1991) pg. xi. 
318 Expert System is a specific term which Coveney & Highfield define thus: "[a] 
computer program that uses a direct encoding of human knowledge to help solve 
complex problems, such as diagnosing an illness or interpreting the law. Also 
called a knowledge-based system. " In Coveney & Highfield, Frontiers of Complexity, 
(Ballantine, 1996) pg. 426 
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(i. e. non-redundant") manner, and there is no direct and unchanging, 
iconographic, symbolic relationship between the system of language and 
the objects it describes. Words can mean different things at different times 
and in different contexts. Similarly there is not an unchanging, symbolic 
and logical relationship between a language of thought and the content of 
that thought. 
Classical representation is not an effective model for describing the 
way in which complex systems store and represent information. It is a 
logical, linguistic and, I would tentatively suggest, a structuralist approach 
to cognitive modelling. 
3.2 - Distributed Representation in Complex Systems 
In this following (sub) section I demonstrate the concept of distributed 
representation in complex systems via the example of an ant colony. 
However distributed representation is not specific to this example and 
319 Redundancy has a specific meaning in terms of information-theory defined in 
the following terms: "The variety in a channel that exceeds the amount of 
information actually transmitted. Its most common forms: (1) repetitive 
transmission of the same message over one channel, (2) duplication of channels, 
of which each could handle the transmission by itself, (3) restrictions on the use 
of characters or on the combinations of characters from an alphabet to form 
proper words or expressions (see language), (4) communicating something already 
known to its addressee. In the process of communication redundancy is essential 
to combat noise, to assure reliability and to maintain a communication channel. 
English writing is estimated to be 50% redundant which accounts for the ability of 
native speakers to detect and correct typing errors. Parity checks, which are 
common in communication within computers, enhance reliability but only at the 
expense of using additional channel capacity. The amount of information actually 
transmitted is not increased by this device. Similarly, Indian governments of the 
Mogul period are known to have used at least 3 parallel reporting channels to 
survey their provinces with some degree of reliability, notwithstanding the 
additional efforts. " From Klaus Krippendorffs A Dictionary of Cybernetics, [an 80 
page unpublished report dated Feb. 2,1986]. Published on Principia Cybernetica Web, 
(the website of the Principia Cybernetica Project - (PCP)) At: 
http: //pespmcl. vub. ac. be/Default. html, (Consulted December, 2003) 
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other complex systems including cognitive models and I argue the complex 
representative systems of the artworld also display isomorphic behaviour. 
The ant colony as a complex system of distributed representation is 
an example which Eric Bonbeau presented at the O'Reilly Emerging 
Technology conference in Santa Clara in May 2002. For several years 
Bonabeau has been studying insect systems for examples of what he calls 
Swarm Intelligence from the Sante Fe Institute in New Mexico (which is 
center of complexity research where W. Brian Arthur amongst others 
work. ) He's arrived at some examples of how an collective system of 
ants (or other insects such as termites) can perform individually stu 
complex teleological tasks (that is tasks with a collective purpose. )320 
The example Bonabeau provided is how a (complex) system of ants 
may find food in a maze. Bonabeau argues that the colony as a whole will 
eventually find the shortest route to the food. Given a collection of hungry 
ants (they must, Bonabeau observes, be given a collective reason to find 
food) in a maze, they will all wander about in a generally random way. This 
is because each single ant is pretty stupid (that is they have no individual 
volition to find the shortest route to and from the food and then 
remember that route. ) However, given their random, non-rational, 
distribution throughout the maze, then it is inevitable that some ants will 
find the food. Ants communicate with one another through 
320 See Bonabeau, Dorigo & Theraulaz, Swarm Intelligence: From Natural to Artificial 
Systems (Santa Fe Institute Studies on the Sciences of Comp)exity), (Oxford University 
Press, 1999) and Kennedy & Eberhart, Swarm Intelligence, (Morgan Kauffman, 
2001), which contains (in chapter 2) a particularly useful discussion on `swarm' 
systems in terms of distributed representation and applies this (in chapter 4) to 
observing social systems. 
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pheromones. 21 Thus on finding the food source and wandering back 
through the maze they leave a trial of these pheromones for other ants to 
smell. Those ants to arrive at the start of the maze first are, obviously, the 
ones who took the shortest route and will have left the strongest scented 
pheromone trail as it has had less time to evaporate. The remaining ants 
will be naturally drawn to the strongest pheromone trail and thus the ants 
will be drawn back again and again to the shortest route to the food. The 
striking thing about this system is that it contains within it the potential to 
remain dynamic and can learn future routes should they present 
themselves. If any ants should randomly find a better route then the system 
can adapt to this; the way to the food isn't fixed. 
The ants are a connectionist system. And despite their individual 
`stupidity' they could be argued to have a collective, or Swarm Intelligence. 
In his book Out of Controk the New Biology ofMachines, Social Syrtemr and the 
Economic World, Kevin Kelly calls this the Hive Mind. 
Ants, too, have hive mind. A colony of ants on the move from one 
nest to another exhibits the Kafka-esque underside underside of 
emergent control... The marvel of `hive mind' is that no one is in 
control, and yet an invisible hand governs, a hand that emerges 
from very dumb members. The marvel is that more is different. To 
generate a colony organism from a bug organism requires only that 
the bugs are multiplied so that there are many, many more of them, 
and that they all communicate with one another. At some stage the 
level of complexity reaches a point where new categories like 
`colony' can emerge from simple categories of `bug'. Colony is 
inherent in bugness implies this marvel. Thus there is nothing to be 
found in a beehive that is not submerged in a bee. And yet you can 
search a bee forever with a cyclotron and fluoroscope, and you will 
never find the hive. ' 
321 Pheromones are `Chemical substances secreted by an organism that elicit a 
behavioural response from other organisms usually of the same species, especially 
substances that act as sex attractants. ' Uvarov & Isaacs, The Penguin Dictionary of 
Science, 7th Edition (1993), (Penguin Books, 1993) 
322 Kelly, Out of Control, (Perseus Books, 1994), pg. 13 
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If a colony of ants is observed as a complex system then it can also be 
observed that the path which they trace to and from their goals are 
distributed representations within that system. By doing so the power of 
this observation becomes present. The path within the maze to and from 
the food is a representation of the optimum path to and from that food. 
Connectionism argues that brains are isomorphic to the ant colony; 
that is they are both complex systems of distributed representation. A 
distributed system of representation represents by virtue of aspects related 
to its complexity; specifically these aspects are: 
(i) interconnection 
(ii) non-linearity 
Thus, isomorphic to the ant colony, a distributed system of 
representation is a network of interconnected elements. This 
interconnection is referred to as a parallel interconnection in so far as the 
separate elements can function simultaneously and do not have to work 
sequentially (in contrast a linear set of functions which must be executed 
one after each other. ) It is because of this simultaneous interconnectivity 
that the operation of the system cannot be understood as a discreet 
sequence of rule based activities; but rather that the way that any part of 
the system operates and any particular representation within the system 
must be conceived of in terms of the functioning of the whole of the 
system. 
In Frontiers of Complexity Coveney and Highfield give the following 
description of complex models of A. I.: 
Artificial neural networks mimic the brain's complexity through 
their non-linearity and a high degree of interconnectivity among 
their nodes. Like the brain, they are inherently parallel devices that 
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can do many things concurrently. Qualitatively, their processors 
behave like neurons and the connections between them act like 
synapses. Any `programming' of such a net consists of rules to alter 
the all important strengths of connections between processors. And 
the `programs' that solve various problems emerge within such 
networks spontaneously. ' 
A connectionist cognitive architecture is based upon a network of 
interconnected nodes, or meeting points. The links between the nodes are 
referred to as being Weighted. In a distributed system of representation 
information is shared by the whole network rather than being specifically 
located. Thus the information of the system is remembered and distributed 
over the system by the different weights of the connections between the 
nodes (or neurones) within the system. The Weight of an interconnection 
corresponds to the amount of information that each connection carries. A 
weight can have a positive or a negative value depending upon whether the 
connection assists or inhibits the flow of information between the nodes. 
Thus as Cummins has stated: 
The state of the network at a given time is revealed by the pattern 
of activation at that time, that is, by specifying the activation level 
of each node at that time, and by the connection weights 324 
As a result of this distributed representation and memory; by virtue of 
differing weights between neurones a certain `thought' generated by the 
system is observed as a pattern within the system. This pattern, or output, 
is a function of the weights of the connections within the network. We can 
think of these weights as being like the pheromone tracks of the ants with 
323 Coveney and Highfield, Frontiers of Complexity, (ref req), pg. 302 
324 Cummins, `Representation in Connectionism, ' in Ramsey, Stich, Rumelhart, 
(eds. ), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory, (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 
1991) pg. 95 
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strong weights representing the shortest path to the food by a strong smell 
of pheromones and weak weights corresponding to a low smell. 
3.2.1 Network Learning 
The above example of the `weighting' in a distributed network provides 
another distinction between Connectionist/Distributed systems and 
Classical/Iconographic systems with regards to how they `learn'. In 
contrast to a Connnectionist system a system of Iconographic 
representation `learns' by being given information from an external source 
in the form of a different program (algorithm) to be run on the hardware. 
An iconographic system treats memory as increased data in so far as there 
is more information provided about a particular symbolic (iconographic) 
representation. 
To compare this with a connectionist system consider the example 
of the ant colony with respect to how they `learnt' to find their food. If, in 
contrast, the same problem of optimum paths to food was presented to a 
classical, or iconographic, system, then the representation of the optimum 
path would have to be presented to the system symbolically from an 
external source in order for the system to `learn' that path. It would need to 
be told the optimum path and then iconographically represent this path 
according to its own symbolic logic. 
In contrast the connectionist system of the ants `learns' the path 
through self-determination. It `finds' the solution; or the optimum path 
`emerges' from the complexity of the system. Similarly a connectionist 
model of cognition (such as a neural network) treats memory in terms of 
the changing and irreversible structure of the whole representative system. 
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A connectionist cognitive architecture learns not through the processing of 
more information but rather through an interaction with its environment 
during which time the environment changes the system and hence its 
output/patterns of distributed representation; just as more and more of the 
ants found the best way to get to and from the food in the maze. 
In summary of the above section. As well as providing a plausible 
model of cognitive activity with regards the complex biological system of 
the brain the connectionist model also provides a plausible account of how 
complex systems can learn and how such learning has significant effects 
upon future functioning of the system. The information which is observed 
to be represented by a distributed network (of ants, or cognition, or the art 
world) at any particular time is the pattern distributed over the connections 
of the whole system at that particular time. Also, because distributed 
representation is a corollary of a pattern at a given time then that 
representation is observed as contingent. This means that the observed 
pattern that represents the system's state and hence the output of the 
system is dependent upon the previous state of the system. ' 2' a result of 
this the system can be said to have learnt according to its previous state. 
Hence it can be said that a complex, interconnected system of 
representation, by virtue of its temporal specificity and its irreversibility, 
can be said to have a memory. 
A distributed network has memory and `learns' by changing the 
weighting structure and by changing the strengths of the interactions 
between the nodes a different pattern will be produced given the same 
325 Further, as Luhman would argue, this representation is also contingent upon 
the system from which it is observed. 
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input. By comparing and then changing the weighting pattern for any given 
input in relation to an expected or required output. 
To reiterate; there is a clear distinction between classical and 
connectionist accounts of representation in relation to how these systems 
learn. This difference is that in 
(i) Orthodox, classical, iconographic, systems: learning is just another set of 
rules being run on the same system. in other words the architecture itself 
remains unaltered but the information circulating with the system changes. 
(ii) Distributed or Connectionist systems: learning, and hence producing 
different representational content in response to particular inputs, means 
that the patterns within the system are themselves altered. The ants follow 
a different path. The system changes by the weights of the nodes changing 
which means that the system itself changes to meet the demands of producing 
different representational output 326 
3.2.2 Distributed Representation and Deconstruction 
In conclusion of the discussion on representation on the facing page are 
some distinctions between: Iconographic Representation'Z' and the 
326 Rumelhart & McClelland, have shown how a virtual connectionist system can 
be taught to learn' the English past tense of verbs and convert the present into 
the past tense in both regular and irregular verbs. The striking claim that 
Rumelhart & McClelland made of their model was it was given no specific rules 
for learning and that in the learning process that it duplicated some of the 
mistakes which children actually make; in Rumelhart & McClelland, `on learning 
the past tenses of English verbs. ' In Rumelhart, McClelland and the PDP 
Research Group (Eds), Parallel Distributed Processing Volume I, (M. I. T Press, 1986), 
pg. 75. Rumelhart & McClelland's model is critiqued extensively by Pinker & 
Prince and Fodor & Pylyshyn. Both critiques appear in Cognition, 28, (1988) 
327 It has been an un-stated implication of the chapter as a whole that traditional 
art history which is founded upon a humanist conception of rationality (in which 
epistemology is equated with mental representation) is further implicated in the 
paradigm shift to connectionist models of cognition. However in both the 
iconographic and connectionist models an art historical method is paralleled in the 
model of cognition upon which it is, ultimately, founded. 
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distributed representation of the Connectionist (the so-called hive mina) 
model. 
In conclusion of this comparison of Iconographic and Distributed 
systems of representation a potential criticism of connectionism (from 
within the non-connectionism A. I. community) is noted. However this 
criticism also throws its epistemological significance into relief. As Fodor & 
Pylyshyn (et al. ) have argued; as a cognitive model for all its attempts to 
talk of representation in terms of networks of distribution, connectionism 
doesn't account for the fact that there is a rational language of thought and 
that language itself, through which that thought is expressed and 
communicated (within social systems) is logical, symbolic and 
iconographic. However as Cilliers has also observed the very concept of 
iconographic representation is what is at stake. He wrote: 
A distributed representation is not a representation in the 
conventional sense of the word. It dispenses with all the 
components of a representational system. There are no symbols 
that `stand for' something, there are no grammatical relationships 
between them, and the system itself has no need of a semantic level 
of interpretation at all. We need neither a central processor nor an 
outside observer. 328 
Likewise the major impact of the post-structural critique of language and 
rationality lies in the questioning of the direct and logical symbolic 
correspondence of the signifier and the signified in a representative 
process. Instead what is favoured is a fluid, dynamic free-play of signifiers 
mediated by their temporal difference (to use the Derridian term) from one 
another. Likewise distributed representation is not iconographic in its 
representative form in so far as there is no discreet correspondence 
328 Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernism, (Routledge, 1998) pg. 27 
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Iconographic Representation 
G. O. F. A. I.; Classical Systems 
Symbolic correspondence 
between representation and 
represented 
Semiotic representation 
Complicated 
Expert Systems 
Data 
Logic/Rules 
Process performed via Inference 
Engine 
Brittle 
No `common sense' (i. e. no 
capacity for self-determination 
and learning) 
Structuralism 
Distributed representation 
Connectionist systems 
No quantifiable symbolic correspondence 
representation and represented 
Non-semiotic representation 
Complex 
Systems which learn 
Pattern 
Self Determination 
Process performed via memory 
Adaptable 
Capacity for self-determination and learning 
Post-Structuralism 
Von Neumann computer I Brain; Ant Colony 
between signifier and signified which is mediated by the structural logic of 
the form of the sign (as Sausurre argued. ) Distributed Representation 
cannot, therefore, be considered representation in the traditional sense of 
the word. 
This connection between complexity and postmodernism is 
observed by Cilliers in his discussion of common-ground shared between 
the two discursive systems. And it is in the light of his observations 
regarding the isomorphisms between the systems-theoretical approach and 
post-structuralism that my thesis now turns with regards to how Art 
History might meet the theoretical challenge presented to its Iconographic 
method by Art after Modernism. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
"CHAOS DAMN IT" - THE WORK OF ART 
OBSERVED FROM THE PERSPECTIVE 
OF DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS THEORY 
Pollock: Autumn Rhythm no. 30 1950, Detail, (1950) 
NO CHAOS DAMN IT 
Jackson Pollock329 
Introduction 
As Art Historians upon approaching the work of art the key question we 
traditionally ask is Wbat is Being Reprerented? There are a number of art 
historical strategies for answering this question ranging from issues of style, 
iconography to other cultural and historical analyses. From the systems- 
theoretical perspective (which challenges the traditional concept of 
representation) this question is reformulated and the following question 
posed instead: What can be Observed. -'30 
What follows, in this and the following chapter, is an attempt to 
answer the question of what is being observed through an application of 
329 "In 1950, Time magazine printed parts of an essay by Bruno Alfieri, previously 
published in Italy, which used the word `Chaos' to describe the paintings of 
Jackson Pollock. Unable to let the criticism pass, Pollock sent Time a telegram that 
began, `NO CHAOS DAMN IT. "' From Coddington, `No Chaos Damn It, ' in 
Varnedoe & Karmel (eds. ), Jackson Pollock. New Approaches, (MOMA, 1999), pg. 
101 ff.. Coddington discussed the order of Pollock's paintings in relation to his 
method but does not reference chaos-theory, fractal analysis or systems-theory in 
doing so. 
330 The paradigm shift from representation to observation is one informed by 
Luhmann's invocation of the concept of observation (and more significantly self- 
observation) as a dominant guiding principle in his systems-theoretical approach. 
He outlined the significance of observation in the following terms: "The relations 
that refer events, actions, conditionings, expectations, and structures to problems 
and that bind functions, references to unity and possibilities for comparison to 
them is not provided for in the performance of action alone; it is a matter of 
observation, that is, a matter of events or processes that are not immediately under 
pressure from a situation. Reproduction of the system can and will carry on 
without its unity being observed. Not everything depends on observation. 
Therefore, free of the pressure of having to produce results, observation can 
afford a more complex view of the system. Accordingly, in the domain of the 
societal system what we have called functional analysis is a principle of scientific 
system observation and not eo ipso a principle of self-organization for societal 
relationship that reproduce themselves everyday. " (Pg. 300) and: "Observation is 
merely the management of a distinction - for example, that between a system and 
environment. It is not a specialized operation for acquiring knowledge, not 
analysis. " (Pg. 177-8. ) Both from: Luhmann, Social Systems, (trans. Bednarz jr. & 
Baecker, ) (Stanford University Press, 1995) 
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the concept of complex system to works of art. More specifically in this 
chapter I will apply a systems-theoretical approach to the abstract work of 
Jackson Pollock and conclude that there are a number of different orders 
of representation that can be observed in relation to such work. 
I have chosen the work of Jackson Pollock for this application for 
two reasons. Firstly, as is discussed below, it has been subject to an 
unsatisfactory systems analysis in which fractal patterns were identified in 
the images; in other words visual evidence of complex patterns have been 
identified in the work yet in a manner which did not, I argue, do justice to 
the radical implications of the Systems-Theoretical approach. 
Secondly an encounter with abstract, non-representational art such 
as Jackson Pollock's Autumn Rhythm: Number 30,1950 highlights the 
problems inherent in seeking to establish what can be observed in an 
image. This is because in the apparent absence of a clear distinction 
between iconographic figure and ground and the lack of a recognisable 
schema of signs and symbols - the ambivalence and artificiality of this 
question about representation, or what can be observed is thrown into 
relief. 
Further, the ambivalence and artificiality of representation in 
abstract art is suggestive of how the figure of the abstract work of art is 
itself be observed against the ground of art-historical discourse. This is to 
say that in the discursive systems of art (as discussed in the final chapter) 
the identity of the art work itself is observed as fluid rather than static, 
ambiguous rather than definitive, and abstract rather than concrete. In 
other words when dealing with abstract art the art historian must confront 
a dual challenge in ascertaining what might be observed, which whilst not 
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specific to abstract art is certainly fore-grounded by it. This dual challenge 
consists of attempting to construct meaning in the face of both a clear 
meaning in the work of art and even a single and obvious strategy for 
determining that single and clear meaning. 
In outlining my arguments the chapter is organised according to the 
following structure. 
1- Answers to the question: What can be observed as represented by 
Jackson Pollock's Autumn Rhythm: Number 30,1950? 
In answer to this, and in relation to the fractal analysis of the image, I 
propose the following answers can be observed "' 
(i) Nature/Mimesis/Representation - in which it is suggested that the 
images, by virtue of the fractal forms within them, can be said to represent 
nature in some sense. 
(ii) Fractals - in which it is suggested that the images can be observed in 
the Formalist terms of their fractal patterns alone 
(iii) An index of Process - in which it is observed that Pollock's work is an 
index of the chaotic process of its creation. 
However, I argue that none of these observations are a satisfactory 
application of the systems-theoretical approach. This is because they treat 
the work of art as a self-contained representative entity. In doing so they 
do not focus their attentions beyond the artwork to the systems which it is 
embedded within or acknowledge the radical implications of the concept of 
distributed representation. 
331 As these observations concern self-similar acts of representation being 
observed at different scales they allegorically mirror the fractal form which they 
invoke. 
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piraIJetty as a complex system of Distributed Representation 2-S 
In this section I return to the very beginning of my thesis by arguing that 
Robert Smithson's Spiral Jetty (1970) is an artwork which is both complex 
and systemic. 
1-Answers to the question: 
What can be observed as represented byJackson Pollock's Autumn 
Rhythm: Number 30,195M P 
Because an art-work can tell us only that which we ask of it, the answer to 
the question what is being represented by Jackson Pollock's Autumn 
Rhythm: Number 30,1950? will depend upon the mode by which that 
question is asked. 
The numerous questions which have been asked of what the art of 
Jackson Pollock represents reflect the cluster of disparate analytical 
critiques the art historian have at their disposal. Marxist, Feminist, Queer, 
Psychoanalytic, Iconographic, Iconologic and Formalist strategies are just 
some of the available. All of these approaches have offered different claims 
about various aspects of the work in response to different questions they 
have asked of it. 
Yet in 1999 in two relatively unassuming papers which appeared in 
Physics World and Naturr, two physicists made a quietly astonishing art 
historical claim. Richard Taylor, Adam Micolich and David Jonas stated 
that through the application of `scientific objectivity' they could determine 
what they claimed to be the `fundamental content' of Jackson Pollock's 
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major work, namely the splatter paintings he produced between 1940 and 
1952. 
To determine this `fundamental content' Taylor, Micolich and 
Jonas' method of objectivity involved an analysis of the particular 
mathematical patterns which they discovered in the paintings. It was 
demonstrated that patterns within the work satisfied the formal 
descriptions of fractals. Fractals are patterns which appear in complex 
systems when they are looked at in a certain way. Therefore by finding 
such patterns in Pollock's work it could be claimed that like other complex, 
and fractal systems, Pollock's work could also be called a complex visual 
system. Such an approach thus demonstrates one way of applying the 
concept of system to the artwork. Yet an approach that I subsequently 
demonstrate is unsatisfactory; both for it's formalist pre-occupations and 
its reliance upon a traditional conception of representation. 
1.1 What is a fractal? 
Stated simply a fractal is a self-similar pattern. 332 This means that the shape 
is the same at different scales of magnification. A visual example of such a 
complex, fractal pattern is provided by the von Koch Curve333 (see image 
332 The literature on fractals is vast. The best introduction to the often baffling 
theory and application of fractal geometry is found in Gleick Chaos, (Vintage, 
1998). The classic work on fractals is Mandlebrot, The Fractal Geometry of Nature, 
(WH Freeman and Company, 1977) which is a balance between accessible 
descriptions of the implications of the theory and obscure mathematics. More 
recent discussions on the applied use of fractal geometry include: Fleischmann, 
Tildessley, Ball (eds. ), Fractals in the Natural Sciences, (Princeton University Press, 
1999); Peitgen, Saupe (eds. ), The Science of FractalImages, (Springer Verlag, 1988); 
Peitgen, Richter, The Beauty of Fractals, (Springer Verlag, 1896). 
333 The Koch curve is so named after the Helge von Koch who first described the 
pattern in 1904 
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The von Koch curve represented at different stages of its genesis 
Richard Voss: "A simple line segment is divided into thirds and the middle segment is 
replaced by two equal segments forming part of an equilateral triangle. At the next stage 
in the construction each of these four segments is replaced by four new segments with 
length 1/3 of their parent according to the original pattern. This procedure, repeated 
over and over, yields the beautiful von Koch curve. " 
on facing page. ) This is a pattern which is complex, as opposed to 
complicated, and hence it is a pattern associated with complex systems. 
The Koch Curve can be constructed using the following simple 
rule given by Richard Voss: 
A simple line segment is divided into thirds and the middle 
segment is replaced by two equal segments forming part of an 
equilateral triangle. At the next stage in the construction each of 
these four segments is replaced by four new segments with length 
1 /3 of their parent according to the original pattern. This 
procedure, repeated over and over, yields the beautiful von Koch 
curve 334 
Thus, by the continued iteration of the initial rule of construction, an image 
emerges which will be infinitely complex in so far as it will obey this simple 
rule regardless of the scale of magnification at which it is viewed. The edge 
of the Koch curve, comprised as it is of ever diminishing triangles, is a loop 
which tightens in upon itself to a greater degree the higher the 
magnification. Further just as the detail of the edge of the image will 
continue to increase as the scale of magnification of the image increases to 
infinity so too the length of the line around the space enclosed by the edge 
of the fractal is infinite. Therefore if we take the initial triangle from which 
the curve is extrapolated, as having sides of length 1 then, as Gleick 
explained: 
The length of the boundary is 3x 4/3 x 4/3 x 4/3.... - infinity. Yet 
the area remains less than the area of a circle drawn around the 
original triangle 335 
This highlights a key paradox of the fractal. This paradox concerns the 
incongruity between the area of the fractal, which can be shown to be less 
334 Voss, `Fractals in Nature: From Characterization to Simulation', in Peitgen and 
ges, (Springer - Verlag, 1988) pg. 26 Saupe (eds. ), The Science of Fractal Ima 
335 Gleick, Chaos, (Vintage, 1987) pg. 99 
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than the area of a circle drawn around the whole image, and the possibility 
that this finite area is contained within an infinitely long edge. Looked at in 
a slightly different way, this can, again, be conceived of as an issue of scale 
with the length of the edge of the curve being seen as relative to the scale 
at which we observe the image. 
Gleick's description of how to generate a von Koch curve by taking 
a simple command and then repeating it further demonstrates how the 
pattern is also a visual analogue for a complex, systemic process. It thus 
demonstrates another systems principle; that of irreversibility and the role 
of memory in the genesis of the pattern. The Koch curve is generated by 
repeating a simple instruction and therefore the pattern has `memorised' 
the conditions of its creation. This illustrates a third key systems principle; 
namely that small causes can have big effects because of the role played by 
positive feedback in such systems. This is also known as the butterfly 
effect. 
Before the discussion on Jackson Pollock's work in relation to such 
fractals which follows below I will first outline in more detail how fractals 
patterns, described briefly above and identified in Pollock's work, are more 
specifically related to complex systems. In short fractals provide visual 
evidence of complex behaviour within dynamical systems. In other words 
they are a means of visualising complexity. It is by virtue of this 
visualisation of complexity that they were applied to the complex, dynamic 
visual systems observable within Pollock's work. 
Fractals are the most easily recognisable icon of the discourse on 
chaos and complexity. It is no surprise therefore to see an fractal displayed 
on the cover of Gleick's bestseller Chaos. Fractals, such as the von Koch 
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curve, are complex and self-similar patterns which emerge from simple 
rules. Fractals can be used to provide visual models of the states and 
behaviours of complex systems. Used in this way they provide an easily 
recognisable visual representation of certain patterns within mathematical 
models of complexity. As Gleick said; despite the fact that: 
The mind cannot visualize the whole infinite self-embedding of 
complexity... In the mind's eye, a fractal is a way of seeing 
infinity. 336 
Infinitude is invoked conceptually when looking at a fractal image because 
a fractal is a mathematical concept and the pattern they produce 
demonstrates an infinite level of self-similar complexity. This means that 
strictly speaking the reproduced images which have come to represent 
fractals of chaos in the popular consciousness, such as that on the cover of 
Chaos are not fractals in the sense of duplicating their complexity to an 
infinite degree of scale. Due to limitations of printing procedures, and 
suchlike, the reproduced images we see of fractals do not, by necessity, 
replicate to an infinite degree of magnification. However they are 
representations of various mathematical models and are, as such, visual 
analogues of conceptual ideas of infinite self-similarity. 
Fractals contain within their replicating patterns a conceptual 
signpost to an infinite degree of self-similarity. It is by virtue of this infinite 
degree of self-similarity that they are patterns which are dynamic and 
complex. Like the very specific distinction between complicated systems 
and complex systems Fractal refers to a particular type of visual and 
systemic complexity which is conceptually distinct from the merely visually 
336 Gleick, Chaos, (Vintage, 1998) Pg. 98,101 
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complex. Fractals are not merely complicated images or ones containing a 
high level of detail and a complicated image is not (necessarily) fractal by 
virtue of its level of detail. A printed-circuit board, for example, is very 
complicated and could well contain detail beyond the ability of the unaided 
human eye to perceive, it is not however a fractal. The systems connected 
with fractals are, instead, complex. As is discussed in a previous chapter 
these systems are complex (related to the dynamics of the complex system) 
as opposed to the complicated (related to systematic informational density). 
The fractal system is Complex in the Systems definition of the word as 
being distinct from complicated with regards to what Cilliers has observed: 
"I have heard it said, by someone from France, of course, that a jumbo jet 
is complicated, but that mayonnaise is complex. s337 
A fractal is then, in some respects, similar to Mayonnaise. 
Fractals are defined as being complex because of a fundamental 
characteristic of their make-up - namely self-similarity. Further it is by 
virtue of their self-similarity that their complexity emerges. Self similarity 
means that the structure is similar to itself over different scales or different 
degrees of magnitude. The pioneer of Fractal Geometry Benoit Mandlebrot 
defined his discovery of fractal geometry in the following terms; 
Broadly speaking, mathematical and natural fractals are shapes 
whose roughness and fragmentation neither tend to vanish, not 
fluctuate up and down, but remain essentially unchanged as one 
zooms in continually and examination is refined. Hence the 
structure of every piece holds the key to the whole structure. 38 
337 Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernity, (Routledge, 1998), pg. 3 
338 B. B. Mandlebrot, `Fractal Geometry: what is it, and what does it do?, Fractals in 
the Natural Sciences; a discussion organized and edited by M. Fleischman, F. RS., D. J. 
Tildesley and RC. Ball, eds. M. Fleischman, D j. Tildesley and R. C. Ba1, (Princeton 
University Press, 1989) pp. 3-16 
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The implications of Mandlebrot's observation are that every part of 
a fractal image can be described in the same terms as any other part of the 
image. Thus, no matter what level of magnification a fractal is viewed at, it 
can always be described by using the same rules. Mandelbrot further 
observed: 
The key to fractal geometry's effectiveness resides in a surprising 
discovery that the author has made, largely thanks to computer 
graphics. The algorithms that generate the other fractals are 
typically so extraordinarily short, as to look positively dumb. This 
means that they must be called `simple'. Their fractal outputs, to 
the contrary, often appear to involve structures of great richness 339 
The Koch Curve is one of simplest ways of conceiving the idea of a self- 
similar structure. It will be visually similar, and will look the same at any 
level of magnification, because every part of the structure will conform to 
the simple re-iterated rule of construction given above. However a 
structure can still be self-similar and hence fractal without maintaining 
exact visual similarity across scales. This is because self-similarity can 
extend to statistical self-similarity (Voss)340, meaning that the same, simple 
mathematical rule describes the macro and micro elements of the particular 
complex structure. It is this balance between simplicity and complexity 
which distinguishes fractal models from the merely complicated. Based, as 
they are, upon simple `rules' re-iterated infinitely their structure, like other 
complex systems is based upon a certain order which is at once basic yet 
multiplex, ordered yet dynamic, determined yet random. 
339 B. B. Mandlebrot, `Fractal Geometry: what is it, and what does it do? ', Fractals in 
the Natural Sciences; a discussion organized and edited by M. Fleischman, F. R. S., D. J. 
Tildesley and R. C. Ball, eds. M. Fleischman, D j. Tildesley and RC. Bal, (Princeton 
University Press, 1989) pg. 6 
340 Voss, `Fractals in Nature: From Characterization to Simulation', in Peitgen and 
Saupe (eds. ), The Science of FractalImages, (Springer - Verlag, 1988) pg. 30 
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There is a further relationship between Fractals and complex 
systems. This relationship occurs because it is also the case that fractals are 
most likely to become apparent in those complex and dynamical systems 
which are poised in a state of non-equilibrium; that is within systems which 
are described by Broomhead and Jones as systems whose: "dynamical 
behaviour is governed by non-linear evolution equations. ""' This includes 
such dynamically chaotic systems such as those which have been observed 
in the natural world which include systems such as those seen in 
connection with neuron activity (in conscious systems), chemical reactions, 
fluid flows and economic systems, all of which have been modelled using 
the methods of fractal geometry. 342 Further examples of this are provided 
by Gleick who related how problems in the mapping of human anatomy 
have been solved through the application of fractals. To illustrate the wide 
variety of systems which display fractal patterns here are some examples: 
The Urinary collecting system, for example has been shown to be 
constructed according to a fractal structure, 343 as have the edges of clouds 
and the economic system of 20`' Century cotton prices as analysed by 
Mandelbrot. 344 
341 Broomhead and Jones, Time-Series Analysis', Fractals in the Natural Sciences; a 
discussion organized and edited by M. Fleischman, F. R. S., D. J. Tildesley and RC. Ball, eds. 
M. Fleischman, D . J. Tildesley and R. C. Bal, (Princeton University Press, 1989) pg. 
103 
342 See especially Fischer and Smith ed., Chaos, Fractals and Dynamics, (Marcel 
Dekker Inc., 1985) and Peitgen and Saupe (eds), The Science of FractalImages, 
(Springer - Verlag, 1988) 
343 Gleick, pg. 109. Other examples can be found in Peitgen and Saupe (eds. ), The 
Science of FractalImages, (Springer - Verlag, 1988) and Fractals in the Natural Sciences; a 
discussion organized and edited by M. Fleischman, F. RS., D. J. Tildesly and RC. Ball, eds. 
M. Fleischman, D j. Tildesley and R. C. Bal, (Princeton University Press, 1989) 
344 `Indeed when Mandlebrot sifted [Houthkakker's] cotton-price data through 
IBM's computers, he found the astonishing results he was seeking. The numbers 
that produced aberrations from the point of view of normal distribution [and the 
classical economical model of supply and demand] produced symmetry from the 
point of view of scaling. Each particular price change was random and 
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Because, in a fractal pattern, the micro corresponds to the macro, 
by having the same description across different orders of magnitude, the 
structural organisation of the system is duplicated throughout the different 
scales of that system. This provides another example of the principle of 
self-organisation which I have observed elsewhere within this thesis as a 
key characteristic of complex systems. In other words the system is 
organised according to simple rules which have been iterated (that is 
repeated) at different scales. Further, this demonstrates how a fractal 
pattern demonstrates another characteristic of complex systems; namely 
irreversibility and the role systemic memory plays in the structure of the 
system via processes of positive (and negative) feedback. Because a fractal 
pattern is formed by the repetition of these simple instructions the role of 
systemic memory forms part of the way that pattern is formed. The system, 
in its entirety, has remembered the initial and subsequent iterations of that 
instruction, within the pattern which accumulates. Hence via positive 
feedback every iteration forms part of the structure of the whole system. 
An example of this is demonstrated in the now-familiar Butterfly Effect. A 
Butterfly flapping its wings in Glasgow and causing a tidal wave in New 
York could be likened to a fractal pattern whereby a self-similar pressure 
wave to that of the butterfly's wings is the, now amplified, tidal wave. To 
return again to the Koch Snowflake as a means by which to visualise such 
behavioural patterns; the complexity of this pattern is a function of the 
unpredictable. But the sequence of changes was independent of scale; curves for 
daily prices and monthly price changes matched perfectly. Incredibly, analyzed 
Mandelbrot's way [according to fractal patterns] the degree of variation remained 
constant over a tumultuous sixty-year period that saw two World-Wars and a 
depression. ' Gleick, Chaos, (Vintage, 1998) pg. 86 
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system `memorising' and subsequent repeating the initial motif of the 
pattern. 
In summary of the above introduction to the form of the fractal it 
is argued that the analysis of fractals represents a systems approach in so 
far as it focuses attention upon the whole structure, or system, of the 
fractal across all scales. 
In the arguments that follow below it is conjectured that if we can 
find evidence of fractals within a work of art then we have found a way of 
finding a system (in this case a complex visual system) within the work of 
art. This might, therefore, suggest a way of applying the systems-theoretical 
approach within Art History. 
1.2 Pollock, Fractals and Systems 
Artistic activity involves acts of representation and fractals are a visual 
analogue of a theoretical mathematical model. It is argued therefore that 
the act of representation provides a link between fractal mathematical 
models and art. It is further argued that because fractals provide specifically 
visual evidence of complex systems, if they can be identified in particular 
works of art then we have, perhaps, found evidence of complex, systemic 
behaviour within those works of art. Evidence of Fractals in certain 
artworks would then provide a demonstration of the formal concept of 
system to the work of art. This has, arguably, been demonstrated by the 
discovery of fractal patterns within the splatter paintings of Jackson 
Pollock, which, according to certain fractal analysis, can be seen to 
demonstrate evidence of complex, chaotic and hence systemic properties. 
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Three theoretical physicists, Richard Taylor, Adam Micholich and David 
Jonas, have attempted such a fractal analysis of Pollock's images. In 
conclusion they argued that certain of Pollock's abstract canvases are 
fractal. That is that they satisfy a calculation of fractal dimensions whereby, 
like other naturally occurring fractals such as coastlines and the edges of 
clouds etc.: 
The large amount of repeating structure within a fractal pattern 
causes it to occupy more space than a smooth on-dimensional line, 
but not to the extent of completely filling the two dimensional 
145 plane. 
Fractal dimensionality is the method Mandlebrot used to describe the 
relationship the viewer has to the object with regards to scaling, or the level 
of detail at which the object is analysed. Contrary to the 3 dimensions of 
Euclidean geometry, of height, depth and breadth, of which we are 
intuitively familiar, fractal dimensions need not be an integer. Fractal 
dimension is a way of expressing a level of detail of a self-similar shape in 
relation to the observer's level of scrutiny. Thus the fractal dimension, or 
D, provides an expression of the level of detail of that shape, or, as Voss 
has explained: "the fractal dimension D, thus, provides a quantitative 
measure of the wiggliness of the curves. "'46 
Gleick describes this concept of fractal dimensions thus: 
What is the dimension of a ball of twine? Mandlebrot answered, it 
depends on your point of view. From a great distance the ball is no 
more than a point, with zero dimensions. From closer the ball is 
seen to fill spherical space, taking up three dimensions. From closer 
still, the twine comes into view, and the object becomes effectively 
one-dimensional, though the one dimension is certainly tangled 
around itself in a way that makes use of three dimensional space. 
345 Taylor, Micolich, Jonas, `Fractal Expressionism, ' Physics World, (vol. 12,10, 
October 1999) pg. 25-28 
346 The Science of Fractal Images, pg. 29 
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The notion of how many numbers it takes to specify a point 
remains useful. From far away it takes none - the point is all there 
is. From closer it takes three. From closer still, one is enough - any 
given position along the length of twine is unique, whether the 
twine is stretched out or tangled up in a ball" 
For certain shapes, Mandlebrot argued, their dimensionality is best 
expressed in terms between integers; they are, in other words, not clearly 
defined by one scale, but instead have a certain, yet characteristic 
irregularity which remains constant over different scales. This is the regular 
irregularity of the self-similar and infinite patterns suggested by fractals. 
The concept of Fractal dimensions is an obscure one which 
requires detailed mathematical working to express fully. Let it therefore 
suffice to acknowledge that within the practice of fractal analysis, 
dimensions of between 1 and 2, for complex and irregular shapes indicate 
that the shape has a fractal dimension. Therefore if such a dimension could 
be discovered in a shape it could be identified as a fractal. Such methods 
were applied by Jonas et al. to Pollock's canvases and in conclusion it was 
suggested that by satisfying the formal descriptions of fractals it could be 
argued that the canvases of Pollock could be successfully analysed as if they 
were complex systems. 
To demonstrate the existence of fractals within Pollock's painting 
the work Number 14,1948 (see image on facing page) was analysed using 
the following method. A5x5 cm. square was placed over the canvas at 
various points and the patterns with analysed according to pattern density. 
The conclusion reached was that the pattern within the square was self- 
similar, in so far as it could be described using the same formal rules of 
347 Gleick, Chaos, (Vintage, 1998), pg. 95 
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Pollock: no 14,1948, (1948) 
fractal description, at different places on the canvas. Further, this pattern 
was seen to be similar to that observed in other chaotic and naturally 
occurring systems such as the edges of clouds, river patterns, coastlines and 
lightning paths. 348 It was concluded, therefore, that certain of Pollock's `all- 
over' drip paintings from between 1940 and 1950 were not just randomly 
chaotic, but that they could be expressed by fractal dimensions. 
The second stage of the analysis thus moved to calculating the 
fractal dimension of certain paintings; this entailed discovering the certain 
mathematical descriptions of these observed patterns, in order that they 
could be compared both with each other and with other fractal patterns, 
such as naturally occurring ones. These were calculated in the following 
manner. 
The chosen painting was scanned into a computer and overlaid with a 
computer-generated grid of identical squares. This was to allow for the so- 
called `box-counting' method of analysis. Numerous counts were done, 
each using different sizes of squares between the very largest (1 square 
containing the whole canvas), to the very smallest which was taken to be 
the detail of the very finest paintwork (which in this case was found to be a 
square of 0.8 mm. ) The figures accrued were then used to determine the 
fractal dimensions of the patterns 3a9 It was found that when plotted on a 
348 Taylor, Micolich, Jonas, `Fractal Expressionism, ' Physics World, ( vol. 12,10, 
October 1999) pg. 25-28 
349 "Values of the Fractal dimension, D, are then extracted from a graph of N (L) 
versus L using the relation N(L) -LD. [Where N (L) is the number of squares 
that contain part of the painted pattern]. The validity of this expression increases 
as L becomes smaller and the total number of boxes in the mesh is large enough 
to provide reliable counting statistics. In our measurements the total number of 
boxes ranges from 100 to 4 million. If the results are plotted on log-log axes, the 
gradient of the curve is -D. The straightness of the graph's curve reflects statistical 
self-similarity of the pattern, and the accuracy of the pattern has been confirmed 
by analyzing test patterns consisting of standard fractals of known dimensions. " 
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Detail of non-chaotic (top) and chaotic (middle) drip trajectories generated by a 
pendulum and detail of Pollock's'Number 14' painting from 1948 (bottom). Images 
from Jonas et al, `Fractal Expressionism. ' 
particular graph (as shown in image on facing page) a straight line could be 
observed which suggests a statistical self-similarity in the pattern for 
different sizes of boxes. This means that the pattern is self-similar in terms 
of its numerical description, over different levels of magnification between 
0.8mm and around 2.5 meters. 
Jonas et al. found that in several of the paintings that they 
investigated there are two co-existent fractal patterns. This means that 
there are two levels of detail. Of these levels of detail both have a differing 
fractal dimension relative to the level of detail at which the pattern is 
analysed: the first pattern corresponding to the fine paintwork at a scale of 
between 1mm and 5 cm; and the second pattern corresponding to the 
broad paintwork at a scale between 5 cm and 2.5 m. 35o Both patterns can 
be expressed as a fractal dimension. Thus, for example, Blue Poles Number 
11 (1952), was found to demonstrate two fractal patterns, the first of which 
the close detail fractal, or Dd - having a value 1.72, with the larger scale 
pattern, or DL having a value which was stated to be "quite close to 2. " In 
all the paintings analysed the second, large scale, fractal was found to have 
a value close to 2, and the following values were found for the small-scale 
fractal pattern, Dd - Untitled. - Composition With Pouring II (1943) - has a Dd 
value "close to 1 ", Number 14,1948 has a Dd value of 1.45 and Autumn 
Rhythm: Number30,1950 a Dd value of 1.67. 
Taylor, Micolich, Jonas, `Fractal Expressionism, ' Physics World, (vol. 12,10, 
October 1999) pg. 25-28 
350 `°This fractal analysis reveals two distinct D values occurring over the ranges 
1mm L< 5cm and 5 cm <L2.5 M. " from Taylor, Micolich, Jonas, `Fractal 
Analysis of Pollock's Drip Paintings', Nature, vol 399,3 June 1999, pg. 422. 
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At this point it is worth recalling that Jonas et al's self-proclaimed 
method of `scientific objectivity' was applied with the promise of the holy 
grail of art historical investigation; namely what they claimed was the 
`fundamental content' of several of Jackson Pollock's paintings produced 
between 1940 and 1952. This claim has lead to the conclusion that within 
these paintings there are fractal patterns, and that a painting such as 
Autumn Rhythm: Number 30,1950 has two fractal dimensions: 
a Dd value of 1.67 and a DL value close to 2. 
This is reminiscent of the statement made by the computer Deep 
Thought in Douglas Adams' Hitch-Hikers Guide to the Galaxy, which having 
pondered the ultimate existential question, the meaning of life, the universe 
and everything, gave the answer as being 42. Upon giving the under- 
whelming answer the computer subsequently made the Earth as a 
computer to calculate the Question of what was the meaning of life, the 
universe and everything. And like Deep Thought, it would seem that if the 
fundamental content of Autumn Rhythm: Number 30,1950, is 1.67 and nearly 
2, then the questions we are asking of it need some further investigation 
presented? needs asking again. and refinement. This question what is being re 
In the concluding section I will revisit the question which I began 
this chapter with - `What is being represented by Jackson Pollock's Autumn 
Rhythm: Number 30,1950? 
I will provide four different responses to this question; all of which 
are related to the fractal forms discovered within them. Because each 
answer to the question engages in a different order of representation it is 
also functions as an analogy for the form of the fractal itself; that is as a 
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self-similar pattern which is manifested at different scales within the 
discursive system of my thesis. 
1.3 What can be observed? (1) Nature/Mimesis/Representation 
Firstly it could be argued that existence of fractal patterns in Pollock's all- 
over canvases demonstrate that they are a representation of the natural 
world. As has already been observed fractal patterns occur naturally in 
nature (for example in bracken fronds and capillaries in the lungs. ) Taylor, 
Micolich and Jonas note that natural fractal patterns such as coastlines and 
lightning display a fractal dimension of between 1.25 and 3. They also 
observe that systems which have two fractal dimensions, like the paintings, 
also display, are also naturally occurring. The examples they provide of this 
are "trees and bronchial systems. " Thus, by illustrating fractal patterns and 
demonstrating such dynamic, systemic patterns as are naturally occurring, 
the paintings could be seen to be mimetically representative of naturally 
occurring dynamic systems. Hence the dynamism of the natural world is 
seen as re-presented within the complex artistic system supported by the 
canvas. 
1.4 What can be observed? (2) The Fractal Itself 
The second answer to the question takes a Formalist reading of the fractal 
patterns and suggests that what is being represented is the fractal itself. 
This question takes the painting as a closed system of representation 
gesturing toward the conceptual object of a mathematical model; the icon 
of which is the fractal pattern. 
This second approach thus brings the response within the sphere 
of the claims which have been made for other fractal images. If Pollock's 
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paintings are fractals, then naturally it follows that what has been claimed 
for fractal images may be claimed for them. Fractal images provided as 
representations of mathematical models have been applied to an aesthetic 
analysis, as if they were artworks. And it has been suggested that in their 
graphical representation of the non-representable infinite regress of self- 
similarity, they might display aesthetic qualities. Certainly this is how 
Mandelbrot conceived of his fractal geometry, as a "world of pure plastic 
beauty unsuspected till now. s351 In this respect then, it could be argued that 
fractals provide an ultra-modernist artform; an expression of Mondrian's 
Pure Plastic Art. Mondrian's definition of his `Pure Plastic Art' would 
indeed seem to fulfil the criteria of a fractal in so far, as he argued that: 
The important task of all art, then, is to destroy the static 
equilibrium by establishing a dynamic one. Non-figurative art 
demands an attempt of what is a consequence of this task, the 
destruction of particular form and the construction of a rhythm of 
mutual relations, of mutual forms of free lines 352 
Following this line of argument, the self-similar, fractal patterns of 
Autumn Rhythm: Number 30,1950, as with other visual representation of 
fractals (such as image of Julia set on facing page) suggest a visual system 
which is in a state of dynamic, non-equilibrium, and which, by virtue of its 
scaling self-similarity, is a "construction of a rhythm of mutual relations, of 
mutual forms of free lines. " Couched in these terms fractals (Pollock's 
included) are exemplary of Modernist Pure PlasticArt. 
351 Mandelbrot, The Fractal Geometry of Nature, (W. H. Freeman and Company, 
1977), Pg. 4 
352 Mondrian, `Pure Art and Pure Plastic Art' (1936), in Chipp (ed. ), Theories of 
Modern Art, (University of California Press, 1968) pg. 349 ff. 
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A Julia Set Fractal 
Developing this question further, in an article which appeared in 
Modern Painters, P. W. Atkins argued that images based upon fractals fulfilled 
the description of being a `hypermodern art'. He argued that in its synthesis 
of aesthetic and scientific concerns the fractal could provide the conceptual 
basis for an art which was suitable for our technologically and scientifically 
advanced society. From his starting point that "it is plausible that a 
rigorously scientific basis of aesthetics will one day be available", he argued 
that aesthetic response results from the `exposure' of the "appropriately 
resonant circuitrys353 of the brain to the aesthetic object which is the focus 
of the aesthetic attention. Whilst, as Akins admits, such a determinist 
project is beyond the present state of Biological and Physical knowledge, 
Atkins argues that such a model of aesthetic response, which is reminiscent 
of Kantian aesthetics and the `free-play' of reason and imagination can, 
theoretically, be conceived of in materialist terms as being a function of the 
organic system of consciousness. In conclusion Atkins goes on to state that 
because fractals are mathematically, intellectually and aesthetically both 
engaging and pleasing they are `beautiful' images. This is because, he 
argued, "At one level the warmth of our response to it must lie in the 
dizzying richness of the image. A fractal image is an image without end. " 
Fractals are, for Atkins, in their simple, yet theoretical infinite complexity 
"deep, inexhaustible wells of beauty. " 
Following this line of thought it could be argued that as fractals 
Pollock's paintings such as Autumn Rhythm: Number 30,1950 also fulfil the 
strictly formal (and mathematical) conditions of being "deep, inexhaustible 
353 Atkins, 'T'he Rose, The Lion, and the Ultimate Oyster', Modern Painters, (Vol. 2, 
4, Winter, 1989/90), pg. 50-55 
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wells of beauty, " and are, therefore, a fulfilment of the criteria of a 
hypermodern art of which Atkins talks about. The logical conclusion of 
this would seem to suggest that if both fractals are inherently aesthetic, and 
the canvases are inherently fractal, then it is possible to provide an 
algorithm for beauty in art. At the heart of this take on fractals is the 
suggestion that there can be a mathematically formalised set of formal 
procedures (algorithms) lying at the core of the visual systems of Pure 
Plastic, hypermodern Art. Playing like a parody of Greenbergian formalism 
the conclusion would be that the hypermodern beauty of Pollock's 
paintings has at its core an explanation in terms of the fractal dimensions 
implicit in these images. 
1.5 What can be observed? (3) An index of process 
As Rosenberg suggested in The American Action Painters's (1952) one 
way of looking at the complex visual system of Pollock's paintings is that 
what is being represented on the canvas is "not a picture but an event. "354 
According to this interpretation the paint on the canvas is an index of the 
act of its creation. It is thus representative of Pollock's movements around 
the canvas and it serves as a visual record of not only his own movements 
around the canvas but also the application of the paint itself whether it was 
placed by Pollock or let to fall by its own devices. That this index of 
creation and the application of the paint is Fractal suggest that the way in 
which the paint fell was chaotic and hence dynamic in its nature in the 
354 Rosenberg, `American Action Painters, ' in Harrison & Wood, Art in Theory 
1900-1990, (Blackwell, 1991) 
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same way that other natural process can be modelled using the visual 
analogue of the fractal ass 
As already noted in the paintings analysed by Taylor, Jonas and 
Micholich two fractal dimensions were identified, corresponding to two 
different types of patterns. If these patterns are, as has been suggested, an 
index of process, then it can also be shown that these two fractal patterns 
correspond to different working procedures. Taylor, Jonas and Micholich 
acknowledge this and suggest that the two fractal dimensions represent the 
following: 
(i) An all-over, large-scale pattern which could be seen as the visual 
scaffolding of the paintings. This corresponds to Pollock's movement 
around the canvas. This pattern was identified as having a fractal 
dimension of "nearly 2. " Significantly this figure is the same for the larger 
pattern in all of the canvases which were analysed. This suggests that a 
similar process was being employed each time. This pattern is the anchor 
layer of the painting, upon which the complete pattern is built upon, 
around and within. 
(ii) A smaller scale fractal pattern which fills in the detail of the scaffolding 
of the anchor layer. This pattern is an index of a finer, more detailed 
working approach which concentrates upon particular areas of the canvas 
at any one time (as opposed to the anchor layer which involves working on 
the canvas as a whole. ) It is suggested that this pattern is the detaillayer of 
the painting. Taylor, Jonas and Micholich claim that this smaller scale 
355 Whirlpools and sand piles are two such examples discussed by Buchanan, in 
Ubiquity (Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 2000) 
- 256 - 
pattern represents Pollock's dripping technique which was `refined' 
between the years 1943 - 1952. And they have stated that: 
Our analysis shows that Pollock refined his dripping technique: the 
fractal dimensions increased steadily through the years from close 
356 to 1 in 1943 to 1.72 in 1952 
They argued that this increase in the fractal dimension, which means simply 
that the pattern became more expansive, meant that the pattern of this 
detail layer became more dense in Pollock's later abstract work. This could 
be used, therefore, they argue as a legitimate art historical technique. They 
state that the: "fractal analysis could be used as a quantitative, objective 
technique both to validate and date Pollock's drip paintings. i357 
The claim that these two fractal patterns inherent in Pollock's visual 
systems correspond to different working practice can be validated by 
looking at accounts of Pollock's method of working on the abstract 
canvases. These accounts corroborate the argument that the patterns are 
visual indicators of the dynamic events of their creation. First hand 
accounts of Pollock at work by Goodnought, Namuth (who filmed 
Pollock) and Karmel358 (who has produced an exhaustive study based upon 
Namuth's films and other accounts of Pollock at work) demonstrate on 
one hand Pollock's broad approach to the whole canvas (corresponding to 
the fractal of the anchor layers); and his more detailed close working of the 
canvas (corresponding to fractal the detail layers. ) 
356 Taylor, Micolich, Jonas, `Fractal Analysis of Pollock's Drip Paintings', Nature, 
vol 399,3 June 1999, pg. 422. 
357Taylor, Micolich, Jonas, `Fractal Analysis of Pollock's Drip Paintings', Nature, 
vol 399,3 June 1999, pg. 422. 
358 All quoted in Pepe Karmel, `Pollock at work: The Films and Photographs of 
Hans Namuth, ' In: Varnedoe with Karmel, Jackson Pollock, (The Museum of 
Modern Art, 1998) 
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The accounts of the processes involved in the creation of Autumn Rhythm: 
Number 30,1950 demonstrate this. In an article which first appeared in Art 
News in 1951, Goodnought gave the following description of Pollock's 
method. 
At the start of the process Pollock began with a blank, clean 
canvas, which, Goodnought observed, was worked in a period of intense 
and absorbing activity (about 2 hours) at the end of which Pollock was 
"completely exhausted. " 
After a while he took a can of black enamel... and a stubby brush 
which he dipped into the paint and then began to move his arm 
rhythmically about, letting the paint fall in a variety of movements 
on the surface. At times he would crouch, holding the brush close 
to the canvas, and again he would stand and move around it or step 
on it to reach to the middle. Within half an hour the entire surface 
had taken on an activity of weaving rhythms... As he continued, 
still with black, going back over former areas, rhythms were 
intensified with counteracting movements 359 
Then, Goodnought related, Pollock would spend two weeks becoming 
accustomed to the painting, after which he would sporadically apply 
different layers of paint to the canvas in a more deliberate fashion. The 
third and final working of the canvas, some weeks after the initial act of 
construction is described by Goodnought in terms which are instructive. 
This process was described as being: 
"Slow and deliberate. The design had become exceeding complex and had to 
be brought to a state of complete organization.. "360 
359 Pepe Karmel, `Pollock at work: The Films and Photographs of Hans Namuth, ' 
In: Varnedoe with Karmel, Jackson Pollock, (The Museum of Modern Art, 1998) 
360 Goodnought quoted in Karmel, (1998) (pg. 95) Emphasis added. 
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Whilst Karmal discusses inconsistencies with Goodnought's account, it is 
clear nonetheless that Pollock did work at different levels of intensity at 
different periods of time until the canvas as a whole was left. 
Goodnought's identification of three types of activity (the initial work, the 
complementary changes and the final, close detailing) this would, therefore 
correspond with Taylor, Jonas and Micholich's argument that the different 
fractal dimensions represent different working processes; on the one hand 
a canvas-wide action, and on the other a closer detailing of the pattern. 
Karmel also provides evidence of this taken from his close scrutiny of the 
two films Namuth made of Pollock at work. To demonstrate this Karmel 
uses some of Namuth's colour film out-takes from the filming of Pollock 
working on a now lost painting made on red canvas. Karmel suggests that 
this footage refutes the idea that the paint is applied rapidly at random, but 
is instead he says a 
Step by step evolution of the painting from bare canvas to a complex 
web, ' which, demonstrates Pollock's, non-random, `combination of 
kinetic freedom and formal control. 36' 
As Karmel also observes with reference to one sequence of film: 
A close look at several frames [of the film] sequence underscores 
the fact that the . plats are produced 
by a different band motion than the 
initial curves. After taking the brush from the paint can, Pollock lifts 
his hand and bends the brush inward, toward his body; he then 
snaps his forearm downward, finishing with his palm down rather 
than up. It is the same gesture of wind-up and release visible in 
some of the still photographs of Pollock working on Autumn 
Rhythm. 362 
Such a working method is also seen in the section of the second film where 
Pollock paints onto glass, with the camera beneath. 
361 Ibid. 
362 Karmel, (1998) pg. 114 
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There are two important parts of this statement. Firstly the observation 
that there is visual evidence of Pollock's differing techniques which again 
corroborates the argument that the two fractal patterns correspond to two 
differing types of activity. And secondly there is the observation that 
Pollock used the same type of motions between canvases (in this case the 
lost, red canvas painting and Autumn Rhythm: Number 30,1950 - which was 
subjected to fractal analysis. ) This further confirms the argument that there 
is a fractal similarity shared between (a selection of) the canvases. 
1.6 What can be observed? (4) A different scale of observation 
There is a self-similarity in the three arguments given above for what is 
being represented in Pollock's work. 
In all of the three arguments above Pollock's abstract canvases are 
saved from the irrationality of abstraction through the work being observed 
as representing the concept of `system. ' 
Through the discovery of fractal patterns within them they are seen 
to demonstrate meaning through being representative in some form; be 
this literally, conceptually or visually. 
Firstly is was suggested that the fractal patterns are representative 
of nature by being mimetic of abstract, dynamic or natural systems. 
Secondly it was suggested that the fractal patterns are representative 
of a conceptual ideal, of a way of visualising infinite self-similarity and that 
art using them was therefore a hypermodern artform that has certain 
inherent aesthetic qualities. 
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Thirdly it was suggested that the fractal patterns are representative 
of the process of their creation - that they a dynamic, visual system which 
is an index of the patterns of the non-periodic repetitions of their genesis. 
Yet all of these self-similar acts of representation are founded on 
paradox. 
All three are answers to the question of what is being represented 
in the fractal forms discovered in the visual systems of the paintings. The 
self-contradiction here is that these abstract paintings only become 
representative by being abstract. This is because it is only through the 
establishment of the fractal as the figure, differentiated from the ground of 
the canvas, that they are seen as being representative of the abstract, 
dynamic (and natural) systemic patterns as they are re-presented upon the 
canvas and within the picture space. 
This paradox is illustrated further by a particular example from 
Karmel. Having undergone an exhaustive analysis of Pollock's painting 
methods through close observation of Namuth's films of Pollock at work 
(using, amongst other methods, computer reconstructions of whole 
canvases from filmed parts), Karmel finds an initial figurative order to 
Pollock's visual system. In contrast to Goodnought's account of Pollock's 
tri-partite working method, Karmel suggests the work has four stages with 
the first, intense period of activity being split into two also distinct actions. 
Firstly there was an initial tracing of calligraphic and loosely 
representational figures (clearly distinct from the ground) followed by the 
second task of immediate over-painting and obscuring of these figures. 
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In one example, number 27,1950, the painting was begun with black lines, 
and a series of loose arcs which are vaguely descriptive of the Picasso- 
esque motifs which appear elsewhere in Pollock's work. Karmel has related 
this inception of the work: 
Watching from above, we see a hand extend a paint-clotted brush a 
few inches above the bare canvas. A black line appears on the white 
surface below it. As the brush moves through the air, the line 
swerves to the left, curves upward, and then loops to the right, 
forming a pumpkin shaped ovoid. Narrow, then thick, then narrow 
again, it terminates in a pair of tiny blots connected by a stem; a 
miniature barbell with one end light and the other dark..... 
In the following nine seconds, Pollock adds a series of lines 
describing the contours of a figure unmistakably similar to the 
figures in earlier pictures such as Untitled (Cut Out) (1948). One line 
curves upward on the left to form a shoulder then turns down and 
right to make an arm, terminating in calligraphic fingers. A second 
line rises from the left corner of the canvas to describe a foot and a 
leg. A third descends on the right, bending at the knee. A fourth is 
bent into a foot, shaped like a triangular shirt hanger. Moving right, 
Pollock begins a second figure, working upward this time instead of 
down 363 
Having stated this Karmel argues next that the randomness of Pollock's 
painting in the second half of this first stage obscures this initial 
representational aspect of the picture. Through this, he continued: 
This is the point at which the painting is transformed from a 
collection of independent pictographs into a single all-over 
composition united by a consistent rhythm of dark and light, thick 
and thin extending across the surface. 3"a 
Thus, and herein lies an irony, the point at which the painting becomes a 
chaotic and dynamic visual system, represented through the inherent fractal 
patterns, is the point at which traditional visual representation breaks down 
and the distinction between figure and ground is obscured. Thus it is that 
363 Karmel, `Pollock at Work: The Films and Photographs of Hans Namuth, ' In 
Jackson Pollock. New Approaches, (MOMA, 2000), pg. 107 
364 Karmel, Ibid. 
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the point at which the question - what is being represented? becomes 
impossible to answer in one way it emerges in another. This is because the 
point of abstraction is the point at which the fractal figure emerges from 
the ground. And this figure itself serves a representative function as we 
have seen above. By being non-representative, the paintings end up 
becoming representative again on a different scale. 
In conclusion the argument is moved on to another scale within the 
discursive system of the thesis. In doing so another order of question is 
also addressed and other, self-similar, acts of representation are questioned. 
These acts of representation concerns what a Jackson Pollock itself 
might represent within other, larger scale systems of representation of a 
different order; that is distributed representation as outlined in the preceding 
chapter. I refer here to what the work of art itself represents within other 
complex distributed systems within which art occurs. These other systems 
include: the financial systems of the art market; the systems of display and 
archiving of the gallery and the discursive systems of art writing and art 
history and the museum amongst other artworld (to adopt a phrase from the 
Institutional Theory of Art) systems. Finally it is argued that it is by 
presentation which occur observing these self-similar acts of distributed re 
across the different complex systems of the artworld that a more 
satisfactory answer to the question what is being represented can be engaged by 
asking instead: what can be observed? In the remaining arguments of the thesis 
I attempt this. Firstly within this chapter where I conclude that Spiral Jetty is 
an art work which is a complex, distributed system. And in the following 
chapters I look at other distributed systems art. 
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2- The Complex, Distributed System of Spiraijetty 
As I discussed from personal experience in the opening chapter, Spiral Jetty 
is an unstable and chaotic work both physically and conceptually. Further, 
its physical intransigence serves as a powerful metaphor for its shifting 
conceptual identify. It is this ambiguous identity which presents a challenge 
in determining what is being represented in the work. And there are 
different conceptual scales at which the work can be observed. 
Robert Hobbs gave the following physical description of the 
sculptural aspect of Spiral Jetty as: "Spiral Jetty, Rozel Point, Great Salt 
Lake, Utah, April 1970; Mud, precipitated salt crystals, rocks, water; coil 
1500 ft long and 15 ft wide. "365 
But there is more to Spiral Jetty than its physical constitution. Spiral 
Jetty is a complex work. Different aspects of it include: 
(i) The Sculpture in the Salt Lake, which Smithson completed in 1970 
(ii) the 35 minute 16mm film which Smithson made 
(iii) the Essay Smithson wrote about the work 
(iv) the photographs taken by Smithson and Gianfranco Gorgoni of the 
work and its creation 
(v) the sketches Smithson made in preparation 
(vi) the performance of the work's creation 
(vii) the subsequent discourse which surrounds the work 
and so on, and so on. 
Smithson himself acknowledged the instability of the work in his 
concept of the site/non-site dichotomy; an unstable interconnection of 
365 Hobbs, Robert Smithson; Sculpture, (1981, Cornell University Press) pg. 191 
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cross-reference which he explored in his work 3G6. He defined non-site in 
the following terms: 
The non-site an (indoor earthwork) is a three dimensional logical picture 
that is abstract yet it represents an actual site... To understand this 
language of sites is to appreciate the metaphor between the 
syntactical construct and the complex of ideas, letting the former 
function as a three dimensional picture which doesn't look like a 
picture... Between the actual site ... and The Non-Site itself exists a 
space of metaphorical significance. It could be that `travel' in this 
space is a vast metaphor. Everything between the two sites could 
become physical metaphorical material devoid of natural meanings 
and realistic assumptions 367 
Initially it seems that in the concept of the non-site that Smithson 
proposes is merely a replication of the notion of representation which is 
critiqued from a systems-theoretical perspective. This is because it is a 
`logical picture' (normally in sculptural form; incorporating material from 
the site) that `represents' the site; thus preserving the structural relationship 
between signifier and signified upon which non-distributed representation 
is founded. However it subverts this by the site being interconnected with 
the non-site; both of which are in a paradoxical yet symbiotic processes of 
fulfilment and negation. As Smithson said of this negation: 
In the very name `non-site' you're making a reference to a particular 
site but that particular site evades itself, or it's incognito. You're on 
your own. You're groping out there. There's no way to find out 
what's there. Yet you're directed out there. The location is held in 
suspense. The non-site itself tends to cancel out the site. Although 
it's in the physical world, it's not there3G8 
366 Smithson produced a series of non-sites including, A Non-site, Pine Barrens, New 
Jersey, [a sculpture of blue aluminium boxes containing sand from the site 
accompanied by a aerial photograph/map of the site in New Jersey] (Winter 1968; 
Virginia Dwan); and A Non-site, Franklin, New jersey, [a sculpture of wood boxes 
filled with limestone from the site with accompanying map, ] (Summer, 1968; 
Museum of Contemporary Art; Chicago) 
367 Smithson, `A Provisional Theory of Non-sites, ' (1968), in Robert Smithson, 
(ed. Flam), The Collected Writings, (University of California Press, 1996, ) pg. 364 
368 Robert Smithson on conversation in, `Four Conversations between Dennis 
Wheeler and Robert Smithson, (1969-70)" in: Smithson, (ed. Flam, ) Robert 
Smithson: The Collected Writings, (University of California Press, 1992), 
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This is to say that even though the site is incomplete without its 
complementary counterpart it is simultaneously negated and effaced by the 
presence of the non-site (and likewise the non-site is both fulfilled and 
negated by the site). Smithson talked about the site/non-site in such terms: 
There's a central focus point which is the non-site; the site is the 
unfocused fringe where your mind loses its boundaries and a sense 
of the oceanic pervades as it were. I like the idea of quiet 
catastrophes taking place.... The interesting thing about the site is 
that, unlike the non-site, it throws you onto the fringes. In other 
words, there's nothing to grasp onto except the cinders and there's 
no way of focusing on a particular place. One might even say that 
the place has absconded or been lost. This is a map that will take 
you somewhere, but when you get there you won't really know 
where you are. In a sense the non-site is the centre of the system, 
and the site itself is the fringe or the edge 369 
Right, because also the site isn't there. Here you are confronted 
with both a mental and a physical manifestation that purports not 
to be there, so that's an effacement through the physical properties 
of both mind and matter. In other words, in the non-site idea here 
is this container and it has the limit of my mental experience plus 
the physical point. 370 
In Spiral Jetty the complex of sites (and non-sites) which offer themselves 
up for observation the ambiguity of which of the various aspects of the 
system to be prioritised becomes the central feature of the work. As Owens 
has observed: 
Like the nonsite the jetty is not a discreet work, but one link in a 
chain of signifiers which summon and refer to one another in a 
dizzying spiral. For where else does the jetty exist except in the film 
which Smithson made, the narrative he published, the photographs 
which accompany that narrative, and the various maps, diagrams, 
drawings, etc. , 
he made about it? Unintelligible at close range, the 
spiral form of the jetty is completely intuitable only from a 
distance, and that distance is most often achieved by imposing a 
369 Robert Smithson in conversation in, `Discussions with Heizer, Oppenheim, 
Smithson, (1970), in: Smithson, (ed. Flam, ) Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings, 
(University of California Press, 1992), pg. 249 
370 Robert Smithson in conversation in, `Four Conversations between Dennis 
Wheeler and Robert Smithson, (1969-70)" in: Smithson, (ed. Flam, ) Robert 
Smithson: The Collected Writings, (University of California Press, 1992), pg. 204 
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text between viewer and work... That Smithson thus transformed 
the visual field into a textual one represents one of the most 
significant aesthetic "events" of our decade; and the publication of 
his collected writings constitutes a challenge to criticism to come to 
terms with the textual nature of his work, and of postmodernism 
in general. That challenge is formidable, since it requires the 
jettisoning of most of our received notions about art; it can only be 
acknowledged here. "' 
Given this complexity the key questions to ask of this complex 
system -Spiral Jetty are the questions that were also raised in the preceding 
concerning representation and the work of Jackson Pollock. Therefore the 
significant question to ask of the work is not only what is being r resented; 
but also how is the work representing; and also further how is the work itself 
observed from within particular discursive systems? 
Spiral Jetty is observed as a complex system in so far as it is a System 
defined by Ackoff in 1960 as: 
The term system is used to cover a wide range of phenomena. We 
speak, for example, of philosophical systems, number systems, 
communication systems, control systems, educational systems, and 
weapon systems. Some of these are conceptual constructs and 
others are physical entities. Initially we can define a system broadly 
as any entity, conceptual or physical, which consists of 
interdependent parts. Even without further refinement of this 
definition it is clear that in systems research we are interested only 
in those systems which can display activity - that is behavioural 
systems. 
The essential characteristic of a behavioural system is that it 
consists of parts each of which displays behaviour. Whether or not 
an entity with parts is considered as a system depends on whether 
or not we are concerned with the behaviour of the parts and their 
interactions 372 
Further, Spiral Jetty is identified as a complex system in so far as it is 
complex as Luhmann defined it: 
371 Craig Owens, `Earthwords', Beyond Recognition, (University of California Press, 
1992), pg. 47 
372 Ackoff, `Systems, Organizations, and interdisciplinary Research', General Systems 
Yearbook, vol. 5 (Society for General Systems Research, 1960), p3 
- 267 - 
When the number of elements that must be held together in a 
system or for a system as its environment increases, one very 
quickly encounters a threshold where it is no longer possible to 
relate every element to every other one. A definition of complexity 
follows from this: we will call an interconnected collection of 
elements `complex' when, because of immanent constraints in the 
elements' connective capacity, it is no longer possible at any 
moment to connect every element with every other element. The 
concept of `immanent constraint' refers to the internal complexity 
of the elements, which is not yet at the systems disposal, yet which 
makes possible their `capacity for unity'. In this respect, complexity 
is a self-conditioning state of affairs; the fact that elements must 
already be constituted as complex in order to function as a unity for 
higher levels of system formation limits their connective capacity 
and thus reproduces complexity as an unavoidable condition on 
every higher level of system formation. Leaping ahead, we may hint 
at the fact that this self-reference of complexity is then 
`internalised' as the self-reference of systems 37 
This idea that it is impossible to relate every element to every other one 
except by virtue of their interconnectedness suggests that complexity is 
about the unity of system as a whole which is of greater conceptual 
significance than the sum of the parts. 
In other words a complex system demonstrates behaviour which is 
unpredictable and which can't be quantified by an atomic analysis of the 
separate constituent parts of the system as discreet elements. Thus the 
whole of the system is a separate theoretical entity which cannot be 
described purely in terms of its interactions of interconnected parts. This is 
the idea that complex system display emergent properties which arise from 
out of their structural organisation. 
In 1972 the brackish waters of the salt lake submerged the Spiral 
Jetty. And so I come back (again) to the question where I began - does 
Spiral Jetty still exist? And as I also posed at the outset this question can be 
373 Luhmann, Social S 
Press, 1995) pg. 24 
yrtemt (trans. Bednarz Jr. & Baecker) (Stanford University 
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couched not only in terms of representation but the systems-theoretical 
terms of distributed representation and observation too. In other words the 
complex system Spiral Jetty can be observed in relation to the following 
questions: 
(i) What is being represented? 
(ii) How is the work representing? 
(iii) How is the work itself represented? And to answer this question 
attention needs to be focused away from the work onto the institutional 
systems within which it circulates. It is to a systems-theoretical analysis of 
these systems that the remaining chapters of my thesis is directed. 
As I outlined in the discussion on distributed representation in complex 
systems representations are distributed over the whole system, and do not 
reside in a single part of the system. Hence in cognitive models of the mind 
as connectionist/distributed system demonstrate memory in a 
connectionist manner. This means that if part of the brain destroyed this 
doesn't correspond to the loss of a particular memory. Instead due to 
distributed nature of the representations when damaged distributed 
systems display what is know as `gentle degradation' of their 
representations. Following from this it is argued that despite its physical 
degradation the complex system of Spiral Jetty can still be observed via the 
systems across which its representation is distributed. And this means that 
when we `look' for Spiral Jetty we need to provide a context for our 
observations. One sense might not be enough. Or - as Coveney and 
Highfield state in their book Frontiers of Complexity - "In order to 
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understand the value of money, we shouldn't stare at dollar bills. ))374 
374 Coveney & Highfield, Frontiers of Complexity, (Ballantine Books, 1995) pg. 320 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE SYSTEMS THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVE AND THE GALLERY 
SYSTEM 
Introduction 
In this chapter I identify that the systems of display and preservation of art 
are complex systems. In doing so I apply two key systems-theoretical 
concepts to the systems of the art gallery. These concepts are: 
1) Complex systems are distributed systems of representation. That is that 
the representations associated with such systems are distributed across the 
entire system. In the case of the art gallery I argue that is demonstrated by 
the concept of art itself being understood as a function of a representation 
which is distributed throughout the gallery system. 3' In this respect I argue 
that the Institutional Theory of Art as formalised by Danto et al can be 
restated from a systems-theoretical perspective. 
2) Complex systems display the behaviour of positive feedback. That is 
they become `locked-in' around particular patterns of behaviour. In the 
cases of the gallery systems outlined below I argue that when this complex 
systemic `locking-in' is manifested in cultural systems it leads to the 
`locking-in' of certain cultural tropes. In other words the systems- 
theoretical principle of positive-feedback and irreversibility leading to a 
`lock-in' within complex systems can be used to explain patterns of cultural 
inertia and structures of social hegemony. 
In order to demonstrate more thoroughly the systems-theoretical 
concept of `lock-in' I provide a discussion of positive-feedback, 
irreversibility and lock-in as it was used by W. Brian Arthur to explain the 
development of the VHS/Betamax video market which became `locked-in' 
around VHS as the dominant (but not necessarily technologically superior) 
375 It is also noted that the gallery system refers to both the individual gallery space 
and also the worldwide network of galleries of which individual galleries are a 
subsystem. 
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format. My conclusion is that the complex systems of the display, 
preservation and archiving of art can also be said to display isomorphic, 
complex `locking-in. ' 
Further it is also noted that in the spirit of the thesis as a whole - 
namely that isomorphisms can be identified across a wide variety of 
complex systems - the arguments in this chapter concerning the art 
gallery/museum as a complex system can also be applied to Art History as 
a complex system. And in the chapter immediately following this one I 
argue that, like an art gallery, the Museum of Language which is Art 
History is also a complex, distributed representational system which is 
`locked-in' around certain patterns of behaviour, cultural tropes and social 
hegemonies. 
1- The Genuine Fakes 
What follows in this chapter section is a cautionary tale for revisionist art- 
historians; be careful not to break the law. 
On Friday February 12th 1999 Judge Geoffrey Rivlin convicted 
John Drewe of conspiracy to defraud, forgery, theft and using a false 
instrument with intent. The following Monday he was sentenced for 6 
years, a sentence which he continues to serve in Pentonville prison. The 
severity of his crime was deemed to be so grave that Detective Sergeant 
Jonathan Searle of the Organised Crime Squad was moved to state that: 
"The World will be a much safer place with Drewe in jail. It is a relief to 
know this man will now face the justice he deserves. s36 
376 Amelia Gentleman, `Fakes leave art world in chaos', The Guardian, Saturday, 
Feb. 13,1999, pg. 10 
I 
- Real 
Giacometti: (Nimatallah/Art Resource, NY, Copyright ARS, NY) 
Bottom - Fake 
Giacometti: (Photonews Service/Old Bailey) 
Drewe's allegedly heinous crime which was identified as such an affront to 
decent humanity is something which all of us art-historians should be 
vigilant of. "Anything he has touched becomes suspect, " Detective 
Sergeant Searle elaborated, "He has rewritten art history. s377 
Drewe had apparently made art out of nothing. His rewriting of art 
history was deemed to be criminal because he had seemingly created works 
of art where none should have existed. He was punished because he had 
tampered with the complex internal workings of the gallery system and its 
archive. He had, in short, been able to alter what was being represented as 
Art by this complex system. 
The story began in 1987 with an advertisement placed by the 
painter John Myatt in the back of Private Eye. Myatt advertised his services 
as offering: "Genuine fakes. Nineteenth and twentieth century paintings 
from £150. Phone [... ]s378 
Since 1981 the painter Myatt had earned a humble living by 
counterfeiting artworks in a variety of Modern styles, as he himself 
explained: 
Quite a few people wanted impressionist paintings. The only thing 
I avoided as Pre-Raphaelite work, because it was too detailed and 
379 took too long. 
Myatt's work was also characterised by his use of cheap materials 
which are easily available from hardware stores. His `genuine fakes' were 
377Amelia Gentleman, `Fakes leave art world in chaos', The Guardian, Saturday, 
Feb. 13,1999, pg. 10 
378 Amelia Gentleman, `Fakes leave art world in chaos', The Guardian, Saturday, 
Feb. 13,1999, pg. 10 
379 Jay Rayner, 'The Fake's Progress, ' Observer Review, (Observer, July 4th, 1999, ) 
pg. 7 
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made using Leyland trade paints (emulsion), petroleum jelly and powder 
paint. 
When Drewe contacted Myatt the counterfeit and fraud 
partnership began. Firstly Drewe asked Myatt to paint a Matisse-style 
painting. Satisfied with the result he then requested several other styles of 
Modernist painting, leaving Myatt free to choose artist and style. 
Later that year Drewe took a counterfeit Gleizes to an auctioneer3so 
who identified the Cubist work to be either a Gleizes or after Gleizes and 
valued the work at £12,500. This set the whole process in action with 
Myatt producing his genuine emulsion fakes and Drewe circulating them 
within the systems of the artworld. At the trial the jury heard that by the 
time the partnership were apprehended, in 1995, Myatt had created by his 
own estimate more than 180 fakes. It was also estimated that Drewe may 
have earned more than £ 2.5 million from his conspiracy. 
The problem which Drewe presented to the system of the 
Artworld, and presumably the reason as to why it was alleged that the 
world is now a `much safer place' with his subsequent incarceration, is the 
way in which he gained credibility for his fakes. A question mark still hangs 
over the whereabouts of all the genuine fakes and just how much money 
was made. As Detective Constable Micky Volpe has said: "The corruption 
which has taken place of the national archive of contemporary art has been 
considerable. "3S1 And it may be that there are still Drewe and Myatt's 
simulacral art works are still being circulated around the circuits and 
systems of the Artworld. 
38o Identified by The New York Times Magazine as working for Christies. [REF. ] 
381 Amelia Gentleman, `Fakes leave art world in chaos', The Guardian, Saturday, 
Feb. 13,1999, pg. 10 
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1.1 Representation and DirtyData 
I argued that the plausibility of Drewe's simulacral art works can be 
explained by the ways in which the art gallery system represents works of 
art; that is as a complex system of distributed representation. The confidence 
trick worked because Drewe was able to redirect information and thus 
provide opportunities for the genuine fakes to be represented over the 
gallery system as authentic. This was achieved by creating false 
provenances for the genuine fakes. I will now outline how this `false' 
representation was made possible. 
As the agent by which the genuine fakes entered into circulation in 
the artworld system the first thing that Drewe needed to do was to draw 
attention away from himself. To do this Drewe created false owners like 
Daniel Stoakes who he coerced into selling paintings for him and who 
himself faced trial at the time for his involvement. Whilst Stoakes was a 
real person, hoodwinked into the fraud as a front for false provenaces and 
sales, another `owner', Len Martin, never even existed. Using 
correspondence with a professor of physics at Kiel University, in Germany, 
called H. Heinrich Martin Drewe reconstructed letters of authentication 
using Professor Martin's signature. Prosecutor John Bevan QC explained: 
What he did was take an original document from a solicitor's, 
skillfully cut-and-pasted it, whited out the lines, photocopied it, 
copied it again. There you are, a lovely official document: `To 
Whom It May Concern, this letter confirms the painting by 
Giacometti is being sold with the full authority of the owner. ' This 
letter is signed by the owner of the Giacometti, Len Martin. Len 
Martin doesn't exist. 3a2 
382 Peter Landesman, `A 20th Century Master Scam', New York Times Magazine, 
(July 18th 1999. ) 
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Drewe then approached the Institute of Contemporary Arts in 
London and donated two forgeries, a Le Corbusier and the Giacometti, to 
be sold at an auction to raise funds. Given the apparent generosity of his 
gifts the scrutiny directed toward both himself and the art works was less 
strict. The gifts meant that Drewe was able to pose as a patron with a 
particular interest in the institution; he was thus able to gain access to the 
archives at the I. C. A. and he was given a key to the library. Drewe made a 
similar offer to the Tate gallery and offered it a pair of forged paintings 
apparently by Bissire. Again there seemed to be an equal desire for 
accepting the works as a genuine act of generosity. However when the 
paintings were shown to Bissire's son he threw the works' authenticity into 
doubt by questioning the materials used. In order to avoid a potentially 
difficult situation as the Tate stalled on accepting the work Drewe 
withdrew the paintings in favour of a £20,000 cash donation. Again Drewe 
used the gift in order to pose as a someone with a serious interest in the 
archive (the Tate funds were offered to support the upkeep of the 
catalogue) and again Drewe used the gifts as leverage to apply for access to 
the archives to which the Tate readily agreed. Drewe demonstrated similar 
duplicity to gain access to a third archive - the Victoria and Albert's 
National Art Library. In his application for access Drewe listed himself as 
`professor of physics, ' an identity which he had travelled under for some 
time. He listed his own address as the contact for a character reference for 
`Dr. John Cockett, ' a fictional character of his own creation; and when The 
National Art Library requested a reference Drewe wrote his own - `John 
Drewe is a man of integrity, ' he wrote and signed it `John Crockett. ' 
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Drewe used his access to the archives to aid his fraud. In the police 
reports of the case it was found that Drewe had used his access to the 
I. C. A. archives, where he was given a key to the library, to create false 
provenances for the works and paperwork bearing the I. C. A. letterhead. 
Correspondence from their archives featured in some of the false evidence 
which Drewe used to support the sale of the genuine fakes. In the National 
Art Library at the Victoria and Albert Museum Drewe also doctored the 
archives. One example involved the counterfeit Giacommetti first offered 
to the Tate which he validated by altering an old catalogue. Taking a 
catalogue from 1955 of an exhibition called "Exhibition of Paintings, 
Sculpture and Stage Designs by Members of the Entertainment World, " at 
the Ohana Gallery in London, Drewe reprinted several of the pages of the 
publication to make it appear that his own genuine fakes had been on 
display at the exhibition (including with the fake Giacometti and some 
counterfeit works supposedly by Chagall, Dubuffet, de Stael and 
Nicholson. ) He then placed his own pages (which he had printed on a 
computer and aged accordingly) into the catalogue and re-stitched the 
catalogue binding thus creating a permanent archival record of the 
existence of the genuine fakes which could be used to validate sales. A 
similar level of tampering is believed to have taken place at the Tate; and 
when detectives first raided Drewe's house on April 6th 1996 they found 
several rubber stamps of authentication bearing the Tate seal. 
Drewe's fake documentation proved to be highly plausible even 
when used to support a lacklustre artwork. As Peter Landesman observed: 
Alan Bowness, former head of the Tate and the son-in-law of Ben 
Nicholson, was fooled into authenticating two of Myatt's fake 
Nicholsons, not because the pictures were good - in fact, the 
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general consensus was that they were unimpressive at best - but 
because the provenancing was flawless 383 
In addition to his contamination of documented evidence for the 
existence of the forgeries Drewe also set up his own validation agency 
called Art Research Associates which offered a professional provenance 
checking service. One New York dealer had obtained the `genuine-fake' 
Giacometti (for $175,000) but was having trouble selling the painting on as 
the Alberto et Annette Giacometti Association under the directorship of 
Lisa Palmer refused to vouch for the work. Via a middle man (an 
accomplice of Drewe's who posed as a representative of the Art Research 
Associates) the dealer was put in touch with Drewe. Posing as an expert 
and calling himself Professor Drewe, Drewe was then able to show the 
dealer the faked Ohana gallery catalogue in the National Art Library which 
included black and white photographs which proved the paintings was 
genuine. Further evidence included faked letters from owners who had 
never existed and many counterfeit bills of sale which charted a virtual 
history of the work throughout its circulation within the system of the 
artworld. In support the Art Research Associates produced a report in 
which it was claimed that the painting had been `thoroughly investigated' 
some months previously at that subsequently, `the provenance of this 
painting is not in question. ' The dealer was subsequently convinced. 
It is therefore argued that galleries and their archives are complex 
representational systems and that Drewe had corrupted these gallery 
systems with the corrupted or dirty data which mis-attributed works of art. 
383 Peter Landesman, `A 20th Century Master Scam', New York Times Magazine, 
Qu1y 18th 1999. ) 
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In doing so, I argue, he was able to exert an influence over the 
representative function of these complex systems. In short he was able to 
make these systems represent his own fakes as genuine. 
It has been estimated that of the approximately two hundred work 
painted by Myatt and circulated by Drewe the whereabouts of only 73 are 
known, The rest are still in circulation in the art world; being bought, sold, 
gazed upon and consumed. 
It is further observed that the phenomenon of the `genuine fake' is 
not particular to this particular case. It has been claimed that between 10 
and 40 percent of pictures by major artists are faked or have been restored 
to such an extent that they are what can be deemed the equivalent of a 
fake 384385 Landesman has observed that: 
One of a number of reputable West End dealers drawn into [the 
Drewe and Myatt] scam, who demanded anonymity, claims that 15 
percent of sales at auction houses are fake. Thomas Hoving, former 
director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, has said that during 
his tenure, a full 40 percent of the artworks considered for 
purchase by the museum were phony or overrestored. Geraldine 
Norman, the British art journalist credited with exposing Keating 
and Hebborn, says that at least 10 percent of the pictures 
purportedly made by major Impressionists are fake. Some experts 
say that as much as 60 percent of the Giacomettis on the market 
are fake, at least in part as a result of Drewe's con. Forty percent of 
pictures supposedly from the Russian avant-garde era are almost 
certainly forgeries. The widows of Modigliani and Chagall were 
accused of selling certificates of authentication. Salvador Dali, lying 
on his deathbed in a stupor, is said to have been fed thousands of 
sheets of blank paper to sign for fake lithographs. In a grotesquely 
sad twist, the Italian painter Giorgio de Chirico was caught back- 
384 Peter Landesman, `A 20th Century Master Scam', New York Times Magazine, 
(July 18th 1999. ) 
385 It might also be the cases that the easy acceptance the genuine fakes was made 
increasingly possible by the climate of credibility created by the boom in the art 
market of the 1980's. Given the value of art as a commodity people were all too to 
buy art and sell any art. It didn't really matter what it was as long as someone 
wanted to buy and someone wanted to sell. 
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dating new pictures to a time, 20 years previously, when his work 
was popular and in heavy demand, in effect forging himself. 38. 
In conclusion of this section I argue that the claim that 
Myatt/Drewe's `genuine fakes' are artworks which are fake yet which pose 
as genuine is an oversimplification of the complex representation which 
has taken place. This is because it leaves the problem of identifying what 
distinguishes the genuine from the fake as unanswered except in rigidly 
material terms alone (and that such materialism on its own is an 
unsatisfactory art historical tool not least because it fails to account for 
more recent artistic practice such as conceptual art and the `dematerialised' 
art object of the 2"a half of the 20th century. ) What is instead suggested is 
that the undiscovered genuine fakes are represented by the complex 
systems of the artworld in exactly the same way as other genuine works. In 
other words the `genuine fakes' are not simulacral artworks masquerading 
as the real thing; instead they are the real thing and this can be 
demonstrated by looking at the ways in which they are being bought, sold, 
gazed upon and consumed accordingly. This is a further articulation of a 
key theme of the 2nd half of thesis (regarding the application the systems- 
theoretical approach to the arguments of the Institutional Theory of Art 
and using it to provide a plausible ontology of art in terms of as a 
representation within the various and interconnected complex systems of 
the art world. ) It is argued that Art is not dependent upon a category of 
material existence but rather is relative to an act of representation or 
386 Peter Landesman, `A 20th Century Master Scam', New York Times Magazine, 
Qu1y 18th 1999. ) 
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observation; and hence relative to the system of representation (or 
obserevation. ) I discuss this in more detail below. 
2- Locked In: The Art Gallery and Positive Feedback 
Having identified that the Drewe/ Myatt case demonstrates how the art 
gallery is a system of representation it is also stated that this brings it within 
the sphere of arguments common to Institutional Theory ofArt (as outlined in 
the Introduction to Section 2) In the arguments which follow I will discuss 
how the representational system of the art gallery may be identified in 
terms specific to Dynamical Systems Theory; that is as a Complex system 
which therefore displays the behavioural properties of complexity. This is 
demonstrated through identification of two types of behaviour specific to 
Complex Systems These are: 
1 -Irreversibility and Positive Feedback; or `Lock-in' 
2- Distributed Representation 
The Drewe Myatt case has been used to illustrate this two points in 
the following terms. The ambiguity of the ontology of the `genuine fakes' 
highlights the following- 
1- The distributed nature of the representations of the art world and in 
particular the gallery system. That is that the representation of the `genuine 
fakes' as genuine is distributed over the gallery system rather than being 
specifically related to the material existence of the work of art itself. 
2 -The role which irreversibility and positive feedback play in the gallery 
system plays is highlighted. This is because once an artwork has been 
`represented' as a genuine artwork then it is very difficult to prove 
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otherwise and to reverse to process; hence the missing 120 or so `genuine 
fakes'. 
2.1 - Saatchi and Lock-in 
The systems of the artworld are, as I argue here, complex systems and thus 
display behaviour common to complex systems such as being auto-catalytic 
(that is self-perpetuating, ). They do this by being financially and socially 
self-determining and self-justified. This is demonstrated below by looking 
at the activities of Charles Saatchi and his role within the contemporary 
British artworld system of galleries, dealerships and criticism. 
Since Charles Saatchi established the Saatchi Gallery in 1985 as a 
showcase for his collection his activities the gallery has become a locus and 
focus of contemporary British Art within the artworld system. As a dealer 
and collector he has been identified as having considerable influence within 
the art market. As Dan Glaister, writing in The Guardian, has noted, one 
way of looking at Charles Saatchi's influence is as: 
The driving force behind the rebirth of British art, the patron who 
has provided the locus and the critical mass to turn a disparate 
group of artists into a movement. 387 
By means of an example on the 8th of December 1998 Saatchi held a sale 
of a small part of his collection (between 4 and 5 percent). The 130 works 
by 97 artists secured X1.6 million, with 109 works being sold. The sale 
created an enormous amount of publicity and speculation in the press over 
Saatchi's influence within the Artworld. 
387 Dan Glaister, `Saviour or Destroyer? Maybe Both', The Guardian, (Wednesday, 
Oct. 21,1998), pg. 5 
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One of the purposes of the sale was to raise money to fund the 
establishment of bursaries to finance the production of future young, 
contemporary are"; and it has been suggested that it provided a means for 
Saatchi to use his influence as a dealer and collector to cherry-pick the 
work of new artists at source which were attractive, collectable works with 
a high resale potential. As Patricia Bickers noted, in Art Monthly, this 
enabled Saatchi to have: 
The pick of the work of the new London graduates of the future. 
In this way, Saatchi could be said to have taken control of both the 
means of production and distribution, which should not surprise us 
about a collector who has been described... as the Rupert Murdoch 
of the artworld. 389 
The sale also demonstrated that this was a system which was autocatalytic 
and self-perpetuating in so far as it could fund itself. By buying art cheap, 
in bulk, and selling it on for profit Saatchi could use the money to buy 
future art whilst keeping the size of his collection in check. Saatchi himself 
noted a desire to make this system self-sufficient and he remarked that: 
"the collection has to be self-financing. Otherwise it would be a bottomless 
pit. "" (And it will be observed below, that this system is also self-sufficient 
in the way in which it provides the conditions for its own critical and social 
legitimacy .) 
At the time of the Christie's sale the system of the art market was in 
a particular situation defined by the two characteristics given below. 
388 £10,000 a year was offered to Chelsea, Goldsmiths', the Royal College and 
Slade art schools in London; secondly the Young Artists' Sponsorships Bursaries 
was established to provide support for artistic projects. 
389 Bickers, `Editorial', Art Monthly, 222, (Dec. 1998 Jan. 1999), pg. 18 
390 Alberge, `A Very Private Collector: Charles Saatchi, Britain's Leading Modern 
Art Collector Talks (but only a little) to Dalya Alberge', The Independent, (March 
3rd, 1992), pg. 19 
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Firstly the art market boom of the 1980's was still a recent memory. 
During this time, aided by the voraciously free-market environment of 
Thatcherism, Saatchi's personal stock as both an advertising guru (as the 
joint chairman of Saatchi and Saatchi) and a speculator on the art market 
had risen astronomically. 
Secondly, despite a recession39t the art market continued to 
perform consistently well as Andrew Marr explained: 
During the last recession, art auction houses enjoyed a two year 
commercial boom. At the top end of the market, only a couple of 
weeks after Black Monday with stock markets plunging Van 
Gogh's Portrait of Dr Gachet was sold by Christie's in New York 
for $82.5m. 392 
A major reason for this, as Marr explained, is that art was seen by 
speculators to be a less risky investment option than stocks and shares: 
While I was [at a sale by Jeffrey Archer of 111 works by Warhol 
and 71 by Hockney at the Peter Gwyther Gallery, off Bond Street 
in October 1998] a buyer phoned in to say he was taking £50,000 
out of shares: he'd rather have paintings. At [another sale of 
contemporary art at] Sotheby's the place is thronging with South 
Americans, Italians and Japanese who also feel that, for the time 
being, art is safer than equities... So art-works become units of 
value like coffee options 393 
This has a significance from a systems-theoretical perspective because, as 
outlined in W. Brian Arthur's example of the video-recorder market of the 
1980's, economies can be seen to behave like complex systems. This means 
391 There was a world-wide recession following 'Black Monday' the notorious day 
on October 19,1987 in which the Dow Jones Index fell by 508 points, almost 
22% and which is identified as the largest one-day drop in the history of the New 
York Stock Exchange. 
392 Andrew Marr, 'T'hrowing the Baby Out With the Bath Water? ' The Guardian 
Saturday Review, (Sat. Oct. 24th, 1998), pg. 3 
393 See Andrew Marr, "Throwing the Baby Out With the Bath Water? ' The 
Guardian Saturday Review, (Sat. Oct. 24th, 1998), pg. 3 
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that apart from Saatchi's influence the current art market adheres to certain 
examples of positive feedback as Mart has observed: 
There is a network of accepted values and conventions 
underpinning a painting or print as a tradeable commodity. For a 
painting, that includes the artist's status in a league table (Picasso 
equals the US; Pissarro, Germany; and Marquet, Argentina); the 
quantity of his work in circulation (art monetarism), the existence 
of similar works in public collections (the national reserve banks)3.. 
Saatchi clearly has significant influence within the markets of the 
art world. As Gordon Burn has observed with regards to Saatchi's 
influence: 
Saatchi's nose for the coming young art star, the next new thing, is 
legendary by now. He has an unrivalled track record. For a decade 
his purchasing decisions have influenced collectors of vanguard art 
all over Europe and America. Being taken up by Saatchi has 
become one of the conditions of success for any young artist 395 
A further example of Saatchi's influence is demonstrated by the exhibition 
Sensation: Young British Artists from the Saatchi Collection (1997) which was held 
at the Royal Academy of Arts in London. With over 300,000 visitors 
Sensation was the most popular RA show of contemporary art in living 
memory396 and it greatly increased the public profile and popular awareness 
of Saatchi's collection and his activities as a dealer and collector. 
394 Andrew Marr, 'Throwing the Baby Out With the Bath Water? The Guardian 
Saturday Review, (Sat. Oct. 24th, 1998), pg. 3 
395 Gordon Burn, `I Want It, I Want It All, and I Want It Now, ' The Guardian G2, 
(Monday, Dec. 7th, 1998), pg. 1-2 
396 Sensation was `the Royal Academy's most popular show since a summer 
exhibition in the dying days of Queen Victoria. ' Andrew Marr, 'Throwing the 
Baby Out With the Bath Water? The Guardian Saturday Review, (Sat. Oct. 24th, 
1998), pg. 3 
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Commentators have complained397 that Sensation provided a lop- 
sided view of the state of British art being based, as it was, on the concerns 
(financial and aesthetic), taste and whims of just one collector and dealer. 
From a systems perspective it could be argued that Sensation provided an 
example of a cultural system becoming `locked-in' around particular pattern 
of cultural activity and particular objects. In this case it could be argued 
that the `attractor' around which the system had become locked was 
Saatchi himself. 
And as Stallabrass has observed this influence and `lock-in' can 
also lead to a conflation between perceptions of economic and aesthetic 
value: 
Art objects are near-perfect commodities: lacking the complications 
of usefulness, they are pure tokens of exchange, their value based 
on opinion alone. Yet the power of their exchange value is taken 
for an aesthetic charge... Money is the necessary and often the sole 
raison d'etre of the gallery system; yet, at least in terms of the 
presentation, the galleries have a prissiness about it, carrying the 
conventions of mercantile display to such a rarefied level that the 
visible signs of commerce (price tags, special offers) tend to 
disappear. Money must simultaneously be gestured at and 
concealed, since it is both essential to aesthetic aura and what 
threatens to taint it. 398 
It is Stallabrass's conclusion that in what he refers to as the current fine art 
system there can be no distinction made between aesthetic and economic 
value; the expensive is regarded as the beautiful, and that deemed to be 
beautiful will certainly be expensive: 
In pursuing aesthetic value, we embark on the old quest for the 
ghost in the machine of the fine art system. As that system is 
currently set up, money is both the fuel of the machine and its 
output, aesthetic value its exhaust, constantly evaporating in the 
polluted atmosphere of mass culture, and as long as the machine 
397 A thorough bibliography of the literature on Saatchi is provided by Stallabrass, Ibid. 
398 Stallbrass, High Art L te, (Verso, 1999), pg. 80 
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runs, constantly replaced. It is pointless to look for the ghost in the 
machine; look rather for the pecuniary machine in what appears to 
be the ghost 399 
Given this conflation between the aesthetic and the economic 
those (such as Saatchi) who exert a significant economic influence within 
this system can therefore also be regarded as exerting a significant aesthetic 
influence within this system. In this respect the artworld system behaves 
like a complex system by demonstrating the effects of positive feedback. It 
is further noted that given Saatchi's role as a cultural attractor within the 
gallery systems within which he operates his influence should be seen as 
not only unsurprising but actually as inevitable consequence of complex 
behaviour within the art world systems as they become `locked-in' around 
particular cultural tropes. 
Stallbrass rejects the gallery as the sole provider of art status to 
objects as too simplistic and also emphasises the role which art schools 
play in the establishment and definition of Art. He argued that: 
By far the most successful definition - though still imperfect - is to 
say that art is something done by those who went to art school. 
The closed shop operates with remarkable effectiveness, and you 
will find very, very few artists endorsed by the gallery system, 
private or public, who have not been through an accredited course. 
The art schools are at the opposite end of the process to the public 
galleries but both have the same role, that of sanctioning a 
particular set of objects or practices as art 400 
This provides a further example of the artworld system locking-in around a 
particular pattern of behaviour and producing a particular output. In the 
case of the work of the YBAs supported by Saatchi the role of art schools, 
particularly Goldsmiths, provides us with clear examples of positive 
399 Stallbrass, High Art Ixte, (Verso, 1999), pg. 83 
40o Stallbrass, High Art Lite, (Verso, 1999), pg. 180 
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feedback. In this case the art market became locked-in around particular 
style or ethos which even though diverse and hard to define exactly could 
be broadly defined in terms of Saatchi's patronage. This is the style which 
Stallabrass has dubbed `High Art Lite. ' 
3- Five Implications of the application of Dynamical Systems 
Theory to an analysis of the cultural systems of art. 
Complex systems have a memory which is expressed in terms of their 
irreversibility and this was outlined in the example given in the introduction 
to section 2 the manner in which the market `remembered' initial effects 
causing it to `prefer' VHS over Betamax, Complex systems reach Bifurcation 
Points or points of no-return beyond which when passed the system cannot 
be reversed to a previous state. Because of the irreversibility of a system's 
memory it `remembers' previous states and incorporates these into its 
current state. In turn this means that effects cannot be reversed, small 
causes can be amplified to have big effects; often with surprising and 
unexpected results such as the dominance VHS. This demonstrates how a 
system's memory can lead to the effects of Positive Feedback or what has also 
been called the Butterfly Effect, W. Brian Arthur calls the effects of positive 
feedback examples of systems Locking-In around a certain behavioural 
pattern. And, as has already been noted elsewhere in the thesis systems 
such as ant colonies or financial markets can become Locked-In. 
It is argued, therefore, that the systems of art galleries and art 
markets can, like ant colonies and Video-recorder markets, also become 
locked-in around certain patterns systemic behaviour and attractors. And via 
the mechanisms of positive feedback cultural systems, just like other 
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systems, can become more and more firmly entrenched in representing 
particular values and interests and thus become locked-in. This leads me 
onto the concluding section of this chapter in which I outline five 
implications of the application of Dynamical Systems Theory to an analysis 
of the Art Gallery. They are presented below 
3.1 - Isomorphisms 
Saatchi is just one example of a strange attractor around which a complex 
cultural system has become locked via the processes of Positive Feedback. 
Von Bertalanffy identified a key aspect of his General systems Theory as a 
similarity (`isomorphism) to be found between disparate systems. If the 
example of Saatchi's influence is a demonstration of the behaviour of one 
complex system then, given these suggested isomorphisms between 
systems then we should be able to find other examples of cultural locking- 
in in gallery systems. As the example of Saatchi demonstrated a gallery 
system can be seen to lock-in around the dominant personality of a key 
collector. The importance of key collectors has shaped the accepted 
histories of art as Gere and Vaizey observed: 
Collecting must, in our view, significantly alter the repute of the 
objects collected, not only by adding to knowledge and expanding 
appreciation, but perhaps even more by conferring status: the 
collector can make the unfashionable or ignored more central to 
the culture of the day. 401 
To demonstrate this a similar process of feedback and `lock-in' can 
be seen in the significance of Peggy Guggenheim's collecting in the 
establishment of American Abstract Expressionism as a dominant cultural 
401 Gere & Vaizey, Great Women Collectors, (Harry N Abrams, 1999) 
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system. Like Saatchi she was a wealthy patron of contemporary art whose 
support, especially whilst she lived in New York and collected American 
Art, could transform the status, significance and value of an artist. This is 
demonstrable in the example of Pollock whose reputation was, arguably, 
created by the dual poles of influence of Peggy Guggenheim and Clement 
Greenberg. Tom Wolfe described this positive feedback loop of how an 
artist's reputation could snowball on receiving the correct patronage in the 
following terms: 
Greenberg didn't discover Pollock or even create his reputation, as 
was said so often later on. Damnable Uptown did that. Pick Me! 
Peggy Guggenheim picked Pollock. He was a nameless down-and- 
out boho Cubist. She was the niece of Solomon (Guggenheim 
Museum) Guggenheim and the centre of the most chic Uptown art 
circle in New York in the 1940s... In a single year, 1943, Peggy 
Guggenheim met Pollock through Baziotes and Motherwell, gave 
him a monthly stipend, got him moving in the direction of 
Surrealist "automatic writing" (she loved Surrealism), set him up on 
Fifty-seventh street - Uptown Street of Dreams! - with his first 
show - in the most chic Modernist salon in the history of New 
York, her own Art of This Century Gallery, with its marvellous 
Surrealist Room, where the pictures were mounted on baseball bats 
- got Sweeney to write the catalogue introduction, in prose that 
ranged from merely rosy to deep purple dreams - and Barr inducted 
one of the Paintings, The She Wolf, into the Museum of Modern 
Art's Permanent Collection - and Motherwell wrote a rave for 
Partisan Review - and Greenberg wrote a super-rave for the 
Nation... and, well, Greenberg was rather late in getting into the 
loop, if anything. 402 
3.2 - The effect of individual agency is minimised. 
In identifying the artworld and the gallery as systems then they are 
identified as complex interconnection of component parts. As we saw in 
the example from the preceding chapter an ant colony might be seen to 
behave like such a complex system of many connected components. In the 
ant colony, as with other complex systems, the organic unity of the whole 
402 Wolfe, The Painted Word, (Black Swan, 1989) Pg. 56 
-291- 
system is of greater operative significance than the individual components. 
Thus it is not that one smart ant in the maze finds the way to and from the 
food, similarly in the complex system of the brain one neuron doesn't think 
for itself but instead thought is distributed over the entire system. Likewise 
in W. Brian Arthur's example in order to explain the market shift to VHS 
we can't explain this through the actions of any singular agent, be this the 
VHS designers, their marketing department or a particular recorder 
dealership. Instead we can note that the system as a whole settled into a 
particular pattern. Similarly whilst it may be rhetorically convenient to lay 
the blame for the current state of contemporary British art solely upon the 
shoulders of one man this is as unsatisfactory as blaming an art for the 
behaviour of its colony, or blaming a neurone for an inappropriate thought. 
Within any complex system and hence also within the artworld the effect 
of individual agency is minimised. Hence we should look upon the 
phenomenon of Saatchi as distinct from Saatchi the individual. As a 
phenomena it is one which is relative to the systems within which emerges; 
in other words as an attractor rather than an agent; and an emergent 
phenomena rather than prime mover. And within such complex systems 
there will be other attractors and emergent phenomena. As an individual 
however we should see Saatchi the man and other figures and components 
like him, out of which the whole network is composed, as just singular 
elements which contribute to the functioning of the greater unity of the 
system. Just like an neurone. Or an Ant. 
3.3 - Criticism becomes self-fulfilling 
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Every damning column inch, book or radio and television report which 
condemns Saatchi (as in Hatton & Walker's Superrollector40), his taste in 
British Art (Stallabrass404) and his influence contributes to a self-fulfilling 
cycle of positive feedback. Hence with every act of reflection the system 
becomes further locked-in around these examples. News breeds news. And 
the media phenomenon surrounding Saatchi features prominently in most 
of the commentaries upon him. This, in turn, creates more column inches 
and publicity which creates more of a story; and so on, and so forth. 
The Royal Academy was complicit in the generation of positive 
feedback. It courted the press with information about the controversial 
works within the show such as the exhibition's show-stopper Marcus 
Harvey's, Myra, (1995) which received fierce criticism from the right-wing 
press over its portrayal of Myra Hindley painted using a cast of a child's 
hand; Chris Ofili's The Holy Virgin Mary (1996) also received strong 
criticism. 405 The Academy also publicly suggested that some of the artists 
within the show were to be offered RA membership. 406 This offer was a 
hollow and cynical gesture calculated to generate further publicity407 
because, as Stallabrass noted; firstly the number of Academy members is 
403 Hatton & Walker, Supercollector, (Ellipsis, 2000) which is a crude attempt to 
provide a self-styled "hostile critique written from a socialist perspective. " pg. 10 
404 see chapter 7, `Saatchi and Sensation' in Stallabrass, High Artlite, (Verso, 1999) 
405 See `Mother's Fury at Myra "Art"", Daily Mail, (July 26th, 1997); Armstrong & 
Byrne, `Artless: Fury at Child-Fingerprint Portrait of Monster Myra', Mirmr, (July 
26th, 1997); Waugh, `The Great Painting of Myra "Designed to Shock"', Evening 
Standard, (July 25th, 1997); Mouland, `Invitation to Outrage', Daily Mail, 
(September 17th, 1997); `Exhibited by the Royal Academy in the So-called Name 
of Art, Defaced by the People in the Name of Common Decency', Mirror, (Sept. 
19th, 1997); `How can this pile of Sh*t be worth 250,000? ', Sport, (Sept. 19th, 
1997); Johnson, `An Obscene Picture and the Question: Will Decency or 
Decadence Triumph in British Life? ', Daiy Mail, Spet. 20th 1997. Stallbrass also 
provides a good overview of the outrage generated by Sensation, in `Saatchi and 
Sensation', Ch. 7, High Artllte, (Verso, 1999) 
406 Stallbrass High Art lite, (Verso, 1999) pg. 200-2 
407 Although four members did resign over the exhibition. 
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fixed so that normally members will only be replaced on death. And 
secondly the offer was to provoke an inevitable yet unwitting complicity in 
the positive feedback loop of publicity from the artists themselves who 
immediately and predictably condemned the RA board (Hirst called them 
`Fat, stuffy, pompous' and Jake Chapman branded them, `whinging 
alcoholic old farts[s]i408. 
The self-perpetuating tension in the RA board was replicated by the 
oppositional opinions exhibited in the critical responses to the exhibition 
with a conflict between those seeking to condemn and the exhibition's 
apologists. However, the exhibition was not ignored, and both negative and 
positive responses served the same function of ever increasing interest with 
critics either endorsing the controversy or creating more of the activity they 
were seeking to oppose. As Stallabrass has noted the work actually requires 
opposition in order to create a significance for itself: 
`High Art lite has relied upon the outrage of such red-faced bored to make 
it seem young, cool and oppositional. i409 
As Gordon Burn observed in The Guardian, Sensation earned a great 
deal of publicity for how much publicity it was gaining. 410 This is a 
technique with which Saatchi would have been familiar given his 
experience as an advertising executive and it has echoes of the advertising 
strategy of embedded marketing whereby a product is planted in the media 
in the trojan horse of another story411 hence providing publicity without the 
need to rely upon the placing of expensive adverts. This use of publicity to 
408 Both references from Stallbrass High Art Lite, (Verso, 1999) pg. 202 
409 Stallbrass HighArtlite, (Verso, 1999) pg. 209. 
410 Gordon Burn, `I Want It, I Want It All, and I Want It Now, ' The Guardian G2, 
(Monday, Dec. 7th, 1998), pg. 1-2 
411 Such as the example of a scientific study carried out on behalf of a product. 
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generate publicity is another form of positive feedback at work and in the 
case of Sensation the brand being promoted was Saatchi himself around 
which a cultural system was becoming locked-in. Thus commentaries, critical 
or otherwise, on Saatchi's activities merely perpetuate the increasing phase- 
lock within the system. In this respect there is a certain irony in observing 
that the more vociferous a critique the more it will become self-defeating 
by re-enforcing the cultural significance and postive feedback loops of 
significance and exclusion which they seek to criticise. 
As physical objects books have a permanence and irreversibility 
within social, cultural and epistemological systems in so far as they both 
create and curate historical legacies for the material they contain. What is 
meant by this is that if a book about a particular subject is published and 
then bought by a library a certain locked-In permanence is granted the 
subject matter. This is due to the relative irreversibility and permanence of 
the physical object of the codex. If we take the example of Charles Saatchi 
and High Art lite, when the current debates concerning the status and role 
of Saatchi in the contemporary art market have abated, then the book will 
remain on the shelf for future reference radiating a transfigurative and 
emergent historical significance onto its subject matter; hence there will be 
a `lock-in' in the cultural system around this paradigm. Therefore art 
without a permanent textual record of its existence (other than itself) 
around which for the system to lock-in seems much more likely to fade 
from public and historical memory. In the case of British Art of the last 
twenty years it seems likely that this forgotten art, the locked out betamaxes 
of the cultural system will include much of the art ignored or dismissed by 
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Saatchi as being either a poor investment or simply not fashionable or 
`cool' enough.. 
Contemporary Artists are well aware of the significance of Saatchi's 
influence. One of the reasons for this can be attributed to the media-savvy 
which is indoctrinated into them at art schools such as Goldsmith's where 
students are instructed into how to succeed in the contemporary market. 
Goldsmith's has produced many of the artists Saatchi has collected in bulk 
and at a speech made at the Turner Prize award ceremony in the Tate in 
1994 Saatchi observed: 
Now I don't know, anymore than you, what has made our young 
artists suddenly so supercharged, but I am certain that teachers like 
Michael Craig Martin at Goldsmiths' College have had a 
tremendous effect. Now Goldsmiths', and in recent years the Royal 
College, and some other art schools, they have set a tone and a 
level of ambition that has stimulated not just their graduates, but 
young artists all over Britain who are producing work that is 
challenging, articulate and relevant. 412 
From this is not difficult to make the assumption that ambitious students, 
aware of the significance which Saatchi's influence holds, could be creating 
works in attempts to appeal to his taste. Chris Offili put it this way: 
A lot of artists are producing what is known as Saatchi art... You 
know it's Saatchi art because it's one off shockers. Something 
designed to attract his attention. And these artists are getting 
cynical. Some of them with works already in his collection produce 
half-hearted crap knowing he'll take it off their hands. And he 
does 413 
Stallabrass has made the acute observation that if there is a style to the 
work of the YBAS it lies in their attempt to produce work that will appeal 
to the taste of a man whose background in advertising is manifested by a 
412 Without W"allr, Channel 4 Television, (22nd Nov., 1994) 
413 Quoted in Stallabrass, pg 200 
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taste which is: "is very much for art that looks like advertisements, and 
who - except an adman - would want to own one of them? i414 Thus there 
is a lock-in around an art which is striking - in so far as it must have the 
initial impact of a billboard (such as the work of Hirst for example) and 
work produced in non-threatening and non-volatile media which must be 
portable, durable and hence sellable. This discreteness of media need not 
be the only concern, as was seen in the case of Hirst's Away fmm the Flock, 
(1994); a dead lamb supported in a case or Marc Quinn's Self (1991); a cast 
of the artist's head made from nine pints of the artist's frozen blood and a 
refrigeration unit which must be kept turned on at all times so as not to 
defrost. However in both cases the relative expense and volatility of the 
objects extenuated the predominant aspect of the work which provides a 
unifying aspect to most, if not all of his collection. This is that the work is 
object based art which provides a positive and easily readable advert for 
itself. 
3.4 - Unpredictability 
Whilst we may be able to determine patterns in the ways in which 
apparently chaotic and complex systems behave (such as Lorenz 
Attractors) they are defined as being unpredictable; we can't know in what 
direction they will develop. Thus, as W. Brian Arthur notes, despite there 
being good reasons to predict its success, in terms of a suggested technical 
superiority over VHS, the Betamax video format was eclipsed in its market. 
This is because due to the operation of positive feedback within complex 
systems what appear to be small causes may have very large effects; and we 
414 Stallabrass, High Art Lite, (Verso, 2000) pg. 201 
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can't know what these effects will be. This leads to two related 
observations. 
Firstly that it may be seemingly insignificant reasons was to why 
one work of art gets sold over another. This contradicts any belief in any 
historical teleology within the development of art or that the history of art 
may be shaped by the desire and prerogative of forceful and dynamic 
individuals. 
Secondly the issue of quality in art becomes more ambiguous. That 
VHS would triumph over Betamax was impossible to predict and the 
eventual outcome was not an index of the technical triumph of the VHS 
format. Likewise it might also be suggested that particular cultural forms 
(be these the work of an artist or a particular style etc. ) do not succeed, in 
terms of their social and cultural dominance, because of any supremacy of 
their technical or aesthetic quality. The Art we have now is merely that 
which around which the cultural systems of its support has become Locked- 
In. 
And this leads me on to the fifth, and final, conclusion of this 3' 
chapter section on Saatchi. 
3.5 - Betamax Art 
As Peter Davis parodies in his work Hot One Hundred (1996), the canon of 
what is fashionable is an arbitrary list of the usual suspects which reflect 
whims of taste which may behave, like other systems, chaotically and 
complexly. The history of cultural criticism is composed of attempts to 
redress the balance of canons which have become `locked-in' around 
particular cultural forms at the expense of the exclusion of other cultural 
forms. This suggests that there is a flipside to the Institutional Theory of 
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Davis: The Hot One Hundred, (1997) 
Art. This complementary view argues that just as there may be a social 
ontology of art explicable through inclusion within the representative 
system of the Artworld, so too there may be art which has been rejected 
and excluded from this system (by virtue of not being observed by that 
system. ) To stretch the video-recorder analogy further - if the YBA's and 
Saatchi-supported art is VHS, then there may also be Betamax art and 
artists. 
It is difficult to find extensive examples of artistic activity which 
has been completely excluded from the artworld because it is, by this very 
exclusion difficult, if not by definition impossible, to find. The history of 
art is a patchwork whose very warp and weft is woven from the strands of 
that which it has excluded, ignored and rendered obsolete in one form or 
another. Various politically motivated attempts to redress this balance have 
formed the basis of many different strategies which have sought to 
reconfigure or critiques the values of the artworld on the basis of gender, 
class, race and sexuality. The art of the `outsider' or `other' is where we will 
find our Betamax artists. 
One example of that which we might call a Betamax artist has been 
publicised by the artist in question himself who has complained 
vociferously and at length about his falling stock in both cultural and fiscal 
capital. The artist in question, Sandro Chia, could have been forgiven for 
thinking that he would corner a market share when, in 1985, Saatchi 
bought six of his works. He was, however sceptical of the attention it 
would bring and wrote in a letter to Art News. 
Mr Saatchi started to buy my paintings very early - so early that I 
think I was the first painter that was not American to be included 
in his collection. At the time of his acquisitions, I remember him 
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Betamax Art? 
telling me how highly important he considered my work, etc. Far 
from being impressed by his opinion, I rather expressed to my 
dealers my concern about any person accumulating my works in 
such number, thereby establishing a control and quasi-monopoly. "s 
When Saatchi subsequently sold all of works by Chia his work rapidly 
devalued as it became, effectively, excluded from the canon. At least this 
was the way in which Chia saw his status mutate from a VHS to a Betamax 
artist almost overnight. Writing about the effect of the removal of his work 
from Saatchi's holding Chia was to note at a later date in a statement that: 
At that moment I understood the power of the guy. I thought I 
might as well go and paint in Alaska. My telephone was ringing 
constantly and from that moment no one was ringing any more, it 
was unbelievable at6 
4- Lock-In as Cultural Inertia -A further discussion 
In this concluding section I discuss further the systems-theoretical concept 
of `lock-in' (or positive feedback and irreversibility) and how this is 
manifested in inertia of the cultural systems of the artworld. 
4.1 - Building as system: Beaubourg and Baudrillard 
The galleries and museums of the artworld are housed in buildings; and the 
architectural fabric of these buildings will also evolve and adapt like a 
complex physical system. In How Buildings Learn Stewart Brand describes 
how evolutionary architectural systems are at play in the buildings which 
surround us, and how these buildings not only lock-in to certain patterns 
but also form patterns which evolve over time. He says: 
415 Chia, `Saatchi's 'Dispersals"', a letter to Art News, vol. 84, no. 7, (Sept. 1985), 
pg. 9. 
416 Chia, statement in `Making Art, Making Money: 13 Artists Comment', Art in 
America, vol. 78, no. 7, (July 1990), pg. 138-9 
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Between the dazzle of a new building and its eventual corpse, when 
it is either demolished or petrified for posterity as a museum, are 
the lost years - the unappreciated, undocumented, awkward- 
seeming time when it was alive to evolution. If [Brian] Eno is right 
[that buildings demonstrate an `internal complexity that show the 
traces of an interesting evolution], those are the best years, the time 
when the building can engage us at our own level of complexity. 417 
Brand's argument is that buildings are systems which will change 
according to their needs and function regardless of the desires of the 
architect. For this reason he argues that more flexibility should be built into 
architectural systems from their genesis in order that buildings can improve 
over time rather than become dysfunctional and obsolete. If a building 
system cannot adapt well to the change it will experience over time, that is 
if it is too locked-in to allow for evolutionary growth, then it will fail; and 
this is usually manifested in the building being demolished. The alternative, 
Brand argues, is an architectural system which incorporates change over 
time, that is the building functions as an adaptive complex system, rather 
than an rigid, unchanging structure. 
Brand notes: 
An adaptive building has to allow slippage between the differently- 
placed systems of Site, Structure, Skin, services, Space Plan and Stu' 
Otherwise the slow systems block the flow of the quick ones, and 
the quick ones tear up the slow ones with their constant change... 
Age plus adaptiuity is what makes a building come to be loved. the 
building learns from its occupants, and they learn from it. '418 
With its network of exposed services and complex system of pipes, nuts 
bolts and scaffolding The Pompidou Center at Beaubourg in Paris known 
417 Brand, How Buildings Learn: What Happens After They're Built, (Phoenix 
Illustrated, 1997) pg. 11. The Brian Eno quote is taken from Brand's preceding 
text and is not attributed. 
418 Brand, How Buildings Learn: What Happens After They're Built, (Phoenix 
Illustrated, 1997) pg. 20,23 
-301- 
The building system at the Centre Pompidou 
by locals as The Pompidolium419, is a gallery which exemplifies Brand's 
arguments by actually looking like a system. It has, for example, multiple 
and complex, functions as Nathalie Heinich has documented: 
It is complex in a literal sense in that the building contains several 
distinct departments, such as the Public Information Library (BPI), 
the National Museum of Modern Art (MNAM), and the Center for 
Industrial Creation (CCI), as well as being the home of an number 
of other activities (children's studio, cinematheque, meetings/ 
forums, audio-visual unit, publications and periodicals) and having 
the institute for Acoustic and Musical Research and Creation 
(IRCAM) close at hand in the Place Stratinsky. 420 
The building system not only looks like a machine it works like one 
too illustrating the functioning of the gallery as a processing system. It is a 
system which processes people and culture in an efficient manner, perhaps 
too efficient as has been observed: 
Forecasts based on studies carried out in the early 1970's suggested 
that there would be between 8,500 and 15,000 visits per day, 
making an annual total of between 2.5 and 4.5 million. In reality, 
the figure has been much higher, the daily average being some 
25,000 visitors, giving an annual total of 7.3 million visits. 421 
Since it opened in 1977,145 million visitors have come to ride the 
external escalators with their cinematic views of central Paris, and 
to see great exhibitions of Dali, Matisse and Derain. That's an 
average of 23,000 a day, and all this for a cultural center designed 
for an optimistic capacity of 5,000 a day. No wonder the Pompidou 
was looking shabby and threadbare by the mid-90's422 
Like other museums, galleries and exhibition spaces Centre Pompidou 
is a factory for culture; an industrial system, and a cultural system which 
419 "Not for nothing does local humor call it the Pompidolium - it does in fact 
look like an oil refinery. " In Banham, `Enigma of the Rue du Renard', Architectural 
Review, (1977) 
420 Heinich, The Pompidou Centre and its public: the limits of a utopian site, ' in - 
The Museum Time Machine, ed. Lumley, (Routledge, 1988) 
421 Heinich, The Pompidou Centre and its public: the limits of a utopian site, ' in - 
The Museum Time Machine, ed. Lumley, (Routledge, 1988) 
422 Jonathan Glancey, The Guardian, (Wednesday, Jan. 19th, 2000) 
-302- 
exposes its own supporting structure literally and suggestively - if you know 
where to look. It is a system with a production line which processes people 
and generates the appearance [simulacra] of culture, as Baudrillard 
observed in his extended discussion on Beaubourg; 
Frankly the only contents of Beaubourg are the masses themselves, 
which the building treats like a convertor, a black box, or in terms 
of input/ output, just like a refinery handling petroleum products 
or a flow of raw material. Never has it been so clear that the 
contents - here culture, elsewhere information or merchandise - 
are merely the ghostly support for the opposition of the medium 
whose function is still that of beguiling the masses, of producing a 
homogenous flow of men and minds 423 
Yet for Baudrillard it is precisely this [dys]-functional efficiency of the 
institution which provides its potential and its salvation. And this occurs 
through the institution's paradoxical role in an apparent implosion and 
negation of cultural activity. In 1977 Baudrillard gleefully (and apparently 
correctly) predicted The Pompidou Centre's future problems: 
Critical Mass. Implosive Mass. Above 30,000 it threatens to 
"Buckle" Beabourg's structure. That this mass, magnetized by the 
structure, should become a factor of potential destruction for that 
very structure... what if this were intended by those who conceived 
the project (but it is beyond one's hopes)... if it were part of 
something they had programmed, the chance to finish off both 
architecture and culture in one blow... well, Beaubourg would then 
be the most audacious object and successful happening of the 
century. 
MAKE BEAUBOURG BUCKLE! A new revolutionary slogan. 
No need to torch it or to fight it; just go there! That's the best way 
to destroy it. Beaubourg's success is no mystery; people go there 
just for that. The fragility of the edifice exudes catastrophe, and 
they stampede it just to make it buckle. 424 
Thus it may be possible to regard Beaubourg as a large Lorenz attractor 
around which a complex network of dynamic urban, cultural, political, 
423 Baudrillard, 'The Beaubourg-Effect: Implosion and Deterrence, ' [trans. Krauss, 
Michelson] October 18, (1981) 
424 ibid 
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social, financial, theoretical matrices are drawn. Here one can see the 
resonance between W. Brian Arthur's observations that positive feedback 
plays a role in the dynamics of such complex, open systems and 
Baudrillard's commentary on Beaubourg, 
Thus this concave mirror: it's because they see the mass(es) inside it 
that the masses will be tempted to crowd in. It's a typical marketing 
device from which the whole ideology of transparency draws 
meaning. Or put another way, in presenting an idealized miniature 
model they hope to produce an accelerated gravitational pull, an 
automatic agglutination of culture as an automatic agglomeration of 
the masses. The process is the same: the nuclear chain reaction, or, 
the spectacular operation of white magic 425 
Read in such a way the cultural centre, like the museum, becomes a strange 
social attractor which `locks-in' culture around itself simulating that which 
looks and acts like culture but which for Baudrillard negates art and leads 
to the death of actual or real cultural activity: 
Thus everything is neutralized at the same time: Tinguely is 
embalmed in the museological institution and Beaubourg is trapped 
within its so called artistic contents 426 
Central to Baudrillard's argument in the Beaubourg paper is the 
paradox that the cultural centre of Centre Pompidou negates culture by both 
absorbing and neutralising the creative and psychic potential of cultural 
activity. And this occurs due to the functioning of the system as a means by 
which particular social, cultural and political relationships are represented. 
Beaubourg is therefore, for Baudrillard, symptomatic of the hyper-reality of 
late 20`h century life in which reality is masked and perverted by the 
semiological logic of what he refers to (throughout his work) as `the third 
425 Baudrillard, 'T'he Beaubourg-Effect: Implosion and Deterrence, ' [trans. Krauss, 
Michelson, ] October 18, (1981) 
426 ibid. 
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order of simulation, ' which is characteristic of late capitalism. In this third 
order, Debord's `Society of the Spectaclei427 has mutated into the spectacle 
which simulates and replaces society - we no longer have access to a basic 
reality but only consume a simulation of it. 
This argument was first developed by Baudrillard in The System of 
Objects, in which he argued that the function and utility values of objects 
such as furniture are rhetorical values generated by this system of objects 
and the dynamics of its internal system of signification. As such the system 
generates and conveniently pre-packages for mass consumption the 
iconography of use value which is attached to objects. 
Every object claims to be functional, just as every regime claims to 
be democratic. The term evokes all the virtues of modernity, yet it 
is perfectly ambiguous. With its reference to "function" it suggests 
that the object fulfills itself in the precision of its relationship to the 
real world and to human needs. But as our analysis has shown, 
"functional" in no way qualifies what is adapted to a goal, merely 
what is adapted to an order or system; functionality is the ability to 
become integrated into an overall scheme. An object's functionality 
is the very thing that enables it to transcend its main "function" in 
the direction of a secondary one, to play a part, to become a 
combining element, an adjustable item, within a universal system of 
signs... 
The functional system is thus characterized, in a thoroughly 
ambiguous way, on the one hand by a transcendence of the 
traditional system under its three aspects - as the primary function 
of the object, as drives and primary needs, and as a set of symbolic 
relations between the two - and on the other hand by a 
simultaneous disavowal of these three mutually reinforcing aspects 
of the traditional system. 428 
As a development of this Baudrillard argues that at Beaubourg what 
is consumed is not culture, but rather that which is represented - through 
the functioning on the micro and local level of the Beaubourg system and 
427 Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, (Rebell Press, Aim Publications, 1987) 
428 Baudrillard, The System of Objects [trans. Benedict, ] (Verso, 1996) - first published 
as Le Systeme des Objets, (Editions Gallimard, 1968) 
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at the macro level of social relations in the hyper-real `Third Order of 
Simulation' as a simulation of culture. Thus, like the iconography of utility 
value, at Beaubourg all that can be accessed is the iconography of aesthetics 
which has been hijacked - and with this hijack comes cultural implosion 
which removes the potential for genuine cultural activity which might serve 
as an antidote or site of resistance to the simulacral world we circulate 
within and around. 
4.2 - Archive as System 
As the Drewe and Myatt fraud illustrates the art gallery is not only defined 
by the system of its architectural fabric but is also constructed around a 
system of classification and cataloguing. Hence it is that the system of the 
archive might behave like other complex systems and demonstrate 
complex behaviour such as - locking in, memory (an archive is, after all, a 
system of memory), irreversibility and be autocatalytic (that is self- 
perpetuating. ) 
And the case is used here to demonstrate how the art gallery is a 
system of representation in so far as they observe, order, classify, 
differentiate and represent. This is demonstrated by the following example. 
At the centre of a rather obscure report on the `International Symposium 
on the Conservation of Contemporary Arti429 the following words on the 
classification system of the museum are given with reference to a proposed 
Tate Gallery Installation File System (for `Installation Art') In their 
429 International Symposium on the Conservation of Contemporary An, 7-12 July 1980, 
Abstracts, (National Museums of Canada, 1980) 
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absurdity they read like they read like the scheme of a curator dreamt up by 
Borges: 
The file card design - The final layout and headings, have not, at 
the time of writing, been settled. The set of headings below 
summarises the kind of information that will be included. At some 
future date, it is hoped that the data will be computer-stored and 
storable in order to produce useful lists such as "All works needing 
electric power"; "All works with purpose-built storage facilities"; 
'a "All paintings not requiring barriers. 3o 
Thus it is that if this system of archiving, differentiation and 
memory within the social system can be seen to be a system which is 
irreversible and which has become `locked-in' then we could argue that the 
space of the gallery is the site of cultural inertia. It is the site, or attractor, 
around which the social system gravitates; and in doing so a particular 
configuration of social and cultural relationships also become `locked-in'. 
Like Baudrillard, Robert Smithson too acknowledged the cultural inertia of 
the gallery, which has been identified as locking-in: 
Museums are tombs, and it looks like everything is turning into a 
museum. Painting, sculpture and architecture are finished, but the 
art habit continues. Art settles into a stupendous inertia. Silence 
supplies the dominant chord. Bright colours conceal the abyss that 
holds the museum together. Every sold is a bit of clogged air or 
space. Things flatten or fade. The museum spreads its surfaces 
everywhere, and becomes an untitled collection of generalisations 
that immobilise the eye. "" 
4.3 - Lock-In and Class 
It has been suggested so far that the concept of the complex system can be 
applied to the systems of the artworld with specific reference made to the 
430 Peter Wilson, Sandy Nairne, "The Installation File - Conserving by 
Documenting, " in International Symposium on the Conservation of Contemporary Art, 7-12 
July 1980, Abstracts, (National Museums of Canada, 1980) pg. 16-19 
431 Robert Smithson, `Some Void Thoughts on Museums', 1967, in Smithson Ed. 
Flam, Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings, (University of California Press, 1996), 
pg. 42 
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art gallery/museum. This is in so far as there are observable patterns of 
`lock-in' in both the archive system of the museum and the architectural 
system of the museum. 
In conclusion a particular aspect of `lock-in' within systems will be 
further extrapolated upon with a view to carrying it forward into the next, 
closing chapter. This is a theme which has already been mentioned in 
relation to lock-in and the effects of positive feedback. This theme suggests 
that cultural systems (like other complex systems) whilst being complex 
and unpredictable are also predisposed to inertia in so far as they lead to a 
certain stability being achieved within those systems. In Arthur's 
VHS/Betamax system a stability could be observed to emerge within the 
market. And in cultural systems this could be likened to the emergence of 
dominant cultural forms. An example of this inertia within a cultural 
system might be evidenced by the suggestion that YBA's were VHS art 
which cornered a market share over what I called `betamax art'. It is thus 
suggested that this systemic stability is manifested as a form of cultural 
inertia which, in turn, has implications within the larger social systems with 
which it interacts. 
Bourdieu has written extensively about the role the gallery system 
plays in the re-enforcement of the social hierachy of class structure. And 
while his approach can be critiqued as relying too heavily upon a particular 
conception of class distinction the central theme - that museum systems 
are a mechanism of cultural inertia or `lock-in'- is one which I suggest can 
be recast in the vocabulary of a systems-approach. 
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In Love ofArt Bourdieu attempted a thorough analysis of the public 
which visit European museums in order to: 
Devise a systematic survey of the European museum-going public, 
its social and educational characteristics, its attitudes to museums 
and its artistic preferences, as a process of verification aimed at 
confronting a coherent system of theoretical propositions with a 
coherent system of facts produced by - and not for - the 
432 hyposthesis which it was necessary to validate. 
Bourdieu uses the questionable criteria of `quality' of a work of art 
on display in museums which he grades on a scale from one to five and 
which has been assessed and "evaluated by the panel of experts'"" which 
he has used to establish a hierarchy of art works as displayed in European 
galleries. Despite the problems inherent in such a method which must rely 
upon the establishment of the quality of the artwork the hierarchy which is 
established can be seen to reflect a `lock-in' in so far as that work which is 
perceived to be of a higher quality will attract more attention and visitors to 
the museum. As Bourdieu notes: 
Analysis showed that the majority of the museums' characteristics 
were strongly interrelated: disregarding the museums that receive 
less than 2,000 visitors a year (six museums, which are hard to 
reach and exhibit a small number of poorly presented works), it is 
apparent that the number of works displayed is strongly related to 
the number of visits (except in the case of certain large museums 
showing relatively few works but which are very famous or of great 
quality). The same applies to the fame and quality of the works 
(evaluated by the panel of specialists), which tends to demonstrate 
that, as far as visiting rates are concerned, the "official" hierarchy 
defined by the "cultural authorities. %P434 
432 Bourdieu, Darbel, Schnapper, The Love ofArt. European Art Museums and Their 
Public, trans. Beattie & Merriman, (Polity Press, 1991), pg. 5 
433 These experts were constituted by, `a panel composed of five curators and art 
specialists selected from amongst all French museums, 123 art museums 
(containing paintings and sculptures. )' Bourdieu, Darbel, Schnapper, The Love of 
Art. " European Art Museums and Their Public, trans. Beattie & Merriman, (Polity 
Press, 1991), pg. 6. 
434 Bourdieu, Darbel, Schnapper, The Love ofArt: " European Art Museums and Their 
Public, trans. Beattie & Merriman, (Polity Press, 1991), pg. 8. 
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This provides another example of positive feedback loops within 
cultural systems with the system gravitating around particular cultural 
forms. When the artwork is deemed to be of high quality, by the `official 
hierarchy' it attracts visitors which, in turn as popular work attracts more 
visitors, attract more visitors; and so on. This leads to the lock-in of 
cultural inertia in so far as it leads to a dominance of the cultural forms 
which are identified and thus sanctioned by the `official hierarchy' of the 
`cultural authorities' and which subsequently cause people to be attracted to 
them. 
When combined with a sociological critique of the function of 
museums based upon his own agenda of class distinction and analysis it is 
concluded that just as there is a `lock-in' around certain museums so too 
there is a lock-in around the type of visitor to these museums: 
Museum visiting increases very strongly with increasing level of 
education and is almost exclusively the domain of the cultivated 
classes. The proportion of the different socio-economic categories 
in the French museum public is almost exactly the inverse of the 
proportion in the total population. "' 
Given that for Bourdieu increasing level of education is an index of 
class (in terms of `socio-economic category) the art museum is `locked-in' 
around the structural social order of bourgeois power relations and is both 
a function and instrument of such hierarchy. This is reflected in the 
education and the employment of visitors as Bourdieu notes: 
As the modal visitor to French museums holds a baccalaureate (55 
per cent having at least this qualification), it is not surprising that 
the profile of the public, according to socio-economic category, 
should be very close to the profile of the population of French 
university students according to their social origin; the proportion 
aas Bourdieu, Darbel, Schnapper, The Love ofArt. " European Art Museums and Their 
Public, trans. Beattie & Merriman, (Polity Press, 1991), pg. 14. 
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of farmers and farm labourers in the public of French art museums 
is 1 per cent; that of industrial manual workers 4 per cent; 
craftworkers and tradespeople 5 per cent; clerical staff and junior 
executives 23 per cent (of whom 5 per cent are primary school 
teachers), and uppers classes 45 per cent. 436 
It is also noted that the time spent in the museum is a further index 
of both class and education: 
Thus the average time actually spent on a visit which can be taken 
to be an objective value given to the works on display, whatever 
the corresponding subjective experience might be (aesthetic 
pleasure, cultural goodwill, sense of duty or a mixture of all of 
these) increases in proportion to the amount of education received, 
from 22 minutes for working class visitors, to 35 minutes for 
middle class visitors and 47 minutes for upper class visitors. "? 
Education is an important indicator within Bourdieu's method of analysis 
because, he argues, it provides the means for one to decode the art on 
display and to therefore understand the systems of representation on 
display. It is thus the way in which certain social and cultural values and 
cultural forms perpetuate - in the preservation and transfer of cultural 
capital. From the systems-theoretical perspective this transfer of `cultural 
capital' is observed as a form of memory (irreversibility) within a social 
system; and that this irreversibility provides the means by which the social 
system might become `locked-in' around a certain social order. As 
Bourdieu (et al) note both the quality and the legibility of a work of art is 
mediated by the values of the social system, and is hence both relative to 
that system and maintained by the memory of that system through, 
amongst other apparatuses, the gallery system and the system of education: 
436 Bourdieu, Darbel, Schnapper, The Love ofArt: European Art Museums and Their 
Public, trans. Beattie & Merriman, (Polity Press, 1991), pg. 15. 
437Bourdieu, Darbel, Schnapper, The Love ofArt: EuropeanArtMuseums and Their 
Public, trans. Beattie & Merriman, (Polity Press, 1991), pg. 38 
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Considered as symbolic goods, works of art only exist for those 
who have the means of appropriating them, that is, of deciphering 
them. An agents degree of artistic competence is measured by the 
degree to which he or she can master all the means of 
appropriation of works of art available at a given time: in other 
words, the interpretative schemata which are the condition of 
appropriation of artistic capital, that is, the condition of deciphering 
the works of art supplied to a given society at a given time. "' 
The legibility of a work of art for a particular individual is a 
function of the distance between the more or less complex and 
sophisticated code demanded by the work, and the individual's 
competence, defined by the degree to which the social code, itself 
more or less complex and sophisticated 439 
In Conclusion 
This conclusion comes as a rejoinder to the predominant theme of the 
chapter. It has, thus far, been suggested that whilst the museum system is 
complex an implication of this complexity might be that this system acts as 
an apparatus of cultural inertia within social systems. That is that the 
complexity of the museum system allows for, by the processes of 
irreversibility and the memory of the system which is manifested in the 
effects of positive feedback, for the preservation of particular cultural 
forms. And with the preservation of certain cultural forms at the expense 
of the exclusion of others certain social hierarchies, structures and power 
relations are also maintained. It would seem then that there might be the 
tendency to lay the blame for a particular configuration of social power 
relations upon `the system'. 
In response to this blaming of the system it is suggested that `lock- 
in' within cultural systems rather than being seen as a purely negative 
aas Bourdieu, Darbet, Schnapper, The Love ofArt. " European Art Museums and Their 
Public, trans. Beattie & Merriman, (Polity Press, 1991), pg. 39 
439Bourdieu, Darbet, Schnapper, The Love ofArt: European Art Museums and Their 
Public, trans. Beattie & Merriman, (Polity Press, 1991), pg. 42-3 
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phenomena which stifles all activity which it fails to validate by inclusion 
can also provide the conditions and potentialities for its own critique. 
Robert Smithson recognised the potential for transgression and 
critique which the museum system provided: 
Well it seems to me that there is an attitude that tends toward 
McLuhanism, and this attitude would tend to see the museum as a 
null structure. But I think the nullity implied in the museum is 
actually one of its major assets, and this should be realised and 
accentuated 4'10 
In this respect Smithson's identification of the potential site of cultural 
transgression as the site of potential cultural subjugation can be likened to 
the Foucauldian invocation of `power' as transformative as opposed to 
purely repressive. As Foucault argued: 
Where there is power, there is resistance, an yet, or rather 
consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in 
relation to power... [The existence of power relations] depends 
upon a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of 
adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations. These 
points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network. 
Hence there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, 
source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead 
there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case: 
resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; others that are 
spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, violent; still 
others that are quick to compromise, interested or sacrificial; by 
definition they can only exist in the strategic field of power 
relations. "' 
And hence it could be argued that rather than acting as a site in which the 
propagation of cultural activity is negated, as Baudrillard pessimistically 
feared, the cultural inertia of the museum system actually provides for the 
possibility of resistance, action and transgression. It is this potential for 
4Q'What is a Museum? A Dialogue between Allan Kaprow and Robert Smithson, ' 
(1967), in Flam cd., Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings, (University of California 
Press, 1996), pg. 43-4 
441 Foucault, The History of Sexuality; Vol. 1, an Introduction, trans. Hurley, (Penguin 
Books, 1998)pg. 95-6 
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resistance to the power relations implicit in the systems of the gallery, art 
history and other cultural systems which is where the artistic impulse which 
has been called The Institutional Critique emerges. This is the artistic 
impulse which Robert Smithson identified, with foresight which was 
proved to be well-placed, as: 
The great issue, I think it will be the growing issue, of the seventies; 
the investigation of the apparatus the artist is threaded through. 42 
Craig Owens has further discussed Smithson's comments in his 
discussion of such an impulse - `From Work to Frame, or Is There Life 
After "The Death of the Author"? ' (based around the activities of such 
postmodern artists as Marcel Broodthaers, Daniel Buren, Michael Asher, 
Hans Haacke, Louise Lawler, Martha Rosler, Mary Kelly, Allan Sekula, 
Robert Smithson et al. ). Owens, like Smithson argues that it is imperative 
we engage with the: 
De facto social nature of artistic activity [in order that]... we 
ourselves are to employ rather than simply being employed by, the 
apparatus we all - "lookers, buyers, dealers, makers" - are threaded 
through. "' 
And this means looking to the systems around which art circulates. 
Finally; this again raises the possibility of hanging a potentially huge 
ontological question mark over that which is not validated by being 
brought within the field of cultural production and which doesn't make it 
into the cannon. We thus return to the question that if practice and objects 
don't become institutionalised not only in galleries but also in art history 
then can they be called art - and if so on what terms? 
442 `Conversation with Robert Smithson; Edited by Bruce Kurtz', in Flam ed., 
Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings, (University of California Press, 1996), pg. 
262-3 
443 Owens, Beyond Recognition, (University of California Press, 1992) pg. 136 
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It is suggested therefore that discursive systems of art history, like 
galleries systems, are also locations around which `lock-in' occurs. It is for 
this reason that we all, as art historians, should all be aware that the 
processes and systems which are engaged in, in terms of every thing that 
we write, and every thing we say are couched in terms of certain ideological 
positionings; which whilst seeming to be small causes might have large 
effects. 
For we operate within a number of complex systems which have an 
irreversible memory. And which, despite our apparent lack of individual 
agency, we must take a collective responsibility for. 
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CHAPTER 7: 
ART HISTORY IS A DISTRIBUTED 
SYSTEM OF REPRESENTA TION 
OR ART DISCOURSE OBSERVED FROM 
THE PERSPECTIVE OF DYNAMICAL 
SYSTEMS THEORY 
NAT TATE 
(Clockwise from top left) 
Rembrandt, Self Portrait, (1661), 
Cover of Nat Tate, by Will harn Boyd 
Stella at work, (on an original Hank Herron work? ) 
1- Introduction 
The argument in the concluding chapter relies upon one assumption and 
advances two claims. The initial assumption, which will be subsequently 
demonstrated through three examples, is that Art History is, like the space 
of the Art Gallery, a complex system of observation, differentiation and 
representation. In doing so this assumption follows on directly from the 
arguments of the opening chapter of the thesis in which a direct analogy 
was drawn between the Art Museum and the `space' of Art History. In the 
preceding chapter particular claims where made about the systems of 
preservation and display of art in so far as they displayed certain systemic 
principles. It is argued below that the same patterns of systemic behaviour 
can be seen at work within the systems of Art History. 
The arguments concerning the assertion that Art History behaves 
like a complex system operate by identifying and analysing key features of 
systemic behaviour in the system of Art History. These are; that the system 
of Art History is a distributed system of representation. And following 
from this is the conclusion that the discursive systems of the art world 
(including Art Historyn are locked-in around certain concepts (that is that 
they have memory and inertia. ) 
In the preceding chapter the problem of the disappearing artwork 
was discussed by analysing Spiral Jetty as a system. When framed by a 
systems-theoretical perspective I argued that the dematerialisation of the 
singular artwork is best understood in terms of the ontological 
444 What is meant here is that art history and art criticism are sub systems of the 
system of art-discourse, and that art discourse itself is a system which has 
particular behavioural patterns which is discussed below. 
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subordination of the singular artwork to the distributed systems of both 
the art gallery and the complex artwork itself. " 
Through the discussions of the Institutional Theory of Art it was 
demonstrated that the conditions for the existence of a work of art are not 
limited to the singular artwork alone. Instead the artwork needs to be 
conceived as a node in a network of preservation and display. Also, 
through the example of Spiral Jetty it was argued that the system of 
distributed representation by which the artwork was represented was 
robust enough to stand the dissolution of certain aspects of it, such as the 
submerging of the sculpture by The Great Salt Lake. 
Such a dematerialisation raises a similar question to be asked of the 
discursive systems of art, such as Art History. This question concerns the 
dematerialisation of the identity of the singular Author in relation to their 
work; an author who is also implicated in these process of distribution and 
dissolution. 
In what follows I will initially approach this question by initial 
invoking Foucault's question - `What is an Author? ' I will then provide an 
answer to this question by framing the answer from within both an Art 
Historical and a systems-theoretical perspective. In turn, I will formulate a 
445 What I mean here is that when applied to art a systems-theory understanding 
will take the systems surrounding the artwork rather than the singular artwork 
itself as the fundamental conceptual object of analysis. Such an approach has 
similarities with Luhmann's claims for a sociology based on a Systems-Thinking 
approach which looks not to singular human subjects but social systems as 
fundamental objects of analysis. He says: "If one views [from a Systems-Thinking 
approach] human beings as part of the environment of society (instead of as part 
of society itself), this changes the premises of all the traditional questions, 
including those of classical humanism. It does not mean that the human being is 
estimated as less important than traditionally. Anyone who thinks so (and such an 
understanding either explicitly or implicitly underlies all polemics against this 
proposal) has not understood the paradigm change in systems theory. " Luhmann, 
Social Systems, [trans. Bednarz & Baecker], (Stanford University Press, 1995) Pg. 
212 
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response which is isomorphic to the question `What is Art? ' which was 
addressed from the Systems-Thinking approach a preceding chapter. 
Foucault has observed: 
Yet, what of a context that questions the concept of a work? What, 
in short, is the strange unit designated by the term, work? What is 
necessary to its composition, if a work is not something written by 
a person called an "author. "446 
Foucault treats the Author not in terms of the individual creative subject 
but instead as `a function of discourse'. It will be argued below that such an 
argument can be re-stated from within the Systems-Theoretical perspective. 
By doing so it is proposed that the Author or Artist can also, along with 
the gallery and the artwork, be conceived of in terms of a function of a 
system rather than as a unique originating source in its own right. From 
this position I argued that, like the dematerialised Spiral Jetty, the 
author/artist need not be physically present in order to continue to be 
represented by the distributed systems within the artworld. 
In response to Foucault's question the role of `author' is taken up 
by the artist. In the following, I will discuss three examples of artists who 
are not, in different senses of the word, present. They are, like the post- 
modern art object, dematerialised. Nevertheless these artists have been re- 
presented by the distributed systems of art discourse (including art history) 
as the originating `authors' of their work. And this tells us something of the 
ways in which these discursive systems function. 
These three `authors' are: 
446 Foucault, `What is an Author', (1969), in Preziosi (cd. ), The Art ofArt History, 
(Oxford University Press, 1998), pg. 301 
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1- Rembrandt - An Artist who lived and exists in the system of the art 
world 
2- Nat Tate - An artist who never lived and did not exist in the art world 
system 
3- Hank Heron - An artist who never lived yet who did have a existence 
in the art world system. °47 
2- Art History and the Author Function 
Vasari famously put individual artist at the centre of his history of the 
`Lives of the Artists. ' In doing so he identified the work of art as the 
physical manifestation (and material mediation) of the individual 
subjectivity of the artist. Such a prioritisation of the artistic subject of the 
artist was dissolved in the various and subsequent attempts to provide a 
different set of criteria for historical reflection. These include analyses such 
as Wölfflin's `Art History Without Names' which is explicit in its attempts 
to distance itself from being over-determined by biographical 
considerations. The desire to differentiate the critical act from questions of 
biography in favour of addressing more general cultural questions can also 
be seen in Riegl's analysis of the figure of the genius in Art as one who 
does not `stand outside' the cultural systems within which art operates. " 
This is also revisited in Panofksy's iconological archaeology of social 
systems through their systems of artistic representation. 
447 Contrary to a standard view that the examples used in this chapter are 
exceptions, or even distortions, of the normal discourse on art I propose that they 
are indeed paradigmatic for the general behaviour of the systems of art discourse. 
448 "Geniuses do not stand outside their national tradition, they are an integral part 
of it... The great artist, even the genius, is nothing but the executor, though the 
most perfect executor, the supreme fulfilment, of the Kunstwollen of his nation and 
age. " Riegl, quoted by Pächt and cited by Holly in Panofsky and the Foundations of 
Art History, (Cornell University Press, 1984) pg. 75 
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Similarly, in her defence of a critical Art Historical method 
grounded in Formalist principles Krauss launched a critique on `art history 
as a history of the proper name. ' She has criticised auto-biographical Art 
History which singles out particular artists as the central focus for critical 
attention. 
She says: 
It is as though the shifting, changing sands of visual polysemy, of 
multiple meanings and regroupings, have made us intolerably 
nervous, so that we may wish to find a bedrock of sense, 4' 
and that this `bedrock of sense' has been found by many writers in the 
identity of the author who provides the key, coherence or origin to a body 
of work. 
The identification of the author as the single and unique origin for 
the work of art faced two major problems in its confrontation with the 
Modernist Art Object. The first challenge arises in the light of the 
pronounced autonomy of the Modernist art object. The proclamation that 
the Modernist art object can speak on its own terms, as defended by 
Greenberg, "' means that qualities extraneous to the `purely plastic or 
abstract qualities of the work of art' are negated; such terms might include 
not only the language of the art's iconography but also the biographical 
details connected to the author. 
449 Krauss, `In the Name of Picasso, ' October, 16, (Spring, 1981), pg. 5-22 
450 "The purely plastic or abstract qualities of the work of art are the only ones 
that count. Emphasise the medium and its difficulties, and at once the purely 
plastic, the proper, values of visual art come to the fore. " Greenberg, Towards a 
Newer Laocoon, ' (1940), in Harrison & Wood (eds. ), Art in Theory 1900-1990, 
(Blackwell, 1992), pg. 555 
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Rauschenberg: Portrait of Iris Clert, (1962) 
The second challenge to the Art History of the Proper Name 
comes in the aftermath of the demise in faith in the Modernist art object. 
The subsequent disappearance of the autonomous art object did not see 
the re-instatement of the author/artist as the prime origin of the work as is 
evidenced by the post-structural claims of the Death of the Author. Within 
the field of art this disappearance occurred when the Modernist art object 
was questioned and critiqued from within both artistic and art historical 
practice in favour of attention being diverted to the various systems of 
support. Such a critique is exemplified by a claim of artistic relativism such 
as Rauschenberg's sending of the telegram: `This is a portrait of Iris Clert if 
I say so' in 1962 (see image on facing page) as a proxy for an absent object 
(and in which the artist himself is also distanced from the work. ) 
Despite the artistic statement of post-modernism such as 
Rauschenberg's it is in the face of the loss of the Modernist art object that 
the attractiveness of the Art History of the Proper Name might potentially 
increases. This is as a means by which to anchor attention and as a site 
around which a discursive system can become locked-in around the 
concept of the author. This is to say that given the loss of a discrete object 
the proper name of the artist can function from within a system of 
representation as a stand-in for the dematerialised art object; as it does in 
Rauschenberg's telegraph. However what also needs to be acknowledged is 
that this statement of Rauschenberg's does not stand as a reclamation of 
mastery of the artist over the act of representation. Whilst it acknowledges 
that with this work makes any easy differentiation between art object, artist 
and environment impossible it is also true that the work can only function 
because the figure of the artist depends upon the same continuum as the 
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artwork itself. This continuum is the system of representation within 
which object, artist and artworld environment are all incidents of 
representation. 
2.1 In the Name of Rembrandt 
The problem which the Author Function presents to the discursive systems 
of Art History is exemplified in the first of the three artists I will look at in 
this chapter, namely the work of Rembrandt. 
The large body of Rembrandt's work presents several problems for 
the systems of art history to negotiate. Central to these problems is the very 
`name' or persona of Rembrandt itself. Clearly the name and personality 
Rembrandt (like that of Michelangelo or Caravaggio for example) is 
inextricably bound up with the body of work referred to as `Rembrandt'. 
This holds to such an extent that this art historical `personality' (as opposed 
to his biographical or biological one) dominates much of the discourse. 
The most acute illustration of this is provided by the series of paintings for 
which he is arguably most famous. These are the self-portraits which he 
made throughout his life. In these portraits the person and artist 
`Rembrandt' have themselves become something of the work of art; his 
personality has thus explicitly become the object of art historical discourse. 
As Alpers has observed this raises certain questions: 
Individual uniqueness, monetary worth, aesthetic aura - the name 
of Rembrandt summons up different but nevertheless convergent 
notions of value. And to what precisely does the name itself refer? 
Rembrandt as it is commonly deployed tends to elide the works with 
the man. Is all of this a recent invention, a prejudice of the 
nineteenth century to which we are heir? Or is it appropriate to 
Rembrandt's own making a marketing of his own works that they 
should offer an example of that relationship between the 
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production and valuing of a person, property, and aesthetic worth 
that lies so deep in our culture 4s' 
The corpus collected under the name `Rembrandt' thus provides us with an 
excellent example of the Art History of the Proper Name which Krauss 
had critiqued. Yet as I will further demonstrate this is an example which 
also subverts the operations of such art historical strategies. 
The way in which Art History has dealt with such problems is of 
particular interest to my project as it concerns the identification of Systems 
within Art Historical practice. For it is in these negotiations that the very 
operations of those systems of Art History become obvious and are thus 
made available for scrutiny. In the following section I will use the work of 
the Rembrandt Research Project to demonstrate that within the systems of 
Art History the way in which the proper name 'Rembrandt' functions is as 
a descriptor within a complex representative system. In short for the whole 
body of work which makes up the corpus of 'Rembrandt, ' and is archived 
under that name, 'Rembrandt' serves as an organising principle rather than 
as a signifier for a single originating source. 
The Rembrandt Research Project (or RRP) was established in 1968 
with a grant from the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of 
Pure Research. It was born from a perceived need amongst scholars to 
scrutinise and possible reduce the large number of works, (which at one 
stage had reached over a thousand) attributed to the single source of 
Rembrandt. For there were clearly numerous works which did not originate 
from Rembrandt's own hand. As the RRP identified: "by the 1960s it was 
451 Alpers, Rembrandt''s Enterprise, (Thames and Hudson, 1988) pg. 3 
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difficult for an impartial eye to accept all the works currently attributed to 
Rembrandt as being by a single artist. "452453 
One result of this process of differentiation which arose from the 
RRP's investigations was the establishing of three categories for further 
classification of 'Rembrandts'. 
These were: 
1- those works identified beyond all reasonable doubt as being by 
Rembrandt himself 
2- those of uncertain authorship. (The Project acknowledged that this 
category was necessary but also pointed out that given its ambiguity this 
category should be kept as small as possible. ) 
3- Those works identified as being not produced by Rembrandt. These 
works (previously accepted as being by Rembrandt) included works by his 
studio or after Rembrandt or fakes and pastiches which were also included 
in this category. Examples of these types of work include two works in the 
Hague now officially accepted as non-Rembrandts; these are The Polish 
452 Rembrandt Research Project, A Corpus of Rembrandt Paintings I, (1982, Stichting 
Foundation/ Rembrandt Research Project) pg. I 
453 The activities of the RRP engage in issues similar to those faced by the Warhol 
Art Authentication board, a body which exists to secure the authenticity of Andy 
Warhol's work. A controversy concerning the board's activities was initiated when 
film producer Joe Simon tried to sell a Warhol self-portrait for $2 million. 
Apparently although the image was not signed it did bear a stamp of authenticity 
from Fred Hughes, Warhol's business manager and also had supporting 
paperwork. However on submitting the picture to the board for a guarantee of 
authenticity it was rejected. Given the nature of Warhol's practice this issue is 
both sensitive and complex. So far about 15% of the artworks re-appraised by the 
board have had their authenticity removed. It was reported in the Telegraph that 
`Ron Spencer, the lawyer for the authentication board, said that its role was to 
ascertain the "intent" of the artist... [and] that even if a work were printed by a 
number of other people the board would still classify it as genuine. "If Warhol 
conceived the idea and he then directed someone else to prepare a silkscreen, 
supervised the process of production and, in effect, signed off on it, as long as he 
said, That'sgood, that's what I wanted, Warhol created that work. "' Quoted in, 
Catherine Milner, `Collectors insist "our Warhols are genuine" The Telegraph, (filed: 
26/10/2003) See also the originating article by Michael Shnayerson, in Vanity Fair 
(November, 2003) 
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Rider and David and Saul as well as Man With the Golden Helmet (Berlin) 
which was also formerly considered as being Rembrandt's own work. 
The first stage of the RRP (between 1968-1972) involved collating 
all the information that existed for all works that were attributed to 
Rembrandt. This was done in the form of a literal description of each work 
and an accompanying photographic record. This meant that the RRP had a 
established and definitive body of works which were, at the time, 
recognised as 'Rembrandts'. In the second stage of the RRP's modus 
operandi this larger set of `Rembrandts' was reduced to a much smaller 
number of works comprised of all those pieces that be said to consistently 
display having clear similarities to one another. 
The initial information used by the RRP was taken from an 
established and recognised art historical archive. This was the catalogue of 
Rembrandt's work compiled by Bredius in 1935. The assumption was that 
this would, at the very least, contain all the works by Rembrandt in 
existence along with other work. In total this body of work of unproven 
provenance was estimated as being about a thousand paintings. It should 
be noted that the choice of Bredius catalogue already meant the exclusion 
of an even larger body of work based on 19th Century compilations that 
included works of dubious provenance which had nonetheless been 
identified, at some point, as `Rembrandt'. By taking the task of defining and 
purifying Rembrandt's oeuvre as the guiding principle and ethos of their 
method the RRP have so far been able to reduce the number of what is 
`accepted' as Rembrandt's work to below four hundred pieces "' 
454 In collating their results the Rembrandt Research Project produced the five 
volume work A Corpus of Rembrandt Paintings I-V (Stichring Foundation/ 
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Starting from this central question of attribution the members of 
the RRP then sought to establish working strategies by which to 
accommodate and address the particular problems that the Rembrandt 
corpus presented. 
The first major problem with the corpus was what was generally 
understood to look like Rembrandt's work was (and still is) both highly 
distinctive and extremely well-known. As a result of that fame and 
recognition Rembrandt's originals have been much copied and any 
emulated in acts of homage, pastiche and fraud. The fact that there were 
many works referred to as `Rembrandt' which, however, cannot beyond 
reasonable doubt be attributed to the hand of Rembrandt Harmensz van 
Rijn of Leiden who died in 1669 (for example the Flayed Ox at 
Kelvingrove Museum in Glasgow which until relatively recently was 
wrongly attributed to Rembrandt) makes the problem of attributing works 
of art to a single individual artist/author very clear. 
And secondly the case study of Rembrandt and the RRP further 
highlights the problem of attributing works of art to specific historical 
individuals with regards to the issue of the unique autographed work. 
Common to working practice in 17`h Century Holland, Rembrandt worked 
with a studio of apprentices and assistants; in fact he had over fifty 
students and assistants working for him during his working life. 455 This 
means that many hands may have worked on a work which was 
subsequently identified as an `original' Rembrandt. 
Rembrandt Research Project), which they hope to be the authoritative work of 
attribution. 
455 Alpers, Rembrandt'r Enterprise, (Thames and Hudson, 1988), pg. 59 
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However attribution is a complex issue. On the one hand, 
Rosenberg et al observed that: 
In the Night Watch and the Conspiracy of Julius Civilis - large 
pictures for which we could have used help - there is no evidence 
that a hand other than the original touched the original work. as6 
On the other hand they observed that Rembrandt's studio system was 
markedly different from that of, for example, Rubens. Rubens undertook 
large scale decorative projects (such as the decorations for the Luxembourg 
Palace, 1622) and as a result would have used a whole team of assistants as 
a normal working practice. The very fact that Rembrandt does not seem to 
have worked on such collaborative projects might be taken to suggest that 
in his case single works might indeed be attributed to a single, originating 
source. 
However it is also known that Rembrandt worked closely with his 
pupils and that he often altered drawings they had made. Thus, 
consequently his hand may have been at work in a number of pieces which 
he neither started nor finished but which were instead executed in the main 
by students and colleagues. Further, as Rosenberg et al have claimed: 
It is difficult to determine how many Rembrandt school pictures 
are based upon the master's own inventions, but the number is 
probably high, and in a few cases a definite connection can be 
established asp 
The examples they cite in order to give an impression of the way in 
which the studio operated include an engraving after the painting Anna and 
456 Rosenberg, Slive, ter Kuile, Dutch Art andArchitecture 1600-1800, (Yale 
University Press, 1966) pg. 142 
457 Rosenberg, Slive, ter Kuile, Dutch Art andArchitecture 1600-1800, (Yale 
University Press, 1966) pg. 142 
- 328 - 
the Blind Tobit (1630, National Gallery, London). It is signed `Rembr. van 
Rijn fecit' despite the fact that the original has been identified as having 
been painted by Gerrit Dou. Dou was a member of Rembrandt's studio 
and there is evidence that Rembrandt did add some cursory last minute 
touches to the painting. Those works which had been updated by the 
master were identified at the time as being `retouched by Rembrandt. '458 
These include the Sacrifice of Isaac, attributed to Govert Flinck, (the 
Pinakothek in Munich) which is based upon the master's treatment of the 
same subject matter (1635, Leningrad and a drawing in the British 
Museum). 
According to Rosenberg et al: 
The inscription in Rembrandt's hand at the bottom of the Munich 
(Rembrandt verandert En overgeschildert. 1636) announces that the 
master was not satisfied with his pupil's results, and that he 
changed and retouched the work. "' 
The issue of Rembrandt's signatures, especially with regards to its 
appearance on work that didn't otherwise conform to the criteria of being 
`Rembrandt' is one which the RRP diverted particular attention to as part 
of their attempts to provide empirical evidence for their attribution of 
works. 
They say: 
In some instances they do come so close in form to that of an 
autograph signature that one wonders whether the artist may not 
also have put his signature on paintings produced, in his workshop 
and under his supervision, by others 4Ci0 
458 `van Rembrandt geretukeert', from the 1656 inventory of Rembrandt's effects, 
cited in Rosenberg et al (1966) 
459 Rosenberg, Slive, ter Kuile, Dutch Art andArchitecture 1600-1800, (Yale 
University Press, 1966) pg. 142 
460 Rembrandt Research Project, `A Descriptive Survey of the Signatures, ' A 
Corpus of Rembrandt Paintings I, (1982, Stichting Foundation/ Rembrandt Research 
Project) pg. 59 
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The above quotation is taken from an article by the RRP on the unfinished 
painting, Self-Portrait from 1642 in the Royal Collection. The self-portrait 
was originally derived from another painting which Rembrandt began and 
then abandoned but which was later updated and thus `finished'. The RRP 
have argued that such alterations provide further evidence of the work's 
originality since "traces of other paintings are found in approximately one 
third of Rembrandt's accepted self-portraits. "a6' 
This brief sketch of some of the working methods of the RRP 
leads me onto a more detailed description of how they conduct the process 
of differentiation and attribution. I propose that this process demonstrates 
a systems principle - namely that of representation; and more specifically 
distributed representation. But before I present this account in Systems- 
Thinking terms I first will outline in further detail the most relevant 
features of the working methods of the RRP. 
The working method of the Rembrandt Research Project is based 
upon thorough empirical research supported by technical and scientific 
methods of material analysis. In doing so the RRP thus return to the 
materiality of the art object as the central focus for their interpretive 
method. The technical means that the Rembrandt Research Project have at 
their disposal to facilitate the process of attribution include: 
dendrochonology (which is the dating of the wood of support on painted 
panels); x-ray imaging (to see earlier versions of the image including pencil 
sketching and so-forth); infra-red photography; microscopy (to identify 
461 van de Wetering & Broekhoff, `New Directions in the Rembrandt Research 
Project, Part I: the 1642 Self-Portrait in the Royal Collection. ' Burlington Magazine, 
vol. 138 (1), (1996) pg. 174-180 
micro-details of the support); and autoradiography (in which a beam of 
neutrons is fired at the painting to help identify aspects of the layers of 
paint. ) The rationale behind this was to seek to establish grounds for 
authenticity on material terms. 
However although the project went to great lengths to provide 
rigorous empirical evidence for their attribution ultimately, the process of 
differentiation was not a purely technical one. Whilst the description of the 
paintings was primarily grounded in purely materialist terms (in terms of 
paint, canvas, frame etc. ) which was practiced as being the most basic and 
fundamental act of investigation and differentiation this was, in turn, 
mediated by the interpretative act of art historical representation. It is a 
notable feature of the Rembrandt Research Project that it is composed not 
of scientists but of Art Historians. Therefore, as expressed by members of 
the RRP the interpretative act of historical evaluation does takes 
precedence over pure material empiricism: 
Apart from elementary information on the materials used, we have 
not attempted a systematic study of pigments, media, drying agents, 
dilutants etc; such studies may yield further specific technical 
information as analytical methods become more refined, though it 
remains to be seen whether the results will help solve problems of 
attribution. We have, rather, selected such information as can 
clarify the stratified structure of the painting as it results from the 
actual painting procedure. 62 
This refusal to rely upon purely technical data in the identification 
of the works was to allow for the foregrounding of particular interpretative 
reasons of attribution based on stylistic and qualitative evaluations on the 
part of the art historians. 
462 Rembrandt Research Project, A Corpus of Rembrandt , gs 
I, (1982, Stichtrog 
Foundation/ Rembrandt Research Project) pg. xi 
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The difference between a purely materialist and an art historical 
investigation and historical reconstruction is, according to the RRP: 
Provided by the differences in the sort of questions asked and the 
working method adopted by a scientist and an art historian, even 
when they approach the work of art as a shared object of study. 
Each is conditioned by the traditions of his own discipline. Without 
being unfair to either, we might perhaps say that the scientist 
arrives at his interpretation from relatively fragmentary and, of 
itself, unstructured information relating to the physical make-up of 
the work of art, while the art historian is concerned mainly with the 
stylistic interpretation of the picture and its execution. Their 
common frame of reference ought to be an understanding based 
on source studies, of the craft that governed artistic practice 4G3 
It was also noted by the authors of the project that materialist accounts of 
the work in terms of attribution had already been well developed in 
Rembrandt studies, but that this was limited in so far as: "this is only 
seldom clearly related to what the art historian is seeking. ""' What the Art 
Historian is seeking, in this case, is the process of historical reconstruction. 
Thus the attribution of works to the Rembrandt corpus requires the 
interpretative act of the art historian (or historians in this case) to establish 
a coherency between works beyond that of mere materiality. This 
coherency can be identified as an organising principle in the systems of 
both the Rembrandt Corpus and larger Art Historical systems (such as art 
historical discourse, or the gallery system, and so forth). These grounds of 
authenticity are based on consistency amongst the accepted pieces of the 
corpus (within the system of Rembrandt). And if anything doesn't 
correspond to the organising principles then it is be deemed as inauthentic 
463 Rembrandt Research Project, A Corpus of Rembrandt Paintings I, (1982, Stichting 
Foundation/ Rembrandt Research Project) pg. xii 
464 Rembrandt Research Project, A Corpus of Rembrandt Paintings I, (1982, Stichting 
Foundation/ Rembrandt Research Project) pg. xii 
- 332 - 
and hence not a 'Rembrandt. ' This coherency is, in turn, achieved through 
the act of historical interpretation which thus requires the imposition of a 
narrative between the work and the 'Rembrandt' corpus. I propose that 
this narrative can be seen, from a systems-theoretical perspective, as a 
observation system which thus observes, represents and hence 
differentiates some works as belonging to the Rembrandt oeuvre and 
others as not; it does so around the organising principle of painting: that look 
like Rembrandts. 
As it can safely be assumed that Rembrandt and his shop assistants 
used the same materials and procedures, it was inevitable that the 
Members of the Rembrandt Research Project, like their 
predecessors, had to rely on connoisseurship in their attempt to 
distinguish autograph from workshop productions. "s 
Thus, in the attribution of identity the project invoked the working method 
of Morelli466 who claimed that a process of attribution should be informed 
by the connoisseur's eye which was tuned to the smallest details of the 
work. In doing so the connoisseur would be able to identify the involuntary 
stylistic ticks and unconscious habits of the painter's style in otherwise 
similar paintings. In the case of Rembrandt however the analysis of 
attribution of works via brushstrokes was considered insufficient by the 
members of the RRP. This was for two reasons. 
465 van de Wetering & Broekhoff, `New Directions in the Rembrandt Research 
Project, Part I: the 1642 Self-Portrait in the Royal Collection. ' Burlington Magazine, 
vol. 138 (1), (1996) pg. 174-180 
466 See, Italian Painters, in which Morelli, in the narrative guise of an elderly Italian 
traveller whom the author meets relates his thesis on the nature of a correct art 
historical method founded upon close attention to detail and informed 
connoisseurship. "A true knowledge of art is only to attained by a continuous and 
untiring study of form and technique, that no one should venture into the domain 
of the history of art without first being an art connoisseur. " From Morelli, Italian 
Painters, excerpted in Fernie (ed), Art History and its Methods, (Phaidon, 1995) pg. 
110 
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1- Unlike the art of the Renaissance, which Morelli concentrated on, 
Rembrandt did often not work on the incidental details of his paintings but 
instead left such matters to be completed by his studio. 
2- Rembrandt's brushwork was (and still is) highly distinctive. For this 
reason it is one of the characteristics of his art that was most appropriated 
by students and members of the studio, copied by contemporaries and 
those whom he influenced and parodied by forgers. This makes subsequent 
attributions based on attributes of his handling of pens and brushes highly 
problematic. 
It was because of the problems in using techniques of the artists 
hand, such as brushstrokes, that the Rembrandt Research Project required 
a different conceptual organising principle by which to differentiate the 
paintings that looked like Rembrandt from other works of art. In doing so they 
turned, ultimately, to questions of `Style. ' This was complicated procedure 
because the Rembrandt Corpus had become locked-in around the style of 
Rembrandt; hence the need for the project's work in first instance 467 
In summary of the above it is stated that the working method of 
the Project was an intricate process of differentiating those paintings from 
467'The process of illegitimate accretion to the oeuvre, which took place in the 
18th and even as early as the 17thcentury, can be glimpsed from the prints put out 
in those years and purporting to reproduce paintings by Rembrandt. When John 
Smith published the first catalogue of the paintings, in 1836, his work inevitably 
reflected a corrupted tradition and consequently gave a distorted view. Eduard 
Kolloff (1854) and Carel Vosmaer (1868) deserve credit for bringing some kind of 
order into chaos, as Scheltema had done for biography; but it was particularly the 
young Wilhelm Bode who, in the 1880s, produced a corrected image of 
Rembrandt's work, especially that from the early years. ' From: Rembrandt 
Research Project, A Corpus of Rembrandt Paintings I, (1982, Stichting Foundation/ 
Rembrandt Research Project) pg. Ix. Other names which are cited as providing 
the foundations for the body of work accepted as 'Rembrandt' at the time of the 
beginning of the Rembrandt Research Project include: de Groot (1915), 
Sedelmayer (1897-1905), Bauch (1966), Wurzbach (19110, van Dyke (1923). 
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the larger corpus which appeared to be sufficiently 'Rembrandt-esque"8 
and not an attempt to identify a single authorial voice manifest in all of 
them. To the contrary, RRP tried to determine a set of multiple criteria that 
all the works within the oeuvre of `Rembrandt' would display. 
Thus a `Rembrandt' is not defined by virtue of an external 
reference which the work signifies; i. e. Rembrandt the artist. The process 
of attribution and differentiation instead functions according to the 
criterion of internal coherence within the system `Rembrandt'. And it is due 
to this internal coherence that a unity emerges among the works of the 
Rembrandt system regardless of whether they were painted by one artist or 
not. 
Paradoxically the focus on style could also be interpreted as an (if 
only unintentional) return to the author in art history. As Bal has concluded 
on the work of the Rembrandt Research Project: 
True, some Rembrandt critics (the members of the Rembrandt 
Research Project are among them... ), voluntarily question the 
quality of some of the works, and even take pride in their 
demythologising attitude. Yet the very fact that these aesthetic 
criticisms lead to the rejection of the authenticity of the works as 
Rembrandt provides evidence of the basically unchallenged status of 
both author as genius and of aesthetic quality as determinable. 
Hence these acts of judgement rest on the possibility to delimit high 
art from other art. An ever higher purer Rembrandt is thus 
safeguarded. " 
And: 
That many of these works are now in the process of being 
disavowed as part of the Rembrandt does not bother me; it rather 
supports my argument that Rembrandt is a cultural text rather than a 
468 Broos and Alpers have identified that there are three broad types of 
`Rembrandtesque' paintings which show his influence both materially and 
conceptually. Alpers identifies these as: `(1) Study heads taken home by pupils, (2) 
copies after Rembrandt and (3) paintings by the assistants sometimes perhaps 
even signed and sold as Rembrandts. ' See Alpers, Rembrandt's Enterprise, (Thames 
and Hudson, 1988) pg. 125. Broos, `Fame Shared is Fame Doubled, ' in Rembrandt 
Impact o fa Genius, (1983, ), pg. 41 
469 Bal, Reading Rembrandt, (Cambridge University Press, 1994) pg. 7 
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historical reality. Rembrandt constitutes these works and the 
response to them, responses that range from their mistaken 
attribution to attempts to challenge their authenticity on the basis 
of a holistic and elitist concept of authorship. a"o 
However although the RRP take the question of authorship as a 
starting point, their conclusions demonstrate that ultimately rather than 
being defined purely in terms of either materiality, or the individuality of 
the artist Rembrandt is instead a product of the discursive systems of the 
artworld. This highlights the role which these systems play in the processes 
of art historical observation, representation and differentiation. 
2.2 In the Name of Nat Tate 
On March 31S` 1998 a party was held in Jeff Koons' SoHo studio in New 
York. Amongst the art dealers, writers, agents and other usual figures who 
attend such events were several high profile guests including the artists 
Julian Schnabel and Frank Stella, the author Paul Auster and David Bowie. 
The party had been arranged by Bowie's publishing company (21 
Publishing) to celebrate the publication of William Boyd's biography of Nat 
Tate, an `American Artist' who had died in 1960. Bowie read several 
extracts from the book to the audience. Boyd's book provided a brief 
biographical sketch of this would-be mythical figure from the history of 
American Modem art. The story was illustrated by photographic images of 
the time, some documenting Tate and others key figures from the story, 
and three of Tate's own works. The works reproduced showed two 
drawings from Tate's series of over 200 images said to be inspired by Hart 
Crane's epic poem, The Bridge. The third image was an abstract oil painting 
470 Ba!, Reading Rembrandt, (Cambridge University Press, 1994) pg. 8 
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called Portrait of Y, reputed to have been painted in 1958 in a drunken 
frenzy; the style appeared to be reminiscent of Abstract Expressionism, 
although in the text the work was referred to as Abstract Impressionism. 47 
Nat Tate the man, however, never existed. The whole event had 
been part of an intended joke to play on the culterati of New York. The 
scheduling of the party on the day before April Fool's Day had been a 
deliberate attempt to place the story in the next mornings papers. The 
intention had been to coax those at the party into claiming to have heard of 
the (fictional) figure of Tate and for the papers to replicate this mistake the 
following morning. Karen Wright, a co-publisher of the book said: 
Part of it was we were very amused that people kept saying, "yes 
I've heard of him". There was a willingness not to appear foolish. 
No one wants to admit that they've never heard of him. But critics 
are too proud to admit that. 4'2 
However, as The Times reporter in New York related the joke fell a little 
flat: 
But the hoax did not come off. The party went with a swing, but 
not one word appeared in any of the newspapers the following day. 
Or even the day after. Clearly, no-one had taken it seriously. 
Reports have now filtered through from London to the effect that 
The Independent carried a front-page story about how the novelist 
"fooled the US art world". The Evening Standard followed suit. 
But the question everyone here is asking is: What Hoax? 473 
The Independent was indeed the first paper to break the story a week late on 
April 7th, although The Telegraph had serialised some of Boyd's book the 
471 Abstract Impressionism was the description which Elaine de Kooning had used to 
describe the early colourful painterly abstraction of Phillip Guston. See Elaine de 
Kooning, `Subject; What, How or Who? ' Artnews (April 1955); cited in Sandler, 
The New York School (Harper and Row, 1978) pg. 55 
472 David Lister, `How a British Novelist Fooled the US Art World, ' Independent, 
(April 7th, 1998), pg. 15,16 
473 Tunku Varadarajan, British joke Falls Flat in New York, ' The Times, (April 8th, 
1998), pg. 11 
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previous week. This was followed up two days later with another story 
under the congratulatory headline: `London Partygoers Revel in Hoax that 
took in New York's Smartesti474 under which it was reported that, `one 
branch of Waterstone's bookshop reported yesterday that it had had 
numerous requests for the "book about the American artist written about 
in The Independent. "'475 
All things considered the joke of Nat Tate appears not to have 
fooled a gullible artworld into believing in the existence of an artist who 
never lived. But, equally, neither did it appear to be a totally incredulous 
story. There was something about Nat Tate that did seem at least in some 
sense plausible. One only needs to compare his story with that of the real- 
life `lost' Abstract Expressionist John Schueler, a painter under the tutelage 
of Reinhardt, Rothko and Guston, who was also a jazz musician and who 
was described in the very recent catalogue of his first one man show in the 
UK (2003) as: 
A well established member of the younger generation of the New 
York School by the time Leo Castelli, an influential art dealer, 
opened his first gallery with a Schueler exhibition in 1957. The 
authors of the catalogue even go on to say that had Schueler stayed 
in New York, his career would have progressed in step with his 
more famous friends. 476 
Scheuler instead chose to move to Mallaig and obscurity on the west coast 
of Scotland meaning that his work, like that of Nat Tate, drifted out of the 
systems of Art History. 
474 David lister, `London Partygoers Revel in Hoax that took in New York's 
Smartest, ' The Independent, (April 9th, 1998) 
ass David Lister, `London Partygoers Revel in Hoax that took in New York's 
Smartest, ' Independent, (April 9th, 1998) 
476 To the North: Paintings by John Schueler, Brochure to the Exhibition at City Art 
Centre, Edinburgh, (5th July - 27th September, 2003) 
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The life story of Nat Tate used a series of motifs common to the 
typical biographies of Art Historical discourse. They occur with regularity 
within the system(s) of art historical biography and thus become 
representational tropes which constitute and demonstrate a systems 
principle. In other words such narrative tropes are organising principles 
around which the systems of biographical Art History writing are `locked- 
in., 
What follows are six such principles to be found in the narrative of 
Nat Tate's life. It is easy to illustrate how typical these principles are to art 
historical biographies in general. This is illustrated by the fact that some of 
these six principles are also applicable to the real-life figure of Schueler 
(with the exception of Schueler dying early and being an orphan. ) 
1. Firstly Nat Tate was a solitary figure who, like Van Gogh or Rembrandt 
did not receive the fame which he deserved in his own lifetime heightening 
the tragedy of his story. 
2. Secondly he was firmly embedded in the art world milieu of the Abstract 
Expressionists, supposedly having been tutored by Hoffman, written about 
by Greenberg (who called his work `promising, oddly disturbing... '), slept 
with by Peggy Guggenheim and befriended by Jackson Pollock. He was 
thus a suitable candidate to bask, posthumously, in their reflected glory. 
3. Thirdly, like Jackson Pollock, Tate was the existential hero of his own 
drama who was tortured by the twin torments of his genius and his 
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alcoholism. One only needs to see Ed Harris' hagiographic film Pollock 
(2001) to see how pervasive this notion is. 
4. Fourthly he witnessed a moment of artistic epiphany. In 1959 Tate was 
said to have visited Braque in Normandy. A photograph in the book 
corroborated this meeting at which Tate was reported to have seen Braque 
reworking a much older canvas. It was this, Boyd reports, which lead him 
to his final artistic statements by attempting to radically rework all the 
previous work which he could get his hands on: 
Throughout December 1959 it is clear that Nat Tate tried to buy 
back or asked to be allowed to "rework" as many as possible of his 
paintings as were in public hands. There is no reason to doubt that 
he was sincere in this regard, that it was not, in Mountstuart's 
words, "little short of theft". Nat Tate had seen Braque at work, 
had witnessed his tireless and dogged perfection at first hand, and it 
is entirely conceivable he was inspired by Braque's example. In any 
event, he locked himself away in his Windrose studio and worked 
uninterrupted through the holiday season and into the early days of 
1960 47 
Tate's reworking of his art actually meant the destruction of his paintings; 
and this suggests a fifth narrative trope at work in the story of Nat Tate. 
5. Conveniently practically none of Tate's work was left after his suicide. 
The story of Tate as an heroic, `lost' artist is undoubtedly helped by this as 
there was very little material evidence that could have been used as 
evidence to disprove his `genius'. This was a trick of artistic re-invention 
which can be seen in the oeuvres of Malevich and Hans Hoffman whose 
reputations benefited from being their early work having been fortuitously 
477 Boyd, Nat Tate An American Artist 1928-1960, (21 Publishing Limited, 1998), 
pg. 56 
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destroyed478 and their subsequent reputations having been generated in the 
absence of paintings dating prior to the mature phases of their work. 
6. Tate had taken his own life by leaping from the Staten Island Ferry in 
New York on January 12th, 1960. This motif of the suicidal artist can be 
seen in the lives of Gorky and Rothko and has a specific narrative similarity 
to the poet Hart Crane's drowning after jumping off a steamboat in the 
Caribbean in 1932. That Tate was an orphan who was only 32 years old 
when he died only serves to heighten this tragedy. 
Yet despite displaying all of the above persuasive and convincing 
biographical characteristics, Nat Tate never gained credibility. However, 
that the fact that Tate did not exist as a `real-life' person was not the reason 
that his story lacked plausibility. Rather it was because his story never 
gained the required credibility within the systems of art history. His story 
was never convincing enough for him to `exist'. 
The third and final example of authorship within the discursive 
systems of the art world will demonstrate what this credibility entails. As 
will be shown, the artist can indeed have a historical `existence' in the 
systems of art discourse. 
The example of the Artist Hank Heron demonstrates once more 
that the discursive systems of the art world and more specifically the 
system(s) of Art History are best understood as distributed systems of 
representation. In fact it is their distributed nature that makes them robust 
478 This process of artistic re-invention has been revisited at least twice in the last 
forty years by John Baldessari's Cremation Project (in which he burned his 
previous work) and Michael Landy's Breakdown, (2001) 
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enough to sustain themselves in the absence of the artist (as a person who 
lived) without losing the figure of the artist/author around which a body of 
work may be locked-in. 
2.3 In the Name of Hank Heron 
Hank Herron was an artist who never lived. He was written about by a 
critic Cheryl Bernstein who also never lived. But both existed. 
As will become clear from what follows, however, in terms of the 
discursive systems of art both Herron and Bernstein had a particular type 
of existence in the discursive systems of art. For unlike Nat Tate both 
Bernstein and Herron gained enough credibility for the discursive systems 
of the art world479 to `lock-In' around them. They became, like Rembrandt, 
representations within art discourse. 
Both Herron and Bernstein were invented by the Feminist critic 
and author Carol Duncan (with her husband Andrew Duncan) in 1970. In 
her brief written introduction to the anthologised versions of the two 
articles that appeared under Bernstein's name (`The Fake as More' and 
`Performance as News, i48) Duncan explains that Bernstein came about in 
response to the contemporary house style of Artforum which was `widely 
regarded as the most theoretically advanced publication, "" yet which also 
often seemed to sacrifice explanation for erudition in its defence of 
contemporary art. 
479 And by this I mean writing on art to include both art history and art criticism 
both of which form part of a discursive system connected to art (see footnote 444 
above). 
480 Both' he Fake as More, ' and `Performance as News' appear in the anthology 
of Duncan's work; Duncan, TheAestheticr of Power, (Cambridge University Press, 
1993) 
481 Duncan, The Aesthetics of Power, (Cambridge University Press, 1993) 
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Cheryl Bernstein made her first appearance in print as the author of 
the article, `The Fake as More, ' which was a review of the work of the 
unknown but up-and-coming artist Hank Herron. Bernstein described 
Hank Heron as: 
A white, Anglo-Saxon New Englander seeped in modernist art and 
criticism, and making a debut in one of those stylish and expensive 
galleries that could count on critical attention from the high-art 
press. 482 
Herron's work was said to consist of nothing more than the exact 
replication of every art work that Frank Stella had produced up to that 
point in time. Yet the work was completed by Frank Stella over a ten year 
period (from 1961-1971); whereas Heron had taken just a year to complete 
the process of duplication. They were perfect fakes. And all the more 
profound for being so as Bernstein helpfully explained: 
On second viewing, one begins to be more profoundly conscious 
of and receptive to a radically new and philosophical element in the 
work of Mr Herron that is precluded in the work of Mr Stella, i. e., 
the denial of originality, both in its most blatant manifestation (the 
fake as such) and in its subtle, insouciant undertones of static 
objectivity (the telescoping of time. ) ... Mr Herron's art is neither 
deepening nor broadening nor, if anything, joyous. On the 
contrary, it is surface, narrow, and, most especially, tragic, for one is 
forcefully reminded at every line and turn that it represents the 
ontological predicament of our time, indeed of every living being: 
inauthentic experience. They are, in a word, fakes 483 
These appropriations of Stella were the first works on public display by 
Herron. Thus there were no other pieces from his existing `oeuvre' with 
which to compare this work and it was impossible to distinguish the two 
artists. After all, Herron's style was Stella's style alone. In this act of naked 
482 Duncan, The Aesthetics of Power, (Cambridge University Press, 1993) pg. 212 
483 Cheryl Bernstein, 'The Fake as More, ' in Duncan, The Aesthetics of Power, 
(Cambridge University Press, 1993) pg. 216-218 
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appropriation Herron appeared to have taken Stellas famous statement 
`what you see is what you see, ' and purified it by removing all authorial 
connotation. He thereby seemed to have carried out Stella's project more 
successfully than Stella ever could. Stella had attempted artistic non- 
representation484 but had always fallen short due to his own factual 
presence and status. All his works in fact did symbolically refer to 
something beyond themselves: to Stella the artist and to Stella the `oeuvre' 
(just as the proper name Rembrandt does for the Rembrandt system). 
Hank Herron's works on the other hand, could not be Stella the 
man because they had supposedly originated from the hand of Herron. 
They were thus free from the symbolic function of representing `Stella' and 
referred instead merely to themselves - they were, when regarded visually, 
truly non-representational. And likewise neither could Heron be considered 
the author of the works as they were on visual terms alone utterly 
indistinguishable from the works by Stella. Herron had added nothing to 
the visual experience, had no creative input, and could not be considered 
the `author' of the patterns in all but the most general sense. It seemed 
therefore that Herron had `out-Stella-ed Stella, ' whose work from the 
1960's was indicative of, according to Leider: 
A cold, smartaleck, humourless, methodicalness that showed up, in 
the paintings he finally exhibited at the Museum of Modem Art in 
1960 like a slap in the face. The Paintings were insufferably 
arrogant. They seemed to reiterate nothing but insultingly simple 
principles that only his paintings, however, seemed to 
understand. 485 
484 For a fuller discussion of Stella and non-representation with reference to the 
concept of Literalism see Philip Leider, `Literalism and Abstraction: Frank Stella's 
Retrospective at the Modern. ' In Frascina & Harris (eds. ), Art in Modern Culture, an 
Anthology of Critical Texts, (Phaidon, 1992) pg. 319-325 
ass Philip Leider, `Literalism and Abstraction: Frank Stella's Retrospective at the 
Modern. ' In Frascina & Harris (eds. ), Art in Modern Culture, an Anthology of Critical 
Texts, (Phaidon, 1992) pg. 322 
Further despite (or maybe even because of) the cool irony of Herron's 
gesture it didn't seem incredible that such an artistic action could have 
taken place. One only needs compare Herron's gesture with that of the 
actual practice of artists such as Mike Bidlo, Malcolm Morley or Sherrie 
Levine all of whom have used a strategy of appropriating images (such as 
Piacasso, Vermeer and Walker Evans) in their work. 48' 
In Herron's case this lack of the actual objects of his work only 
served to heighten the overall credibility of him as a figure, as Duncan 
explained: 
Indeed, so fully theorised was Herron's work, that its physical 
absence from the art world would become a positive asset in the 
elaboration of its meaning. Never at any time would anyone wish to 
see the actual work or even wonder where it could be glimpsed. "' 
Having been written as a parody Bernstein's (or Duncan's? ) article was first 
circulated in photocopy form amongst various people until it came to the 
attention of Gregory Battcock. Battcock included the paper in Idea Art 
which was his collection of articles on conceptual art first published in 
1973. Battcock thereby made a major contribution to the subsequent `lock- 
in' around Bernstein/Herron which ensured their subsequent existence 
within the discursive systems of the art world. 
486 In the thorough discussion of Hank Herron given by Thomas Crow in 'The 
Return of Hank Herron: Simulated Abstraction and the Service Economy of Art, ' 
Crow discusses the resonance between the imagined practice of Herron and the 
actual practice of appropriation artists such as Levine and Sturtevant (and artist 
who actually did copy Stella's paintings, ) in relation to the internal economy of the 
art market in the 1980's. In Crow, Art in the Modern Culture, (Yale University Press, 
1996) 
487 ibid. pg. 212 
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Soon people began to talk about Herron as a if he were a real artist 
(which by now he was, in a certain sense, in the process of becoming. ) The 
systems of discourse were becoming `attracted' (in the sense of an attractor 
within a complex system) to the figures of both Herron and Bernstein who 
became `real' attractors within the complex system of art discourse and its 
subsystems of art criticism and art history. 
In her later commentary on the affair Duncan commented that 
Bernstein had developed an autonomous identity independent of Duncan: 
The concept of authorship has become in any case difficult to 
sustain .... Bernstein said things 
for me that I could not easily say. 
She brought difficult truths to light and then buried them again. 
Certainly she owes much to me, but whatever her debt, her life 
unfolded quite independently of mine. She established her own 
relationships (admittedly, they were one way), entered into the discourse 
of art criticism and helped more than one individual find his or her 
own critical or artistic path... 
On the basis of only two published texts she became a minor 
celebrity, a marginal but significant critical force in the art world, 
and, recently, the object of intense critical study. At present, the 
literature about her stretches several time the total length of her 
collected oeuvre. More interesting than her writing per se is Cheryl 
Bernstein the narrative construct. "' 
In summary of the above: we can see that in the figure of Herron two 
themes of this and the preceding chapter are brought together - the 
dematerialised art work and the dematerialised artist. Yet this did not mean 
that Herron as an historical figure did not exist within the discursive and 
historical representational systems of the art world. This serves to illustrate 
that in ontological terms the figures of both the artist and the critic are like 
that of the artwork itself - namely relative to the representative systems 
which they are both subordinate to and constitutive of. 
488 Duncan, The Aesthetics of Power, (Cambridge University Press, 1993) pg. 211 
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3- 'LOCKED-IN' ART HISTORY 
In concluding I return to the two leading claims of this chapter. 
These are: 
1- Discourse in general displays certain systemic principles and can therefore 
be understood in terms of a systems-thinking approach as a complex 
representational system. 
2- Discourses on art in particular can equally be understood in these terms. 
This is to say that discursive systems are complex systems too; and they will 
therefore display behavioural patterns common to all complex 
representational systems. 
In the above examples this correlation was demonstrated by two 
examples. Firstly it was shown that it was precisely due to their distributed 
nature that the discursive systems of art were robust enough to 
accommodate the absence of the artist as a person who lived. Secondly it 
was shown how these distributed discursive systems could become, like 
other systems, `locked-in' around certain concepts and behavioural 
patterns. In the above examples discursive systems of art had become 
`locked-in' around certain narrative tropes, such as the method of `art 
history of the proper name' or common expectations of typical 
biographical motifs within art history, and also around particular artists, 
such as Rembrandt and Herron (but not Nat Tate). 
Underlying all of these arguments is the claim that by identifying 
discourse on art as a subsystem of the system of art on can then recognise 
its behaviour as isomorphic to other complex systems. More specifically it 
is argued that isomorphic behaviour can be identified across all of the 
complex systems which feature in this thesis. These include: the art 
work/art works; the art gallery/museum; and discourse on art. In fact, even 
my thesis itself constitutes a part of this whole as it operates according to 
the concepts of the discursive systems of art. It too is `locked-in' around 
certain fundamental concepts (namely, art, art history, and systems-theory). 
The recognition of these isomorphisms across the different systems 
of art enables one to map the behavioural of one system onto other 
systems. Thus it is revealed that the isomorphic artistic systems of 
representation, display and preservation of the art world are all locked-in 
around the concept of art. The very ambiguity of the concept of art serves 
to highlight that the processes of representation, differentiation, display 
and preservation take place across the various systems of art. Consequently 
the meanings of the concept of art in the sub-systems of the artwork, the 
gallery and art discourse are systematically related and cannot be 
understood in isolation from one another. "' 
Furthermore Thomas Crow has observed, processes of positive 
feedback and `lock-in' (as observed by W. Brian Arthur at play in particular 
financial markets) are at work in the art market too. Crow wrote: 
While governments and large corporations have plainly acquired a 
stake in contemporary art, the financial risks are miniscule by 
comparison. 
[with for example both the film industry and professional sports, 
both of which, Crow observes, `demand elaborate forms of 
concentration, monopoly and state intervention in order to secure 
the enormous financial commitments involved. Whereas] 
With their low costs of entry and potential for exponential returns, 
the fine arts seem closer in this respect to computer software, our 
era's most potent form of intellectual property. Art seems similarly 
well adapted to a world in which markets are completely 
internationalised, politics are subordinated to them, and economic 
489 In addition these process of differentiation, whilst related to art in the systems 
outline above, are not unique but are also observable across a range of complex 
systems including those studied in biology, physics, economics and cognitive 
science - and so forth. 
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exchanges, unconstrained by time and space, are expressed in 
disembodied, quasi-fictional forms of information transfer. 490 
Curiously, the economy of art is described here by Crow in almost the 
exact same terms in which William Burroughs described the economy of 
the heroin market. This could be taken to mean that art, like heroin, is one 
of the most exemplary expressions of the commodity system. They are 
both `things which don't need any advertising'. 491 Perhaps then positive 
feedback in cultural systems (manifested in cultural and systemic memory, 
in irreversibility and ultimately cultural inertia) can be understood as a type 
of systemic `addiction'. Thus Crow's claim that "The art world's continual 
circulation of information and services has become a primary source of 
profit in itself'492 explains how the economy of the art market has `locked- 
in' around particular cultural paradigms and has become a systems which is 
self-organising and self-perpetuating (which is to say, in systems-theory 
terms, auto-peoetic). Extending this analogy further the other systems of 
the artworld, including art discourse, are not only `locked-in' around art 
they are addicted to it too. 
490 Thomas Crow, The Return of Hank Herron: Simulated Abstraction and the 
Service Economy of Art, ' in Crow, Modern Art in the Common Culture, (Yale 
University Press, 1996) pg. 79 
491 junk is the ideal product ... the ultimate merchandise. No sales talk necessary. 
The client will crawl through a sewer and beg to buy.... The junk merchant does 
not sell his product to the consumer, he sells the consumer to his product. He 
does not improve and simplify his merchandise. He degrades and simplifies the 
client. He pays his staff in junk. Junk yields a basic formula of "evil" virus: "The 
Algebra of Need" The face of "evil" is always the face of total need. A dope fiend 
is a man in total need of dope. Beyond a certain frequency need knows absolutely 
no limit or control. In the words of total need: "Wouldn't you? " Yes you would. 
You would lie, cheat, inform on your friends, steal, do `anything' to satisfy total 
need. Because you would be in a state of total sickness, total possession, and not 
in a position to act in any other way. ' Burroughs, The Naked Lunch, (Flamingo, 
1986) 
492 Thomas Crow, The Return of Hank Herron: Simulated Abstraction and the 
Service Economy of Art, ' in Crow, Modern Art in the Common Culture, (Yale 
University Press, 1996) pg. 82 
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That the discursive systems of art are locked-in or addicted to the 
concept of art is something which has come under scrutiny in the ongoing 
debates concerning visual culture studies and the reconfiguration of art 
historical practice; a debate which is still an unresolved exchange of claim 
and counter-claim and which will not be revisited here. What I will take 
from these ongoing debates however is the non-trivial observation that art 
history requires both a concept of Art and of History in order to function 
in a recognisable form (distinct from other academic disciplines). 
As de Duve has claimed: 
Whatever the history of art - most often indeed the history of 
styles - does, it postulates (when it doesn't simply prejudge) the 
continuity of its substance, the invariance of its concept, the 
permanence of its foundations, and the unity of its limits. You are a 
historian of art and this is why, even though (all things considered) 
you don't know what art is, as far as you are concerned its history 
must be cumulative. Despite changes, even despite revolutions, the 
history of styles, accumulated in the mass of things that humans 
have called art over the course of time, appears to you as a cultural 
heritage. It belongs, you say, to humanity, and this is why your 
discipline is humanist. It is made up of objects but also of relations 
between those objects, ties of filiation, hinges of influence through 
which history obeys its own causality, broken influences and new 
departures through which art renews itself, naked as on the first 
day... As a humanist historian, you redefine this corpus historically: 
it is a patrimony. Its manifest heterogeneity gives way to its 
cumulative continuity, which is grounded on the fact that an 
essence called art maintains itself unchanged through a succession 
of avatars 493 
Finally it should also noted that there is a political dimension to the critique 
of such discursive `lock-in'/'addiction' by couching the arguments in terms 
of cultural inertia as equated with hegemony and power. Donald Preziosi 
has argued that the attractor Art, which I have identified here as a concept 
around which the systems of the artworld are `locked-in', is part of a more 
493 De Duve, `Art was a Proper Name, ' in Kant After Duchamp, (MIT, 1996, ) pg. 8-9 
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general language of dominant cultural forms/norms. It is, in short, part of 
the `Esperanto' of western hegemony and power relations. He stated: 
On a global scale art has come to be a universal method of (re) 
narrativising and (re) centring "history" itself by establishing a 
standard or canon (or medium, or frame) in or against which all 
peoples of all times and all places might be seen together in the 
same epistemological space a9a 
And it is through identifying such hegemony in terms of the 
principles of the Systems-Theoretical perspective that the potential for an 
engagement with such power structures of differentiation and 
representation can be realised with force and with efficacy. 
494 Preziosi, `Collecting/Museums', in ed. Nelson & Shiff, Critical Terms forArt 
History, (University of Chicago, 1996) pg. 289 
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Conclusion 
In this thesis I set myself the task of working within the parameters of a 
particular problematic: that of the uneasy relationship between a discursive 
system and the objects which that system observes. 
More specifically I concerned myself with the particular problem of 
the difficult relationship between Art after Modernism and a discourse 
(namely English language art history) which, as it is commonly practiced, 
remains largely structurally unaltered since its foundations in modern times. 
It is thus, I argued, insufficient in dealing with the ambiguities and 
complexities of post-modem artistic practice. In other words I worked 
from the assumption that art after Modernism challenges us to find new 
critical paradigms by which to account for it. It has been my attempt to 
investigate the Systems Theoretical approach as such a paradigm. 
From a personal perspective this questioning took the form of a 
search for a particular artwork; Robert Smithson's Spiral Jetty. In April 2003 
I visited Utah in order to find Spiral Jetty, document its physical appearance 
and report my observations at a conference at the University of Utah. 491 
This journey was a fitting place for me to finish my studies; for the 
question of finding an appropriate strategy (or system) by which to observe 
the complexities and ambiguities of Robert Smithson's work was what had 
motivated me to begin my post-graduate research in the first place. It had 
seemed to me that to observe such work in traditional art historical terms 
(such as: visual iconography, style, biography and so forth) simplified the 
radical and unstable systemic complexities that were a central feature of the 
work. Likewise I argued that a post-structural analysis, such as that of 
495 Smithson himself had given a presentation at the University of Utah in 1972, 
(to architectural students on his fascination with the allegorical form of the 
architecture at the Hotel Palenque. ) 
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Owens (who is a subtle and sophisticated reader of Smithson), over- 
prioritises a textual understanding of the work and thereby runs the risk of 
negating its multi-sensory and systemic qualities. Thus, my journey across 
the Atlantic and then to the edge of the Salt Lake became an allegory for 
the research and exploration that had brought me to that place. 
Articles in local Utah papers and the New York Times Magazine496 
had reported that the jetty had emerged from the lake once more. The 
pictures were seductive. Since re-appearing the spiral had become covered 
in salt and was now elegantly frosted with an icing of crystals. "' However 
on finally reaching my destination it transpired that the Salt Lake had 
reclaimed the Spiral Jetty once again. Standing on the edge of the Great Salt 
Lake in Utah I looked in vain for it. Throughout the thesis I tried to 
investigate the potential of the systems-theoretical perspective as a new 
discursive system from which to observe, and thus rediscover, Spiral Jetty. 
The process does not end here though. This thesis has two parts; 
both of which can develop and evolve from the outlines presented here. In 
the first half of the thesis, having first introduced the central problem (that 
of observation, ) I outlined some of the conceptual implications of the 
Systems-Theoretical approach to be applied as an art historical strategy. 
The two most striking features of it are, I argue, its contemporaneity and its 
496 Micheal Kimmelman, `Out of the Deep, ' New York Times Magazine, (Sunday, 
Oct. 13th, 2002), pg. 40; Orme, `Utah Excursions: Spiral Jetty Vies With Nature's 
Otherworldly Art on Great Salt Lake, ' The Salt Lake Tribune, (Sun., January 26, 
2003) 
497 This process had already begun as early as 1970 as Phillip Leider noted in his 
account of visiting the site with John Coplans, Nancy Holt and Smithson himself: 
Thick deposits of salt had outlined the piece in white. A completely unexpected 
yellow mineral had appeared, mixing with the rosy water and the salt crystals along 
many edges of the piece. ' In `How I Spent My Summer Vacation; or, Art and 
Politics in Nevada, Berkeley and Utah (Read about it in Artforum! )' Arforum, 
(Sept., 1970) 
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self-reflexivity. This is to say that it is a discursive system which has 
emerged after modernism and one which can observe its own reflections 
and the contingency of those very reflections/observations. It is by virtue 
of these two features that it provides modernist discourses, such as art 
history, with the potential to adapt to contemporary conditions and 
demands; and thus to survive. In the second half of the thesis I explored 
the implications of this adaptation by observing the following issues from 
the systems-theoretical perspective: the work of art, the gallery system, and, 
finally, the discursive systems of art history. In the final chapter (directly 
preceding this conclusion) I demonstrated the use of the systems- 
theoretical perspective as a means for discursive self reflection (a theme 
which runs throughout the entire thesis. ) 
But a number of questions remain unanswered. And this thesis is 
not an attempt to restore a theoretical hygiene to a discipline which might 
retain its vibrancy and creativity though being chaotically resistant to 
instrumental reason. I see it rather as a prolegomena to future research on 
the collaborative potential which can be realised when art history looks 
beyond its territorial restrictions (or to the environment within which its 
system operates. ) Topics to be investigated in more detail include: 
1-A more thorough analysis of artistic and critical practice which actively 
engages with the vocabularies and methods of systems-thinking. I am 
thinking here of artists such as Burnhman, Haacke, Sol-Lewitt, Alloway, 
Bochner and Smithson (amongst others. ) 
2- Looking to systems-theoretical perspective as a means by which to re- 
engage in the question of aesthetics in post-modem artistic practice 
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Spiral Jetty taken by Space Imaging's IKONOS satellite, 2003 
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Spiral Jetty, 2003, Picture by Author 
(something that is often lost in the move away from the visual as the move 
away from Modernist artistic practice is often understood) 
3-A thorough application of Luhmann's thought to an analysis of art and 
art history in the English language; in particular his reconfiguration of 
modernist self-reflexivity498 from a systems-theoretical perspective and the 
implications for this on discursive self-reflexivity in general (and Art 
Historical self-reflection specifically. ) 
In conclusion Systems-Theory provides the means for an expanded 
sociology of art and art history in terms of system, environment, 
communication and control. Its most radical claim is that it can account for 
both itself and the objects which it observes in the same terms. However it 
has not been my intention to use these observations to (in the warning 
words of T J. Clarke) diversify or disintegrate the systems of Art History, 499 
and hence stifle politicised commentary. Rather, I see this incomplete 
project as an opportunity for Art History to rediscover its significance and 
its efficacy. And to do so without returning to business as usual. In theory 
at least. 
498 This project would include a analysis of Luhmann's work in relation to Hegel (and 
discursive systems, ) Habermas (and Modernity) and Husserl, (and the 
phenomenological project observed from systems-theory. ) 
99 See, TJ Clarke, 'The Conditions of Artistic Creation, ' in Fernie (ed., ) Art History 
and its Methods, (Phaidon, 1995) 
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